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This thesis explores differences in response style between left- and right-handed 
individuals. Evolutionary and comparative backgrounds suggest that we should 
expect left- and right-handers to show differential responses in some similar 
situations and for the behaviour of left-handers to be adaptive and not necessarily 
pathological. Exploration of genetics, pathology and culture show that hand 
preference is best understood in terms of a genetic susceptibility modulated by 
experience. Consideration of how to measure and categorise handedness revealed 
that there is no universally accepted method and so a new inventory was developed, 
utilising the main accepted measuring scales (Annett, 1970; Oldfield, 1971 and 
Peters, 1998). A series of experiments was conducted in order to explore the 
potential differences in response style. Chapter 4 looked at response to a novel task: 
the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi and found that left-handers took significantly longer to start 
the task and solved it in significantly fewer moves than right-handers.  In Chapter 5, 
the role of emotional processing was explored and it was found that both left- and 
right-handers showed broadly similar identification of facial emotions, although there 
were some sex and valence effects. This suggests that the differences in response 
style were probably not caused by differential lateralised emotional processing (and 
negative emotional ‘interference’) differences. Chapter 6 investigated the role of 
planning and type of task and found that in common with the findings of Chapter 4 
when completing a manual sorting task there was a handedness effect, with right-
handers showing a significantly quicker latency to start the task. However, spatial 
tasks showed mixed effects and sequencing tasks showed no significant differences. 
It was hypothesised that novelty of task might be the cause and this was further 
explored in Chapter 7. This chapter looked at the influence of stress and anxiety as 
well as the role of novelty. A further study using the Tower of Hanoi showed a similar 
but non-significant first move difference on a ‘simple’ version (3-disk) of the task but 
not the more complex (4-disk) version. However, state anxiety (Speilberger, 1983) 
was found to be significantly higher for left-handers on the simple task (when it was 
novel) but not for the 4-disk and non-novel versions. This suggests that task 
complexity and novelty may be important factors in understanding differences in 
response style between left- and right-handers. These findings are discussed in 
terms of the literature and suggestions are made for future studies. 
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Chapter 1 : Laterality and the evolution of handedness 
1.0. Aims of the thesis 
One of the most overt forms of lateralisation is handedness.  Handedness has been 
tested widely in both humans and animals and a variety of similarities and differences 
have been reported between left- and right-handers (these will be discussed 
throughout the thesis).  One key study central to this thesis concerns differences in 
response styles between left- and right-handed monkeys. Cameron and Rogers 
(1999) reported that left-handed marmosets took significantly longer to approach a 
novel object than right-handed marmosets.  This pattern was also found in 
chimpanzees (Hopkins & Bennett, 1994).  These findings suggest that there are 
fundamental differences shown in the way that these primates interact with the world 
that are related to handedness.  However, very few human studies have reported 
differences between left- and right-handers’ behaviour and their interaction with the 
world.  Therefore this thesis will investigate the response styles of human left- and 
right-handers towards a variety of different novel tasks.  Possible underlying cognitive 
and behavioural differences will be investigated. 
1.1. Handedness 
Around 10% of the human population are right-handed (e.g. Annett, 1985) although 
this figure is now often quoted to be as high as 14% in many cases because the 
intolerance of left-handedness in society has greatly subsided in recent years (Coren, 
1992). There is much debate on how handedness should be defined and measured 
however most people still define themselves as either left-handed or right-handed 
(Provins, 1997).  Men and younger people are reported to have higher levels of non-
right-handedness (Amunts, Jäncke, Mohlberg, Steinmetz & Zillies, 2000) and around 
33% of the population exhibit some form of mixed-handedness (a mixture of 
preferences between the left and right hand for performing a number of actions rather 
than ambidexterity where a person can perform actions equally well with either 
hand). Consistent right-handedness and consistent left-handedness is estimated to 
be around 64% and 4% respectively (Amunts et al., 2000).    
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However, humans appear to be unique in this trait, as comparative research shows 
that this preference differs vastly in primates.  Indeed, Lehman (1993) argues that 
monkeys, apes and prosimians show very little bias towards either left- or right-
handedness.  It has been argued that handedness in great apes would allow us to 
gain a valuable insight in to the evolution of human handedness but there is much 
debate about whether handedness and more specifically a population bias towards 
right- or left-handedness actually exists in this group.   
The origins of and the proposed reasons for human handedness (especially a bias 
towards the right hand) have often been debated. It is often assumed that 
handedness is solely a human trait and the argument resides over whether 
handedness is genetic or whether it is learned through environmental influences (see 
chapter 2 for details of these arguments). However, in order to explore the 
evolutionary issues of handedness further we have to look back to our closest 
relatives, the apes, and evaluate their laterality and handedness patterns. 
1.2. Comparative lateralisation in primates and other animals 
1.2.1. Primates 
The existence of primate handedness has been debated for a long time.  If 
handedness and laterality evolved a long time ago then we should look for signs of it 
in our closest evolutionary relative, the chimpanzee (they share around 99% of their 
genetic make-up with humans, (Corballis, 1991)). It is often supposed that if human 
handedness is similar to that of primates then it is probably inherited along with some 
subtle environmental influences (primate handedness would not have been subjected 
to educational or social influences that could have influenced their handedness) 
(Harris, 1993).  Non-human primates (particularly chimpanzees) are not only similar 
to humans genetically but also anatomically and physiologically (Vauclair, Fagot & 
Depy, 1999).  Chimpanzees also have similar motor and perceptual processing to 
humans (Vauclair et al., 1999).  Thus, it is important to examine animal models of 
behaviour in order to be able to understand similar human processes and thus it is 
important to study animal handedness (and more specifically non-human primate 
handedness) in order to compare human handedness.  However, there is support for 
the existence of lateralisation in a number of animals other than primates and some 
of these examples will be discussed later. 
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It is generally accepted that apes and monkeys show some form of handedness but 
the question of handedness being species specific is debated (MacNeilage, Studdart-
Kennedy & Lindblom, 1987).  MacNeilage et al. (1987) add that although population 
level asymmetries appear to exist in non-human primates, that the demand of the 
specific task can have an effect on hand preference.  Ward, Milliken and Stafford 
(1993) report that lower primates (such as lemurs) appear to hold food with their left 
hands but hold and swing on tree branches using their right hands.  This suggests 
that they have more strength in their right hands but does not indicate whether the 
hand used to hold the food is also used to manipulate it.  It is also unclear which 
hand Ward et al. are suggesting is more skilled.  Westergaard and Suomi (1996) 
reported that rhesus macaques showed a right hand preference for the manipulation 
of tools but they did not find this effect in capuchin monkeys.  However, capuchin 
monkeys showed more definite hand preferences as individuals than the rhesus 
macaques did and this was the case particularly among adult primates.  MacNeilage 
et al. (1987) backed up this finding by suggesting that many primates (particularly 
apes) use their right hands for manipulating objects and to perform fine motor skills.  
Hopkins (e.g. 1994; 1999) has researched laterality in chimpanzees for a number of 
years and reports that chimpanzees as a population group have a right hand bias.  
He classifies handedness using a frequency system.  In order to do this he observes 
and calculates the number of times a chimpanzee uses each hand to perform a 
series of actions.  However, calculating only the frequency of hand preference has 
been criticized by some researchers (e.g. Marchant & McGrew, 1996).  Therefore, 
Hopkins, Cantalupo, Freeman, Russell, Kachin and Nelson (2005) examined 
chimpanzee handedness using a series of different measurements including bouts of 
handedness as well as frequency measures and also examining handedness using 
both continuous and categorical scales of measurement.  Hopkins et al. found that 
when different scales of measurement were used that a population level bias of right-
handedness still existed among chimpanzees.   
Other studies have reported that handedness exists at the population level in a 
number of non-human primates.  The most widely researched groups are 
chimpanzees but a number of studies evaluating the hand preferences of, among 
other primates, gorillas and orang-utans have also been carried out.  Colell, Segarra, 
& Sabater-Pi (1995) reported that chimpanzees displayed a right hand preference for 
a number of activities including object manipulation and reaching.  Bard, Hopkins and 
Fort (1990) reported that chimpanzees mainly showed right hand preferences and 
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these preferences became stronger as the chimpanzee got older.  Lutz-Maki and 
MacNeilage (1991) reported that 77% of their chimpanzee sample exhibited right 
hand preferences (however the group only consisted of 13 animals where 2 of the 
others exhibited left hand preferences and the other exhibited no preference at all).  It 
appears that a substantial body of evidence exists in favour of a right hand 
population bias among chimpanzees however, a number of researchers have failed 
to find an existing right hand bias.  Palmer (2002) questioned Hopkins’ findings and 
reanalysed Hopkins’ data (along with data from a number of other studies) and 
reported that there were unusual patterns in the data and that the validity of the 
findings could be questioned.  Palmer concluded that there was no concrete 
evidence of right-handedness at the population level among chimpanzees.  Palmer 
proposed that the problem lay with the distribution of hand preference among the 
chimpanzees and the number of observations made.  He found that hand preference 
became more ambiguous as the number of observations increased, that is as the 
sample size increased and the number of times each individual was observed 
performing specific actions the more mixed the hand preference became (often with 
almost equal numbers of left and right hand actions).   Boesch (1991) reported that 
there was no population asymmetry in reaching or grooming in chimpanzees.  
Dimond and Harries (1984) reported that there was no population asymmetry in a 
group of chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans and McGrew and Marchant (1997) 
reported that there was no evidence of right-handedness at a population level among 
chimpanzees.  According to Boesch (1991) an important factor that has to be taken 
in to account when considering hand preference in chimpanzees is age.  Boesch 
reported that right hand preference was higher amongst younger chimpanzees than it 
was in adults.  However, Byrne and Byrne (1991) countered this by reporting that 
there was no effect of age on hand preference in apes and more specifically in 
gorillas.  This conflicts with the previous findings of Bard et al. (1990) who stated that 
there was a right hand bias among chimpanzees and that this preference got 
stronger as the chimpanzee got older. 
Hopkins et al. (2005) challenged the findings of Palmer (2002) and in particular the 
point that handedness became more ambiguous as the number of observations and 
sample size increased.  Hopkins reported that his sample consisted of three sub 
samples of which he had combined the data and thus each group in itself displayed a 
population level right hand preference before being merged.  However, the choice of 
analysis carried out by Palmer (funnel analysis) lost this effect and thus he concluded 
that there was no right hand bias among the group.  Hopkins et al. (2005) add that 
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sensitive and reliable measures of hand preference have to be used in order to pick 
up effects and if these are used then most individuals will show nearly exclusive left 
or right preferences for individual actions.  
The findings for gorillas have been a little more consistent in that many studies report 
that there is a lack of a population bias of handedness among this group.  Annett and 
Annett (1991) reported that there was an even distribution of left-handed and right-
handed reaching in gorillas.  Byrne and Byrne (1991) studied a group of gorillas in 
the wild and found that there was no population asymmetry overall but there was a 
slight trend towards right-handedness for action movement (for example they 
reported that around two-thirds of gorilla preferred the right hand for preparing 
vegetables to eat). They also reported that there was no bias at all for foraging 
behaviour.  Shafer (1988) examined handedness in groups of gorillas in the wild and 
in groups of captive gorillas (which were zoo born) and found that there was only a 
population asymmetry towards right-handedness in the group that was zoo born (16 
right-handed gorillas compared to 2 left-handed gorillas).  The group of wild gorillas 
did not show a population level asymmetry as 8 of the gorillas were left-handed and 9 
were right-handed. Thus it appears that overall right-handedness is more common 
than left-handedness among gorillas but not significantly so that it can be regarded 
as dominant within the gorilla population.  Also, it has to be taken in to account, as 
can be seen from Shafer’s (1988) study, that the habitat of the primate might also be 
important as many of the findings that have reported existing population level 
asymmetries have all involved captive primates.  From this is might be presumed that 
the importance of the findings with captive primates is that they often imitate their 
caregivers and therefore a bias in their hand preferences is likely. 
One problem with researching handedness in non-human primates is that the groups 
that conclusions are drawn from are often very small and therefore it is difficult in 
many cases to make valid claims.  For example, Bresard and Bresson (1983) 
reported that chimpanzees and orang-utans exhibit a right-hand preference over a 
series of manipulation tasks.  However, the study only consists of 1 chimpanzee and 
1 orang-utan and therefore the results are lacking in power and validity.  Similarly, 
Cunningham, Forsythe and Ward (1989) reported that orang-utans demonstrated a 
right hand preference for reaching and object manipulation but a left hand preference 
for touching their bodies.  However, the sample again only consisted of a single 
orang-utan and thus the validity of making such claims is weak.   
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In summary, there have been several problems with acceptance of the position of a 
dominant hand preference in the chimpanzee population.  Palmer (2002) argued that 
there are sampling biases in the data and therefore any evidence of population 
handedness is weak.  McGrew and Marchant (1997) added that Hopkins’ data is 
collected using captive chimpanzees and therefore assumptions cannot be made to 
the population in general.  McGrew and Marchant (2001) argue that apes reared in 
captivity are influenced by the humans around them and in many cases they will 
develop a right hand preference through social learning.    However, Hopkins and 
Cantalupo (2005) add that there is no evidence that states that hand preference 
differs between groups of wild chimpanzees compared to those who are raised in 
captivity.  Hopkins and Cantalupo compared five different hand preference 
behaviours (scratching, grooming, eating, picking things up and holding) in captive 
and wild chimpanzees using data from a number of previous studies (see Hopkins & 
Cantalupo, 2005 for details of these). They reported that there were no large 
differences between the hand preference behaviours of the captive groups and the 
wild groups for any of the behaviours except for ‘holding’.  They also reported that 
there was a high incidence of ambiguous hand preference in both the captive and the 
wild chimpanzee groups.     Groups of captive chimpanzees are often larger than 
groups of wild chimpanzees and thus the numbers of right-handed chimpanzees are 
often cited as being higher in the captive group (Hopkins & Cantalupo, 2005).  
However, when these numbers are transformed into ratios the split of left- and right-
hand preferences are similar between the captive and wild groups (often cited as 2:1 
in favour of a right hand preference).  Marchant and McGrew (1996) reported that 
there is no population level handedness among wild chimpanzees. However, this 
conclusion was reported using only two studies of chimpanzees and there was much 
debate on whether a sensitive enough measure of hand preference was used.  
Hopkins and Cantalupo (2005) state that in order to be able to directly compare the 
hand preferences of groups of wild and captive chimpanzees a similar measurement 
of handedness must be used which is sensitive enough but also which is flexible 
enough to accommodate differences in context between the two groups.   
An additional factor which has to be taken in to consideration when examining hand 
preference is whether the behaviour is unimanual or bimanual (whether the individual 
uses one hand to perform the action or two, see Chapter 3 for further discussion).  It 
is often debated which hand is the leading or dominant hand in a number of bimanual 
actions and thus there are often some discrepancies across studies for this reason.  
For example, in the human literature participants are often asked how they sweep 
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with a broom.  Some questionnaires ask which hand is at the top of the broom (e.g. 
Annett, 1970) while others ask which hand is at the bottom of the broom (e.g. 
Raczkowski & Kalat, 1974).   The argument is that the hand at the top of the broom is 
the hand that controls the direction and thus this is regarded as the dominant hand 
(Annett, 1970) however, others regard the hand at the bottom of the broom as the 
dominant hand as that is the one that pushes the broom harder and requires more 
strength (Raczkowski & Kalat, 1974).  In other cases the researcher does not report 
which hand does the holding and which hand manipulates the object (Steiner, 1990).  
Therefore it is important to consider whether a task is unimanual or bimanual in order 
to examine strength of handedness.  Hopkins and Rabinowitz (1997) compared 
unimanual and bimanual strategies using a honey dipping task used to fish for 
termites.  They found that there was population level right-handedness for bimanual 
actions (when holding the stick with two hands) but not for unimanual actions (when 
using a single hand to fish for termites).  MacNeilage et al. (1987) propose that a 
dominant hand preference in non-human primates is most apparent in those who can 
stand bipedally.  MacNeilage et al. propose that non-human primates have a slight 
left hand bias and state that the evolution of bipedalism may have shaped this hand 
preference.  When the animals were quadrapedal then the right front limb was 
probably used for support and the left hand (front limb) used for picking food or 
catching insects.  However, when the animals evolved to be able to stand on two 
legs the right hand possible developed the skill to manipulate and co-ordinate 
objects. 
However, as has been previously mentioned, the type of task that is being carried out 
may play an important part on hand preference (also see Chapter 3).  Westergaard, 
Kuhn, and Suomi (1998) examined hand preference in humans and rhesus monkeys. 
They studied the reaching behaviour of humans and rhesus monkeys from a bipedal 
position (on two legs with both hands free) and also from a quadrapedal position (on 
all four limbs with no hands free).  Westergaard et al. found that the human 
participants exhibited a population-level preference for the right hand regardless of 
their posture. However, rhesus macaques showed a population-level preference for 
the left hand when quadrapedal but they exhibited a shift toward the right hand when 
bipedal. Westergaard et al. reported that there is a correlation between right 
handedness and bipedal reaching and propose that bipedalism may be an attributing 
reason for why there is a species-level of right-handedness in humans. 
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While it is debatable whether animals show an overall population-level handedness 
similar to humans, Fagot and Vauclair (1991) state that it is clear that non-human 
primates exhibit population level handedness for numerous behavioural measures. 
Fagot and Vauclair define handedness as a routine action that is non-specific.  In 
other words, every day actions with which the animal uses their hands to perform.  In 
order to get the most honest handedness measurement from non-human primates 
(such as baboons) Fagot and Vauclair (1988) state that the first few trials on a new 
task are the most important.  
Warren (1980) studied a series of old world monkeys (such as baboons and 
macaques) and described their manual preferences as being divided equally 
between those with a left hand preference and those with a right hand preference.  
He also added that in order to examine hand preference that the task that was used 
to measure the laterality was of vital importance as it could alter preferences 
depending on what it was (for example if it required 2 hands in order to manipulate 
it).  Also, the novelty of the task is also important because an accurate measure of 
hand preference would not necessarily be recorded if the primate was practiced in 
the task thus a naïve primate would give the most accurate data.   
MacNeilage et al. (1987) reported a different set of findings from that of Warren 
(1980).  MacNeilage et al. reported that there was an existing population level of 
asymmetry among various groups of primates.  For example, they reported that 
prosimians (such as lemurs) displayed a left hand preference for actions that were 
visually guided.  This finding is common amongst groups of primates (including apes 
according to MacNeilage et al.).  MacNeilage et al. also reported that monkeys and 
apes appear to have a right hand preference for manipulative tasks or in tasks that 
require both hands the right hand acts as the dominant hand most often.  
MacNeilage et al propose that a left hand population bias is more likely to occur in 
monkeys that are in the field rather than in a laboratory setting and also in tasks that 
are relatively simple (they state that more complex tasks that require more 
manipulation would be more likely to evoke a right hand response).  One final factor 
that MacNeilage et al. propose that could evoke higher left hand responses is if the 
subjects are adults rather than infant primates.  This ties in with the findings of 
Boesch (1991) who stated that right hand preferences are higher amongst infant 
chimps than adults.  Thus, there appears to be some form of decline in right-
handedness among primates, as they get older in some cases.   
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It is relatively easy to measure human handedness once the definition of handedness 
has been established.  If hand preference is being measured then the format is 
usually a handedness questionnaire and if hand skill is being measured then a task is 
performed (usually with both hands one at a time) that will allow the researcher to 
see which hand is more skilled and by how much (for example, Annett’s peg moving 
task, see Chapter 3).  However, the measurement of primate handedness is much 
more difficult.  A non-human primate cannot be presented with a questionnaire and 
asked which hand they use to perform a series of actions.  However, it is easier to 
get a primate to perform on a task that will give an idea of which hand they prefer to 
carry this out with.  One frequently used method of collecting data on non-human 
primate handedness is to get the primate to perform a single task numerous times so 
that numerous observations can be calculated and analysis can be performed.  
Additional methods of collecting handedness data from non-human primates involve 
using a series of different tasks and actions and averaging the responses to these in 
order to calculate hand preference.  These include free field reaching, restricted 
reaching, carrying behaviour, object manipulation, touching the face and/or body and 
feeding (Hopkins, 1995a, b).  The items that are used to assess non-human primate 
handedness are important in order to get accurate measurements. Hopkins and 
Bennett (1994) measured hand preference in a group of chimpanzees using bipedal 
reaching.  Chimpanzees had to reach for a suspended food incentive and the hand 
used to grab the food was recorded over 50 trials.  In order to avoid any from of 
lateral bias the food was placed central to each individual.  However, Marchant and 
McGrew (1991) state that in order to get accurate measurements of hand preference 
that it is not enough just to study the general reaching or touching behaviours of 
primates.  Instead, Marchant and McGrew suggest that actions that require a degree 
of motor skill have to be studied in order to get a true indication of hand preference. 
Arguments are often presented about the classification of handedness in non-human 
primates and at the point at which is hand dominance applied.  Hopkins and Morris 
(1993) use a frequency criterion of 50% where frequencies greater than 50% 
represent a right hand preference, a frequency of 50% represents no preference and 
a frequency of less than 50% represents a left hand preference.  Hopkins and 
Bennett (1994) used a frequency paradigm in order to calculate their handedness 
classifications.  Chimpanzees were classed as right-handed if they bipedally reached 
for food more than 59% of time (over 50 trials).  Chimpanzees who used the right 
hand for reaching less than 41% of the time were considered to be left-handed and 
those who used the right hand more than 40% of the time but less than 60% were 
classed as ambidextrous.   
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Another inconsistency that exists is the definition among non-human primate 
researchers about what ‘no preference’ actually means.  Hopkins and Morris (1993) 
suggest that chimpanzees are classed as having ‘no preference’ when they do not 
show any behaviour on a task or fail to show a significant left or right hand bias on a 
given task.  Hopkins and Morris add that many studies are only interested in the 
subjects that display a left or right hand preference and that those with no preference 
are dropped from the analysis.  However, they state that the results of some of these 
studies would be questioned in terms of their validity, as the claim of a population 
asymmetry without considering those with no preference would be weak. 
Hopkins and Morris (1993) propose that in order to accurately test comparative 
models of handedness, both in humans and non-human primates, a test battery that 
consists of multiple tasks and a solid criterion of handedness would have to be 
established and be able to be applied to all species in order to draw valid and 
comparative conclusions.   
Although many studies have argued for or against the existence of population level 
handedness among non-human primates, most of these studies involve apes rather 
than monkeys.  Because apes are closer ancestors to humans then it is easier to link 
right-hand dominance as the preferred trait in these animals.  However, numerous 
studies have also examined handedness in a variety of species of monkeys and 
mixed results have been reported.  De Sousa, Xavier, De Silva, De Oliveira and 
Yamamoto (2001) reported that there was no population bias for right or left-
handedness amongst a group of marmosets.  Their handedness was measured 
using a food reaching task and was measured over 100 trials per monkey.  Hook-
Costigan and Rogers (1995) examined hand preference using motor tasks in 
common marmosets and reported that although there were individual biases for hand 
preference there was no clear population bias.  Spinozzi and Cacchiarelli (2000) 
studied manual laterality in a group of capuchin monkeys using three reaching and 
discrimination tasks and found that there was a significant left-hand bias at the group 
level for one of the reaching tasks and also for the discrimination task while a right-
hand group level bias was found for the other reaching task (this task involved 
visually guided reaching while the other involved reaching by touch only).  Spinozzi 
and Cacchiarelli concluded that the hand preference can vary according to the type 
task presented and more specifically that both spatial requirements and visual cues 
affected preference in this instance.  It has been proposed that the right hemisphere 
is involved in processing tactile information (e.g. Lacreuse & Fragaszy, 1999) and 
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this therefore supports the left hand group level preference by the capuchin monkeys 
when performing a reaching task by touch only. 
Westergaard (1991) examined the hand preferences of tufted capuchin monkeys and 
lion-tailed macaque’s in tool use and tool manufacture.  He found that a dominant 
hand preference for tool use was found in 4 out of the 5 capuchins and in 3 out of the 
4 macaques 
One factor that has to be taken in to consideration, and it is one that is often 
proposed by McGrew, is that many reports of hand preferences among non-human 
primates are the result of animals held in captivity.  Very few studies report hand 
preferences of non-human primates in the wild and when they do it is often reported 
that there is no population level of hand preference.  Most of the studies reported 
above were carried out in with captive primates and therefore they have to be 
considered with caution.  The direction and strength of hand preference in non-
human primates is considered to be a very sensitive variable and susceptible to 
change.  Fagot and Vauclair (1991) report that, for example, task complexity can 
affect non-human hand preference.  If a complex task involves fine motor skills then it 
is likely that there will be a switch in hand preference or that both hands will be used 
across the task in order to manipulate it successfully.  Another factor according to 
Fagot and Vauclair that can affect hand preference is the novelty of the task.  In the 
same way that complexity has an effect the novelty can also trigger a response of 
uncertainty.  Because the individual does not know how to manipulate a novel object 
or task then a system of trial and error often takes place where different attempts are 
made to effectively solve or manipulate the task.  In doing so it is common for a 
change of hand preference to occur.  Hopkins (1996) however, states that familiar 
tasks often result in a symmetrical distribution of hand preference.  He adds that 
there is a relatively consistent use of one hand for each individual when familiar tasks 
are being carried out. The issue of novelty is further examined by the work of 
Lehman (1980), who studied hand preference in a group of stump-tailed macaque 
monkeys using a simple reaching task.  Lehman studied which hand the monkey 
originally used to reach with and every time the monkey subsequently used that hand 
they did not receive a reward.  However, every time the monkey used their opposite 
hand to reach with they were rewarded.  Lehman found that in spite of the reward 
system that most of the animals continued to use the hand that they had originally 
used (the unrewarded hand).  Lehman concluded by suggesting that monkeys are 
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predisposed to choose which hand they prefer for a new task rather than always 
using the same one.  
Numerous studies of prosimians have proposed that there is a population bias 
towards left-handedness in these animals.  Larson, Dodson and Ward (1989) studied 
a group of 10 bushbabies and found that 7 of them had a left hand preference 
compared to 3 with a right hand preference.  Sanford and Ward (1986) studied 8 
bushbabies and found that all of them were left-handed.  Forsythe and Ward (1987) 
also noted that there was a trend for left-handedness among lemurs.  They studied a 
group of 33 black lemurs and found that 20 of them were left-handed and Masataka 
(1989) studied 22 ring-tailed lemurs and found that 20 of the group were left-handed. 
The biggest study to date of handedness and lemurs was carried out by Ward, 
Milliken, Dodson, Stafford and Wallace (1990) who studied a group of 194 mixed 
species lemurs and found that 47% of the group had a left-hand preference 
compared to 34% preferring the right-hand.  However, another problem that often 
arises is the small sample numbers of the groups.  It is not unusual for conclusions to 
be drawn using a sample size of less than ten in many cases (e.g. Westergaard, 
1991 used 5 capuchins and 4 macaques in his study). 
King (1995) reported that tamarins (Saguinis oedipus) exhibit population level right-
handedness.  However, King (1995) states that marmosets do not exhibit any 
handedness bias at the population level.  Marmosets and tamarins are closely 
related but there appears to be a difference in their population level hand preference. 
King states that reasons for this could range from the difference in their diet or the 
different sized territories that they defend (the territories of tamarins are larger than 
those of marmosets).   
Studies of various species of monkeys have resulted in fluctuating results.  Some 
studies propose that there is a left-handed trend among monkeys (e.g. Fagot & 
Vauclair, 1991; Hatta & Koike, 1991), others propose that there is a right hand 
preference among monkeys (e.g. Westergaard & Suomi, 1996) while other studies 
report that there is no population bias at all (e.g. King, 1995).   
1.2.2. Parrots 
Corballis (1991) stated that handedness is a unique and universal human behaviour 
in relation to primates.  Corballis (1991) proposes that the only animal that appears to 
show any sign of true handedness is the parrot.  He states that parrots use their feet 
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like hands and that most parrots are left footed.  Rogers (1989) reported that only 
around 12% of parrots are right-footed and thus this pattern is the inverse of human 
handedness statistics.  Parrot footedness is measured by examining the claw that is 
used to pick up food from the cage and the non-dominant claw is considered to be 
the one that the parrot is left perching on.  Most parrots use the right hemisphere to 
view the food and manipulate it with the left claw.  It views the food with the eye 
ipsilateral to the foot that they are standing on.  In contrast to the left foot dominance 
of the parrot, Rogers and Workman (1993) reported that chickens show a right foot 
preference.   
 
1.2.3. Chicks 
Extensive studies have been carried out examining lateralisation in chicks.  
Vallortigara, Regolin, Bortolomiol and Tommasi (1996) carried out a study where they 
trained chicks to discriminate between two identical boxes using a pecking 
response– the only difference was that one box was placed on the right and the other 
was placed on the left (and one box contained food).  The chicks were then trained 
using a red box and a green box (where the one on the right contained food).  This 
time there were three conditions. In the first group the position of the boxes were 
alternated randomly, in the second group the position of the boxes did not change at 
all and the third group was a control group who continued to use the two original 
white boxes.  The chicks had to differentiate between the two boxes based solely on 
their positions.  Vallortigara et al. found that chicks took fewer trials during training 
(using the white boxes) to learn when the positive box (the box with food) was placed 
on their right side.  This pattern also occurred when the second phase of training was 
carried out (using the coloured boxes which were not moved) and in the control 
condition.  However, in the alternating condition chicks were trained to learn when 
the positive box (the one with the food in it) was placed on the left hand side.  The 
approach behaviour of these chicks to the food (a positive behaviour) and the box 
being placed on the right hand side further reinforces the approach and positive 
behaviour.  Chicks trained themselves very quickly to identify the pattern of positive 
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1.2.4. Bees 
Evidence exists that laterality is also present in a number of other animals.  Kells and 
Goulson (2001) examined the behaviour of four species of bees (B. lapidarius; B. 
terrestris; B. lucorum and B. pascorum) on a series or flowers arranged in a circle. 
They noted the rotation behaviour of each bee around the flowers over ten trials. 
Kells and Goulson reported that in three of the four species that there was a 
significant overall tendency for the bees to rotate in a preferred direction suggesting 
that this may be linked to handedness.  B. lucorum and B. pascorum displayed a 
significant anticlockwise rotation around the flowers while B. lapidaries displayed a 
significant clockwise rotation around the flowers.  B. terrestris did not display any 
significant direction in rotational behaviour.  Kells and Goulson state that thee 
findings may be linked to handedness in that the bees are choosing one direction 
over the other.  It might be possible to assume that the two species that preferred the 
anticlockwise direction would be exhibiting a right-hand preference and the species 
choosing the clockwise preference would be exhibiting a left-hand preference due to 
the direction that the bee would start from.  However, it could also be possible that 
anticlockwise could refer to the direction that the bee is heading towards (so this 
would be the left in this case).  Kells and Goulson do not clarify which direction would 
be linked to left- and right-handedness respectively and thus in order to draw further 
conclusions this would have to be rectified in order to do this.  
1.2.5. Mice and Rats 
Collins (1985) carried out numerous laterality studies with mice and rats and 
concluded over a series of food reaching tasks that there was no population bias for 
handedness amongst the group.  He found that in every study around 50% of mice or 
rats were right-pawed and the other 50% were left-pawed.  However, Waters and 
Denenberg (1994) disagree with Collin’s findings and report that the task that the 
mice are performing will affect the paw dominance.  They state that a population of 
inbred mice showed a significant right paw preference (61%) on a paw preference 
test (Waters and Denenberg’s 1994 lateral paw preference test) but there was a left 
paw dominance (55%) on a reaching test (using Collin’s 1968 paw preference test).   




Cole (1955) (cited in Pike & Maitland, 1997) reported that cats show a slight bias for 
the left paw over the right paw.  However, Pike and Maitland (1997) studied paw 
preferences for food reaching in around 50 cats living in a household environment.  
They reported that 46% of the cats showed a right paw preference, 44% preferred 
the left paw and 10% used either paw (measurements were taken over a 10 week 
period).  Pike and Maitland also reported that 60% of the sample used the same paw 
100% of the time.  Pike and Maitland conclude that cats show and equal distribution 
of left and right pawedness.  Broadly similar findings were also reported in studies 
conducted by Tan, Yaprak and Kutlu (1990) and Fabre-Thorpe, Fagot, Lorinez, 





Few studies have been carried out on the laterality of dogs.  However, Tan (1987) 
reported that domestic dogs favoured their right front paw on a single task (57% of 
the sample) than their left paw (18% of the sample).  However, Wells (2003) found 
that the sex of a dog was related to their paw preference.  She reported that there 
was a population bias in both male and female dogs but these were in opposite 
directions.  Female dogs preferred to use their right front paws while male dogs 




Bisazza, Cantalupo, Robins, Rogers and Vallortigara (1997) examined pawedness in 
toads.  A piece of paper or a balloon was attached to the toad’s head (centred so that 
there was no side bias) and the paw with which the toad reached to remove the 
paper or balloon from its head was recorded.  It was reported that there was a right 
paw bias for removing the balloon (59% of the sample used their right paw) and also 
a right paw bias for removing the piece of paper (55% of the sample used the right 
paw).  Bisazza et al. carried out additional tests on different species of toads – the 
first example used the common European toad (Bufo bufo) while the following 
example uses the South American cane toad (Bufo marinus).  The toads were placed 
upside down in water and the paw used to control the movement of the toad back to 
the upright position was recorded.  It was found that 66% of the toads used the right 
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paw to get back in to the upright position.  Robbins, Lippolis, Bisazza, Vallortigara 
and Rogers (1998) carried out a similar study to Bisazza et al.’s. (1996) study with 
the upturned toads submerged in water.  The difference this time was that the toads 
were turned upside down on a dry surface (such as a table) and the limb used to 
move the toad back the right way up was noted.  Three different species of toad were 
tested in this study (Bufo marinus, Bufo viridis and Bufo bufo).  Bufo viridis is the 
European green toad.    It was found that each species of toad used their hind limbs 
to navigate them back.  Robbins et al. reported that Bufo marinus and Bufo bufo 
preferred to use the right hind limb to navigate them while Bufo viridis preferred to 
use the left hind limb.  These findings support the work of Bisazza et al. (1997) who 
found that Bufo viridis showed a left paw preference on a wiping test while the other 
species showed a right paw preference.  It appears that pawedness in toads not only 
depends on the task that they are doing but also on the species of toad (Vallortigara, 
Rogers, Bisazza, Lippolis, & Robins, 1998).   
 
1.2.9. Summary of Animal Handedness 
 
Thus it can be seen that various arguments exist for and against the presence of 
handedness amongst a number of animals.  The biggest controversy lies amid the 
hand preferences of primates and most specifically chimpanzees.  Since these are 
our closest relatives then there is a great amount of interest in whether or not they 
exhibit right hand dominance as a species in order to attempt to relate their hand 
preference to that of humans.  It has been extensively reported by Hopkins that 
chimpanzees do exhibit right-handedness at the population level and thus the 
relationship between chimpanzees and humans and the dominance of right-
handedness would appear simple.  However, there is extensive evidence (e.g. 
McGrew) which states that around 50% of chimpanzees are left-handed and 50% are 
right-handed (although there are varying degrees of the strength of this preference 
across the animals).  This view appears to contradict the link between human 
handedness and handedness in chimpanzees.  If right-handedness were dominant in 
chimpanzees then the obvious answer would be that this preference continued to 
evolve after humans spilt from the chimpanzees almost 6 million years ago (see 
Corballis, 1989).  To complicate things further, it has been argued that right-
handedness in society did not become much more apparent until around 170,000 
years ago (Corballis, 2002).  However, it is unclear how the true dominance of right-
handedness in our (human) society evolved and a number of possible reasons for 
this have been proposed (see further on in this chapter for some possible reasons 
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and chapter two for genetic, environmental and pathological theories).  Provins 
(1997) proposes that some genetic change must have occurred during evolution that 
shifted hand preference sharply in the favour of right-handedness.  Also, MacNeilage 
et al. (1987) argued that there is a slight bias towards left-handedness in 
chimpanzees (particularly in visual reaching tasks) therefore this also complicates the 
straightforward relationship between handedness and primates.  Previc (1991) 
contradicts this finding by stating that the bias of right-handedness did emerge in the 
great apes, however, the more extreme right hand preference that is observed in 
humans, Previc says, is caused by cultural and environmental influences created by 
humans themselves.  Finally, Corballis (e.g. 1991) proposes that chimpanzees do not 
exhibit handedness at all and although they may use certain hands to perform a 
number of actions any existence of a dominant hand preference is very weak.  
Corballis concludes that humans are a unique group in our society as they are the 
only species that show population level handedness.  Thus the question that is often 
asked is ‘Is handedness a uniquely human trait?’ and based on the evidence 
presented in the previous section it appears that many other species show various 
degrees of hand preference but it appears that only humans have a population level 
right-handed society.   The evolution of handedness and the dominance of right-
handedness will be examined and discussed in the following sections of this chapter 
as well as in Chapter 2. 
 
 
1.3. Emergence of hand preference 
 
Evidence suggests that the dominance of right- handedness (at almost 90%) has 
stretched back as far as prehistoric times.  For example, in Egyptian tombs, cave 
paintings depicted people performing activities with their right hands and the profiles 
of the people in the paintings suggested that a right-handed person drew them.  
Additionally, analyses of numerous tools and weapons from this time also suggested 
that not only were they made with the right hand but also for the right hand (E.g. 
Corballis, 1991). 
 
Strong evidence for right-hand dominance has been illustrated through the analysis 
of fossilised baboon skulls.  It was concluded that the positions of the injuries on the 
skulls of the baboons were the results of blows inflicted by the clubs of right-handed 
humans (Springer & Deutsch, 1993). 
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Another theory for why right-handedness was dominant in society was that human 
handedness was caused by the way that blood flowed around the body (Harris, 
1993).  This idea was devised through much earlier work by Aristotle (cited in Harris, 
1993) who stated that the blood supply to the right hand side of the body was purer 
and warmer than the blood supplied to the left hand side of the body.  The reason 
given for this was that the vena cava (which is the larger part of the heart) supplied 
the right side of the body while the more restricted aorta supplied the left hand side.  
An alternative theory of the cause of right hand dominance was concerned with the 
balance of the body which was known as visceral distribution (McManus, 2002).  This 
theory proposed that the liver was positioned more to the right hand side of the body 
and thus the body would not be equally balanced.  Thus in order to balance the body 
the balance would have to be shifted to the left hand side such that the right hand 
and right leg would be free in order to perform actions (Harris, 1993).  However, one 
problem with this theory is that it does not account for left-handedness and fails to 
explain how left-handedness exists using the theory of visceral distribution. 
 
Therefore a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to explain firstly, 
how handedness evolved and secondly, why humans are predominantly right-
handed.  Chapter 2 will investigate genetic, environmental and pathological theories 
of handedness.  
 
 
1.4. Brain lateralisation 
 
1.4.1 Brain lateralisation and behaviour in animals 
 
Lateralisation, behavioural and cerebral asymmetries have generally been argued to 
be part of a uniquely human set of behaviours.  However, this has changed recently 
and numerous cases have been proposed for the existence of asymmetries in a 
variety of species such as frogs, toads, lizards, rats, mice and mammals.  However, 
perhaps the most important evidence that has been reported is that of asymmetries 
among non-human primates.  Because non-human primates are our closest living 
relatives and research into their cerebral organisation has been extensively carried 
out the results are vital in aiding our understanding of the evolutionary origins of 
human lateralisation.   
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Spinozzi and Cacchiarelli (2000) state that in order to investigate whether cerebral 
specialisation in non-human primates is similar to that of humans, manual 
performance has to be studied along with hand preference.  Ettlinger (1988) 
proposed that manual performance is a much more effective way of examining 
hemispheric specialisation (particularly with respect to motor functioning) than hand 
preference would be.   
As previously mentioned, brain lateralisation and its related behaviours such as 
handedness, language abilities and cognitive functioning were often thought to be 
solely human traits (Vallortigara, Rogers & Bisazza, 1999).  However, a number of 
researchers have reported that the brains of many mammals, vertebrates and non-
human primates are also lateralised.  Vallortigara et al. (1999) state that animals are 
very important in order to be able to investigate hemispheric asymmetries as they 
provide models that can be related to human asymmetries and help trace the 
evolutionary pathway of cerebral asymmetry.  In order to examine early brain 
lateralisation Vallortigara et al. (1999) state that brain asymmetries in lower 
vertebrates should be examined.  Bauer (1993) reported that frogs had a left side 
dominance of the brain for vocalisations and Cantelupo, Bisazza and Vallortigara 
(1995) reported that some species of fish favoured the right side of the brain when 
fleeing from predators (this is linked to the avoidance behaviour and right hemisphere 
link proposed by Davidson, 1992).  A number of studies have been carried out on the 
lateralisation of toads and it has been reported that toads display pawedness (see 
section 1.2.8.).   
Rogers (2002) stated that it is possible that cognitive style, temperament and 
emotional responsiveness are connected to hemispheric lateralisation.  This has 
been found in chicks (see Workman & Andrew, 1989, for a comprehensive review) 
but is also widely reported in non-human primates.  Rogers states that a possible 
indicator of hemispheric lateralisation in primates is handedness and the preferred 
hand is related to the behaviour and style of the contralateral hemisphere controlling 
it.  Thus an individual with a left hand preference would exhibit potential cognitive 
styles and behaviours associated with the right side of the brain such as strong 
emotional responses (particularly negative responses) (Davidson, 1992) and those 
with a right hand preference would not exhibit behaviour directly related to such a 
strong emotional response.  Studies on non-human primates have been carried out 
in this area (Hopkins & Bennett, 1994; Cameron & Rogers, 1999) and these will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4.  To summarise these two studies here Hopkins and 
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Bennett examined the response behaviour in chimpanzees to novel objects and 
found that left-handed chimpanzees took significantly longer to approach the novel 
objects than right-handed chimpanzees did.  Hopkins and Bennett concluded that 
approach behaviour and willingness to explore must be related to the left hemisphere 
while avoidance behaviour must be related to the right hemisphere.  Similarly, 
Cameron and Rogers (1999) found that left-handed common marmosets took 
significantly longer to enter a novel room containing novel objects than right-handed 
common marmosets.  Again this is consistent with the right hemisphere being 
dominant for fear and avoidance responses and the left hemisphere being dominant 
for approach behaviour and no fear responses.  Cameron and Rogers (1999) and 
Hopkins and Bennett (1994) concluded that right-handed primates appear to exhibit 
more exploratory behaviour and show less fear and avoidance behaviour than left-
handed primates.  Rogers (2002) speculates that a population bias towards right-
handedness may be plausible in species where survival depends on a high level of 
exploratory behaviour but a low level of fear and negatively associated emotions.  
Rogers also proposed that survival among a left-handed species group would 
depend on high levels of vigilance in new environments and the exhibition of high 
fear and stress responses towards both novel environments and objects.  Rogers 
(1999) adds that additional factors such as gender and age can influence these 
findings (see Rogers, 1999, for a more detailed account). 
Andrew and Rogers (2002) argue that “the left hemisphere mechanisms provide 
inhibitory influences on behaviour such as fear and attack, and that the left 
hemisphere is used when there is a need to assess the situation before taking a 
decision.” (p. 111).   
As previously mentioned, King (1995) reported that tamarins exhibited a population 
level of right-handedness while marmosets had no population bias for handedness 
(left- and right-handedness in marmosets is said to be around 50% each).  However, 
Rogers (2002) states that if the two species were mixed then it may be beneficial in 
terms of cognitive and emotional responses to a variety of objects and situations.  
The left-handed monkeys in the group would be more vigilant but cautious in their 
approach to novel objects and situations and would therefore possibly be more likely 
to survive from predators.  However, the right-handed group (of which the numbers 
would be higher if the two groups were combined) would be more explorative and 
also less fearless and willing to approach novel situations more readily and thus 
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would perhaps have more chance of being caught by a predator but also would have 
more chance of gathering food than the left-handers.   
Hook-Costigan and Rogers (1998) studied the facial expressions of marmosets and 
reported that there was a greater emotional expression on the left side of the face 
when the marmoset produced two different fear expressions but the emotional 
expression was more apparent on the right when the marmoset produced a social 
contact call.  Andrew and Rogers (2002) state that this provides evidence that the left 
hemisphere controls the production of vocalisations in these animals 
One of the most studied animals in terms of brain lateralisation is the domestic chick 
(e.g. Vallortigara & Andrew, 1994).  Reports have found that the functions of the two 
hemispheres are very different in the way that they store information and how they 
perceive different things.  Vallortigara and Andrew (1994) reported that the right 
hemisphere of chicks is specialised to deal with spatial awareness and novelty while 
the left hemisphere is specialised for its categorising ability.  Andrew (1991) found 
that chicks are lateralised for a number of similar features to humans.  He states that 
chicks display lateralised motor behaviour, lateralised emotional behaviour and 
lateralised cognitive processing.  Rogers (1997) reported that chicks were able to 
distinguish between grain and pebbles when using the right eye only (and thus the 
left hemisphere) but not when they used the left eye and the right hemisphere.  
Another example of brain lateralisation in chicks was illustrated in a study carried out 
by Tommasi and Vallortigara (1999).  When chicks performed a task where they had 
to scratch the floor with one foot while one eye was covered Tommasi and 
Vallortigara found that the chicks supported themselves using the foot contralateral to 
the eye that was covered.  That is the foot used to support the chick would be on the 
same side as the hemisphere of the brain that was being used for vision in the 
contralateral eye.  Andrew and Rogers (2002) report that the use of the left eye in 
chicks (and thus the use of the right hemisphere) is associated with fear responses, 
attack and copulatory behaviour.  Andrew and Rogers also report that the use of the 
left hemisphere suppresses attack and copulatory responses.   
Not only is handedness examined amongst non-human primates but hemispheric 
specialisation has also been found to affect behaviour in primates.  Morris and 
Hopkins (1993) reported that chimpanzees had a right hemisphere advantage for 
face recognition (and this was also the case in recognising facial expressions).  This 
pattern is similar to humans.  Bradshaw and Rogers (1993) reported that the 
perception and production of emotions in monkeys was lateralised in the right 
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hemisphere.  Once again, this pattern is similar to that reported in humans.  Hopkins 
and Bennett (1994) propose that it is unclear whether or not cognitive differences 
occur between left- and right-handed primates in the same way that they occur in left- 
and right-handed humans.  Hopkins and Bennett proposed that right-handed 
chimpanzees would approach novel stimuli faster than left-handed chimpanzees 
based on the lateralisation of left- and right-handed humans.  They state that 
because, in general, right-handers reflect greater left hemisphere dominance and 
left-handers reflect greater right hemisphere dominance and this is associated with 
positive emotions and approach behaviour and negative emotions and avoidance 
behaviour respectively that there would be a delayed response towards a novel 
object by the left-handed chimpanzees.  Hopkins and Bennett reported that there 
was a difference in the approach behaviour of left- and right-handed chimpanzees 
towards a novel object in that left-handers took significantly longer to approach it.  
These findings support Davidson’s (1992) model of approach-avoidance hemispheric 
specialisation. 
The hand used to perform a number of actions can be related to hemispheric 
lateralisation (Rogers, 2002).  Ward and Hopkins (1993) report that prosimians often 
use their left hands to catch prey.  However, there could be different explanations for 
why this is the case.  Firstly, catching prey with the left hand might reflect the 
dominance of the right hemisphere in the role of spatial awareness of where the prey 
is and the judgement of its’ distance in the animal’s visual field.  However, it could 
also be argued that the left hemisphere could be dominant in this situation as the 
right limb may be the important limb in the process as support limb so that the animal 
could successfully strike it’s prey.  One problem with this work is that it assumes that 
hand preference and hemispheric specialisation are closely linked in non-human 
primates.  However, Corballis (1991) states that this is a controversial assumption 
and that hand preference has to be considered independently of hemispheric 
specialisation in non-humans.  Corballis also proposes that there is no population 
level hand preference amongst non-human primates and thus it makes it difficult to 
draw conclusions concerning primate handedness and hemispheric specialisation.  
Corballis (1991) adds that handedness in non-human primates is a much weaker 
form than the handedness of a human.  
Another lateralised behaviour that is often cited is that of vision in relation to vigilance 
or anti-predator behaviour (e.g. Bisazza et al., 1997 in toads; Andrew & Rogers, 2002 
in chicks;). It has been reported that when a predator is viewed in the left visual field 
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that both human and non-human primates’ aggression levels are higher than if the 
predator is viewed in the right visual field (Vallortigara, 2000).  This behaviour has 
been reported in a vast number of species such as fish, frogs and lizards.  Most 
studies of aggression focus upon male aggression however, Hews, Castellano, & 
Hara (2004) report that mated female lizards display similar behaviour to lizards 
presented in their left visual fields, which is similar to the aggressive behaviour of 
male lizards.  This display did not occur when other lizards were presented in their 
right visual fields.  Also, when females were displaying themselves they used the left 
visual field significantly more often than the right to view the males that they were 
displaying to.  According to Vallortigara (2000) visual lateralisation is subject to some 
controversy as many species have their eyes placed on the sides of their heads 
(such as many birds, fish and reptiles).  Thus, the visual system works generally in a 
contralateral fashion with the brain but in some species the brain works in an almost 
ipsilateral fashion with the visual system.  Visual lateralisation in chicks has been 
extensively examined and it has been reported that there are different visual abilities 
in the left and right eyes.  Andrew (1988) reported that the right eye of chicks is 
specialised for more detailed vision (such as patterns on stone or granite) while the 
left eye is more specialised at picking up emotionally charged stimuli.  Regolin, 
Vallortigara and Zanforlin (1994) devised a detour test for chicks that was used to 
examine eye preference.  They reported that when a chick was faced with a stimulus 
that was novel the left eye was used more in females. In males when the stimuli was 
moderately novel again the left eye was used more than the right eye but when the 
stimuli was completely novel males used the right eye more often.  Regolin et al. 
conclude that it is not only that the two cerebral hemispheres of the chick show 
different specialisations but more specifically the chick can control its sensory input 
depending on the visual field that it is located in.  Many animals have been reported 
to show a link between the left hand side and negative behaviour relating to 
predators.  Vallortigara et al. (1998) carried out a series of studies examining the 
visual fields of toads and their reactions to horizontally presented worms.    The 
worms were presented to both the left and right visual fields but only one at a time.  
Vallortigara et al. report that almost all of the reactions by the toad (normally in the 
form of a tongue strike) occurred when the worm was in the right half of its binocular 
field of vision.  When prey approaches in the toad’s left visual field the toad does not 
strike it until the prey has moved in to the right visual field. Vallortigara concluded that 
predatory behaviour is more likely to be displayed by the toad when the prey 
approaches from the right visual field.  Vallortigara (2000) carried out an additional 
study that examined tongue striking amongst feeding toads.  He found that toads 
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struck other toads with their tongues most when they were in their left visual fields 
(this is the opposite way round from how they strike their prey).  Toads are thus more 
likely to strike their prey when they are in the right visual field but are more likely to 
strike their own species when they occupy the left visual field.  This behaviour has 
also been displayed amongst a series of other species including chicks, pigeons, 
baboons and lizards (Vallortigara, 2000).  Lippolis, Bisazza, Rogers and Vallortigara 
(2002) examined fear responses among three species of toads using a toy snake as 
a predator.  They presented the snake individually to the left and the right visual 
fields and found that the toad reacted more when the snake was presented on the 
left.  Lippolis et al. concluded that this demonstrated one of the roles of the right 
hemisphere as instigating a fear response towards a novel stimulus. Rogers (2002) 
reported that agnostic responses are made towards a conspecific when in the left 
visual field.  Rogers continues that the aggressive responses towards others when 
viewed in the left visual field are not results of a simple leftward bias but more 
specifically an agnostic reaction, which is an emotional response, controlled by the 
right hemisphere.   
One fact that has to be taken in to consideration when considering the lateralisation 
of toads is that they have a binocular visual system.  That is because their eyes are 
placed on top of their heads so that they do not have such a clearly defined left and 
right side as animals that have eyes placed on the side of their heads (Lippolis et al., 
2002).  However, as it has been noted the toad strikes prey approaching from the 
right and strikes other toads that approach from the left but this is not advantageous 
to the survival of the toad or its defence of their food sources.  The toads do not react 
to prey on the left hand side nor do they strike other toads approaching from the right 
hand side and thus they are risking not only their food sources from other toads but 
also are endangering themselves from predators and prey who approach from the 
right hand side (Lippolis et al., 2002).  Rogers (2002) states that it is difficult to say 
whether or not the left and right hemifields in toads differ in their reactive behaviour 
due to the closeness of the eyes and thus an ambiguous midline. 
 
1.4.2. Visual Lateralisation  
A vast body of research in conjunction with lateralisation in animals has been carried 
out on the visual system.  It is a possibility that different species of animals might use 
their visual systems differently.  However, visual asymmetry of responding to 
predators can cause problems.  A reaction to the detection of predators in toads, for 
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instance, only evokes a response when the predator moves to the right visual field.  If 
the predator/prey approaches from the left visual field then the toad does not react.  
This can cause problems, as it might be too late if the toad waits until the predator is 
in the right visual field.  Vallortigara (2000) states that predators should be detected 
and avoided with the same caution regardless of which visual field it is identified in.  
This problem is a bit more difficult in fish.  Because fish mainly move in schools then 
the avoidance of predators depends mainly on the group response rather than an 
individual response.  If the majority of fish swim in one direction then it becomes 
difficult for any individuals to swim in the opposite direction.  Also, because fish have 
laterally placed eyes this can have an effect on how they deal with potential 
predators.  One visual field (and thus one hemisphere of the brain) potentially sees 
most other species as a threat while the other visual field would treat the potential 
predator as non-threatening.  This could cause major disruption within a school 
depending on the position of the predator.  Vallortigara (2000) states that this type of 
population asymmetry would be more likely to be encountered among social species 
rather than solitary species.  Magurran and Seghers (1990) reported that when fish 
are part of a large shoal it is common for one pair to leave the group and inspect for 
potential predators.  If both fish inspect a potential predator then the risk of them both 
being attacked is shared.  However, if only one fish of the pair approaches the 
potential predator then they put themselves at risk while freeing the other fish.  This 
takes the form of a model of mutual co-operation among unrelated individuals.   
Bisazza, De Santi and Vallortigara (1999) studied predator inspection in mosquito 
fish with respect to mutual co-operation.  They did this by positioning a mirror either 
at the right or left hand side of the fish in order to create an additional fish.  
Vallortigara found that predator inspection was more likely to take place when the 
mirror image was on the left rather than on the right hand side of the fish.  He 
suggests that this way the right eye watches the predator while the left eye monitors 
the companion.  These findings suggest that different types of social behaviour can 
be displayed depending on what the fish can see with each visual field and the 
response to perceptual information processed by each side of the brain. 
Patterns of lateralisation across many different species of animals are therefore 
somewhat unclear and in many cases are varied.  However, there seems to be 
certain situations where one hemisphere takes precedence over the other (for 
example the role of the right hemisphere in avoidance behaviour).  It is proposed that 
animals will react to different features of the environment (such as other animals or 
novel objects) according to the hemisphere that is in control 
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1.5. Lateralisation in humans 
 
Brain lateralisation or asymmetry, according to Byrne, Kuba and Meisel (2004), is 
when one side of the brain is structurally different from the other or when one side of 
the brain performs different functions from the other.  Hews et al. (2004) add that the 
brain is lateralised in order to perform specific tasks. 
 
Although the left and right hemispheres of the human brain appear to look relatively 
symmetrical there are a number of existing anatomical differences.  These 
anatomical differences include the right hemisphere being slightly heavier and larger 
than the left hemisphere; the temporal lobes are asymmetrical with the planum 
temporale being larger on the left hand side in around 65 to 90% of humans (Kolb & 
Whishaw, 1995).  Also, the right hemisphere is longer at the front of the brain than 
the left hemisphere while the left hemisphere extends further back than the right 
hemisphere.  Anatomical differences can be affected by sex and handedness and a 
brief summary of these differences will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
Lateralisation is a complicated process for a number of reasons.  Firstly, factors such 
as gender and handedness can affect laterality of function and it has been frequently 
reported that left-handers and females are more likely to be less lateralised (in that 
they have bilateral control of many functions) than right-handers and males (Kolb & 
Whishaw, 1995).  Although most behaviours or functions (such as language) are 
predominantly controlled by one hemisphere of the brain, this control is not exclusive 
and the other hemisphere will also play a role in this.  Thus, although the left 
hemisphere is dominant in the role of language production, the right hemisphere is 
also involved.   
 
Additional hemispheric asymmetries exist but these tend to be static irrespective of 
hand preference.  For example there are lateral differences in the visual system, the 
auditory system and the somatosensory system.  Research into the somatosensory 
system has examined the recognition of shapes and patterns solely by touch.  It has 
been reported that in these types of tasks that the left hand of right-handers is better 
at recognising shapes and patterns through touch.  Asymmetries in the 
somatosensory system have been investigated through the reading of Braille (both in 
blind and sighted individuals) and it has been reported that both blind and sighted 
individuals read Braille faster with the left hand (Corballis & Beale, 1983).  In addition 
it has been reported that the recognition of Braille patterns requires spatial 
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awareness and knowledge and thus there is an important role for the right 
hemisphere to play in this while the processing of the spatial information does not 
directly involve the left hemisphere.  Other tests of the somatosensory system involve 
simultaneously presenting different objects to both hands at the same time and 
asking the participant to identify the object that they had in their hand by looking at a 
selection in front of them.  In almost all cases the individual selects the object placed 
in the left hand quicker than the object that is in their right hand (showing a right 
hemisphere superiority).     A more common asymmetry with respect to handedness 
and laterality is that of the motor system.  Kimura (e.g. 1977) has reported that 
control of movement is functionally asymmetrical.  Kimura (1977) studied the 
gestures of groups of people while they were either talking or humming and found 
that right-handed people tended to gesture with their right hands while they were 
talking but were also inclined to touch or scratch their bodies with either hand while 
doing this.  Kimura concluded that the hand used for gesturing was the one that was 
contralateral to the hemisphere that is dominant for speech and therefore there was a 
relationship between speech and certain manual activities (see section 1.6.1. for 
additional information).  However, it could be argued that the previous study merely 
indicated hand preference rather than any form of asymmetry of motor control.   
 
Davidson (1995) states that in humans the right hemisphere is associated with 
negative emotions and avoidance behaviour while the right hemisphere has been 
associated with more positive emotions and exploration and approach behaviour.  
Andrew and Rogers (2002) add that the right hemisphere appears to be heavily 
involved in human emotion and can be associated with negative states and social 
withdrawal.  The debate continues as to whether all emotions are processed in the 
right hemisphere or whether the valence of emotions is hemisphere specific such as 
negative emotions being processed in the right hemisphere (see chapter 5, section 
5.1. for an extended outline of this).  Andrew and Rogers (2002) conclude that 
surprising and/or painful stimuli as well as novel stimuli affect the right hemisphere 
more than the left hemisphere.  
 
Byrne et al. (2004) state that there are two definitions related to individual and 
population level lateralisation.  One definition is concerned with the behavioural 
aspects of lateralisation (such as the work of Rogers and Andrew 2002) while the 
other definition is concerned with structural asymmetries.  Those interested in 
behavioural lateralisation tend to define a population as lateralised if more than half 
of that population have the same preference (i.e. if more than 50% preferred the right 
Chapter 1: Laterality and the evolution of handedness 
 28 
hand then the population would be said to be lateralised to the right for hand 
preference).  Rogers and Andrew (2002) add that lateralisation at the individual level 
occurs when most people in a population are lateralised but not necessarily in the 
same direction thus there will be no dominant bias.  Lateralisation concerning 
structural asymmetries can be expressed in a number of different ways.  One form is 
known as ‘fluctuating asymmetry’.  Fluctuating asymmetry refers to differences 
between the right and left sides of many different parts of the body.  Among the 
things that can be measured to get a measure of fluctuating asymmetry include hand 
size, digit size, feet size and ear size.  High fluctuating asymmetry occurs when there 
is a big difference between the two sides being measured and low fluctuating 
asymmetry occurs when the two sides are similar.  Fluctuating asymmetry has been 
used in a number of studies to predict a number of relationships such as 
increased/decreased levels of fertility; sex related behaviour and health issues (such 
as susceptibility to certain forms of cancer) (Manning, 2002).  Additionally, human 
faces are also asymmetrical and Smith (2000) reported that males have a larger left 
side of the face and females have a larger right side of the face.  However, Hardie, 
Hancock, Rodway, Penton-Voak, Carson, and Wright (in press) did not find an effect 
of gender on facial asymmetry.  However, Hardie et al. found an effect of handedess 
on facial asymmetry with right-handers having a larger left side of the face.  This 
pattern was not found among left-handers. 
 
 
1.6. Handedness and cerebral asymmetry 
 
Most people exhibit the standard pattern of right-handedness and left hemisphere 
dominance for language and right hemisphere dominance for spatial abilities and 
emotional processing.  However, individual differences do exist in the lateralisation of 
cognitive function (Grimshaw, Bryden & Finnegan, 1995).  Bryden (1988) adds that 
women may be less lateralised for cognitive functions than men.  Witelson (1991) 
states that this could be because exposure to pre-natal testosterone leads to 
increased lateralisation of function.  However, this could be argued against as there 
are claims that left-handers are less lateralised than right-handers and yet it is 
claimed that left-handers are exposed to increased levels of testosterone in utero 
according to Geschwind and Galaburda’s (1985) theory (see chapter 2, section 2.5.9. 
for a detailed description of this theory).  Grimshaw et al. (1995) reported in their 
longitudinal study that girls with higher pre-natal testosterone levels were more 
strongly right-handed and had stronger left hemisphere speech dominance where as 
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males who had higher pre-natal testosterone levels showed higher right hemispheric 
dominance for emotional processing.   
 
Davidson and Fox (1982) suggest that hemispheric specialisation in humans possibly 
underlie differences in various types of human behaviour (for example, affective 
behaviour).  This view leads to the suggestion by Davidson (1992) that there is a 
relationship between affective states and lateralisation.  He reported that positive 
states or approach behaviour is associated with the left hemisphere while negative 
states are associated with the right hemisphere.  Thus the hemispheric dominance of 
a person can have a possible effect on their behaviour.  Similar conclusions have 
been drawn from animal studies (see Hopkins & Bennett (1994), section 1.2.1.). 
 
1.6.1. Language  
 
It is also often assumed that the brain organisation of left-handers and right-handers 
differs dramatically.  However, these differences vary across individuals and in many 
cases left- and right-handers are lateralised in very similar ways.  One main area that 
has been identified as being different is the lateralisation of language. It has often 
been cited that non right-handers are less strongly lateralised for language than right-
handers (e.g. Bishop, 1990).   Studies have revealed that over 95% (and up to as 
many as 99%) of right-handers are left hemisphere dominant for language whereas 
only around 70% of left-handers are left hemisphere dominant (Green, 1995).  
 
Corballis (e.g. 1989) has constantly proposed that handedness is specific to humans 
and that non-human primates do not show population level handedness.  Corballis 
(1991) states that right-handedness is dominant among humans and any existence 
of handedness in non-human primates is very weak and most of the time favours the 
left hand over the right. The main point that Corballis makes is that the differences 
between the left hand and the right hand are caused by the asymmetry of structure in 
the brain rather than a difference in the structure of the hands. 
 
Corballis (1991) proposes that the most important part of cerebral asymmetry is not 
the resultant hand preference but the left side specialisation of the brain for speech 
and language.  Corballis leans heavily on the lateralisation of language in order to 
help explain why humans have asymmetric preferences.  There are many functional 
differences between the two hemispheres of the brain but there are fewer differences 
between the structure of the brains of left- and right-handers.  Corballis (2002) 
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proposes that right–handedness in humans is associated with left hemisphere 
dominance but not for language but more specifically for vocalisation.  He states that 
vocalisation evolved much earlier than language as it was derived from manual 
gestures and this eventually led to manual gestures with elements of vocalisation.  
Corballis reports that the left hemisphere in many species is specialised for 
vocalisations but only humans have a link between vocalisation and right-
handedness.  He adds that Broca’s area is situated in the left hemisphere in humans 
but in monkeys Broca’s area is located bilaterally.  Broca’s area was also reported to 
be situated in the left hemisphere of Homo habilis (Corballis, 2002) and thus a link 
can be made between gesture and vocalisation in humans as long as 2 million years 
ago.  Corballis adds that although gesture and vocalisation are linked to Homo habilis 
speech probably did not originate until the evolution of Homo sapiens around 
170,000 years ago.  Corballis (2002) suggests that any right hand bias in chimps 
may be linked with the dominant left hemisphere that may be specialised for 
vocalisation and communication.   
 
Hopkins and Leavens (1998) state that the fact that captive chimpanzees can be 
taught to point and do so with the right hand may be important for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, it may simply be a link to human right-hand dominance.  Secondly, 
it may be linked to left hemisphere dominance for speech and communication or 
thirdly, chimpanzees may just imitate the humans who taught them to point (most of 
whom would be right-handed) and thus most chimpanzees would use the right hand 
with which to point.   
 
The production of vocalisations in animals (such as rhesus monkeys – Hauser & 
Andersson, 1994) is lateralised in the left hemisphere in almost all cases and thus 
this would suggest that they would show a right side advantage.  However, Hauser 
and Andersson found that these vocalisations were not correlated with handedness.  
This is not the case in humans however as it is reported that the lateralisation of 
speech and handedness are correlated (e.g. Knecht, Dräger, Deppe, Bobe, 
Lohmann, Flöel, Ringelstein, & Henningsen, 2000).  Green (1995) states that 99% of 
the right-handed population are left hemisphere specialised for speech and 
vocalisation.  Additionally, around 70% of left-handers are left hemisphere dominant 
for speech and language. 
 
Corballis (2002) proposes that the dominance of right-handedness in our society is a 
consequence of the dominance of the left hemisphere for speech and vocalisation.  
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He states that since vocalisation emerged early on in evolution that this might have 
influenced hand preference.  Annett (1995) suggests that this might have occurred 
due to a single genetic mutation that could have influenced both the left hemisphere 
as dominant for vocalisation and the preference of the right hand as the preferred 
hand.  Crow, Crow, Done and Leask (1998) added that it was this event (the genetic 
mutation which may have created the left hemisphere as the dominant hemisphere 
for speech and for right-handedness) that led to the emergence of Homo sapiens.  
Homo sapiens were different to any of the previous Homo species as they had the 
ability of speech, whereas previous species such as Homo habilis had vocalisations 
but not speech.  Crow et al. (1998) add that Homo sapiens had a number of 
additional uniquely human abilities such as theory of mind.   
 
Corballis (2002) reports that one of the main differences between humans and 
chimpanzees after they split over 6 million years ago was the bipedal posture of 
humans.  He reports that the bipedalism of humans allowed them to have their arms 
and hands free and be able to use them for manual expression.  McNeill (1985) 
states that people make hand gestures during speech and that these gestures follow 
the pattern of their speech.   
 
Corballis (2002) proposed that population level right-handedness evolved after the 
emergence of the ability of speech.  Corballis states that the association between 
handedness and vocalisation occurred through the evolution of language.  He 
continues that gestures made during vocalisations from animals such as apes led to 
the lateralisation of manual gestures and this led to a dominant right hand 
preference.   
 
Thus, Corballis concludes that the dominant right hand preference in humans derives 
from the left hemisphere which is specialised not only for speech but also for 
vocalisation and gestured behaviour.  As humans evolved from apes and apes 
communicated through vocalisations and gestures then it was the dominance of the 
hands in these gestures that were first noted.  Corballis proposes that the 
synchronisation of the hands and mouth while making gestures may be what evolved 
to allow a right-hand preference. He added that along side the synchronisation of the 
mouth and hands was vocal production that was lateralised.   
 
Kimura (1977) studied the use of the hands in gesturing and reported that right-
handers gesture with their right hands but left-handers gesture with both the left and 
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right hands.  Graves and Goodglass (1982) studied the movement of the mouth while 
speaking and found that around 90% of the population moved the right side of their 
mouth more than the left side.  This supports the percentage of right-handers in the 
population but Graves and Goodglass did not specifically look at handedness.   
 
McManus (1999) proposes that during evolution all humans were right-handed and 
that left-handedness only developed due to a genetic mutation.  If this was the case 
and all early humans were right-handed then this would suggest that the vocal 
elements of speech (but not speech itself) would have been evident over 2 million 
years ago.  The main difference between humans and apes is the actual ability to 
pronounce words rather than just make simple vocalisations.  Corballis (2002) states 
that the vocal tract in humans had to evolve sufficiently in order to be able to make 
these articulate sounds and he suggested that the first group of humans that this was 
possible in would probably have been Homo sapiens over 170, 000 years ago.  
  
Even though humans are dominantly right-handed for a number of actions 
(particularly writing, eating and throwing) Corballis (2002) suggests that gesturing 
plays a leading role towards a strong right-handed society.  The link between 
gesturing and language and the resulting hand preference can be supported through 
the examination of developing handedness in young children.  Although later in life 
children are often influenced to use a specific hand to do certain activities hand 
preference in relatively young children (around the ages of 2-4 years) can be driven 
by the development of speech.  Hand preference often settles around 4 years of age 
(Annett, 2002).  Annett (2002) proposes that handedness settles down around 4 
years of age as that is the time when a child begins to write or draw or use their 
hands for finer motor movements.  She adds that this coincides with the time that a 
child perhaps attends nursery school.  Annett also accepts, however, that the hand 
preference of some children will have been apparent before the age of 4 and in 
others hand preference might take much longer to settle down.  
 
The relationship between hand preference and the dominant hemisphere for speech 
is not simple.   This would insinuate that all right-handers were left hemisphere 
dominant for speech and all left-handers were right hemisphere dominant for speech.  
The relationship is much more complicated than this as around 70% of left-handers 
are left hemisphere dominant for speech (e.g. Green, 1995).  Thus, gestural 
communication would have to be studied further where the dominant hemisphere for 
speech was examined alongside dominant hand preference and the hand or hands 
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noted that were doing the gesturing.  However, Corballis (2002) reports that the 
incidence of left cerebral dominance for language is higher than the incidence of 
right-handedness and thus left cerebral dominance must play a more important and 
superior role than right-handedness.  He goes on to state that if 90% of the human 
population are right-handed and the incidence of left hemisphere dominance for 
language among right-handers is 96% and among left-handers is 70% then 93.4% of 
the population are left hemisphere dominant for language.  This statistic is higher 
than the incidence of right-handers in the population itself and could also be higher if 
the percentage of right-handers with left hemisphere dominance is as high as 99% 
but could also be reduced if there is an overestimation of the number of right-handers 
with left hemisphere dominance for language.   
 
Another link between handedness and language has been proposed through another 
genetic theory.  Crow et al. (1998) stated that a link between handedness and 
language dominance was dependent on a genetic mutation that was only present in 
humans.  The models of Annett (e.g. 1995) and McManus (e.g. 1999) also propose a 
link between handedness and language (see chapter 2, sections 2.3.3. & 2.2.4. 
respectively for more details of these theories).  
 
Corballis (1991) states that one main problem with McManus’ single gene theory is 
that handedness and cerebral dominance are determined independently of each 
other and this is less clear in those with the DC genotype.  McManus’ theory focuses 
on hand preference and he states that if an individual does not have a dextral (D) 
gene then their hand preference will be determined by chance, however, if an 
individual has the DD genotype then they will almost certainly become right-handed 
and if they have the DC genotype there is a 75% chance that they will become right-
handed.  However, McManus states that the alleles in this theory do not code for 
language dominance but he does states that there is a link between parental 
handedness and language lateralisation.  McManus indicated that an individual with 
at least one left-handed parent would be more likely to have right hemisphere 
language dominance than those with two right-handed parents.  If an individual has 
the DC genotype then this would be difficult to clarify as they could either have a left- 
or right-hand preference.  Corballis (1991) states that handedness and cerebral 
dominance of language are related and thus the occurrence of one affects the other.  
Corballis (2002) goes on to state that because handedness and cerebral dominance 
of language are related then the relationship between the two factors is continuous 
rather than independent (Corballis, 2002).  Knecht et al. (2000) back this up and 
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report that as the incidence of right hemisphere dominance for language increases in 
an individual the degree of right-handedness decreases.  That is there are very few 
right-handed individuals (less than 1%) with a dominant right hemisphere for 
language but there are a high proportion (around 15%) of left-handed individuals with 
a dominant right hemisphere for language.  However, in terms of strongly lateralised 
individuals, Knecht et al. state that around 27% of extreme left-handers have right 
hemisphere lateralisation of language whereas only around 4% of extreme right-
handers have right hemisphere dominance for language.   
 
The single gene models (e.g. Annett and McManus) of handedness suggest that one 
allele codes for speech or language in some dimension (usually the cerebral 
dominance of speech) while the other allele is an expression of handedness (which is 
often left down to chance).  However, Corballis (2002) proposes that the influence of 
handedness in humans on the production and perception of speech is thought to be 
relatively strong in humans and states that this is the case due to the relationship 
between gesturing and vocalisation and the early evolution of language in humans.  
Corballis (2002) adds that the genetic mutation that Crow, Annett and McManus 
report cites a link between handedness and vocalisation rather than creating specific 
asymmetries.  
 
The specialisation of language in the left hemisphere in most of the population is 
linked to the dominant preference to use the right hand to perform fine motor tasks 
(Crow et al. 1998). Crow (2000) proposed that a gene for cerebral dominance was a 
critical factor in human evolution.  He suggested that the specialisation of the 
hemispheres (and hence cerebral dominance) led to the establishment of language.  
However, as there are sex differences for language abilities Crow proposed that a 
gene for cerebral dominance would be located on the sex chromosomes.  Crow adds 
that a mutation of this gene would be responsible for schizophrenia.  Crow (1997) 
examined language dominance and handedness in schizophrenics.  He reported that 
there were elevated numbers of mixed-handers among this group. Annett (2002) 
reports that schizophrenia is uniquely human and no other species show any 
equivalent to this.  Annett adds that although we share around 99% of our genes with 
chimpanzees that any bias in humans for right-handedness, left hemisphere 
dominance and the onset of schizophrenia are thought to be genes that are not 
common with chimpanzees.  As it has been reported that we are the only species 
capable of speech and as schizophrenia is uniquely human then there appears to be 
a tentative link between the two.  However, Crow’s theory is based on language as 
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opposed to speech (whereas the right shift theory is directly concerned with speech) 
so this cannot be directly compared.  Crow concludes that schizophrenia is a 
disorder of cerebral dominance for language and suggests that it is due to the 
mutation of a gene that was associated with language over the course of human 
evolution. 
 
Crow et al. (1998) stated that handedness is an overt behaviour which is correlated 
with cerebral dominance for language.  Crow et al. examined children’s abilities on a 
series of verbal, non-verbal and mathematical tests and divided them according to 
their hand skill.  They found that those who had similar levels of skill between the two 
hands (and what Crow et al. termed as hemispheric indecision) performed worse 
than the other groups.  Also, those who were strongly right-handed and strongly left-
handed did not perform as well as those who were found to be moderately left- and 
right-handed.  This finding supports the work of Annett (e.g. 2002) who predicted that 
there would be deficits on a task by those who were extreme left- or extreme right-
handers.  Crow concluded that those who displayed the largest deficits were those 
who wrote with a different hand to the one that they were more skilled with (for 
example someone who write with the left hand but was more skilled with the right 
hand).  Although Crow et al.’s. results suggest that it is a disadvantage to have a 
more mixed preference Annett (e.g. 2002) has postulated that those who are 
heterozygote in her right shift theory (see chapter 2 for a detailed outline of this) will 
perform better than homozygotes on some cognitive tasks.  Crow (2000) concludes 
that the degree of lateralisation establishes how quickly verbal ability will develop. 
 
Overall, the link between handedness and language is complex and subject to a lot 
of disagreement and debate. It is fair to say that importance of language in humans 
has led to a focus of research in this area, but we await more clarity in how these 
skills evolved in the first place. 
 
1.6.2. Effects of human handedness on cognition and emotion 
 
Emotion 
There is very little literature available on the effects of human handedness and 
emotion.  Although emotion is a widely researched topic many of the studies carried 
out only use right-handed participants and very few studies compare any differences 
in emotions between left- and right-handers.  For example, Bourne (2005) examined 
the processing of positive facial emotions but only did this with right-handed 
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participants.  Additionally, Jansari, Tranel and Adolphs (2000) examined the valence 
specific effect for discriminating facial expressions but again only used right-handed 
participants. 
 
Much of the research that has been carried out on emotion with both left- and right-
handers is the discrimination of emotional faces between the two groups (e.g. 
Rodway, Wright & Hardie, 2003) or similarly, rating a series emotional faces on a 
forced choice paradigm (e.g. van Strien & van Beek, 2000).  However, many of these 
studies have found no clear handedness differences between left- and right-handers 
on how they rate emotional faces or how they discriminate between positive and 
negative faces.  Reuter-Lorenz, Givis and Moscovitch (1983) found that there was an 
interaction of valence and visual field for right-handers and left-handers with inverted 
writing postures.  This suggested that these groups had faster reaction times to 
negative faces that were presented in the left visual field and faster reaction times to 
positive faces presented in the right visual field.  However, left-handers with a non-
inverted hand posture displayed the opposite pattern.  Also, Everhart, Harrison and 
Crews (1996) asked left- and right-handed participants to use a forced-choice 
questionnaire to identify positive and negative faces from a series of happy, neutral 
and sad pictures.  Left-handers rated neutral faces as negative faces more when 
they were presented in the right visual field than when they were presented in the left 
visual field.  The ratings of right-handers remained the same irrespective of the visual 
field that the face was presented in.  Everhart et al. conclude that the findings of the 
right-handers do not support the valence specific hypothesis and the findings of the 
left-handers suggest the opposite from the valence specific hypothesis (in that 
negative emotions are identified more often in the right visual field).   
 
Cognition 
The effect of human handedness on cognition is a vast area of research.  Many 
studies which examine cognitive abilities and handedness focus upon IQ scores and 
other measurements of intelligence.  Many studies address the question of whether 
there are any intellectual differences between left- and right-handers and a series of 
contradictory results have been reported (Nettle, 2003).  For example, Hardyck, 
Petronovich and Goldman (1976) examined left- and right-handers on a series of 
tasks including writing, intelligence, reading, spelling and attention and found that 
there were no clear relationships between handedness and any of these tests.  A 
common citation is that left-handers generally have lower IQs than right-handers (e.g. 
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McManus & Mascie-Taylor, 1983; Bishop, 1990).  However, Benbow (1986) studied 
a group of students who scored significantly higher than their peers in mathematics 
and verbal ability and found that her sample consisted of high numbers of left- and 
mixed-handers.  There were very few strongly right-handed people in this sample but 
there were a considerable number of weak or moderate right-handers.  Additionally, 
Annett and Manning (1989) reported that IQ scores were highest in right-handers 
who had a weak to mixed preference rather than in those with a strong right hand 
preference.   Annett and Manning add that pattern is also found for left-handers 
where those with a weak to mixed left hand preference often show higher IQ scores 
than strong left-handers.  However, these findings have been challenged by Crow, 
Crow, Done and Leask (1998) who reported that cognitive ability and IQ scores were 
lowest among those with a mixed hand preference.  Crow et al. add that those who 
show very little difference in skill between the two hands will be those who perform 
worst on these tasks.  However, this finding was not supported by Mayringer and 
Wimmer (2002) who found that performance was no worse in those with equal hand 
skill abilities.   
 
Nettle (2003) states that the contradictory findings in this research might be 
influenced by the way that handedness is both defined and measured.  For example, 
the distinction between hand preference and hand skill needs to be made as hand 
skill itself is often reported to correlate with cognitive ability.  Nettle reported that 
cognitive ability increases as the strength of handedness increases.  Therefore 
someone with a strong hand preference would have higher cognitive abilities than 
someone with a mixed hand preference.  Additionally, Nettle states that right-handers 
have more of an advantage, as they as a group are more strongly lateralised than 
left-handers.  Harris and Carlson (1988) add that perhaps the distinction between 
pathological and non-pathological left-handers would also have to be considered in 
order to draw valid conclusions as pathological left-handers may respond differently 
to non-pathological left-handers (see Chapter 2, section 2.5. for details of the 
pathological argument).   
 
In addition to this researchers have proposed that left-handers can be divided in to 
two main sub-groups that differ in their cerebral organisation.  The first group is 
comprised of familial left-handers (who have a history of left-handedness in their 
family) and non-familial left-handers (who have no history of left-handedness in the 
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family).  Hecaen and Sauguet (1971) reported that non-familial left-handers with 
unilateral lesions performed similarly to right-handed individuals on a series of 
neuropsychological tests.  However, familial left-handers performed differently which 
led Hecaen and Sauguet to conclude that the cerebral organisation of familial and 
non-familial left-handers is somewhat different. 
 
1.7. Implications for humans 
 
Fagot and Vauclair (1991) state that population level handedness will differ 
depending on the type of task that is being carried out (for example whether there are 
more cognitive demands on a task rather than motor demands).  This point is often 
ignored particularly in human handedness research as hand preference is often 
classified by quantifying the number of tasks an individual prefers to carry out with a 
particular hand.  Thus in order to examine the variation of an individual’s hand 
preference it would be useful to look at the tasks according to type (e.g. cognitive) 
and classify hand preference for each task type.   
 
Corballis (1989) states that it is difficult to directly compare the hand preferences of 
non-human primates with those of humans.  He argues that non-human primates 
display weaker asymmetries than humans and thus in order to be able to make even 
slight comparisons stringent handedness criteria would need to be developed which 
would be applicable for both human and non-human primates.  Also, a number of 
comparative tasks would have to be devised in order to collect valid comparative 
handedness data.  These tasks would have to be sensitive enough to pick up any 
handedness effects (particularly in non-human primates) but varied enough so that 
all of the actions could be carried out by both the humans and non-humans.   
 
1.7.1. Asymmetry in the motor system 
On the surface our motor systems are symmetrical (Corballis, 1998). Several areas 
of the cerebral cortex are responsible for voluntary movement in humans.  The main 
areas involved are the primary motor cortex, the secondary motor cortex and the 
premotor cortex (Hellige, 2001).  All movements performed in humans are induced by 
the lateralised motor system (Sabaté, González & Rodriguez, 2004). The primary 
motor cortex of each cerebral hemisphere controls the movement of the contralateral 
side of the body (Kolb & Whishaw, 1995) and it is widely reported that the left 
hemisphere is dominant for many aspects of motor control while the right hemisphere 
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is dominant for visuo-spatial processing and the processing of emotions (Hellige, 
2001).  The dominance of the left hemisphere for motor control is said to be critical 
for controlling both arm movements and also oral movements (Watson & Kimura, 
1989).  They state that speaking and gestural movements are linked and that these 
are both controlled by the motor cortex.  However, it is thought that the left 
hemisphere dominance for motor control may have evolved due to the dominance of 
right-handedness in our society.  Hellige (2001) states that hand preference or 
dominance indicates that one hemisphere’s control of the hand is superior to the 
other.  Kimura (1977) suggests that speech also derives from motor control.  In terms 
of looking at the  link between handedness and the human motor cortex, things are a 
bit unclear as Amunts, Schlaug, Schleicher, Steinmetz, Dabringhaus, Roland and 
Zillies (1996) report that no clear relationship between the two have been 
demonstrated.  Amunts et al. (2000) tested whether asymmetries in hand 
performance (in a group of consistent-right, consistent-left and mixed-handers) were 
associated with anatomical asymmetries in the motor cortex.  The asymmetry was 
measured by examining the depth of the central sulcus and it was found that 
consistently right-handed males showed a significantly deeper central sulcus in the 
left hemisphere than the right hemisphere.  This asymmetry decreased for mixed-
handers and decreased further for consistent left-handers.  Over half of the 
consistent left-handed group (62%) had a deeper central sulcus in the right 
hemisphere than the left but this difference was not significant.  There was no pattern 
of asymmetry found in females regardless of handedness and Amunts et al. 
concluded that sex differences occurred in the motor cortex but this pattern was only 
demonstrated in males.   
 
 
1.8. Reported laterality and handedness differences 
 
Numerous differences have been reported between left- and right-handers.  Some of 
these differences are factual differences while other differences include cognitive and 
performance differences. 
 
1.8.1. Biological/factual differences 
 
Left-handers are often reported to die earlier, on average, than right-handers (e.g. 
Harris, 1993). Also, pathological models of left-handedness have proposed that left-
handers undergo some form of brain damage (normally during birth) that ranges from 
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unnoticeable brain damage where there is very little apparent difference in 
performance to minor brain damage which results in lowered ability on various tests 
of mental functioning to those who have learning disabilities caused by severe brain 
damage at birth (e.g. Satz, 1972) see Chapter 2, section 2.5. for a more detailed 
account of pathological handedness. 
 
Left-handers have also been reported to be more susceptible to migraines, allergies 
and thyroid problems (e.g. Springer & Deutsch, 1993).  Geschwind and Galaburda 
(e.g. 1985a) proposed in their biological theory of handedness that testosterone is 
not only responsible for left-handedness but also it plays a major role in susceptibility 
to immune disorders.  Geschwind and Galaburda state that when foetuses are 
exposed to testosterone it slows down the growth of the left hemisphere and 
accelerates the growth of the right hemisphere (see chapter 2, section 2.5.8. for links 
to handedness).  Geschwind and Galaburda believe that the slow development of the 
left hemisphere caused by the high exposure of testosterone in utero could also 
affect the development of the immune system.  They do state, however, that the 
accelerated growth of the right hemisphere also leads to additional skills (and name 
artistic ability among them).  However, the effects of the testosterone on the left 
hemisphere could be detrimental to the development of language in some cases 
(particularly as around 70% of left-handers have language lateralised in their left 
hemispheres (Green, 1995). Bryden, McManus and Bulman-Fleming (1994) reported 
in a review of Geschwind and Galaburda’s model that left-handers were more likely 
to show signs of asthma and allergies; however, right-handers were more likely to be 
more susceptible to disorders such as arthritis.  
 
Hellige (2001) states that the brain lateralisation of left-handers is more variable than 
right-handers in both the degree and the direction of the asymmetry.  For example 
Annett and Kilshaw (1983) have reported that people with dyslexia tend to be either 
non right-handed or people with a very strong right hand preference.  However, 
Bishop (1990) states that the evidence of increased numbers of non right-handers 
among those with developmental language disorders is not strong.  Bishop (1990) 
reported that there was no evidence in 8-year-old children that there were hand 
preference differences linked to language impairment.   
 
Another difference that has been reported is that there is a higher level of non-right-
handedness among gay men and women in the normal population (McCormick & 
Witelson, 1991).  However, although minor handedness differences have been 
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reported between the homosexual and heterosexual population the actual 
performances of the two groups on a variety of tasks did not differ.  For example, on 
a finger dexterity task there was no difference between the performance of gay men 
and heterosexual men (Hall & Kimura, 1995). 
 
Differences in levels of anxiety have also been reported between left- and right-
handers.  However, these reports have been mixed and some argue that left-handers 
experience higher levels of anxiety (e.g. Dillon, 1989) while others suggest that there 
are no differences at all between the anxiety levels of left- and right-handers (e.g. 
French & Richards, 1990).  (Also see Chapter 4, section 4.7. and Chapter 7, section 
7.2. for additional details).   
 
1.8.2. Performance differences 
 
Performance differences reported between left- and right-handers are often attributed 
to differences in intellect between the participants.  These differences address the 
effect that handedness has on differences in cognitive abilities and most of this 
research focuses on IQ tests and similar tests of intelligence (see section 1.6.2. of 
this Chapter for a summary of this research).  For example, it is often cited that left-
handers have higher mathematical abilities than right-handers (e.g. Annett, 1995).  
O’Boyle and Benbow (1990) found that in a sample of college students who scored 
the highest grades on a mathematical aptitude test the number of left-handers in this 
sample was significantly higher than the number of right-handers.  They also 
reported that around 50% of the students in the group who scored the highest maths 
scores were either left-handed, mixed-handed or were right-handed but had 
immediate relatives who were left-handed.  O’Boyle and Benbow stated that this 
finding supported the argument that bi-lateralisation, rather than greater 
specialisation of the hemispheres, is associated with increased mathematical ability. 
 
Therefore a number of differences exist between left- and right-handers ranging from 
easily observable performance differences to more complex and perhaps hidden 
biological differences.  However, as previously stated much of this research has 
focussed upon addressing the cognitive abilities of left- and right-handers through a 
series of intelligence measures and therefore a wider measurement of cognitive 
ability tests in addition to the current IQ tests need to be carried out before strong 
conclusions can be drawn. 




Around 90% of the population are right-handed and although this dominance has 
(evidently) always existed in human society it is unclear why right-handedness is the 
dominant preference.  Evolutionary theories of handedness have shown that right-
handedness has existed as far back as pre-historic times and evidence from 
Egyptian cave paintings and fossils supports this.  However, in order to explore this 
issue further we have to look back to our closest relatives, the apes, and in particular, 
the chimpanzee with whom we share around 99% of our genes with, in order to 
evaluate both the development and the pattern of their handedness.   
 
The existence of right-hand dominance in apes is a controversial area and there has 
been great debate as to whether dominantly right-handed societies exist.  It is 
generally accepted that apes and monkeys show some forms of handedness 
however the existence of population level right-handedness is generally challenged.  
Hopkins (e.g. 1999) and Fagot and Vauclair (1991) report that chimpanzees exhibit 
right-handedness at the population level which means that right-handedness is 
dominant in chimpanzees.  However, this finding has been widely challenged.  
Westergaard et al. (1998) state that the type of task being performed can affect hand 
preference; Ward et al. (1993) state that the posture adopted by the primate (whether 
they walk on two legs or four) can also affect hand preference and Marchant and 
McGrew (1996) state that whether the chimpanzee was raised in captivity or in the 
wild can also influence hand preference as those raised in captivity may be 
influenced by the right hand dominance of the humans around them.  Marchant and 
McGrew also state that most of Hopkins’ work is done on captive chimpanzees and 
therefore in order for Hopkins to make clear assumptions on population biases then 
more research on wild chimpanzees would have to be done.  Many researchers who 
work with chimpanzees reared in the wild report that the split in handedness is 
around a 50% left-hand preference and 50% right-hand preference.  A final measure 
that may affect hand preference in chimpanzees and other primates is how the 
preference is actually measured.  Marchant and McGrew (1996) measure 
handedness by examining performance on motor tasks whereas others such as 
Hopkins and Bennett (1994) measure a number of tasks over around 50 trials in 
order to get a consistent measurement of the hand used.  A number of researchers 
concluded that there was no evidence of population level right-handedness in 
chimpanzees (e.g. Boesch, 1991; Dimond & Harries, 1984; Marchant & McGrew, 
1996).  MacNeilage et al. (1987) proposed that there is a slight left hand bias in 
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chimpanzees and they stated that this was due to the evolution of bipedalism as the 
chimpanzees probably used the right hand at the front for support when they walked 
quadrapedally and therefore developed a certain amount of skill in the left hand.  A 
final point that researchers make who study handedness in chimpanzees is that a 
consensus has to be reached as to what ‘no hand preference’ in chimpanzees’ 
means as this data is equally as important to researchers but researchers define this 
in a number of different ways.   
 
The lack of bias in hand preference is more prominent in monkeys.  Warren (1980) 
stated that hand preference in old world monkeys (such as baboons) is divided 
equally in 50% right-hand preference and 50% left-hand preference.  However, 
MacNeilage et al. (1987) claimed that the type of task could affect the preference and 
state that a number of prosimians (such as lemurs) display a left hand bias in visually 
guided tasks and many monkeys and apes show a right-hand preference in some 
tasks that require manipulation.  However, very little evidence of population level 
handedness exists in monkeys (e.g. De Sousa et al., 2001; Hook-Costigan & Rogers, 
1995).  Other studies have proposed that there are left hand biases in groups such 
as bushbabies and lemurs (e.g. Larson et al., 1989; Sanford & Ward, 1986; Ward et 
al., 1990; Masataka, 1990).  Thus, it appears that there is no handedness bias 
overall in groups of monkeys but in apes many additional factors have to be taken in 
to account (such as the type of task) in order to effectively evaluate their hand 
preferences.  It does seem in many studies that there is a right hand population bias 
but in many other studies the spread of hand preference is equally divided between 
left- and right-hand preferences.  The distributions of hand preferences in primates 
leans steadily to a right hand preference and in very few species is there any 
evidence of left hand dominance and thus it is possible that this dominance has 
progressed throughout evolution and become even more dominant as human beings 
and chimpanzees split from their common ancestor.   
 
Additionally, brain lateralisation in both humans and animals has to be investigated in 
order to examine the link between lateralisation and handedness.  Again it is perhaps 
most relevant to examine the brain lateralisation of the chimpanzee in order to 
examine the evolutionary links between them and humans.  Rogers (2002) stated 
that cognitive style; temperament and emotional responsiveness were all affected by 
lateralisation in primates as well as humans.  Handedness is often used as an 
indicator of lateralisation both in human and non-human primates and thus both 
groups display a number of similar responses and temperaments based on 
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hemispheric dominance (e.g. Davidson, 1992).  That is the lateralisation of each 
individual may affect how they respond to an object or situation based on their 
cerebral dominance.  For example, someone with a left-hand preference and a 
strong right hemisphere dominance may display a temperament that reflects some of 
the strong characteristics of the right hemisphere such as strong emotions and 
inhibitory behaviour.  Differences in temperament and cognitive behaviour between 
left- and right-handers have been found in chimpanzees and marmosets (Hopkins & 
Bennett, 1994; Cameron & Rogers, 1999).  This finding suggests that the right 
hemisphere in primates might be associated with negative emotions and avoidance 
behaviour.  These behaviours allow us to hypothesise about humans and links can 
be made by citing the findings of Davidson (1992).  Davidson reported that the right 
hemisphere of humans is associated with inhibitory and avoidance behaviour while 
the left hemisphere is associated with approach behaviour.  These findings aid in our 
understanding of the brains of human and non-human primates and it can be 
proposed that there are many similarities between the lateralisation of the two.  A 
similar link can also be made in terms of the lateralisation of language.   
 
Although humans differ from chimpanzees in the fact that we have the mechanism of 
speech we share common lateralisation (particularly with chimpanzees) with respect 
to communication and vocalisation.  Corballis (2002) stated that the most important 
part of lateralisation is the specialisation of the left hemisphere for language.  This 
has been found to be the case in both chimpanzees and humans.  Corballis linked 
our left hemisphere specialisation for language and vocalisations back to primates 
and stated that the cerebral specialisation of language and hand preference evolved 
through manual gestures coupled with vocalisations in Homo habillis around 170,000 
years ago.  There have been objections to these findings and Hauser and Andersson 
(1994) stated that vocalisations were not correlated with handedness but they report 
that this link has been reported in humans.  Thus, in conclusion a tentative link 
between hemispheric dominance of vocalisation and hand preference in 
chimpanzees can possibly be attributed to the evolution of the left hemisphere for 
language and right hand dominance.  This however is a much-debated issue. 
 
Therefore, examining handedness and lateralisation in chimpanzees and other 
animals gives us an invaluable insight in to how both the brain and hand dominance 
has evolved.  A number of handedness differences have been found to exist in 
primates and these often involve response style and/or temperament.  However, 
studies concerning particular cognitive behaviours and styles of interaction with the 
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world in humans are sparse and many human handedness studies report factual 
differences such as left-handers are more prone to migraines or have higher allergy 
levels.  However, the differences found in temperament and response styles in 
primates suggest that fundamental differences do exist with how left- and right-
handers interact with the world and thus these possible differences in humans need 
to be investigated.  Additional theories on the causes and consequences of 
handedness are examined in Chapter 2 and these will take in to account genetic, 
environmental and pathological theories.  Chapter 3 will then investigate how 
handedness is categorised and measured and Chapter 4 will examine response 
styles of left- and right-handers towards a novel object.  This thesis will be developed 
in accordance with these findings. 





Chapter 2 : What causes human right-handedness? The role 
of Genetics, Culture and Pathology 
 
 
2.0. Aims of the Chapter 
 
Chapter 1 outlined the relationship between handedness in humans and other 
animals and associated brain lateralities. While it is the case that the roots of human 
right-handedness may be debated, it is certainly clear that unlike other animals, 
humans have population level right-handedness. This chapter seeks to examine 
theories related to how this pattern may be brought about and maintained. More 
specifically this chapter will look at a number of different theories that attempt to 
explain what ‘causes’ or influences a person to have a left-hand preference or a right-
hand preference.  These include genetic theories, environmental and cultural 
arguments and pathological theories and arguments.   
 
 
2.1. Traditional Theories 
 
“Nearly 90% of humans are right handed.  That is, they prefer the right hand for most 
tasks requiring a single hand and the right hand dominates in tasks involving both 
hands, such as unscrewing the lid off a jar.”  (Corballis, 1991, p82). 
 
The preferred hand of an individual is regarded to be the one with which they are 
most skilful in activities such as writing and drawing (e.g. Annett, 2002).  A variety of 
evidence suggests that the incidence of right-handedness at almost 90% has 
stretched back as far as prehistoric times.  For example, in Egyptian tombs, cave 
paintings depicted people performing activities with their right hands.  An analysis of 
tools and weapons from this time also suggested that not only were they made with 
the right hand but also for the right hand (Springer & Deutsch, 1993).  Contrary to 
this, it was originally thought Ancient Egyptians were predominantly left-handed 
because cave paintings showed a number of profiles of humans and animals facing 
the right and it was suggested that it was more natural for right-handers to draw left 
profiles (Springer & Deutsch, 1993).  However, Corballis (1991) proposed that the 
dominance of the right-handed profile might have been related to the belief that the 
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right side is sacred.  This aside, it was accepted that by the time of the Bronze Age 
right-handedness was established (3000-100 B.C), as many tools and weapons of 
that time were almost exclusively manufactured for right-handers (Corballis, 1991). In 
further support of this, an analysis of the locations of the fractures in fossilised 
baboon skulls concluded that injuries were the results of blows inflicted by humans 
using clubs in their right hands (Springer & Deutsch, 1993). This suggests that 
population level right-handedness has been a characteristic of human behaviour for 
at least the last few thousand years. 
 
Some theories of handedness were popular in the 19th Century.  One of the main 
theories was Visceral Distribution, meaning ‘displacement of internal organs’ 
(McManus, 2002).  It was argued that the position of the organs in the body such as 
the liver resulted in some form of imbalance in many people and resulted in them 
being tilted slightly to the right.  Thus, it was suggested that we balance better on the 
left foot and this therefore leads to us becoming more right footed and in 
consequence right handed  (Langford, 1995).  It was argued that left-handedness 
might result from an opposite centre of gravity but no evidence has been produced to 
support this point. For example, Browne (1648) (cited in Langford, 1995) dismissed 
this by saying that “left-handers and right-handers have been found in whom the 
position of the liver is at variance with the strong emphasis placed on its location in 
this theory” (p18).  He also said that apes, whose livers are on the right, show no 
distinctive preference for one hand or the other, thus he concluded, why should the 
position of our livers play any part in determining our handedness? Another popular 
theory was Carlyle’s Sword and Shield Theory (cited in Springer & Deutsch, 1993), 
which suggested that soldiers held their shields with their left hands to protect their 
hearts and thus, held their weapons with their right.  Therefore, more skill was gained 
with the right.  But, as with the theory of Visceral Distribution, no attempt was made 
to explain left-handedness or why humans still predominantly used their right hands. 
 
The right side has also been reported as being seen as sacred and the left as 
unclean.  In fact, according to Barsley (1970), there are over one hundred favourable 
mentions of the right hand in the Bible and about twenty five unflattering mentions of 
the left (Corballis, 1991). This supports the idea that right-handedness has long been 
regarded as being more important than left-handedness. 
 
In summary, traditional views of handedness indicate that the right hand was not only 
the dominant one but that it was also the accepted one by most people.  Whilst the 
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left hand was considered to be anything from sinister, evil or unclean, the right hand 
was considered sacred.  These traditional views, however, can be argued against 




2.2. Genetic theories and explanations of handedness 
 
Many arguments exist as to whether handedness is genetic or not.  Among those 
who argue that handedness is genetic are Hepper (Hepper, Shahidullah & White 
(1991); Hepper, McCartney & Shannon (1998) and Hepper, Wells and Lynch (2005)) 
who looked at handedness in foetuses; Annett (e.g. 1972; 1985; 1995, 2002) and 
Annett & Kilshaw (1983) who argued that there is a ‘right shift’ in the human 
population which causes most humans to have a right hand bias, plus McManus 
(1985) who outlined an opposing genetic theory to Annett’s (although some argue 
that both Annett’s and McManus’s theories are essentially very similar and this will be 
discussed later in this chapter).  More recently the genetic random-recessive model 
of Klar (1996) has been added to this debate, which, like the models of Annett and 
McManus, is a single-gene model.  The final models that will be discussed are the 
gene-culture models of Laland, Kumm, van Horn and Feldman (1995) and James 
and Orlebeke (2002), which take genetic arguments into consideration, but maintain 
that there has to also be an element of cultural influence in determining handedness.  
Most recently an additional genetic theory by McKeever (2004) was proposed and 
this will be covered briefly. 
 
There is much debate in handedness research as to whether it is an inherited trait.  
Blau, 1946 said, “Preferred laterality is NOT an inherited trait.  There is no evidence 
to support the contention that dominance, either in handedness or any other form is a 
predetermined human capacity”  (cited in Springer & Deutsch, 1993, p132).  Some 
theories propose that left-handedness is a natural variant while others propose that it 
is abnormal or pathological (Annett, 2002).  According to Annett (2002), those 
theories that propose that left-handedness is normal are best explained through 
genetics.  She adds that even if some left-handers are pathological left-handers that 
their hand preference can still be explained through genetics. 
 
Early genetic models of handedness proposed that the preferred hand would be 
determined by the action of a single gene (The Mendelian Model).  This gene would 
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either be a dominant R allele and code for right-handedness or a recessive l gene 
and code for left-handedness.  Thus, it was assumed that an individual who inherited 
an R allele from one parent and an l from the other would be right-handed.  Left-
handers would be those who inherited the l allele from each parent (Springer & 
Deutsch, 1993).  This model, however, cannot account for the fact that 54% of 
offspring of left-handed parents are right-handed (e.g. Green, 1995).  It also assumes 
that two left-handed parents will produce only left-handed offspring through the 
transmission of the l allele and this is firstly, too simplistic a model and secondly, 
these findings are clearly not the case.   
 
Many are sceptical when considering the evidence for genetic models of handedness 
and cerebral dominance.  Because the simplest genetic model cannot be effectively 
demonstrated for handedness (the Mendelian model) then it is questioned whether or 
not handedness can be a purely genetic mechanism (Klar, 2003).  The most 
convincing evidence that could be provided to indicate that handedness is influenced 
by genetics, according to Klar (2003) would be the discovery of some form of 
handedness gene but so far there is no evidence of this.  Others who have opposed 
genetic models include supporters of pathological explanations of left-handedness 
(E.g. Bakan, 1971) and those who support biological explanations (e.g. Geschwind & 
Galaburda, 1985a).  These will be discussed during this chapter. 
 
When considering the case for and against genetic models of handedness three 
major arguments against genetic models are often proposed.  Firstly, hand use can 
be culturally changed and in many cases (particularly those who were originally left-
handed) has been changed (even though some may not be aware of this if it 
happened at a young age).  Secondly, around half of children born to two left-handed 
parents are right-handed and therefore if left-handedness has a genetic component 
and this is the recessive, non-dominant gene for hand preference then it would seem 
unlikely that two left-handed parents would have such high incidences of right-
handed children.  Thirdly, despite sharing the same genes, 18% of identical 
(monozygotic) twins have discordant hand preferences, that is, one twin has a right-
hand preference while the other twin has a left-hand preference.  If handedness is 
genetic and these twins have the same genes then it is proposed that they would 
almost certainly have the same hand preference.  These arguments have led many 
psychologists to believe that handedness must be specified by a combination of 
genetics and environmental and cultural influences.  These issues will be discussed 
in conjunction with the proposed genetic theories that are outlined in this section. 




2.2.1. Pre-natal Handedness 
 
Evidence suggests that hand-preference is apparent even when a child is still in the 
womb.  De Vries, Visser and Prechtl (1985) observed that the embryo makes its first 
whole body movements around 7 weeks gestation and at 9 or 10 weeks it makes 
movements with the left or right arm.  They argue that this is the first sign of 
lateralised behaviour in the foetus. Hepper, Shahidulah and White (1991) studied 
ultrasound observations of foetuses from 12 weeks onwards.  Prior to this, 
behavioural asymmetry research had only been carried out (on people) after birth, as 
it had been argued that because hand preference becomes more apparent around 
the age of 2 then there was little point in looking at it any time before that.  
 
However, Hepper et al’s findings challenged this assumption by showing that some 
form of hand preference did exist before birth and found that foetuses can be seen to 
suck their thumbs at around 12 weeks in the womb  (see figure 2.1.).  They predicted 
that if lateralisation was present before birth then most foetuses should show a right 
thumb sucking bias (in relation to right-hand dominance in the population). Hepper et 
al. looked at the act of thumb sucking for around 15 minutes each in the ultrasounds 
of 282 foetuses noting the preferred thumb. Thumb sucking was defined as having 
the thumb in the mouth with simultaneous mouth movements made by the foetus.  
Twenty foetuses were observed on three different occasions to check the reliability of 
the preferred thumb and these observations were done at least three weeks apart.  
Hepper et al. found a clear right thumb sucking bias both overall and for each 
individual age group (finding around 90% of them consistently sucked the right thumb 
compared to around 8% who consistently sucked the left thumb).  They concluded 
that a bias for right thumb sucking seemed to be present from around 15 weeks 
gestation (and in a few cases from around 12 weeks) and explained this by stating 
that some amount of physical and motor development is needed for thumb sucking 
and up until 15 weeks this had not developed sufficiently in the foetus. Out of the 20 
foetuses that were observed 3 times, 17 of them consistently sucked their right 
thumbs and one of them consistently sucked their left thumb.  The other 2 foetuses 
sucked their right thumbs in two out of the three observations and their left thumb 
during the other.  It therefore appears that, overall, thumb sucking remains stable and 
consistent during the gestation period.  These data concur with the statistics for the 
proportion of left- and right-handers in society (i.e. when the population is split into 
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either left or right-handers approximately 10% are left-handed and 90% right-
handed).   
 
Figure 2.1: Shows a foetus sucking the left thumb around 21 weeks 
(http://pregnancy.about.com/cs/ultrasounds) 
 
Hepper, McCartney and Shannon (1998) expanded upon the work of De Vries et al. 
(1985) and studied the frequency of foetuses’ left and right arm movements in utero 
in order to see if there was any difference in their occurrence.  They observed 87 
foetuses each at 10 weeks gestation, only recording the number of single left and 
right arm moves when both arms were visible. In order to count as a single arm 
movement all other parts of the foetus’ body had to remain still.  Hepper et al. (1998) 
pointed out that at 10 weeks gestation “the foetus is free floating in the uterus and 
thus its body position does not influence its movements” (p532). If a foetus had more 
recorded arm movements with one arm, it was recorded as preferring that arm (i.e. 
more movement with the right arm equals a right preference), and if it displayed 
equal numbers of left and right arm movements then it was classified as having no 
preference.  75% showed a higher number of right arm movements, 12.5% showed a 
higher left arm preference and 12.5% showed no overall preference.  Hepper et al. 
also looked solely at the foetuses that exhibited either a left or right preference and 
found that 85.7% exhibited a right arm preference and 14.3% exhibited left arm 
preferences.  Again this correlates with the figures that around 90% of the population 
are right-handed and around 10% are left-handed. Hepper et al. also reported that 
they looked at the number of arm movements displayed by each foetus over the 
course of half an hour and each foetus displayed around the same number of arm 
movements in that time.  They found that there was no difference in the number of 
arm movements between the three groups.  The work of Hepper et al. (1991) and 
Hepper et al. (1998) presents a strong case that there appears to be some form of 
genetic link to hand (or arm) preference in foetuses.  The displayed behaviour in 
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utero rules out most cultural or environmental factors.  However, the lying position of 
the foetus could have an effect on arm movements, as could more than one foetus in 
the womb.   
 
These findings were further supported by recent follow-up work from Hepper, Wells 
and Lynch (2005) who showed that aged 10-12 years the hand preferences largely 
followed their pre-natal preferences.  They also reported that males who sucked their 
left thumbs prenatally were more likely to switch to be right-handed children than 
females who sucked their left thumbs prenatally.  
 
Other studies that have examined lateralisation in foetuses and newborn infants have 
looked at head turning preferences.  Ververs, de Vries, van Geijn and Hopkins (1994) 
carried out ultrasound studies on the position of foetuses’ heads relative to their 
bodies from around 12 weeks gestation until birth.  They found that around 38 weeks 
gestation the foetus showed a preference for having its head turned right relative to 
its body.  Goodwin and Michel (1981) found that in newborns the majority of the 
infants prefer to lie with their heads turned to the right.  Thus, Hepper et al. (1991) 
proposed that if foetal thumb sucking was linked to handedness then this should 
relate to the infants’ head turning preference after birth.  Goodwin and Michel (1981) 
and Michel and Goodwin (1979) argued that an infants’ head position after birth 
reflects on the position of the foetus intrauterine and therefore this could be linked to 
the developing hand preference of the child.  
 
Hepper et al. (1991) examined this idea further and looked at the thumb sucking 
preferences of 101 foetuses at 32 weeks gestation and then followed up 1/3 of the 
foetuses as newborns (aged between 2 and 4 days old). They examined their head 
turning preferences to see if there was a correlation between the thumb sucking 
preference (hand preference) and head turning as Michel and Goodwin (1979) and 
Goodwin and Michel (1981) had suggested.  Hepper et al. tested the infants in their 
own cots and placed them lying on their backs.  They ensured that there were no 
objects or distractions present that might bias the infants’ head turning.  The infants’ 
head was held in the middle by an examiner and then let go.  The side that the infant 
turned its head to was noted by the examiner, every infant tested turned its head 
either to the left or to the right (turning the head was defined as turning it at least 30 
degrees from the midline).  Of these 32 newborns as foetuses 28 (88%) of them were 
observed sucking their right thumbs.  It was found that 23 (82%) of these ‘right-
handers’ turned their heads to the right and 5 (18%) of them turned their heads to the 
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left.  4 of the foetuses out of the 32 had a left thumb sucking preference (12%) and 
as newborns it was found that 3 of them turned their heads to the left (75%) and one 
to the right.  In total, therefore, 81% of the sample had a corresponding thumb 
sucking preference as foetuses with head turning preference as newborns.  Hepper 
et al. (1991) concluded that foetal hand preference might be related to head turning 
preference in newborns.  Again this forms a case for a genetic basis to handedness, 
as thumb sucking in foetuses is not subject to any form of cultural or environmental 
influence.   
 
In summary, there is clear behavioural evidence to support the idea of a genetic 
component to handedness.  Hepper et al. (2005) suggest that laterality in early 
gesture must be influenced by spinal cord reflexes and not a consequence of brain 
laterality (as the brain lacks a cortex at these early stages) and so may stimulate 
brain organisation, leading to laterality effects. This is counter to the mainstream view 
that brain lateralisation leads to behavioural asymmetry (e.g. Geschwind & 
Galaburda, 1985a; Harris, 1983).  
 
2.2.2. The Levy-Nagylaki (1972) 2 gene-4 allele Model 
 
Levy and Nagylaki (1972) outlined a genetic model of handedness and cerebral 
dominance for speech.  The model proposed that there were two genes and four 
alleles responsible for language and handedness.  The first gene was responsible for 
expressing cerebral dominance for language.  This gene had two alleles one for left 
hemisphere language dominance (L) and the other for right hemisphere language 
dominance (l).  The second gene determined whether the preferred hand was 
contralateral or ipsilateral to the hemisphere that was dominant for language (with 
alleles (C) and (c) respectively).  Thus those with the genotype LLCC would be left 
hemisphere dominant for language and their dominant hand would be their right 
hand.  This would be the most common genotype. 
 
Levy and Nagylaki also proposed that writing posture (i.e. either an inverted posture 
or a non-inverted posture for holding a pen – see figure 2.2) was a possible indicator 
of the genotype of a person’s cerebral dominance for language.  They suggested that 
those with an inverted writing posture (found more commonly in left-handers than in 
right-handers) had more control via the ipsilateral pathways and those with a non-
inverted postures were more likely to be controlled via the contralateral hemisphere.  
Thus as many left-handers adopt an inverted writing posture then this would suggest 
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that those who do will be, according to Levy and Nagylaki, left hemisphere dominant 
for language.  The percentage of left-handers who are left hemisphere dominant for 
language varies between 60 – 70%.  Green (1995) cites Wada test statistics which 
suggest that “around 70% of left-handers have language in the left hemisphere, 15% 
in the right and 15% have a bilateral representation across both hemispheres” p73.  
Levy and Nagylaki (1972) suggest that around 60% of left-handers write with an 
inverted posture and 40% write with a non-inverted posture. This means that the 
figures concur fairly well with the majority of left-handers being left hemisphere 
dominant for language and writing with an inverted posture. Over 95% of right-
handers have their left hemisphere dominant for language (e.g. Carlson, 2001).  Levy 
and Nagylaki propose that those with a non-inverted posture would be more likely to 
be controlled by the hemisphere contralateral to their writing hand and this 
corresponds with the findings that almost all right-handers write with a non-inverted 
posture. 
 
          
      Left hand non-inverted                   Left hand parallel                Left hand inverted/’hooked’ 
 
 
     
     Right hand non-inverted         Right hand parallel            Right hand inverted/’hooked’ 
 
Figure 2.2: Non-inverted, parallel and inverted or ‘hook’ postures shown by the left 
and right hand. 
 
 




However, a number of problems have occurred with this model.  Bishop (1990) 
questions whether writing posture can be used to identify the genotype for cerebral 
dominance.  Several studies back this suggestion up.  Peters and McGrory (1987) 
studied dichotic listening and writing posture and found that there was no difference 
in response between those with inverted postures and those with non-inverted 
postures.  Volpe, Sidtis and Gazzaniga (1981) examined the hypothesis that left-
handers’ dominant hemisphere for language can be identified by their writing posture 
by means of a Wada test and failed to support the predictions of Levy and Nagylaki 
(1972).  Similarly, Ajersch and Milner (1983) found no link between hand posture and 
language dominance using the Wada test.  It is also acknowledged (e.g. Bishop, 
1990) that many left-handers can write using either the inverted posture or the non-
inverted posture and if this is the case and it is susceptible to change in the individual 
then it does not seem to be a strong predictor of cerebral dominance for language.  It 
has also been suggested that posture can simply be an adaptive behaviour for what 
is best for the individual.  It is possible that posture may be altered by an individual’s 
educational experience, for example, Annett (1985) suggests that pressure to 
conform to various postures may differ across societies, or it is possible that 
individuals adopt an inverted posture so to advantage themselves when writing (e.g. 
Meulenbroek & Van Galen, 1989; Teasdale & Owen, 2001).  In the latter case a left-
hander with an inverted pen posture will be able to write without smudging the ink 
and perhaps more importantly they will be able to see what they are writing rather 
than it being concealed by their hand   Other problems exist with the inverted hand 
posture itself.  One problem is the lack of a clear definition of what an inverted hand 
posture is.  Annett (1985) proposes that it could be defined as a point where the hand 
is turned around 180°.  However, Peters (1996) defined hand posture in three 
different ways rather than simply inverted and non-inverted.  He stated that as there 
was an element of ambiguity over what an inverted hand posture was then a third 
category should be introduced which was somewhere in between an inverted and 
non-inverted posture (see figure 2.2).  This third posture was defined as parallel to 
the line of writing.  It could then be easily clarified that if the hand were below the line 
of writing then this would be a non-inverted posture and if the hand were above the 
line of writing then this would be an inverted posture. 
 
Figures regarding percentages of left- (and in some cases right-) handers with an 
inverted posture also fluctuate over studies.  Annett (1985) studied 460 right-handers 
and 68 left-handers and found that 0.65% of the right-handers and 8.82% of the left-
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handers adopted the inverted writing posture.  Studies by Bradshaw and Taylor 
(1979), Coren and Porac (1979) and McKeever (1979) reported percentages of left-
handers adopting the inverted writing posture to be between 30 – 60%.  More 
recently Teasdale and Owen (2001) studied a sample of 232 males and found that 
51% of them adopted the inverted writing posture, 21% adopted a non-inverted 
writing posture and 28% of the sample could not be categorised clearly in to one of 
the categories.     
 
An additional problem with classification of hand posture is that it depends on the 
person who categorises it.  If there are discrepancies between researcher’s 
definitions of what an inverted hand posture is then it is probable that figures will vary 
according to the individual doing the observing of a particular group.  Teasdale and 
Owen (2001) reported ambiguities between researchers, as did Annett (1985).  
Peters (1996) allowed his participants to categorise their own postures.  Thus is can 
be seen that different definitions of what inverted and non-inverted hand postures 
are, fluctuating statistics of inverted hand postures and ambiguities between 
researcher’s classifications of an inverted hand posture are all important things to 
consider when examining the proposals made about those with inverted writing 
postures. 
 
One final criticism of this model is that Levy and Nagylaki hypothesised that there 
were two alleles of each of two genes and that one controlled cerebral lateralisation 
and the other controlled whether the relationship between the hemisphere dominant 
for language was ipsilateral or contralateral to the dominant hand, however, Klar 
(1996) stated that this model was over complex as it proposes that a full expression 
of the allele only occurs when a dominant allele is present in the homozygous and 
heterozygous condition at each of the two loci.  However, it doesn’t state how much 
of or even if the gene is expressed when the recessive allele is present. 
 
Overall, it is clear that the model is too vague to test directly and appears to rely too 
much on a postural assumption that doesn’t seem to be supported by subsequent 
studies and is lacking in some important details.  
 
2.2.3. Annett’s Right Shift Theory 
 
Annett first introduced a possible genetic model of handedness entitled the 
inheritance of cerebral dominance and handedness in 1964.  This model proposed 
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that handedness was determined by two alleles, D (which coded for right-
handedness) and R (which coded for left-handedness).  The D allele was considered 
to be the dominant allele and R was the recessive allele.  Annett (1964) proposed 
that someone with the genotype DD would be right-handed and left-brain dominant 
whereas a person with the RR genotype would be left-handed and right brain 
dominant.  Annett reported that those with the DR genotype would use either hand 
for skilled activities and their speech could be developed in either hemisphere 
(although she stated that this was subject to the strength of the recessive R allele).  
Annett added that due to the dominance of the D allele that most of the 
heterozygotes (those with the DR genotypes) would be right-handed and develop 
speech in their left hemispheres and others would have ipsilateral hand preference 
and speech dominance (right-handed and right hemisphere speech dominance and 
left-hand preference and left hemisphere speech dominance).   
 
However, this model was found to be problematic and Annett worked to develop the 
right shift theory of handedness and brain asymmetry (first published in 1972).  This 
theory has been constantly developed over the past 30 years and a summary of the 
main points will be presented.  The theory has remained broadly similar since the 
original model; however, subtle factors and additional explanations have been added.  
The Right Shift theory has 2 main features.  The first concerns hand skill.  Annett 
stated that the difference in hand skill between the hands in humans and non-
humans is normally distributed.  The second feature is that there is a human shift 
towards dextrality (or right-handedness).  However, Annett (1985) points out that 
there can be no absolute assertions made using this theory in that it cannot be used 
to generalise about the left- or right-handed population (e.g. all right-handers are…). 
 
Handedness in humans 
One important factor within this theory is that it distinguishes mixed-handers from 
consistent right- and left-handers (see chapter 3, section 3.2.4. for more details on 
Annett’s hand classification system).  Annett (1995) states that in order to get an 
accurate measurement of hand preference then handedness must be measured on a 
continuous scale that separates consistent left-handers and consistent right-handers 
from mixed-handers (of varying strengths).  The strength of hand preference is also 
important in this theory as it aids in predicting relationships between handedness and 
cerebral dominance for language. The strength of hand preference is best calculated 
by examining the difference in skill between the left hand and the right hand (Bishop, 
1990).  Other hand classification systems and models work on a purely binary 
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system of left- and right-hand preference (such as Levy & Nagylaki, 1972) and thus 
Annett argues that these models and classification systems may overlook differences 
and effects between those with consistent and inconsistent hand preferences. 
 
Humans vs. Non-Humans 
The Right Shift theory was founded on a comparison between humans and non-
human handedness.  The distribution of the hand preference of animals is U shaped.  
That is, around 25% of them are consistently right-pawed and 25% of them are 
consistently left-pawed with the other 50% distributed somewhere between a 
consistent left and consistent right paw preference (Annett, 1972, but see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2.).  Annett (1995) stated that the distribution of non-human hand/paw 
preference was centred on 0 (as in the U shaped distribution) but the human 
distribution is displaced to the right by around 1 standard deviation (see figure 2.3. 
below) 
 
Some researchers (e.g. Collins, 1969) have argued that there is no evidence that 
genetics play a part in the handedness of non-humans. Bishop (1990) argued that 
the handedness of animals was determined either purely by chance or by 
environmental factors and this resulted in the dominance of one hand (or paw) (but 
see Chapter 1, section 1.2, for a discussion of handedness in chimpanzees and other 
animals).  Annett (1985) argues that the main factor separating humans from non-
humans concerning laterality is that humans display some form of shift to the right 
whereas there is no such bias in non-humans.  This idea of a shift to the right led 
Annett to develop the Right Shift theory and she wanted to investigate what actually 
caused this shift in humans.  She proposed that there had to be something that was 
present in humans but not in non-humans in order to make this shift occur.  Annett 
said that the main difference between the two groups was that humans had the ability 
of speech and therefore the shift may be connected to this in some way.  More 
specifically, Annett (1985) proposed that the shift to the right is linked with left 
cerebral dominance for language.  Annett (1985) linked the dominance of the left 
hemisphere for language to right hand dominance and therefore an inferior right 
hemisphere was related to weaker left hand skill.   However, Annett (1972) stated 
that cultural, accidental and genetic variation should all be taken in to account when 
considering what causes the right shift in humans. 
 





Figure 2.3: The relationship between hand preference and hand skill in humans (a) 
and in non-humans (b). (Annett, 2002, p.65) 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of both hand preference and hand skill in humans 
(figure a) and non-humans (figure b).  Figure a shows that the distribution of hand 
skill is slightly shifted to the right which indicates that in human society most people 
are more skilled with their right hand than their left hand.  The ‘J’ shape within the 
normal distribution curve shows the distribution of hand preference in humans.  This 
distribution indicates that a small proportion of the human population have a left hand 
preference and very few have a mixed hand preference and most people have a right 
hand preference.  However, figure b shows that the hand skill distribution of non-
humans is normally distributed around 0 which suggests that an equal number of 
non-humans have a more skilled left or right hand and that there is no dominantly 
skilled hand among non-humans.  Additionally, the ‘U’ shaped distribution shows that 
an equal number of non-humans have a left or right hand preference with very few 
cases of mixed hand preferences, this is shown by the symmetrical nature of the 
distribution. 
 
Right Shift Theory 
Annett (1972) proposed her first version of the Right Shift in which she suggested 
that genetic variations in handedness could be due to the operation of a single gene, 
which could exist in either of two forms or alleles (RS+ which is the dominant allele 
and RS- which is the recessive allele).  The dominant allele produces a ‘right shift’ in 
those who carry it, thus, the distribution of handedness heavily leans to the right.  
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This is labelled the RS+ allele but a small fraction of the population carrying this will 
be left handed due to environmental factors and influences.  
 
One misconception about the Right Shift theory is that it involves a gene for 
handedness.  The theory involves random biases to the left and right sides of the 
body and some individuals have chance factors plus the RS+ gene and some just 
have chance factors alone.  Annett (1995) points out that no one has the right shift 
gene alone and that there is always the possibility for chance to be involved.   The 
RS+ gene is the dominant gene and codes for left cerebral dominance for language 
rather than for right-handedness.  This gene, however, is thought to increase the 
probability of right-handedness.  One gene is passed on from each parent to the 
offspring and therefore three different combinations are possible.  A person could be 
RS++, RS+- or RS - -.  It would be expected that a person who is RS++ would be left 
hemisphere dominant for language and right-handed, as would the majority of people 
who were RS+-.  When the RS+ gene is present it is thought that there is about a 
95% chance of right-handedness (Annett, 1995).  However, a person with the 
genotype RS - - would display a different pattern but not necessarily the reverse of 
those with the RS+ gene.  Annett (1995) stated that the cerebral lateralisation of 
language and hand dominance (independent of cerebral dominance) were purely 
down to chance in those with the RS - - genotype.  It is predicted in the Right Shift 
theory that those with the RS - - genotype would fall in to equal proportions of right 
and left brained speakers in that individuals with this genotype lack a factor which 
induces left hemisphere dominance for language and right hand dominance.  The 
Right Shift theory also proposes that those with right hemisphere dominance for 
language (in normal samples) will almost all have the RS - - genotype.  Although 
possession of the RS+ gene appears to increase the incidence of right-handedness, 
possession of the RS- gene does not increase the incidence of left-handedness.  The 
incidence of left-handedness in this theory is down to chance in conjunction with 
having the RS - - genotype.  Annett (1995) says that those with the double recessive 
gene would have an equal chance of becoming either left- or right-handed.  Annett 
(1995) also points out that some left-handers carry the right shift gene (RS+) as 
strong random left-handedness would be reduced but not overruled by the right shift.   
 
Annett (1995) stated that there is no gene for left-handedness or even a gene that 
induces left-handedness. Those with the right shift gene present (either the RS++ 
genotype or the RS+- genotype) will almost all have typical cerebral dominance 
(which is the left hemisphere being specialized for language).  Those with the RS - - 
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genotype will have randomised cerebral specialization for language.    Annett (1995) 
suggested that the brains of those with the RS++ genotype differ slightly from the 
brains of those with RS+- genotypes.  Li, Zhu and Nuttall (2003) report that around 
1/3 of the population is made up of people with the RS++ genotype.  Bishop (1990) 
stated that if the RS+ gene were completely dominant then those with the RS++ 
genotype would not differ in phenotype from those with the RS+- genotype.  
However, Bishop argues that the RS+- genotype may be an intermediate genotype 
which falls somewhere in the middle of the RS++ and RS - - genotypes.  Annett 
(1995) suggested that those with the RS+- genotype would have a moderate dose of 
the right shift factor while those with the RS++ factor would have a large dose of the 
right shift factor and therefore they would be expected to show a stronger right hand 
preference and be further shifted to the right.   
 
Annett suggested that the RS+ allele is expressed more strongly in women than in 
men and from this she proposed that women therefore have a greater level of right-
handedness (Annett, 1967).  Annett also stated that this might account for the fact 
that most surveys reveal a higher proportion of left-handers among males.  This is 
also supported by evidence from Oldfield (1971) who stated that there were more 
left-handers among males than females.  However, Annett (1972) stated that if 
females are more asymmetrical to the right (in that their right shift is further than the 
right shift of males in the distribution of handedness) and the factor that determines 
handedness in males and females is the same, then left-handed females would be 
expected to possess a stronger version of left-handedness than males.  Thus, if a 
female were atypically right-handed then in order to express left-handedness then 
the gene to express left-handedness would have to be strong in order to deviate from 
the norm, which is right-handedness (and a strong form of right-handedness in many 
cases if there is an increased shift to the right).  This does not contradict Oldfield’s 
statement that there are more left-handed males but one difference is that Oldfield 
does not comment on the strength of handedness in these left-handers and 
measures them in terms of a laterality quotient over a 10-item handedness inventory.  
Annett (1972), however, claims that many of the female left-handers in her samples 
are strong left-handers (using her 8 classification of hand preference – see Chapter 
3, section 3.2.4. for further information).     
 
A summary of Annett’s Right Shift theory is that it is present in humans but not in 
non-humans (specifically any other primates), the right shift is stronger in females 
than in males and the strength and skill of the right side of the body is increased by 
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the shift to the right.  This, therefore, led to the conclusion that the shift must be 
linked to something that is unique to humans which is the development of speech 
(and more specifically the development of speech in the left hemisphere). 
 
Proposed causes of the Right Shift theory  
There have been various explanations for what causes the shift to the right in 
humans.  Annett (2003) stated that explanations of cerebral dominance fall in to two 
main categories: natural and pathological.  Annett (1995) argued that the main 
findings of her Right Shift Theory are due to genetic factors and not pathological 
factors.  Annett (1985) stated, “The fact that some left-handedness is due to 
pathological causes does not imply that all left-handedness is due to pathology.  The 
right shift theory concerns natural variation in the general population” (p441). Annett 
goes on to say the right shift theory suggests that the presence or the absence of the 
RS+ gene is associated with individual differences in cerebral organization that arise 
from natural variation (Annett, 2003).  Annett argued that the most important factors 
to explain the shift to the right were genetic factors and cultural factors.  More 
specifically, Annett (1985) stated that the factor (or gene(s)) that induces speech in 
the left hemisphere is genetic and that there are no genes for inducing speech in the 
right hemisphere or for displaying left-hand dominance (those with RS - -).  This, 
according the theory, is left to chance with slight influences from culture and the 
environment where hand dominance is concerned.   
 
However, Annett (1995) stated that a gene that influences hemispheric dominance 
and more specifically hemispheric dominance for language may have some 
disadvantages.  One main disadvantage may be that because there is a huge 
commitment to the left hemisphere in those who have left hemisphere language 
specialisation then the right hemisphere may suffer at its’ expense as there may be 
over commitment to the left with very little emphasis on the right hemisphere and its 
functions.  Annett says that this disadvantage would be highest in those with the 
RS++ genotype (around 32% of the population according to Annett & Manning, 
1990), as they would have the strongest shift to the right and the strongest chance of 
left cerebral dominance and right-handedness.  Annett added that those with the 
RS+- genotype (around 49% of the population) would have a very strong chance of 
left cerebral dominance for language and right-handedness but this group would 
“enjoy the advantages of lateralisation of speech to the left hemisphere, with minimal 
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risk to the right hemisphere” (Annett & Manning, 1990, p61) 1. The disadvantage of 
over use of the left hemisphere would be absent in those with the RS - - genotype as 
cerebral dominance and handedness is left entirely down to chance and therefore 
there are no specific demands on either hemisphere and there is a higher chance of 
the left hemisphere not being dominant for language lateralisation.  However, Annett 
and Manning (1990) reported that although this group are not at risk of hemisphere 
impairment (either to the right or the left hemisphere) they are at risk of 
developmental delays of speech and language skills as “there is an inherent difficulty 
of programming a large brain to serve speech, when the corpus callosum is immature 
(the evolutionary pressure presumed to maintain the RS+ gene in the population” 
(p62).  Annett suggested that there is a balanced polymorphism with heterozygote 
advantage in the right shift theory (e.g. Annett, 1995).  By this she means that it 
might be advantageous to have the genotype RS+- as these individuals will have the 
benefits of the RS+ gene but also the influence of the RS- gene, which lowers the 
over-commitment to the left hemisphere, and lack of commitment to the right 
hemisphere (Annett, 1978).  Annett stated that left hemisphere advantage is present 
in gene carriers but is absent on non-gene carriers.   
 
Annett (1995) stated that those with the RS - - genotype can have the same pattern 
of cerebral dominance and handedness as those with the RS++ genotype  (left 
hemisphere cerebral dominance for language and right-handedness) due to chance.  
She added that chance is a major factor in the right shift theory and plays a part in 
almost any type of asymmetry (Annett, 1995).  However, right hemisphere 
dominance for language or bilateral distribution of language is almost never 
expressed in the normal population with the RS+ gene but is expressed in around 
30% of left-handers most of whom would be expected to have the RS - - genotype 
according to the right shift theory.  Annett (1995) stated that although the right shift 
theory is concerned with cerebral dominance and language lateralisation, it is difficult 
to directly measure cerebral dominance and thus handedness can be used as a 
predictor of cerebral dominance patterns as it is a weak by-product of cerebral 
asymmetry and is easily measured. Annett (1985) stated that the shift in the 
population to the right could not be purely down to chance factors and she states that 
that this is not a feasible explanation. 
 
                                                 
1 Annett contends that the most advantaged individuals should not be the most left-handed 
individuals (1992a, 1993a) but rather those biased towards dextrality.  This advantage is what 
Annett referred to as “human balanced polymorphism”. 
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Annett (1972) has also postulated that culture may influence the shift to the right in 
the right shift theory.  She proposed that cultural influences, however, would depend 
on the presence of other people and also the kind of influence they would have 
(whether the influence was conscious or not).  She also stated that if there was an 
equal chance that a person could use the right hand and the left hand then it would 
be probable that there would still be a higher proportion of right-handers in the 
‘chance’ group than left-handers.  The main reason for this is that as we live in a 
right-handed society the use of the right hand is encouraged through cultural 
influences (particularly in skilled activities).  In the case of those with a strong left-
hand preference, they would continue to use their left hands but those with a weak 
left hand preference would be more likely to change hand preference under cultural 
pressure.  Thus, cultural influence could aid in the shift to the right in some groups - 
particularly those with weak preferences who could be easily influenced.  However, 
Annett (1972) has proposed that cultural factors cannot explain the right shift 
independent of any other factors.  Annett argued that if culture were solely 
responsible for the shift to the right then there would be a left-handed society 
somewhere in the world if society was balanced at birth by left- and right-handers 
and cultural influences determined the hand dominance of the society.  As there are 
no known left-handed societies in the world then it appears that other factors must 
also be responsible for influencing this shift to the right. 
 
Right shift in families 
Annett (1983) tested children of two left-handed parents on a peg-moving task and 
found that 50% of the children were faster with their right hands and 50% were faster 
with their left hands.  There was a slight bias towards favouring the right hand as the 
trials progressed but this difference was not significant.  More importantly, if some 
left-handers carry the RS+ gene then it would be expected that these individuals 
would be more skilled with the right hand.  Also, some of the parents of the children 
in the sample had had early birth traumas or difficulties and therefore could possibly 
be pathological left-handers (and thus carry the RS+ gene) (see section 2.5.).  Annett 
found that the children in these families (ones which consisted of potentially 
pathological left-handed parents), although raised by two left-handed parents were 
just as biased to right-hand preferences as the right-handed control subjects.  Annett 
(1983) concluded that this is evidence that the bias to dextrality is genetic but if there 
is an absence of a genetic factor then chance is sufficient to account for right- and 
left-handedness. 
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Annett (1994) reported that right-handers with all right-handed family members are 
likely to have the RS++ genotype and be left hemisphere dominant for language 
whereas right-handers with close relatives who are not right-handed are more likely 
to have the RS+- genotype. The influence of families on handedness can be further 
explored through twin studies. 
 
Twin studies 
Annett (1995) proposed that the right shift is larger in single born children than it is in 
twins.  Handedness in twins is often thought to rule out any genetic influence of 
handedness because proportions of RR, RL and LL pairs are consistent with random 
allocation (Annett, 1995).  It was also pointed out that proportions of RR, RL and LL 
pairs were almost identical in monozygotic and dizygotic twins.   Collins (1970) found 
that in monozygotic twins the proportions of RR, RL and LL pairs were 75%, 23% 
and 2% respectively and were 78%, 21% and 1% in dizygotic twins.  Thus, this 
illustrated that there was a higher incidence of two right-handed twins in dizygotic 
pairs than monozygotic pairs but a higher incidence of left-handedness in 
monozygotic pairs for both discordant twins and two left-handed twins.  However, 
Annett (1995) proposed that if handedness in twins was down to chance then the 
pairings of RR, RL and LL should appear in the proportions 25%, 50% and 25% 
respectively.  However, it has been found that there are an excess number of right-
handers among twins that challenges the view that their handedness is purely down 
to chance.  Annett (1995) proposes that handedness in twins is due to chance plus, 
in many cases, a factor which increases the probability of right-handedness.  Annett 
states that this pattern would fit in with the Right Shift theory, as almost all of the 
variability within it is random.  The model also fits in with the view that there is a 
higher incidence of right-handedness in twins because many of them will have the 
RS+ gene in some form (depending on the genotype of their parents) and those with 
the RS - - gene will have an equal chance of being left-handed or right-handed.  
When this occurs right-hand preference is higher as people and the environment can 
influence it.  
 
It is also important to note that monozygotic twins have the same genotype (thus if 
one twin is RS- - and is left-handed the other twin will also be RS- - (but not 
necessarily left-handed) but dizygotic twins do not necessarily have the same 
genotype as they share only 50% of their genes (Annett, 2003).  Monozygotic twins 
often differ for handedness, as do dizygotic twins.  Monozygotic twins share the 
same genotype (and have identical genes) yet they sometimes differ for hand 
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preference this therefore rules out mirror imaging in twins.  Annett (2003) stated that 
recent theories have introduced chance factors that would permit monozygotic twins 
to differ for laterality even when there was a genetic influence.  Annett (2003) implied 
that the right shift that occurs in single born individuals is different to that of twins.  
She stated that a smaller shift occurred in twins (both mz and dz pairs) and this 
implied that the expression of the RS+ gene was reduced in some way by the 
twinning (although Klar, 1999, suggests that evidence for this idea is lacking).  Annett 
(1978) proposed that the reduction in the shift could be up to as much as 50% in 
order to match the prediction for twin pairs.   However, a later prediction proposed 
that a reduction in the shift of 33% was a more realistic prediction (Annett, 1985).  
This reduction implies that twins are more often left-handed than single born 
individuals and also helps explain why many twins have discordant hand preference.  
This reduction in the right shift in twins implies that the RS+ gene may be a function 
of size or maturity at birth.  Annett (2003) states that this is consistent with the higher 
frequency of right-handed females than males and the higher frequency of right-
handedness in full term infants than premature or low birth weight infants. 
 
Hand Skill 
Hand skill is often used to indicate hand preferences (see Chapter 3, sections 3.5. & 
3.6.). Annett (1972) stated that the distribution of hand skill appears to be universal in 
all species in that it forms a normal distribution (see figure 2.4). She added that hand 
skill is normally distributed and is something that can be more accurately measured 
in humans than in non-humans.  The Right Shift Theory also examines distribution of 
hand preference and hand skill within the normal population.  Annett and Kilshaw 
(1983) looked at hand skill using a peg-moving task in children.  They found that in 
right-handed participants rather than hand skill specifically concerning speed and skill 
of the right-hand it depended in many cases on slowness and lack of skill in the left 
hand.  According to Annett (1995), hand skill studies suggest that there is some form 
of left hand weakness which leads to strong dextrality, which she says is possibly 
associated with impairment of right hemisphere function.  This observation of hand 
skill offers a possible explanation to why the RS+ gene has been limited in the 
population.   
 
The right shift theory hypothesizes that the total population distribution will consist of 
three underlying distributions (one that assumes superior skill with the left hand, one 
that assumes no difference between the hands in skill and one that assumes superior 
skill with the right hand).  However, the type of hand skill distribution obtained will 
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depend on the task used.  Peters (1987) noted that practice was a crucial variable.  
He added that prolonged practice with one hand on a task would emphasise 
differences between the 2 sides (e.g. when demonstrating hand skill using a pen – 
skill will be bimodal – one mode well to the left of 0 and the other at the 
corresponding point on the right).  If a relatively unpractised task were used then 
bimodality would not be as apparent. 
 
Figure 2.4: Right minus Left difference in hand skill for humans and non-humans. 
(Bishop, 1990, p43). 
 
Problems and criticisms 
Overall, Annett’s right shift theory has been very influential in handedness research, 
but this doesn’t mean that it is without its critics. For example, one criticism with this 
model is that it has so many components and levels that it may be possible to fit 
almost any data set to it (Bishop, 1990).  This point is extended by Corballis (1991) 
who stated that the model could be interpreted in a few different ways to explain 
various findings.  For example, it can be interpreted that because there are no left 
handed societies in this world then it cannot solely be culture acting on its own that 
influences handedness.  However, the theory does not justify why culture could not 
be solely responsible for determining handedness.  In assuming that culture cannot 
be solely responsible the theory assumes that genetics is a key part to determining 
handedness and that it is only those with weak hand preferences can be influenced 
by culture.   However, the theory does not explain exactly how weak an individual’s 
hand preference would have to be before there could be a cultural influence and also 
it does not take in to consideration the different types of cultural influence that could 
occur (and to what extent).  These cultural influences could include, among many 
things, imitation of parents and/or teachers or perhaps even the general design of 
materials in the right-handed world.  Corballis (1991) also argued that the absence of 
environmental and cultural pressure could not be guaranteed.  He said that it would 
be almost impossible to do this.  Also, Corballis stated that Annett does not define 
Chapter 2: What causes human right-handedness? The role of Genetics, Culture and 
Pathology 
 68 
chance clearly and leaves it open for interpretation (again allowing different 
conclusions to be drawn depending on people’s interpretations).  He goes on to say 
that Annett’s definition of chance is ambiguous and could probably be just as well 
defined and interpreted with respect to cultural and environmental influences and 
also parental influence. 
 
Another criticism of the model, which leads on from the first criticism, is that the 
general right shift genetic model of handedness states that ¼ of the population are 
expected to have two RS+ alleles (due to classic genetic theory with one 
chromosome coming from each parent), ½ are expected to have      RS + - and ¼ RS 
- - (this is because RS+ is the dominant gene).  Therefore, according to this, ¼ of the 
population (RS - -) will have their cerebral asymmetry and handedness determined 
by chance (Corballis, 1991).  This figure would result in about ½ of the 25% being 
left-handed and this figure of around 12.5% is consistent with the general estimate of 
the proportion of left-handers in society.  However, the main criticism with this is that 
those 12.5% of left-handers are only determined, according to the theory, by having 
the RS - - genotype.  This therefore does not take in to account any left-handers who 
carry the RS+ gene in any form (whether they are pathological left-handers or non-
pathological but carry the RS+ gene).  Corballis (1991) therefore argues that the 
figure of 12.5% of RS - - left-handers is too high and that a more realistic figure would 
be around 9% with the other 4% being made up of left-handers who carry the RS+ 
gene.  Annett does not take these additional pathological left-handers in to account 
when estimating the proportion of left-handers and therefore the general figure for 
left-handedness in the population would be over estimated if the figures that Annett 
reports for left-handers with the RS- -genotype were combined with pathological left-
handers (and also a few RS+ left-handers who are not pathological).  However, 
although Annett predicts that 12.5% of those with the RS - - genotype will be left-
handed, this is most likely not the case.  If those with the genotype RS - - have their 
handedness determined mainly by chance then the influence of the right-handed 
world will have an effect and bias more of this population toward the right hand and 
thus this would reduce the proportion of left-handers with the RS - - genotype.   
 
With respect to twin studies it could be argued that if handedness were purely 
genetic then all monozygotic twins would have the same handedness.  Annett (1985) 
stated that there was room for environmental variation in some twins that would 
cause a difference in handedness and also in homozygous twins there appears to be 
no association in handedness between the twins.   




2.2.4. McManus’s Genetic Model 
 
McManus (1985) proposed an alternative genetic model of handedness that, he 
says, differs from Annett’s right shift theory.  McManus’s model is similar to that of 
Annett’s as it is a single gene model that involves handedness being determined by 
two alleles at a single locus.  The crux of McManus’s (1985) theory is that the he 
states that the direction of hand preference is under genetic control and if an 
individual does not have the dextral gene (the gene that codes for right-handedness) 
then it is possible that the individual might become left-handed by chance. McManus 
states that handedness is controlled by a single gene locus, with a dominant ‘D’ allele 
specifying dextrality, and the recessive ‘C’ allele specifying chance.  The D allele in 
this theory is similar to Annetts’ right shift (RS+) gene, and C equates with the 
absence of the RS gene.  McManus defines handedness using a binary system and 
states that a person is either left-handed or right-handed.  In this model, those with 
the DD genotype will almost always, according to McManus, be right-handed, 75% of 
individuals with the DC genotype will be right-handed and 50% of those with the CC 
genotype will be right-handed (as determined by chance, see Table 2.1.).   
 
Table 2.1: McManus’s (1985) Genetic model and probability of handedness 
according to genotype. 
 
Genotype Chance of Being 
Right handed 
Monozygotic Twins with this 
genotype 
DD 100% Right 
DC 75% 75% Right (independently) 
CC 50% (chance) 50% Right (independently) 
 
McManus (2002) states that one of the most important points that genetic models of 
handedness need to outline is firstly how the hand preference of twins can differ and 
also how it is possible for two right-handed parents to have left-handed children (or 
explain why ¾ of children of 2 left-handed parents are right-handed2).  McManus’ 
genetic model attempts to explain how handedness in twins can differ and also how 
two right-handed parents can have left-handed offspring.  With respect to 
handedness in identical twins, McManus proposed that twins with the DD genotype 
                                                 
2 One feature of Annett’s Theory is that the right shift negative allele (RS-) does not result in 
left-handedness but instead the absence of a bias toward right or left-handedness.  This 
attempts to explain why children of two left-handed parents are divided almost equally into left 
and right-handers.  McManus also attempts to explain this in his theory. 
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would always be right-handed.  If the identical twins had the genotype CC then each 
twin would have a 50% chance of left-handedness but the 50% chance applies 
separately to each twin.  In twins with the DC genotype the pattern is slightly more 
complicated as each twin would have a 1 in 4 chance of being left-handed.  In 
dizygotic twins each twin would have their own genotype and thus their hand 
preference would be determined according to this model by its own individual 
genotype (determined by that of the parents).  McManus explains the possibility of 
two right-handed parents having a left-handed child through the probability of both 
parents being heterozygous (DC) and thus passing on the C allele in both cases to 
the child and thus the child would have a 50% chance of becoming left-handed.  With 
respect to the statistic that ¾ of children of two left-handed parents are right-handed 
McManus’ model explains this by stating that if a child has the genotype CC then it 
would have a 50% chance of being right-handed but also 25% of people with the DC 
genotype are also left-handed so thus the more dominant D allele could be passed 
on to the offspring by the left-handed parent carrying this gene and thus the 
probability of the child being right-handed could be stronger. 
 
McManus (1985) also considered the position between handedness and cerebral 
lateralisation for language.  He stated that there was a link between parental 
handedness and lateralisation and proposed that an individual with at least one left-
handed parent would be more likely to have right hemisphere language 
representation than those with two right-handed parents (however, this could be 
argued against depending firstly on the hand preference of the individual and 
secondly depending if one or both parents were left-handed and if so what type of 
left-hander they were).   
 
One problem with this theory is that McManus does not clearly outline how bilateral 
representation of language can be explained.  However, McManus attempts to 
explain this by stating that more than one language function can be lateralised and 
thus one function can be lateralised in one hemisphere while a different function can 
be lateralised in the other hemisphere.   
 
This model has much in common with the right shift theory.  One of the main 
similarities between the two models is that firstly there is a gene that biases toward 
dextrality but does not code directly for right-handedness. Secondly, the recessive 
gene in both McManus’ and Annett’s theories specify that those with the homozygous 
pairing of this gene (CC in McManus’ case and RS - - in Annett’s case) have their 
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lateralisation determined by chance rather than it biasing toward left-handedness.  
McManus and Annett do not propose that any genotype biases towards left-
handedness.  However, one important difference between the models is that while 
Annett examines handedness in relation to hand skill, McManus looks at handedness 
in terms of preference rather than skill.  Thus, Annett states that an individual inherits 
either a skill bias to the right or no bias while McManus argues that lack of bias to 
either side is characterised by those with the genotype CC.  McManus also differs 
from Annett with respect to his views on hand skill as he states that rather than hand 
skill being normally distributed around zero for the population that there are two 
distributions, one that is shifted to the right of zero and the other shifted to the left of 
zero in order to illustrate that right-handers are more skilled with their right hands and 
left-handers are more skilled with their left hands.  As McManus maintains that hand 
preference works on a binary system then he does not consider those that will be 
equally skilled with both hands or those that prefer to use one hand but are more 
skilled with the other. These differences in predictions for left-handers based on the 
two models may have important implications for the current study (see Section 2.7.). 
 
2.2.5. Annett vs. McManus 
 
McManus (1985) in his genetic theory of handedness proposed that some people 
inherit a gene for dextrality (D) (or right-handedness) and others inherit a gene for 
chance (C).  There are many arguments that suggest that the right shift theory and 
McManus’s genetic theory are very similar (see Corballis, 1991 for a review) with 
respect to the chance factor of the theories.  Corballis (1998) stated that both 
Annett’s and McManus’ theories focus on a single gene locus with two separate 
alleles (and of these alleles in both theories one is associated to left cerebral 
dominance and right-handedness and the other is associated with chance factors) 
and also that both theories assume that the gene is uniquely human.  Both Annett 
and McManus argue that there is a gene that allows lateralisation to be determined 
by chance in both theories, however, in Annett’s theory the alternative gene to the 
chance gene is the right shift gene that determines cerebral dominance for language, 
which in effect influences hand preference, rather than determines it.  In McManus’s 
theory there is a chance gene and there is a dextrality gene that codes for right-
handedness rather than specifically for a form of cerebral lateralisation.  One main 
problem with this theory is that no gene has been discovered that actually codes for 
handedness and therefore the theory remains a little ambiguous compared to 
Annett’s theory which does not specify a handedness gene but rather a gene which 
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influences cerebral dominance for language.  Corballis (1998) stated that the models 
of Annett and McManus are “essentially indistinguishable with respect to how well 
they can fit the data on the inheritance of handedness” (p153).  Corballis concluded 
by proposing that having a chance gene may explain why handedness and cerebral 
asymmetry are not perfectly correlated in the population.  Finally, Corballis (1997) 
states that although Annett and McManus propose different assumptions in fitting 
their models to data, there seems to be no reliable way at the present time to 
distinguish empirically between them.  He concludes that whatever the nature of the 
gene, it is unlikely that it codes for handedness as such.   
 
2.2.6. Klar’s (1996) Random-Recessive Model 
 
Klar (1996) took a different approach when he proposed in his single gene model that 
two alleles existed.  The dominant allele in this model was RGHT (or R as it was also 
referred to) and this allele caused a person to become right-handed.  The recessive, 
“non-functional” allele, as referred to by Klar, was known as r (this stood for random 
handed).  Klar proposed that if a person had the genotype RR then they would 
almost certainly be right-handed, this was also the case if a person had the Rr 
genotype.  However, if a person had the genotype rr then this would infer that 
handedness would be determined at random rather than that person automatically 
becoming left-handed.  That is, there would be an equal chance of the individual 
having a left-hand or right-hand preference.  Klar also inferred that there was some 
form of relationship between handedness and cerebral dominance for language.  He 
speculated that the R allele was linked to the left cerebral hemisphere in some way 
and the influence of this allele caused the left hemisphere to become the dominant 
hemisphere and thus become responsible for the processing of language.  Klar 
proposed that a function of the R allele was to link the dominant hemisphere to the 
development of right hand preference.  This model, therefore, predicts that there will 
be a strong association between left cerebral dominance (particularly for language) 
and the development of right-hand preference (in those with the RR or Rr genotype).  
The model also predicts that in those with the rr genotype that there will be a random 
distribution of both hand preference and cerebral dominance.  Klar stated that there 
was a correlation between cerebral dominance and handedness in right-handers with 
the RR and Rr genotypes but stated that there was no correlation between the two in 
left-handers with the rr genotype.  He went on to say that even though there was no 
correlation between hand preference and cerebral lateralisation in those with the rr 
genotype, most of these individuals are still lateralised with around 70% having left 
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cerebral dominance for language.  However, Klar also proposed that in the absence 
of the R allele other genes controlling brain specialization could dictate lateralisation. 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the main arguments against genetic theories was 
that up to half of children born to two left-handed parents are right-handed.  Klar 
(1999) reported a study that examined couples that consisted of one right-hander 
who had two left-handed parents and another right-hander who had no left-handed 
parents.  It was found that these pairings produced a higher percentage of left-
handed children than pairings of right-handers where neither individual had a left-
handed parent.  Klar (1999) went on to say that the percentage of left-handed 
children produced by a right-handed couple where one individual’s parents were left-
handed was similar to the figures of a left-hander mating with a right-hander in 
general.  Therefore, the right-handers in this example must have the same genotypes 
as left-handers in the population in order for them to be able to produce a higher 
number of left-handed children.  Thus, this answers the argument that it is possible 
that up to half of the children of two left-handed parents can be right-handed but it is 
their genotype and their parent’s genotypes that are important with respect to what 
their hand preference is most likely to be (in that each parent in Klar’s model is 
passing on the r allele thus resulting in the child having the rr genotype which results 
in their hand preference being determined by chance and therefore it is highly 
possible (given that we live in a right-handed world) that this individual will become 
right-handed).  Another argument against genetic theories is that despite sharing the 
same genes, around 18% of identical twins have discordant hand preference.  It 
would be expected that if handedness were genetic then all identical (monozygotic 
twins) would have the same hand preference.  However, Klar addressed this issue 
simply by stating that in his model those with the rr genotype would have their hand 
preference determined at random and therefore there would be high possibility of 
discordant hand preference in twins due to chance alone (providing they had the rr 
genotype).  
 
2.2.7. McKeever’s (2004) genetic model of handedness for writing and hand 
posture 
 
The most recent genetic model of handedness that has been proposed is that of 
McKeever (2004).  In his X-linked three-allele model, McKeever proposes that, unlike 
the theory of Levy and Nagylaki (1972), inverted hand posture is not highly correlated 
with cerebral lateralisation of language.  For an extended summary of this model see 
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McKeever (2004). As this model has appeared late in the development of this thesis, 
then the focus will be on the more established and tested models outlined in the 
previous sections. 
 
2.2.8. Summary of single gene models of cerebral dominance and handedness 
 
Klar’s model is similar in many ways to the models of Annett (1972; 1985; 1995) and 
McManus (1985).  Firstly, all three models are single gene models that identify a 
dominant and recessive gene that is situated at one loci.  Secondly, all three single 
gene theories discuss that there is a dominant genotype that codes for right-
sidedness and that those with this gene will almost certainly be right-handed.  More 
specifically, each theory looks at the relationship between cerebral dominance and 
handedness and proposes that left cerebral dominance for language is an important 
predictor of handedness and lateralisation.  Klar (1999) stated that all three models’ 
main functions where handedness was concerned was that the dominant allele in 
each model was responsible for the cerebral dominance of speech to the left 
hemisphere and more specifically, the development of this dominant hemisphere was 
linked to the dominant hand on the contralateral side (in most cases).   However, Klar 
(1996) stated that having the RGHT gene (or R gene) causes a person to almost 
always be right-handed (but he does not define what figure ‘almost always right-
handed’ refers to) whereas Annett (1985) stated that an individual with the right shift 
gene (RS+) would be likely to be right-handed (but not in all cases - e.g. pathological 
left-handers) and that the gene itself does not code for right-handedness but for 
cerebral dominance for language.  Klar’s (1996) model proposes that the R allele is 
fully dominant and that the r allele is recessive.  However, this differs from the 
models of Annett and McManus as they both propose that there is an additive effect 
in their models, this means that there is an element of variation within their dominant 
alleles and that these alleles may be incompletely dominant – this would mean that 
there would be a chance that a percentage of heterozygotes would develop as non 
right-handers in these two models (8% in Annett’s theory and 25% in McManus’ 
theory, Klar, 1999) due to the incomplete dominance of the right shift gene (RS+) in 
Annett’s case and the dextral (D) allele in McManus’ case.  Also, as Annett’s RS+ 
gene is a continuously varying gene then it is possible that even a small percentage 
of those with the RS++ genotype could develop as left-handers.   
 
Although many studies have concluded that environmental influences are favoured 
when explaining discordant hand preferences in monozygotic twins (e.g. James & 
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Orlebeke, 2002) there are still proposed genetic explanations as to why this might be 
the case.  The issue of twins in the three single gene theories all provide slightly 
different explanations as to why there is discordant hand preference in monozygotic 
(identical) twins.  As previously mentioned, Klar (1996) proposed that there are 
discordant hand preferences in monozygotic twins due to chance factors determining 
hand preference in those with the rr genotype.  Similarly, McManus (1985) proposed 
that hand preference in twins with the CC genotype (the recessive genotype) would 
be decided by chance and it would be highly possible that twins could therefore have 
differing hand preferences.  McManus goes on to say that it is possible that a number 
of those with the DC genotype (in which handedness occurs independently of each 
twin) may also have discordant hand preferences.  Annett (1985) explained the 
discordance of hand preference in monozygotic twins by indicating that the RS+ 
gene was reduced in some way in twins (although it is not known how) and this 
allowed in some cases a higher chance of left-handedness in twins and weaker right-
hand preferences in others.  
 
In summary, all three genetic theories broadly account for the observed pattern of 
handedness, but may have some slightly different implications for the present study 
(see Section 2.7). 
 
After consideration of genetic models of handedness the evidence for cultural and 




2.3. Handedness, Culture and the Environment 
 
It has often been argued that right-handedness was due entirely to cultural pressure 
and that the natural condition was actually ambidexterity.  However, Collins (cited in  
Springer & Deutsch, 1993) takes an extreme environmental position and argued that 
“handedness is transmitted from one generation to the next through cultural and 
environmental biases” p125.  This suggests that the incidence of right-handedness is 
so large because it has been a learned response to a right-handed world and left-
handedness exists when there is some sort of physical defect or some kind of 
emotional problem occurs and consequentially, the right-handed world response is 
not learned.  In many societies, there have been strong sanctions against the use of 
the left hand, especially for activities such as eating or writing (Provins, 1997).  
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However, left-handedness has become better accepted over the last 30 years in 
North America and Western Europe but use of the right hand has been reported 
relatively recently in countries such as Spain, Italy and former Iron Curtain countries 
(Corballis, 1991).  Studies have shown that in Taipei in China, only 3.5% of school 
children were exclusively left handed and in a study of school children in Japan, 7.2% 
were non right handed, this rose to 11% if those who changed from left to right were 
included (Corballis, 1991).  Littlejohn (1973), Wieschopp (1973) and Lauterbach 
(1933) have reported that many children who use their left hands have been 
subjected to severe physical restraint or punishment (cited in Provins, 1997).  
Littlejohn, (cited in Provins, 1997), reported that the knuckles of the offending hand 
were rapped or bound tightly with rags when used in Sierra Leone.  Elsewhere in 
Africa, a child’s left hand was scalded to force them to use their right.  In strict or 
conforming cultures, the incidence of left-handedness was shown to be low.  In 
conforming societies such as Tanzania and Japan, a large population sample 
showed that less than 1% used their left hands for writing (Provins, 1997).  Social 
conformity in handedness is often subtle and left-handedness still occurs despite a 
general population bias to the right.  The most likely sources of environmental 
influences when learning to write comes from parents and teachers because the 
main phase of handedness development occurs from six months to six years.  
Harkins and Uzgiris, (1991), (cited in Provins, 1997), suggested that imitation of the 
mother may be one of the most salient features that could account for infant hand 
preference.  This view is confirmed by Porac, Coren and Searleman (1986), they say 
that there is a decrease in the incidence of right handedness among the offspring of 
one left handed parent and this is greatest when the mother is left handed.  This 
therefore leads to a conclusion that the role of maternal influence is an important 
factor in the determination of handedness. 
 
Annett, (1967), said the discovery of pure left-handers who are as consistently left as 
most right-handers are consistently right, showed that there were some individuals 
on whom the supposed environmental pressures have had no observable effect.  
Blau, (1946), introduced a non-genetic theory of left-handedness (cited in Annett, 
1967) and maintained it to be “an expression of infantile negativism”.  Blau set out to 
establish right-handedness as the normal well ordered human response to the 
environment.  From his work, Blau concluded that handedness was not genetic and 
was only determined by the environment.  He argued the right hand became 
dominant because society influenced it.  Left-handedness arises therefore as a direct 
deviation from this norm, brought about by ‘an inherent deficiency, faulty education, 
Chapter 2: What causes human right-handedness? The role of Genetics, Culture and 
Pathology 
 77 
or emotional negativism’.  He says emotional negativism is the most common type of 
left-handedness; it develops from a child’s active resistance to environmental and 
social pressures to become right-handed.  In other words, the development of left-
handedness is a deliberate challenge to the otherwise natural and normal strain of 
right-handedness  (Langford, 1995).  However, Corballis (1991) argues that “left 
handers as a whole are no worse than right handers, intellectually, physically and 
emotionally” p22.  He also goes on to say that left-handers tend to show special 
maths and artistic talent and that the majority of left-handers are simply part of the 
normal population.  He also says that left-handers may arise, in part, from genetic 
variation, that has no sinister connotations.  Corballis concludes that it is likely that if 
cultural pressures were totally eliminated, right-handers would still make up the 
majority, with the proportion of left-handers around 12-13%.  
 
Studies have suggested that left-handedness seems to run in families, although very 
rarely to the extent that it will run through the whole family.  Corballis (1991) cited that 
92.4% of those born to two right-handed parents were themselves right handed.  If 
one or other parent was left handed, the incidence of the child being right handed 
dropped to 80.5% and if both parents were left handed, the chance of the child being 
right handed went down to 45.5% (Corballis, 1991).  Springer and Deutsch (1993) 
expressed these figures in terms of the probability of having a left-handed child.  
They said that the probability of two right-handed parents having a left-handed child 
was 0.02.  If one parent was left handed, then it would rise to 0.17 and if both parents 
were left handed, the child’s probability of being left handed would be 0.46.  These 
figures not only coincide with the genetic argument, but can also be accounted for by 
environmental arguments because whatever the handedness of the parents, it will 
have some form of influence on the offspring.  So, if both parents are right handed, 
then the amount of left handed influences from the parents will be minimal and 
therefore the probability of a left-handed child will be low.  If one parent is left handed 
then a certain amount of left-handed activities will be presented to the offspring and 
therefore it raises the chances of it becoming left-handed.  Finally, if both parents are 
left handers, then a great deal of stimuli and activities will be done with the left hand 
and will increase the chances even more of left-handed offspring.  However, this can 
be considered in more simple terms, such as the cultural or role models that are 
available to the child.  In some cases, mixed role models may be present but in other 
cases, a child may relate and identify mostly with its mother who happens to be right 
handed and thus, the child if cultural and environmental influences are to be 
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accepted, will probably be right handed.  The same goes if a child related most to its 
left handed father or the person with whom they spend the most time.   
 
Genetic models of handedness and cultural and environmental arguments of 
handedness have been considered in the previous two sections.  However, after 
considering the evidence of these models and arguments and arriving at the 
conclusion that both the genetic argument and the cultural/environmental argument 
both have valuable contributions to make to what causes human handedness, a new 
focus was introduced by Laland, Van Horn and Feldman (1995) who developed what 
was known as the gene-culture model of human handedness which encompassed 




2.4. Gene-culture models 
 
2.4.1. Laland, Kumm, Van Horn and Feldman’s (1995) Gene-Culture Model of 
Human Handedness 
 
Many researchers have dismissed purely cultural and/or environmental handedness 
models as they are seen to have many flaws (such as why no left-handed societies 
exist and why right-handedness is common to all societies).  The gene-culture model 
combined the genetic arguments and the cultural arguments to help explain the 
development of handedness.  Laland et al. (1995) reported that standard genetic 
models assumed that variation in handedness was caused solely by genetics.  They 
added that variation in human handedness is caused by accidents in early 
development that gives advantage of skill and/or strength to one side over the other.  
However, Laland et al. (1995) and Provins (1997) proposed that variation in 
handedness was entirely due to cultural and environmental factors (see 
environmental section (2.3.) for a summary of Provins’ arguments).   Laland et al. 
were not satisfied that only genetics could be responsible for handedness but took in 
to account that they did have an important role to play thus this led to the 
development of the gene-culture model.  Laland et al stated that our genes are 
responsible for pushing handedness to favour the right but were not entirely sure how 
this occurred.   They added that culture also has an important role to play and 
illustrated this with the example of if a child has two right-handed parents then the 
influence of right-handedness on an individual will increase, if a child has two left-
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handed parents then the influence of right-handedness will decrease but if a child 
has one right-handed parent and one left-handed parent then the influence will be 
cancelled out.  In the gene-culture model it is proposed that natural selection (which 
in this case favours right-handedness or whatever originally underlay it) affected the 
probability of individuals becoming right-handed from chance levels.  Laland et al. 
(1995) stated that everyone has the same genotype for handedness, that is, one with 
an increased chance of being right-handed and that left-handedness is produced by 
cultural and/or environmental influence.  They added that the main cultural influence 
that affects an individual’s handedness is their upbringing and more specifically the 
influence of those closest to them (i.e. parental handedness).  Laland et al. stated 
that parental influence could occur in one of two ways.  Firstly, it could be indirect, 
subtle imitation where the individual merely copies their parent(s) (e.g. see Masur, 
1988).  Alternatively, the influence may involve direct instruction where use of the 
‘wrong hand’ may result in some form of punishment (see Barsley, 1970 for 
examples of punishment).  Laland et al. in their model do not state that cultural 
influence solely shapes hand preference and do not dismiss the suggestion that hand 
preference may exist before cultural influence or even pre-natally but they do 
propose that these preferences are sufficiently weak in the early stages so that 
cultural influence could have a major effect.  This model differs from the previous 
genetic models (e.g. Levy & Nagylaki, 1972 and the single gene models of Annett, 
1985; McManus, 1985 and Klar, 1996) as it solely examines hand preference and 
does not examine the role of cerebral dominance in great detail (although Laland et 
al. do acknowledge that there is a link between handedness and cerebral dominance 
they state that it is difficult to get enough reliable data to illustrate the pattern of 
cerebral dominance in left- and right-handers).  Laland et al. accepted that there is 
significant variation in patterns of cerebral dominance but the cause of this variation 
is relatively unknown and could be due to genetic influence or environmental 
influence.  Laland et al. stated that in order for their model to remain relatively similar 
to the previous handedness models (examining the relationship between hand and 
brain data) their model should show an interaction between processes that influence 
handedness and cerebral asymmetry. 
 
With respect to the three problems outlined by Klar (1996) concerning genetic 
models of handedness and/or cerebral dominance (cultural biases influence hand 
preference; twins have an identical genotype but 18% are discordant for handedness 
and not all children of two left-handed parents are left-handed) the gene-culture 
model addressed these issues by adding the factor of cultural influence to the theory 
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in order to help explain these issues.  Rather than explaining these discrepancies 
through chance factors as the single gene models do the gene-culture theory 
explains cultural influence purely by indicating that handedness is not solely 
attributed to genetics but is also influenced by culture and the environment 
(particularly parental influence).  The problem of discordant hand preferences in 
monozygotic twins is dealt with in this model as Laland et al. predict that monozygotic 
twins and dizygotic twins will have the same concordance rates and that cultural 
biases would be most likely to account for any differences.  One problem with this 
theory may occur when addressing the point that not all children of two left-handed 
parents are themselves left-handed. If parental influence and genetics are both 
thought to influence handedness then it would appear very likely that a child of two 
left-handed parents who had their handedness determined both by culture and their 
parents would be left-handed but this is not the case in almost half of these 
incidences and thus this model does not clearly explain why this might happen.  It 
could be, as Laland et al. indicate, that everyone has a genotype that predisposes 
them to right-handedness originally and this influence along with the general ‘right-
handed world’ influence may override parental influence in some cases. 
 
Therefore, the model proposed by Laland et al. (1995) incorporated both cultural and 
genetic factors and suggested that perhaps the strongest influence determining the 
hand preference of a child is parental handedness.  Laland et al. proposed that this 
cultural influence might be stronger than any genetic influence proposed.  This 
therefore complicates arguments that propose that handedness is purely genetic but 
adds additional scope to theories that state that there has to be some form of cultural 
or environmental influence. However, it is also a little bit vague in some details and it 
may be hard to measure the relative influence of these cultural factors in any 
meaningful way. 
 
2.4.2. James and Orlebeke (2002) 
 
A recent study by James and Orlebeke (2002) has challenged the view that 
handedness in twins can be explained through chance factors when debating the 
issue of discordant handedness in monozygotic pairs.  James and Orlebeke 
indicated that there must be some form of environmental influence on handedness 
rather than a purely genetic explanation.  They stated that twin’s probabilities of left-
handedness differ and that they differ due to some factor(s) that correlate with their 
hand preference.  Two factors that have been linked with left-handedness are birth 
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weight and order of birth (in single born children and in twins).  Left-handedness has 
often been associated with low birth weight in babies (e.g. Ross, Lipper & Auld, 
1992) but this is proposed to be more common in single born babies rather than 
within twin pairs.  A factor that has been suggested to influence hand preference in 
twins is birth order (e.g. Christian, Hunter, Evans & Standeford, 1979).  James and 
Orlebeke (2002) examined the order of birth in six categories of (discordant) twins 
(MZ males; MZ females; MZ male-female; DZ males; DZ females and DZ male-
female) and found that in each category the first-born was most likely to be the left-
handed one.  Out of 303 pairs of twins examined the left-handed twin was first born 
in 183 cases.  James and Orlebeke also examined the birth weight of these twins but 
this data was not conclusive as the lighter twin was left-handed in 159 cases and the 
heavier twin was left-handed in 144 cases.  James and Orlebeke concluded that left-
handedness in twins did seem to be associated with birth order and thus this could 
account for discordant hand preference within twins with the first born being more 
likely to have a left-hand preference.  However, with regards to birth weight, although 
there appeared to be no relationship in this study between the birth weight of the first 
born and second born twin and handedness it has been argued in previous studies 
(e.g. Orlebeke, van Baal, Boomsma & Neeleman, 1993) that the first born twin is 
more likely to be the heavier twin but in discordant twins this appears to be obscured 
(James & Orlebeke, 2002).  James and Orlebeke state that the association of low 
birth weight and left-handedness is lower in discordant twins because the factor of 
birth order is stronger in determining handedness.  It is concluded that these factors 
may give some indication as to what causes firstly left-handedness and more 
specifically, what causes discordant hand preference in monozygotic twins.  James 
and Orlebeke (2002) report that each twin has to endure some form of hazard during 
their birth but that these individual hazards are very different depending on the birth 
order.  It has been reported that the second born twin is more susceptible to hypoxia 
(a state of oxygen deficiency in the body which may cause impairment of function 
and in many cases death) whereas the first twin (who is thought to have a greater 
chance of left-handedness) is at more risk of physical trauma and this trauma is 
thought perhaps to be a determinant of left-handedness.  James and Orlebeke 
concluded that genetics alone could not account for a complete explanation of 
handedness and that some environmental factor (such as birth order) would also 
have to play a part. 
 
Thus, the gene-culture models of human handedness appear to fuse together the 
environmental and genetic ideas proposed by the previous models and arguments 
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and indicate that genes and the environment both have a part to play in determining 
human handedness. There is some support for these models, but they have not been 
tested to the same extent as the purely genetic models (e.g. Annett, 1995) 
 
The final argument to be considered when determining what causes human 
handedness is the pathological argument (which was briefly touched upon in the 
previous section).  
 
 
2.5. Pathological Argument 
 
Genetic views and environmental/cultural views of handedness have so far been 
considered.  However, genetic handedness and environmentally determined 
handedness are often labelled under the title of natural handedness when comparing 
them to pathological handedness. Pathological handedness (and in most cases 
pathological left-handedness) is assumed to account for the excess of left-handers in 
groups such as epileptics, mental retardants or schizophrenics compared with those 
that are natural left-handers.  Pathological left-handedness was defined by Coren 
(1992) as some form of “injury or impairment that prevented a person from being 
right-handed” p135.  More specifically, pathological left-handedness is said to occur 
when an individual is left-hemisphere dominant (normally for speech) and has a 
natural right-hand preference.  However, if some form of complication occurs in utero 
and damages the left-hemisphere in some way then dominance would be swapped 
over to the right hemisphere and the individual would become left-handed because of 
this dominance.  Therefore a pathological left-hander is someone who, due to some 
form of brain damage, has had to switch to his or her other hemisphere and thus his 
or her hand preference has changed because of this.  It is not only pathological left-
handers that exist, pathological right-handers also exist but these individuals are 
much less common (see section on pathological right-handedness for a description 
of this). 
 
Initial ideas of pathological left-handedness were far more extreme.  In the early part 
of the 20th Century a quote describing pathological left-handedness was published in 
McClure’s magazine (1913): 
 
“An adult brain, wrecked on the educated side by accident or disease, commonly 
never learns to do its work in the other, the victim remains crippled for the rest of his 
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days.  But a child, in whom the thinking area on the other side is still uncultivated, 
hurt on one side, can usually start over again with the other.  A shift of this sort 
carries the body with it, and the child, instead of being permanently disabled, 
becomes left-handed” (cited in Coren, 1992, p135). 
 
More recently pathological left-handedness has been further researched and 
additional evidence, some of which supports and others that contradicts existing 
findings, has been found.  Proposed causes of pathological handedness will be 




It has been suggested that pathological left-handedness is often unusually high in 
twins (Bishop, 1990).  One reason proposed for this is that twins undergo increased 
perinatal risks and therefore there is a higher chance of some form of damage in 
utero or during birth to either or both babies (e.g. lack of oxygen, difficult birth due to 
there being two babies).  Bishop (1990) also added that a left-handed twin might be 
clumsier with their non-dominant hand and underachieve intellectually in some 
cases.  It has also been found that in twins an estimated 22.5% of monozygotic twins 
have discordant hand preference and 19.3% of dizygotic twins were discordant for 
hand preference (Carter-Saltzman, Scarr, Barker & Katz, 1976).  Adding to this, 
Christian et al. (1979) found that in pairs of discordant monozygotic twins, the left-
handed twin was significantly more likely to be the first-born twin than the second 
born twin.  However, Boklage (1981) found that there was a higher rate of left-
handedness in the second born twin and argued that this was because the second 
twin has a more difficult birth than the first twin. This means the relationship between 




Bakan (1971) suggested that all left-handedness is pathological.  That is, left-
handedness arises due to an occurrence of underlying brain damage or some form of 
complication sustained around the time of birth.  Bakan found that left-handers, on 
average, reported a higher rate of perinatal hazards than right-handers (these 
included caesarean section, breech birth and preterm birth).  These perinatal hazards 
would presumably cause some form of damage (usually minor damage) to the left 
hemisphere in most cases and this would result in the switching of dominance from 
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the now ‘damaged’ left hemisphere to the right hemisphere that would take on the 
role of the dominant hemisphere.  In most people the left hemisphere is the dominant 
hemisphere (in both left- and right-handers) and the resulting damage to this 
hemisphere and the resulting dominance of the right hemisphere would mean that 
the individual would be left hand dominant.  Bakan (1971) argues that damage to the 
left hemisphere is caused by hypoxia, where during birth there is a reduced oxygen 
supply to the brain and this can cause left hemisphere motor dysfunction. Bakan 
dismissed genetic theories of handedness arguing instead that it was a tendency to 
inherit difficult births or stressful pregnancies rather than inheriting a specific hand 
preference.     
 
Bakan’s (1971) model is based around the following figures; approximately 15% of 
left-handers have right hemisphere dominance and 15% have bilateral dominance 
whereas less than 1% of the population have right hemisphere dominance and are 
right-handed.  If there were no left hemisphere damage during birth then the child 
would be right-handed whereas any damage caused to the left hemisphere would 
result in pathological left-handedness.  He also suggested that the incidence of left-
handedness was significantly higher in first-born children or in children who were 
fourth born or later.  Bakan termed this a high-risk parity factor and termed those who 
were either second or third born as a low-risk parity factors.  Bakan suggested that 
first-born children would be subjected to the highest amount of birth trauma and/or 
complications that could increase the chance of some form of brain insult and thus 
increase the chance of the infant becoming a pathological left-hander.  Bakan (1977) 
stated that the pathology that he refers to which is a possible cause of left-
handedness is, in many cases, very minor and subtle.  Another brief area that Bakan 
linked to left-handedness was the age of the mother when the child was born 
(maternal age).   
 
Bakan, Dibb and Reed (1973) stated that children born to older mothers were more 
likely to be left-handed as first-born children to older mothers have a higher risk of 
birth stress.  They found in their study that 17% of the left-handed sample consisted 
of first-born infants who were born to mothers aged 30 or more while only 8% of the 
right-handed sample were first-born infants to mothers of age 30 or more.  
McKeever, Suter and Rich (1995) found that more left-handed infants were born to 
older mothers (but this effect was only found in females).  However, Bailey and 
McKeever (2004) used McKeever et al’s (1995) original sample and added more 
participants to it and this effect was only minimal.  Bailey and McKeever proposed 
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that when examining pathological left-handedness it might be easier to examine 
individuals with two right-handed parents as this will omit the possible confound that 
the offspring’s left-handedness may be due to a genetic link with the parent(s) rather 
than due to pathological factors.  Bailey and McKeever found that by restricting their 
sample to a group with two right-handed parents that the effects of maternal age and 
birth stress on handedness were not significant.  Bailey and McKeever also found 
that Bakan’s parity hypothesis was not supported in their study.   
 
In addition, Bakan’s theory has been criticised for being too extreme and suggesting 
that all cases of left-handedness are the result of brain damage.  It has been argued 
that if all left-handedness were attributable to brain damage or birth complications at 
the time of birth that around 10% of the whole population would have been subjected 
to this damage – this would seem highly unlikely and would seem a very high number 
to be affected by brain damage (see Satz’s argument below, section 2.5.3.).  Also, 
another problem with Bakan’s hypothesis is that in many studies concerning birth 
stress or trauma, the offspring themselves are asked to report how much and what 
kind of trauma they experienced, however, this could result in inaccurate reports in 
many cases and it is proposed that the mother would give a more accurate report. 
However, Coren (1992) made contact directly with mothers rather than the offspring 
and reported that there was an association between birth stress and handedness.  
Additionally, it is often not taken in to account when examining pathological left-
handers what the hand preference of the parents is.  In many cases the focus is on 
whether or not the infant suffered any trauma and if they did, and are left-handed, 
then the link is made that it is a case of pathological left-handedness in many cases.  
Indeed, Bailey and McKeever (2004) stated that very few studies collect handedness 
data from both parents and this could be a major flaw.  The handedness of both 
parents should be examined before concluding that a child is a pathological left-
hander, firstly because not all children that suffer some form of birth trauma are left-
handed and secondly, not all left-handed children that experience birth trauma are 
necessarily pathological left-handers.  If a child has two right-handed parents and 
suffers birth trauma and is left-handed then it is possible that this child is a 
pathological left-hander (although some children of two right-handed parents who do 
not suffer birth trauma are still left-handed).  However, if a child has at least one left-
handed parent and does suffer some form of birth complication then it is more difficult 
to determine if the left-handedness is due to the pathological influence or the genetic 
influence of one (or both) parent(s).  If both parents are left-handed then there is an 
even stronger case that the left-handedness of the child would be influenced by 
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genetic factors.  A final factor to be considered is that Bakan does not take in to 
consideration any sex differences in pathological left-handedness caused by birth 
trauma.  He attributes all left-handedness to birth trauma but does not state if one 
group (either males or females) is more likely to experience this over the other group.  
For example, McKeever et al. (1995) found that the high-risk parity factor (increased 
chance of left-handedness in first born child or fourth or later born child) was linked to 
females but not males while Searleman, Coren and Porac (1989) and Leviton and 
Kilty (1976) only found the effect in male children and the latter also found that the 
frequency of left-handedness increases as the birth order (of fourth offspring and 
above) increases.  However, Hicks, Pellegrini and Evans (1978) failed to find the 
effect at all.  Hubbard (1971) found the opposite effect that left-handedness 
increased in births with reduced stress or trauma and Schwartz (1977) found no 
relationship between handedness and birth stress.  Thus there seems to be much 
controversy if firstly, the effect is there at all and secondly, if it is, is it more common 
in one sex or are there no sex differences?   
 
Hopkins, Dahl and Pilcher (2000) suggest another problem related to these findings. 
They argue that although it was found in many cases that parity might be a factor in 
determining left-handedness, issues that are somehow connected with society and 
with the economy might confound it.  Firstly, it is suggested that those with low 
incomes could have a poorer diet, higher rates of pregnancy and a lower level of 
prenatal care that could potentially contribute to pathologies connected with birth 
stresses and traumas (Bakan, 1977; Searleman et al. 1989) and thus this has to be 
taken into account when examining the participant group in each study as it may be a 
contributing factor.  It could be argued that Bakan (1977) responds to these criticisms 
by stating that socio-economic status does play a role in the findings.  He argued that 
one main reason why Hubbard (1971) did not find any differences was because he 
sampled students from a high paying, private university whereas he sampled his 
participants from state universities.  Bakan stated that there is a clear relationship 
between birth trauma and socio-economic factors including health of the mother and 
medical care and therefore the results can differ according to the sample that they 
were taken from.   
 
Bakan (1977) added that the sampling method used could also be responsible for 
Schwartz’s non-supportive results.  The participants used in Schwartz’s study were 
sampled in Canada where it was alleged the mortality rate was 40 per 1000 in the 
1950s (when most of the participants were born) this is contrasted with a mortality 
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rate of 27 per 1000 in the USA at the same time (where Bakan conducted his 
research).  Bakan therefore proposed that infant mortality occurred most when there 
was some form of birth risk or stress. Therefore the number of left-handers 
represented in Schwartz’s study may be lower as a high number of pathological left-
handers may have died during birth.  Alternatively if there was some form of damage 
during birth that resulted in, for example, mental retardation then it would be unlikely 
that these individuals would be represented among the university sample that 
Schwartz took his sample from.   
 
Finally, Bakan proposed that Schwartz took a very extreme definition of what is 
meant by ‘pathological’.  He states that Schwartz “argues that since left-handers are 
found in the university, this decreases the probability that their left-handedness is 
based on a pathological event” (Bakan, 1977, p838).  Bakan stated that his own 
definition of pathological left-handedness, however, stated that it could be a very mild 
or subtle effect and would not effect the individual in such a way that they could not 
attend university unlike the strong definition given by Schwartz. With respect to the 
association between maternal age and left-handedness in children varying results 
have been found.  Support for Bakan et al’s. (1973) argument came from Coren and 
Searleman (1990) who found that there was a link between maternal age and 
handedness in that older mothers had more left-handed children.  Other researchers 
only partially supported this finding.  Smart, Jeffrey and Richards (1980) only found 
the link between maternal age and handedness in first-born children (which may link 
to the parity factors rather than that of maternal age) while McKeever et al. (1995) 
found this effect only in females (this was also the case for their research on parity).  
Peters and Perry (1991) did not find any relationship between maternal age and 
handedness while McManus (1981) did not find any relationship between either birth 
stress and handedness or maternal age and handedness and concluded that the 
development of left-handedness in the population is due to genetics and not 
pathology of any kind.   Hopkins et al. (2000) concluded that although parity and 
maternal age may be connected in some way to pathology it is not always clear what 
that role actually is.  A final problem with Bakan’s work is that he states that all left-
handers are pathological; he does not allow any scope at all for natural left-
handedness either influenced by genetic factors or environmental/cultural factors 
(see sections 2.2. and 2.3. for these arguments).   
 
In summary, it is clear that there are no convincing reasons to accept Bakan’s 
contention that all left-handers are pathological, although it is clear that a strong link 
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Satz, Baymur and Van der Vlugt (1979) and Soper and Satz (1984), unlike Bakan, 
proposed that only part of the left-handed population was pathological.  They 
hypothesised that at least two groups of left-handers exist in the population.  The first 
of these groups defined by Satz (1972; 1973) is pathological left-handers.  Satz 
(1972) predicts that around 20% of natural right-handers develop as pathological left-
handers because of hemispheric damage.  Satz stated that pathological left-handers 
consisted of those who had experienced some form of brain damage (often during 
birth) to the left hemisphere of the brain and had until then developed as right-
handers but this damage forced the dominant hemisphere to switch to the right 
hemisphere and thus resulted in a left hand preference and right hemisphere 
language dominance in most cases. This is similar to what Bakan (e.g. 1971) 
proposed.  Soper and Satz (1984) said that not all cases of pathological left-
handedness involved a shift in the dominant hemisphere for language.  They stated 
that the important factor in this is the actual timing of the damage to the brain and 
stated that the earlier the damage then the higher the likelihood of a shift in cerebral 
speech dominance.  Satz et al. (1979) add that any damage in the period of time 
from pre-natal growth until around the first year of life is the most vulnerable time 
where the transfer of speech from one hemisphere to the other is most likely.  
Damage outside this time period would be less likely to result in a switch of the 
dominant hemisphere for speech control.     Satz et al. (1979) also stated that if this 
damage can occur to the left hemisphere then it must also occur to the right 
hemisphere in some cases and thus pathological right-handers must also exist (see 
section 2.5.7.). This factor is often overlooked in studies that only use right-handed 
participants. Satz (1972) proposed that much less of the right-handed population 
would be pathological and that the remainder of the population had their hand 
preference determined by either genetics or the environment.  However, Satz (1973) 
stated that minor damage to one hemisphere of the brain could, in many cases, lead 
to an increase in left-handedness and birth trauma is only one way that the damage 
could have occurred.  Satz (1972) stated that birth stress is only one of a few 
suggested factors that the concept of pathological left-handedness comes from 
(other concepts include increased incidence of left-handedness in twins, increased 
left-handedness in epileptics and the increased incidence of left-handedness in the 
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mentally ill).  Satz, Orsini, Saslow and Henry (1985) stated that a high number of the 
left-handed population could be accounted for through the pathological 
representation of left-handers in clinical populations.  Soper and Satz (1984) found 
that the extent of the brain injury could alter the level of left-handedness in many 
clinical populations.  
 
The second group of left-handers proposed by Satz (e.g. 1973) was ‘natural left-
handers’.  This group comprised of those whose hand preference was determined by 
either genetic and/or environmental factors and who had suffered no form of brain 
insult or injury.  Satz (1973) proposed that the incidence of natural left-handers in the 
population was about 8%. Thus comprising the majority of left-handed individuals. In 
relation to cerebral speech dominance the majority of this group would be left 
hemisphere dominant (around 70%) and the remainder of the group would be split 
between bilateral dominance and right hemisphere dominance. Satz et al. (1979) 
stated that very few ‘normal’ left-handers have speech that is controlled by the right 
hemisphere whereas most pathological left-handers have speech that is controlled by 
the right hemisphere.  He predicted that left-handers who had experienced some 
form of early brain damage would be three times more likely to have speech 
controlled by the right hemisphere than left-handers who had not experienced any 
form of brain damage.  Soper and Satz (1984) reviewed the model of pathological 
handedness and proposed an additional category.  They added the third group 
‘ambiguous handedness’ which resulted in the existence of pathological left-
handedness, pathological right-handedness and ambiguous handedness (they did 
state that this group would be very low and would be comprised of those without a 
strong left or right hand preference).  Soper and Satz (1984) proposed that 
ambiguous handedness occurred through some form of bilateral damage and thus 
there would be no clear dominance of either hand.   
 
Satz (1973) therefore concluded that left-handedness could overall be classified in to 
two main groups; the first is linked to genetic factors while the second is linked to 
pathological factors.  He states that the pathological group is the result of either some 
form of damage related to birth or development or to some form of childhood problem 
and adds that within this group physical and psychological problems are often 
observed.  Thus, the view of Satz is similar in some ways to Bakan in that he 
attributes pathological left-handedness is down to brain damage of some form.  
However, Satz’s viewpoint also differs greatly in a number of ways.  Firstly, Bakan 
assumes that all left-handers are pathological left-handers whereas Satz states that 
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only a select group are pathological left-handers and the remaining left-handers have 
been influenced by genetic or environmental factors.  Secondly, Bakan assumes that 
all damage to the hemispheres occurs during birth or is related to birth in some form 
(for example, maternal age, birth trauma and birth order).  Whereas, Satz states that 
although the highest chance of damage resulting in pathological handedness is at or 
around the time of birth, damage can occur afterwards but have different 
consequences such as cerebral control does not always switch if the individual 
suffers damage later than the first year of life.  Satz (1973) states that Bakan is 
unclear in much of his reasoning as to why the incidence of left-handedness is 
altered if an individual experiences early brain injury.   Satz also considers a link 
between pathological left-handedness and various clinical populations, as there is a 
high proportion of left-handedness within certain groups.  Bakan does not consider 
independent groups and concluded that all left-handers are pathological left-handers 
due to some form of birth related incident. Overall, the work of Satz supports the 
contention of the present study that assumes some adaptive component to 




Crow’s work relates to pathology but does not focus completely on handedness; 
rather, the focus is on language and cerebral lateralisation (see chapter 1 for a 
review of this).  However, the main finding of Crow’s research that involves 
handedness is connected to schizophrenia.  Crow states that schizophrenic patients 
show a significant excess of mixed-handedness or left-handedness and a shift away 
from right hand dominance.  Crow (e.g. 1997) explains the symptoms of 
schizophrenia through dysfunction of lateralisation and states that therefore those 
with a non-right hand preference may be more susceptible to this.  One reason for 
this could be related to pathology.  (For a more detailed review see Crow, 1997). This 
work does not directly inform the investigation of the mechanism for determining 
hand preference in the present study, but does relate to cerebral lateralisation 




Bishop (1984) estimated that one on every twenty left-handers is a pathological left-
hander.  This means that out of the whole left-handed population (pathological and 
natural) Bishop proposes that 5% are pathological left-handers.  Again this has 
Chapter 2: What causes human right-handedness? The role of Genetics, Culture and 
Pathology 
 91 
important implications for the present study, as it supports the notion that the vast 
majority of left-handers are probably not brain damaged and can give us an insight 
into why left-handedness has evolved. Bishop (1990) proposed a number of reasons 
for the incidence of pathological left-handedness.  Firstly she stated that one possible 
indicator was familial sinistrality.  Familial sinistrality is one of the most widely used 
indexes as categorising people as pathological or non-pathological left-handers.  
Briggs and Nebes (1976) stated that if a person was left-handed but had no close 
left-handed relatives then it was unlikely that their left-handedness could be attributed 
to genetic influences and should be attributed to pathological factors.  However, 
Bishop (1990) stated that this was not a strong argument and proposed that the 
genetic argument of handedness in itself is a weak argument.  Bishop added that if a 
left-handed person did not have any close relatives that this did not mean that their 
hand preference could not still be influenced in some way by either genetic factors or 
by cultural or environmental influences.  Bishop cites Annett’s (1985) figures that 
there is only a 24% chance of having a left-handed child if one parent is left-handed 
and only a 45% chance of having a left-handed child if both parents are left-handed.  
This highlights that genetic factors cannot be completely dismissed when considering 
hand preference but could also be linked to chance factors within genetic theories. 
Bishop (1984) stated that around 30% of left-handers with poor right hand skill are 
pathological left-handers.  She added that all left-handers are not pathological but 
that hand preference can be affected in a number of ways.  She concluded that in the 
incidence of hand preference being altered due to brain damage the effects of this 
could often be subtle and unnoticeable. 
 
However, Bishop (1990) adds that one problem with left-handers could be that they 
are susceptible to a variety of conditions rather than these conditions causing them to 
be left-handed.  These conditions include epilepsy, mental impairment, autism and 
developmental dyslexia, developmental disorders of speech and language (such as 
stuttering).  This adds to the pathological argument that there are a higher number of 
left-handers in various clinical groups, but doesn’t argue against the position of most 
left-handers being non-pathological (or natural).  
 
2.5.6. Pathological right-handedness 
 
A Pathological right-hander is defined as a natural left-hander who becomes right-
handed due to some form of damage to the right hemisphere (Satz et al., 1979). The 
proportion of pathological right-handers is much lower than the number of 
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pathological left-handers and there are a number of proposed reasons for this.  
Firstly, the left hemisphere, according to Coren (1992), appears to be more 
vulnerable than the right hemisphere to injury or damage.  Therefore, if this is the 
case then the left hemisphere will be more easily damaged and will result in right 
hemisphere dominance and a higher incidence of pathological left-handers.  Harris 
and Carlson (1988) stated that paralysis of the right side of the body due to injury to 
the left side of the brain may be up to four times more likely than paralysis to the left 
side of the body due to right hemisphere injury.  They conclude that if this is the case 
then pathological left-handers are four times more likely to be found in the population 
than pathological right-handers.  Harris and Carlson (1988) also back this up by 
stating that the blood supply to the left hemisphere is lower in volume than the right 
and thus the left hemisphere would be deprived of oxygen more quickly than the 
right, this is particularly the case as they add that the left hemisphere needs more 
energy to function than the right hemisphere does.  Bishop (1990) also supports the 
view that the left hemisphere is more vulnerable than the right to starvation of oxygen 
and thus she states that there is a higher chance of damage and thus a higher 
chance of pathological left-handedness.  Satz (1972) states that as it is assumed that 
there are many more right-handers to begin with than left-handers and when damage 
occurs, both hemispheres are equally as likely to be affected, then the pathological 
left-handers in the population will outnumber the pathological right handers (because 
most people don’t have their right hemisphere as the dominant hemisphere and thus 
any form of minor damage to this will go unnoticed in many cases as it will not affect 
speech or handedness).  It may be the case that this helps to explain why there are 
excess left-handers in certain groups that may have been subjected to brain trauma 
(such as in metal retardants and epileptics where left-handedness is thought to be 
twice as high as in that of the ‘normal’ population).  Corballis and Morgan (1978) 
introduced a similar theme to the work of Geschwind and Galaburda (1985a) (see 
section 2.5.9.) and proposed that there is a difference between the growth rates of 
the cerebral hemispheres of the brain during pregnancy.  They state that the right 
hemisphere develops quicker and earlier than the left hemisphere but whereas 
Geschwind and Galaburda state that excess levels of testosterone stunt the growth 
of the left hemisphere and thus the right hemisphere becomes dominant, Corballis 
and Morgan propose that the left hemisphere catches up in its growth and continues 
to develop after the right hemisphere has stopped developing.  However, Corballis 
and Morgan focus on the fact that because the left hemisphere develops over a 
longer period of time than the right hemisphere it is more vulnerable to damage over 
the entire period of development.  This means that there is a greater chance that the 
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left hemisphere will be damaged than the right hemisphere and thus this could cause 
an increase in the number of pathological left-handers over the number of 
pathological right-handers.   
 
However, one problem with pathological right-handedness is that it not widely 
considered within literature and there is no clear way of measuring it.  Most 
pathological studies (e.g. Bakan, 1971) focus upon left-handers and question them 
about various kinds of birth complications and stress but there is very little emphasis 
on birth complications relating to right-handers and thus the pathological right-




Coren (1992) defined pathological left-handedness as an impairment that prevents a 
person from becoming right-handed.  Coren (1992) proposed that the number of 
pathological left-handers was very high (around 50% of the entire left-handed 
population according to Coren & Searleman, 1990) but did not believe that all left-
handedness was pathological.  Coren believed that left-handedness might be the 
result, in many cases; of either some form of birth stress or by damage to the brain 
resulting in some form of psychological illness.  Coren  (1992) conducted a series of 
experimental studies within groups with psychological illnesses (such as epilepsy and 
schizophrenia).  He examined the proportion of left-handers within these groups and 
found that, in general, the incidence of left-handers was higher.  Coren concluded 
that these findings might lead to left-handedness being regarded as abnormal but in 
many cases there is no visible sign of this.  Another experiment by Coren, Searleman 
and Porac (1982) examined the link between handedness and birth history.  They 
interviewed a number of mothers and asked them if their children had experienced 
any form of birth trauma.  Coren et al’s definition of birth trauma included premature 
birth, prolonged labour, breathing difficulties and breech birth.  They found that when 
the mothers reported at least one of the birth traumas that there was an increase in 
probability that the child would be left-handed.  Coren et al. also found that this effect 
was greater in males than in females.  They explained this by stating that males are 
more vulnerable to brain damage than females.  Also, Coren et al. found that there 
was a difference between the sexes for the likelihood of left-handedness and 
different birth traumas.  For example, they found that males were more likely to be 
left-handed if they had been subjected to breech delivery, low birth weight, prolonged 
labour, caesarean births or multiple births while females were more likely to be left-
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handed if they had experienced premature birth, breathing difficulties, prolonged 
labour or multiple births.  Ross et al. (1992) supported the link between left-
handedness and low birth weight.  They found that in their sample of 4-year-old 
children who had been divided in to two groups (a full term group and a group that 
consisted of premature children) that 80% of the full term group were right-handed 
while only 63% of the premature group had a right hand preference.  O’Callaghan, 
Tudehope, Dugdale, Mohey, Burns and Cook (1987) studied low birth weight babies 
(defined as those who weighed less than 1000 grams) and found that aged 4 that 21 
out the 39 infants sampled had a left-hand preference.   
 
However, Harris and Carlson (1988) state that birth complications cannot be the only 
reason for the occurrence of left-handedness.  They stated that if some cases of left-
handedness are linked to incidences of brain damage then there must be some 
symptoms that can be readily identified in order to spot the injury. With regards to the 
proposition that left-handedness is associated with neurological injuries during birth 
or various forms of pregnancy complications, Coren (1990) anticipated that older 
mothers would be more likely than younger mothers to have left-handed children.  
Coren added the number of left-handed offspring would increase as the mothers’ age 
increased.  Coren (1990) tested this hypothesis by conducting a study that involved 
testing a group of college students’ hand preferences and asking how old their 
mothers were at the time of the students’ births.  Coren found that as the age of the 
mother increased the chance of her having a left-handed child also increased.  Coren 
firstly examined a group of 17 to 24 year old mothers and examined the hand 
preferences of their offspring (this was used as a comparison group as this age 
group is thought of as the ‘safest’ in which to give birth) in order to get a base line 
rate of handedness.  From this Coren found that the children of mothers in the 35 to 
39 years age category were 69% more likely to be left-handed than the comparison 
group and the children of mothers aged 40 and above were 128% more likely to be 
left-handed than the comparison group.  This supports the view that firstly maternal 
age does have an influence on the hand preference of offspring and more specifically 
that birth complications are linked to pathology and may cause left-handedness in 
some cases.  Finally, Coren does not conclude that all left-handedness is 
pathological in the way that Bakan does.  Coren proposes that pathology can be 
something that in many cases goes unnoticed but in other cases is a major issue and 
states that pathological conditions such as birth trauma or certain abnormalities such 
as epilepsy can be associated with left-handedness.   
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Although most of the literature suggests that pathological left-handedness can be 
explained through damage to the left hemisphere often at birth, a number of 
additional reasons for pathological left-handedness have been proposed.  The first is 
familial sinistrality.  Briggs and Nebes (1976) stated that a left-handed person who 
has no close left-handed relatives could be considered to be a pathological left-
hander, as it there would appear to be a lack of genetic influence.  However, Bishop 
(1990) states that although this is one of the most often used indicators of pathology 
that it is unreliable.  She states that there is an 8% chance of two right-handed 
parents having a left-handed child along with there only being a 24% chance of one 
left-handed parent having a left-handed child and thus genetics cannot be completely 
ruled out (Annett, 1985).  Also, if the genetic models of Annett and McManus are 
supported then an element of hand preference is due to chance and thus, in Annett’s 
case, if the offspring of two right-handed parents was left-handed then this could be 
because the parents’ genotype was heterozygous (rs+-) and thus both parents 
passed on the recessive gene (rs -) to the offspring thus resulting in the genotype rs- 
- and therefore the individual’s hand preference and cerebral dominance would be 
determined by chance.  Thus the familial sinistrality argument appears to be weak.  
Another indicator of possible pathological left-handedness is clumsiness of the non-
preferred hand.  Bishop (1990) stated that individuals (either left-handers or right-
handers) who have experienced some form of brain damage would often display 
poor use of the non-dominant hand.  Thus she attributes that poor use of the non-
dominant hand is a potential indicator of pathological handedness.  However, this 
idea would again seem weak in its argument.  Having poor use of the non-preferred 
hand does not necessarily mean that the individual has experienced brain damage 
especially with respect to those with right-hand preferences who are clumsy with or 
have poor skill in the left hand.  Individuals that have strong right-hand preferences 
often display very little skill with their left hands mainly because they have very little 
need to use the left hand as most activities are performed with the right.  However, in 
the case of left-handers, there is often much more call for them to use their right 
hands as they live in a world where most things are designed in this way. 
 
2.5.8. Geschwind and Galaburda 
 
Geschwind and Galaburda’s theory is linked to pathological left-handedness but 
more accurately is a biological explanation of left-handedness.  The theory proposes 
that an imbalance of testosterone in the foetus affects left hemisphere growth and 
causes a shift to non-right-handedness due to the more developed right hemisphere 
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(and thus the more dominant hemisphere).  Geschwind and Galaburda developed 
their theory around six main points.  These were; left-handedness is more common in 
males than females; developmental disorders are more common in males than 
females and also in left-handers than right-handers; spatial skills of males exceed the 
spatial skills of females (but the verbal skills of females exceed those of males). They 
also examined the finding that left-handers have superior right hemisphere functions 
and lastly that immune disorders are more common in left-handedness.   Geschwind 
and Galaburda (1985a, b, c) stated that the left hemisphere is the dominant 
hemisphere that controls handedness and language and similarly to Bakan, they 
state that left-handedness is, in effect, pathological.  Geschwind and Galaburda 
propose that an imbalance of testosterone in the womb can cause both left-
handedness and birth complications.  The simplest explanation of the model is that 
the growth of the left hemisphere is slowed down or retarded in some way by an 
excess flooding of testosterone in the womb.  Thus, when this slowing of the left 
hemisphere is occurring the corresponding parts of the right hemisphere increase in 
their development and growth.  This increased growth and dominance of the right 
hemisphere would suppress the left hemisphere functions and promote right 
hemisphere functions.  Because the role of pre-natal testosterone is central to the 
theory, Geschwind and Galaburda therefore propose that the incidence of left-
handedness is often seen to be higher in males as males generally experience 
higher levels of testosterone and thus will show a greater shift to the right 
hemisphere and will have superior right hemisphere skills and lean towards left-
handedness.  However, females also experience this effect.  All females are exposed 
to some level of testosterone but those who are exposed to excess levels will 
experience, according to Geschwind and Galaburda, slow growth of the left 
hemisphere and therefore an increased likelihood of left-handedness. 
 
Some researchers have reported a lack of support for Geschwind and Galaburda’s 
(1985) findings.  For example, Grimshaw, Bryden and Finegan (1995) examined the 
level of pre-natal testosterone in the amniotic fluid of babies during the second 
trimester and related this to the lateralisation of speech and handedness when the 
child was 10 years old.  They found that girls who had higher levels of pre-natal 
testosterone were more strongly right-handed and had strong left hemisphere 
dominance for speech.  Boys with higher levels of testosterone were found to have 
stronger right hemisphere specialization for the recognition of emotion (they also 
controlled for birth stress and genetic factors during this study).  Witelson (1991) 
found that pre-natal testosterone relates to stronger lateralisation of function.  A few 
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problems exist within this theory.  Noorozian, Lotfi, Gassemzadeh, Emami and 
Mehrabi (2002) pointed out that there is a concern with the theory that Geschwind 
and Galaburda predict that if there is a shift due to the slow growth of the left 
hemisphere that language and handedness are both predicted to shift.  Noorozian et 
al. argue that this disregards evidence that women are less lateralised than men for 
language functions.  Also, Rosen, Sherman and Galaburda (1991) argue that a brain 
that is symmetrical has a larger right hemisphere than a brain that is asymmetrical 
and thus this suggests that in many cases there is rapid growth of the right 
hemisphere rather than a slowing of the growth of the left hemisphere in symmetrical 
brains. Grimshaw et al. (1995) propose that little evidence on the relationship 
between pre-natal testosterone and cerebral lateralisation exists.  Bryden, McManus 
and Bulman-Fleming (1994) stated that the Geschwind and Galaburda model was 
not well supported by recent data.  They stated that there are inconsistencies 
between handedness and some of the immune disorders that are predicted by the 
model.  They state that some of the disorders such as allergies and asthma are 
linked to a higher increase in left-handers while other disorders show that right-
handers are more at risk (such as arthritis).   
 
There are three main theories that have been linked with the role of pre-natal 
testosterone and a link towards individual differences in lateralisation.  These will be 
briefly outlined. 
 
1) The first theory is the sexual differentiation theory: this states that there is a link 
between pre-natal testosterone and cerebral lateralisation.  Annett (1985) has found 
that there are higher rates of left-handedness in males than females (although in 
some cases females have a stronger left-hand preference than males) and Bryden 
(1988) found that women are less lateralized than men.  Researchers (such as Levy 
& Gur, 1980) proposed that it was possible that there is an association between a 
high level of pre-natal testosterone and a higher masculine cohort of left-handers.   
 
2) Geschwind and Galaburda’s (1985) theory of left-handedness.  This theory states 
that left-handedness is partly genetic but that other predictors of left-handedness are 
associated with pre-natal testosterone (see section above for an extended 
explanation of this). From this Geschwind and Galaburda (1985) proposed that pre-
natal testosterone slowed down the growth of specific areas of the left hemisphere 
during critical periods of brain development.  Geschwind and Galaburda predict that 
this pre-natal testosterone also influences the immune system and thus link this 
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effect to the higher level of immune disorders among left-handers.  At the centre of 
Geschwind and Galaburda’s theory is the relationship between pre-natal testosterone 
and cerebral lateralisation and more specifically, the relationship between 
handedness, lateralisation and a number of disorders that include developmental 
disorders and immune disorders.   
 
3) The Callosal hypothesis - The main focus of this hypothesis is that cerebral 
lateralisation does not result from any specific developmental effects in either 
hemisphere but instead results from the pruning of Callosal axons during foetal 
development.  (See Witelson (1991) for additional details of this hypothesis).  
Overall, it appears that testosterone does probably have an important influence in the 
pre-natal organisation of lateralised differences, although the direct role it plays in 
handedness is unclear. However, it may help our to understanding of sex differences 
and lateralised behaviours other than handedness (see Chapter 1).  
 
2.5.9. Harris and Carlson  
  
Harris and Carlson (1988) state that most left-handedness is unlikely to be 
pathological but state that the definition of pathological handedness differs across 
researchers and that the findings can be summarised into two main models of 
pathological left-handedness.  The first is what they refer to as the ‘Two Type Model’ 
– in this model they suggest that only some left-handedness is pathological.  The 
view is that surplus left-handers are found in clinical populations (particularly 
epileptics and mental retardants) but it is considered that these people are actually 
genotypic right-handers who are left-handed due to injury to the left hemisphere.  
These people are said to have pathological left-handedness.  This is ‘an abnormal 
condition initiated by injury or disease processes leading to certain structural and 
functional changes in the left hemisphere’ (Harris & Carlson, 1988, p293).  They 
suggest, however, that left-handers in the general population are presumed to be 
neurologically normal.  Satz (1972) previously proposed this basic model.  He stated 
that brain injury is just as likely to happen to the right hemisphere as it is to the left-
hemisphere.  He also held the view that left-hemisphere lesions lead to more 
switched handedness as there are many more right-handed people in the population 
and thus, when early brain injury occurs and causes a change in hand dominance, 
the results will more often be pathological left-handedness rather than pathological 
right-handedness.  Satz et al. (1985) therefore suggested that pathological factors 
can account for some of the elevated incidences of left-handedness among clinical 
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populations as well as some left-handedness among the population in general, but 
he states that the remaining left-handers in the population are ‘natural’ and their left-
handedness is genetic in origin.  The other model proposed by Harris and Carlson 
(1988) is the ‘One-Type Model’; in this model it is assumed that all left-handedness is 
pathological.  This view considers the suggestion that all left-handers are actually 
genotypic right-handers.  Thus, even left-handers who do not show any form of 
psychological dysfunction are thought to have some form of very mild left cerebral 
dysfunction and left-handedness is the only symptom.  The originator of this type of 
model was Bakan (1971) who, as previously stated, suggested that left-handedness 
was a condition that resulted form some form of birth stress. The ‘brain damage’ 
theory of left-handedness assumes that right-handedness and left cerebral 
dominance are characteristics of humans.  If this were the case then left-handedness 
would be an abnormality due to cerebral impairment (Annett, 2002). 
 
2.5.10. Pathological Conclusion 
 
This section argues that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that some left-
handedness appears to be pathological.  Very few researchers would support the 
view that all left-handedness is pathological but many would support that a proportion 
of left-handedness has pathological origins.  Schwartz (1977) concluded that one 
main problem with defining and testing for pathological handedness is that in many 
studies the methods of measuring and categorising handedness have been 
unreliable.  Some studies have used the writing hand as a valid measurement (e.g. 
Bakan, 1971) while others have asked participants to report their own hand 
preference (e.g. Hubbard, 1971).  Schwartz, however, used a handedness 
questionnaire (that of Crovitz and Zener) to determine hand preference. 
 
One major problem with Bakan’s work is that, as previously stated, he proposed that 
all left-handers were pathological.  If this were the case then firstly, there would not 
be a cause for genetic arguments of left-handedness or of cultural or environmental 
influence.  The theory has been criticised for being too extreme and it does not 
account for the fact that in general, left-handers do not show any deficits in cognitive 
performances or inferior motor proficiency.  However, Satz (1973) proposed that 
there are both pathological and natural left-handers in the population and this view 
seems to be better supported.  One final problem with examining handedness and 
birth stress is that the samples often need to be very large and in many cases consist 
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of samples that have been combined in order to have a large enough sample to find 
an effect but in most cases the findings are very weak.   
 
Some researchers do not support the existence of pathological left-handedness. 
McManus (1983) suggests that there is no such thing as pathological left-
handedness and that no piece of literature exists that shows any proof of this.  He 
suggests that damage to one hemisphere may involve switching to the other 
hemisphere in very extreme cases but that this is not always essential especially if 
the damage is subtle.   
 
 
2.6. Pathology v Genetics 
 
Differences may exist between left and right-handers for certain tasks but these do 
not always consist of an inferior performance by the left-hander, often a superior 
performance is achieved on tasks by left-handers (e.g. Halpern, Haviland & Killian, 
1998).  This points to the suggestion that not all left-handers are pathological left-
handers because if they were it would be expected that they would constantly 
perform poorer than their right-handed counterparts.  Left-handedness may 
sometimes be due to pathology but overall, the majority of left-handers are part of the 
‘normal’ population and left-handedness may just arise from a genetic variation.  
Bishop (1990) states that it is not reasonable to regard all left-handers as 
pathological.  She does; however, state that hand preference can be affected by 
underlying neurological impairment that can raise the proportion of left-handers in the 
population.  Pathological left-handedness is not solely attributed to those with 
obvious signs of brain damage, according to Bishop (1990) it can occur when there is 
no hard neurological evidence of this.  Bishop estimates that around one in every 
twenty   left-handers is a pathological left-hander but better ways of distinguishing 
this need to be developed. Among the indicators cited by Bishop to determine 
pathological left-handedness are, familial sinistrality (but she states that this is often 
misclassified), strength of handedness and poor motor skill on one side.  Annett 
(2002) states a number of reasons why the hypothesis that atypical asymmetries are 
due to brain pathology is highly unlikely.  These include the fact that left-handedness 
occurs among non-human primates.  The pathology view proposes that the natural 
primate variation for handedness was lost in the transition from ape-like to human-
like ancestors and then was introduced in humans as an ‘abnormal’ variation.  Annett 
states that it is much simpler to assume continuity.  Annett (1985) and McManus 
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(1981) in their models state that chance factors are important in determining left-
handedness in many cases but state that birth risk does not have an important role to 
play in determining handedness.    Annett (2002) also proposes that left-handers are 
often found among those who have high achievements in, amongst other things, the 
arts, music and sport and it seems problematic to link these individuals to having 
some form of early brain damage.  Bakan et al. (1973) proposed that pregnancy and 
birth risk factors have a high influence in determining handedness (particularly left-
handedness) and this is supported by McKeever et al. (1995) who propose that up to 
30% of left-handed females may be left-handed because if pregnancy and birth risk 
factors.  However, it seems to be that many researchers have found specific sex 
effects linking to differences between left-handedness and birth risk factors (e.g. 
Leviton & Kilty, 1976; McKeever et al., 1995).  Thus, Bailey and McKeever (2004) 
stated that in order to take sex differences in to account current genetic models 
would have to examine and acknowledge the possible role of birth stress and it’s link 
to left-handed females and the possible genetic effect(s) within this.  Bailey and 
McKeever (2004) conclude by stating that pathological theories of left-handedness 
do not compromise genetic theories of handedness and report that their findings are 
consistent with genetic arguments rather than the pathological ones.   
 
Therefore, it seems that according to these views, genetics play a major part in 
determining our handedness, but if it was only genetics that determined our 
handedness then no left-handed parents would have right-handed children and no 
right handed parents would have left handed children.  This, however, is known not 
to be the case.  Therefore, evidence seems to suggest that to determine handedness 
firstly there is some form of genetic basis to this but it is subject to change by the 
environment in which the individual is raised and handedness will be determined by 
the external stimuli an individual receives.  Also, in some cases the occurrence of 
pathological left-handedness does seem to occur but not in the proportions that 
Bakan proposes (i.e. that all left-handedness is pathological).  In some cases when 
some form of damage does occur to the left hemisphere then it is possible that there 
might be some form of switching between the hemispheres resulting in, in some 
cases, a switch to the hand preference. This would also apply to a switch in the 
opposite direction. However, in almost all cases this effect will not be noticed and 
also the hand preference would not have been known in many cases as to ascertain 
whether there had been any form of switching in the hand preference.  However, a 
link could be made to Hepper et al’s. (1991; 1998) studies as to consider whether the 
thumb sucking observed in utero remained constant after some form of birth stress or 
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if it switched due to pathological factors.    It therefore seems probable that genetics 
and the environment can influence handedness but in other cases, a certain 
percentage of the population are pathological left-handers.  
 
 
2.7. Implications for current research 
 
Implications for the current program of research can be derived from many of the 
theories covered within this chapter.  The initial research idea involved devising an 
appropriate way to measure handedness (see chapter 3 for details) and this could 
only be done in the context of these theories (e.g. is hand skill or hand preference the 
major consideration). 
 
Annett’s right shift theory perhaps is the most salient theory relating to the behaviour 
of left- and right-handers.  Annett (2002) states that there are no clear cognitive or 
performance differences between left- and right-handers as a population.  She states 
that the performances of left-handers are no more inferior on a series of tasks than 
the performance of right-handers.  Thus the implications of Annett’s findings with 
relation to the current research are that there should be no difference in the 
behaviour of left- and right-handers on the solving of the novel problem (either in the 
way that they think or tackle it or in the end result (such as timing and number of 
moves).  As the problem-solving task is not a task of hand skill then Annett’s findings 
of hand skill cannot be directly applied to this.  However, if differences are found 
between left- and right-handers on the problem solving task then Annett does not 
clearly state why this might be the case.  The right shift theory states the group that 
should be most advantaged are heterozygotes (those with the genotype RS+-) as 
they do not have the pressure that RS++ homozygotes do on the left hemisphere and 
can use the right hemisphere more to an extent.  However, one problem with this is 
that it is difficult to tell in many cases whether a right-hander would have the RS++ 
genotype or the RS+- genotype and thus predictions could not be made on this 
basis.  Also, some left-handers would also have the RS+- genotype and thus may 
potentially be differently lateralised from those left-handers with the RS- - genotype 
but again there is no clear way of determining these genotypes.  Also, in relation to 
this, Annett (1985) predicts that there would be deficits on the extreme ends of the 
left- and right-handedness continuum.  Annett links this to her finding that those who 
tend to perform better on tests such as IQ tests tend to be either weakly left-handed 
or left-handed in skill.  Thus, in order to explore this finding, sub-groups of left- and 
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right-handers, ranging from strong to weak, can be examined on the current problem-
solving task.  A series of researchers (such as Bishop, 1990) state that the 
performances of left-handers will be worse than those of right-handers (often due to 
some form of pathology).  If this were the case then it would be expected that right-
handers would perform better on the novel problem-solving task than left-handers 
(Chapter 4).  
 
Annett does not support the pathological view that left-handers are inferior to right-
handers on performance due to them being ‘brain damaged’ in some form.  Annett 
does acknowledge that some left-handedness must be pathological in origin but links 
most pathological left-handedness to groups who have perhaps experienced a shift 
in handedness due to trauma of some form and thus are part of a clinical group.  
Although Annett states that there are no differences between left- and right-handers, 
other researchers have found differences between these groups.  McManus and 
Mascie-Taylor (1983) found that there was an advantage of right-handedness in IQ 
scores but this difference was very small.   Annett concludes by stating that there 
would be no expected difference between a group of ‘normal’ left-handers and a 
group of ‘normal’ right-handers.  However, one major barrier to testing this, is that 
there is no reliable way of determining normal vs. pathological left-handers.   
 
Bakan (e.g. 1971) stated that all left-handers are pathological and proposed that 
pathological left-handers would be inferior to right-handers.  However, Satz (e.g. 
1973) stated that not all left-handers were pathological left-handers and that a 
proportion of ‘natural’ left-handers existed that were determined by either genetics or 
the environment.  Satz’s findings propose that ‘natural’ left-handers would be 
expected to perform no differently than ‘natural’ right-handers.  However, the group of 
pathological left-handers would be expected to be inferior to both the group of 
‘natural’ left-handers and right-handers in general.  Again, this pathological approach 
poses problems to relate to the current research.  Pathological handedness is most 
commonly defined as a switch from one hemisphere to the other causing a switch in 
hand preference and is most often attributed to some form of damage to the brain 
that results from birth stress or trauma.  If there are existing differences between 
pathological and natural left-handers and a difference between them and right-
handers then this cannot be clearly examined during the course of the current 
experiments as there is no clear way of establishing whether a person is a 
pathological left-hander or a ‘natural’ left-hander.  Also, the existence of pathological 
right-handedness is not clearly accounted for and no assumption is made as to 
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whether there would be an expected difference between pathological right-handers 
and ‘natural’ right-handers and whether pathological right-handers would be 
expected to be superior or inferior in performance compared to ‘natural’ left-handers.  
Again the identification of pathological right-handers would be impossible to establish 
and this would be even more difficult than identifying pathological left-handers as 
there is very little literature that recognises the existence of pathological right-
handers and thus almost all right-handers are assumed to be natural right-handers.  
It would thus be very difficult to draw any conclusions with regards to pathological 
handedness relating to the current experiments given the difficulty of identifying and 
defining these individuals.  One last factor relating to the existence of pathological 
right-handedness that has to be considered. If all right-handers are considered to be 
natural right-handers but there are a proportion of pathological right-handers within 
this group then it may cause different results or effects within this group due to the 
possible difference in performance between pathological and natural right-handers.  
Thus, the existences of pathological right-handers have to be considered within a 
group and are as important as the existence of pathological left-handers but are 
much smaller in number.   
 
If Annett’s work is supported or left-handers show a superior performance on a series 
of tasks then this fails to back up the pathological argument. However, it is also 
possible that this supports the gene-culture model. 
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3.0 Aims of the Chapter 
 
This chapter will examine different methods of measuring handedness and will 
describe and review the handedness inventories that are most commonly used and 
the different hand skill tests that are used to assess handedness.  A summary of the 
debate between hand preference (which assesses the hand favoured for a number of 
items, Bishop, 1990) and hand skill (which measures the proficiency of each hand 
while carrying out a skilled activity and examines which hand is more skilled, Bishop, 
1999) will also be addressed. The development of the questionnaire that was used to 
determine hand preference throughout the thesis will also be described. The validity 
and reliability of self-report scales will be discussed and the reliability of the 
questionnaire used for the thesis will be examined.   
 
 
3.1. Self-report scales of handedness 
 
The optimum way of measuring hand preference is often a fiercely contested area.  
There appears to be a distinct lack of agreement across handedness research and 
researchers as how to ascertain the best measurement or even how to define hand 
preference in many cases.  However, Corballis (1997) stated that nearly all people 
can define whether they consider themselves to be left- or right-handed and around 
90% of the human population define themselves as right-handed.  Corballis (1997) 
added that the issue of measurement of handedness depends on many different 
factors but one fundamental issue is whether handedness refers to hand preference, 
hand skill or both.   
 
“The most notorious problem is that there is no agreement as to the definition of 
handedness and hence no agreement on how to classify people in order to discover 
how many fall into different handedness groups.” (Annett, 1998a, p63)  
 
It is difficult to define how handedness can be assessed and thus, the most obvious 
way to find out which hand a person uses to do various things is to ask.  However, 
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asking a person what their hand preference is can cause problems as the use of a 
single hand to perform a variety of different manual actions is very rare and in many 
individuals, very unlikely.  It appears that the best way to find out the hand preference 
of an individual is to ask them to perform specific activities or ask them with which 
hand they perform specific activities (using some form of self-report inventory).  The 
consistency of a person’s handedness can be determined through this type of self-
report questionnaire (Provins & Cunliffe, 1972).  In many cases the researcher gets 
the individual to carry out these activities using relevant props or equipment and 
notes the hand they use to do this.  (See section 3.2. for a review of handedness 
inventories).  Disagreement not only exists over what is the best way to measure 
handedness but also over definitions of handedness, i.e. when can someone be 
defined as left-handed? Or is there more than one type of left-handedness and right-
handedness and if so what are the different types and how are they defined? The 
simplest classification of handedness only distinguishes left-handedness and right-
handedness; however, more complex definitions and categorisations of hand 
preference exist (see section 3.2. for a review of different categories of hand 
preference).  There are many advantages in using hand preference inventories.  
Firstly, they normally require very little (or in some cases no) apparatus and are quick 
and easy to administer and score (Bishop, 1990).  Also data can be collected from 
large groups at the same time and questionnaires can be distributed long distance or 
on-line for completion.  The validity and reliability of these types of questionnaire 
have been questioned and these issues will be covered in section 3.5.  
 
The distribution of hand preference is normally ‘J’ shaped (see figure 2.3. in Chapter 
2) with the highest incidence occurring at the extreme, strong right-hand side and a 
smaller number at the extreme, strong left-hand side.  Those who are not strongly 
left- or right-handed exist at all points along the continuum between the two extreme 
points.   
 
 
3.2. Commonly used handedness inventories and resulting definitions of 
hand preference 
 
Many different handedness inventories exist and these vary quite broadly.  Some of 
the inventories are very short and only ask up to 10 questions (e.g. The Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory – Oldfield, 1971) whereas others cover up to 40 items (e.g. 
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The Waterloo handedness questionnaire – Bryden, 1977).  The response choices 
and the scoring of these inventories also differ; some of them require responses on a 
three-point scale (Left, either and right hand) while others are (more commonly) 
answered on a five-point scale (from 'always right', through 'usually right', 'either', 
'usually left' to 'always left').  Inventories that are scored across a three-point scale 
are usually (but not always) given a score of 1 for a right hand response, 0 for an 
either response and –1 for a left hand response and the total scores are grouped as 
a positive score resulting in a right-hand preference, a score of zero resulting in what 
many of the researchers term as ‘ambidexterity’ and a negative score indicating a left 
hand preference.  On a five-point scale the scores range from 2 for a right hand 
always answer, 1 for a right hand most of the time, 0 for either, -1 for left hand most 
of the time and –2 for left hand always.  The total scores for the five-point 
questionnaire result in different groupings of hand preference.  Where the three-point 
scale only distinguishes left-handedness, right-handedness and ambidexterity, the 
five-point scale also distinguishes between strength of preference within the 
handedness categories.  Many of the researchers who use five-point scales have 
their own ‘cut-off’ points for what score distinguishes, for example, a strong left-hand 
preference compared to a weak left-hand preference but these are all reasonably 
consistent within the categories. Additionally, Annett (2002) has a different scoring 
system for her inventory and a wide variety of handedness categories (see section 
3.2.4. for details of this).  One additional scoring and response factor that will be 
covered is that of a laterality quotient (see section 3.2.7. for details of this).  The 
different designs, response choices and scoring systems of the most frequently used 
handedness inventories will be outlined in more detail below.    
 
3.2.1. McManus (1985) 
 
McManus (1985) proposed the simplest categorisation of handedness when he 
argued handedness is best measured by taking the hand preferred for writing.  
McManus argued that the most skilled action a person does is write and thus the 
hand preferred for this would indicate the individual’s hand preference.  He proposed 
that a single dichotomy between left- and right-handers was the most meaningful way 
of sub-dividing individuals, so long as there were no strong cultural pressures against 
left-handedness.  In doing this he implied that there were no essential behavioural 
differences within the categories ‘left-handers’ and ‘right-handers’.  Also, by stating 
that individuals could be placed in to these two groups McManus implied that 
strength of hand preference is not important and that the importance lay in the 
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direction of hand preference.  Even though McManus states that the classification of 
left- and right-handers based on writing hand is the most meaningful way of dividing 
individuals unless there is some form of cultural pressure he does not explain what 
the alternative would be if there was any form of cultural pressure to shift the writing 
hand.  If any from of cultural or educational pressure occurred then part of this model 
would be seen as invalid as the individual would not always be expressing their 
natural hand preference when writing if they had been pressurised to shift from left-
handedness to right-handedness.  Also, particularly among the older generation it 
was not uncommon for children to be forced in some way to switch hand preference 
from left to right but these individuals do not always remember that they were 
switched and therefore would not always be able to even report this shift.  However, 
McManus (2002) argued that measuring handedness by means of multiple item 
handedness inventories does not always give an accurate measurement and the 
best way to get an accurate measurement is to keep the questionnaire brief.  
McManus (2002) maintains that when the direction of handedness is assessed there 
is still no superior indicator of handedness than the writing hand and that most of the 
items on handedness inventories result in the majority of same responses as the 
writing hand and therefore there is no need to add these surplus statements.  
McManus (2002) concludes that the only item that can satisfactorily be distinguished 
for preference from writing is throwing.  McManus supports Peters and Servos’s 
(1989) suggestion that hand preference for throwing and for writing are often 
inconsistent and cites that this has been extensively validated (see section 3.2.6. for 
further details).   
 
3.2.2. Waterloo Handedness Inventory: Bryden (1977); Steenhuis & Bryden, 
(1989) 
 
The Waterloo handedness inventory is a thirty-six-item questionnaire that asks 
specifically about uni-manual tasks (i.e. tasks that only require the use of one hand) 
and is one of the most frequently used inventories to assess hand preference. 
Bryden (1977) suggested that there are two factors underlying hand preference, one 
representing skilled performance and the other unskilled.  The questions included in 
the Waterloo handedness inventory cover examples of skilled and unskilled actions.  
Examples of some of the skilled questions include ‘with which hand would you use a 
paintbrush to paint a wall’, ‘with which hand would you use an iron to iron a shirt’, 
‘with which hand would you use a spoon to eat soup’ and ‘with which hand would use 
to throw a dart’ while some examples of unskilled actions include ‘with which hand 
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would you use to drink a mug of coffee’ and ‘with which hand would you use to point 
to something in the distance’ (a more detailed description of the questionnaire can be 
found in Steenhuis & Bryden, 1989) .  The questionnaire gives a choice of five 
responses that range from ‘always use the left hand’; ‘usually use the left hand’; ‘use 
both hands equally often’ to ‘usually use the right hand’ and ‘always use the right 
hand’.  Calculating each individual statement’s score and summing up all of the items 
on the questionnaire determine a total score.  A scoring system of –2 for ‘always use 
the left hand’ to 2 for ‘always use the right hand’ is assigned.  It is therefore expected 
that those with a right-hand preference will have a positive score and those with a 
left-hand preference will have a negative score on the questionnaire. 
 
One problem with the Waterloo handedness inventory is that many of the questions 
are ambiguous.  Statements regarding which hand someone holds a walking stick 
with or which hand they use to hold a mug of coffee would not always reflect an 
individual’s hand preference.  It may depend on the position of the mug for drinking 
coffee or with regards to a walking stick the hand used to hold it may be determined 
by the side that it is being used to support and not necessarily which hand is more 
comfortable.  Also, because there are a large number of statements many of the 
actions asked about are very similar, an example of this within the questionnaire is 
one statement asks what hand the individual writes with, another asks what hand is 
used to paint with a paintbrush while another asks which hand uses a rubber on the 
top of a pencil.  These items all require fine dexterity and are not strongly 
distinguished from each other.  Thus it seems that having too many items on a 
handedness inventory such as this may lose the effect of determining a reliable 
measurement of hand preference.  However, having a longer questionnaire does 
have advantages as it allows a number of responses to be made and therefore it is 
easier to determine the strength of hand preference through a higher number of 
responses. However, Annett (1998b) states that strength of hand preference can be 
measured as effectively with a much shorter handedness inventory.  A brief 
discussion of the optimum number of questionnaire items to measure handedness is 
outlined in section 3.2.6. 
 
3.2.3. The Crovitz-Zener Scale (1962) 
 
The Crovitz-Zener scale is one of the earliest handedness inventories still in use.  
The questionnaire consists of fourteen-items which include ‘holding a glass while 
drinking’, ‘ holding a bottle to take the lid off’, ‘holding a potato to peel’, ‘drawing, 
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‘using scissors’ and ‘using a toothbrush’.  Unlike most other handedness inventories 
that either use a three-point scale or a five-point scale, the Crovitz-Zener scale uses 
a six-point scale which is the same as the five point scale but has the additional 
choice of ‘don’t know’ if the individual in uncertain which hand they would use for a 
particular action.  The scoring of the Crovitz-Zener scale is also different to the usual 
scoring system for the five-point scales.  Rather than ranging from a score or 2 to –2 
this scale goes from a scale of 1 to 5 where a strong right hand response would 
score 1 and a strong left hand response would score 5.  If the ‘don’t know’ response 
is chosen then no score is given for that particular statement.  In order to avoid any 
form of response set when completing this questionnaire five of the activities included 
within it refer to activities that a right-handed person would normally do with the left 
hand.  These items include’ what hand do you use to hold a potato to peel’ because 
a right-handed person would peel the potato using the right hand they should 
respond that they hold the potato in their left hand and are thus avoiding answering 
‘right hand always’ to each statement and have to think more carefully about each 
statement.    The statements that refer to the left hand of a person who is right hand 
dominant are scored in a reverse fashion.   A score of fourteen would therefore mean 
extremely right-handed and a score of seventy would mean extremely left-handed.   
 
One problem with the Crovitz-Zener scale is that it makes assumptions that people 
can not only report their hand preference for a number of activities but that they can 
also judge the strength of performance on whether they always use that particular 
hand or whether they only sometimes use it.  The types of activities individuals are 
asked about on handedness inventories are often performed automatically in 
everyday life and when it comes to reporting their preference on these questionnaires 
some people are often surprised by the outcome when they are encouraged to mime 
as they are not sure when solely asked about a particular activity and find that they 
do not use the hand that they thought they did.  Bishop, Ross, Daniels and Bright 
(1996) state that if a person who is prohibited in some way from miming an action 
cannot tell which hand they use to perform some of the actions (especially activities 
such as holding a toothbrush) then they cannot accurately respond to whether they 
do particular activities some of the time or most of the time if they are unaware of the 
actual hand in some cases that they use to do this.  This criticism is not specific to 
the Crovitz-Zener scale, this applies to all of the inventories which use a five-point 
scale where individuals are asked not only to indicate their hand preference but also 
the strength of preference.  
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3.2.4. Annett handedness questionnaire (1970) and subsequent revisions 
 
Annett (1985) states that there is so much controversy in handedness assessment 
that the variance for percentage of left-handers in the population is vast.  She cites 
that it ranges somewhere from 1% to 30%.  Annett therefore states that if agreement 
cannot be reached, as how to classify handedness and this variance exists between 
researchers then it would be difficult to generalise findings to the left- and right-
handed populations in general.  The most common figure cited for the percentage of 
left-handers is somewhere around 9 to 15%.  Annett (1985) herself predicts that only 
around 3-4% of left-handers are consistent left-handers and the remaining left-
handers in the population are mixed-handers of some description.  Annett (2002) 
stated that mixed-handers could be referred to as those who write with one hand and 
do a number of skilled activities with the other or those with some form of 
inconsistent preference between different actions (although one hand is still often 
more strongly preferred for particular actions).   
 
Annett (1985) proposes potential explanations for why this variance amongst 
researchers exists.  Firstly, she states that there could be differences between the 
groups studied (except from their handedness).  For example, one group might 
contain more males than females and thus it is reported that there is a higher 
incidence of left-handedness amongst males therefore the level of left-handedness 
would be higher amongst this group.  Another example could be age.  As left-
handedness is not discouraged in most societies any more then it would be expected 
that there would be higher incidences of left-handedness amongst younger people 
than older people (as many older people will have experienced some attempt to 
switch their hand preference from left to right).  Therefore if a participant group in one 
study consisted of mainly older people then it would be expected that the incidence 
of left-handedness would be relatively lower than a group that was comprised of 
mainly younger people.  Secondly, Annett said that some measurements might be 
observed while others may be self-reported.  This could make a difference in 
classification as a group who are using the self-report method may think that they 
know which hand they use to perform an activity but this may not always be accurate 
whereas a group that are observed are acting out the activities and are more likely to 
give a true reflection of their preference.  Annett (1985) adds that in some cases 
observational studies have to be carried out if the participant group is one that is 
unable to respond to a questionnaire (e.g. young children).    Therefore, the way that 
Chapter 3: Review of measurement and categorisation of handedness 
 112 
measurements are taken can have an effect on the final hand preference 
classification.  Annett (1985) suggests that a final reason for variance among left-
handers may be because of the way that researchers classify handedness.  For 
example, some researchers may only look at consistent or strong preferences while 
others may be interested in only skilled activities.  It is dependent on the individual 
researcher’s criterion how handedness is classified in many cases and thus this 
causes a large amount of variance due to the different questionnaires and measuring 
strategies used.  
 
Annett (2002) therefore stated that clear predetermined rules for classifying 
handedness needed to be outlined.  She stated that handedness is not a 
dichotomous variable but is measured along a continuum (Annett, 2002).  Annett 
(1998b) stated that handedness classification is dependent on many factors and not 
only does it depend upon culture, sex and individual researcher criteria, it can also 
depend on the method used to recruit participants.  Annett found that things such as 
volunteer biases can affect individual classifications; along with the way in which 
participants are recruited (which can also be linked to volunteer biases) and the way 
in which handedness is analysed.  Annett (1998) states that unless these things are 
controlled for then it is difficult to make direct comparisons of different handedness 
groups (and also within handedness groups).   
 
Annett’s (1970) questionnaire consisted of 12 items (see appendix 1).  These were 
write; throw; hold a tennis racket; hold a match; scissors; thread a needle; sweep 
with a broom; shovel with a shovel; deal cards; hammer; use a toothbrush and 
unscrew a jar lid.  Participants were asked to answer each question and respond 
using left, right or either responses.  Annett (1985) states that the first step in her 
analysis of hand preference analysis was to distinguish mixed-handers from 
consistent left- and right-handers.  Annett (1970) developed a decision tree in which 
she illustrated how her classification system was developed (see figure 3.1).  The 
first and most simple thing she considers is the writing hand and splits this in to right-
handed and left-handed.  Within each group she split left-handers in to pure left-
handers and mixed left-handers and split right-handers in to pure right-handers and 
mixed right-handers.  It is these four groups that are often used to broadly categorise 
participants on Annett’s questionnaire.  A person is classified as a pure right-hander 
if they indicated that they use their right hand for all of the activities on the 
questionnaire or if they used their right hand or either hand for all of the activities.  A 
pure left-hander is someone who uses their left hand exclusively or their left hand 
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and either hand to perform all items on the questionnaire.  A classification of ‘mixed 
right-hander’ is given to people who write with their right hand but indicate that they 
perform another activity on the questionnaire with their left hand and finally, a ‘mixed 
left-hander’ is someone who writes with their left hand but does at least one of the 
other activities with their right hand.   
 
However, Annett (1970) further divided these four handedness groups in to eight 
more specific groups.  See Figure 3.1 below. Row 3: Preference Classification shows 
the 1970 version and Row 4: Revision shows the 1998 revised version. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Annett’s (1998b) revised hand classification system with breakdowns of 
all handedness groups (from Annett (2002), p44) 
 (Primary actions are writing, throwing, racket, match, hammer and toothbrush.  Non-
primary actions are scissors, needle, broom, spade, dealing cards and unscrewing 
the lid of a jar).   
 
Firstly, Annett divided her 12 item questionnaire in to two different categories where 
writing; throwing; using a tennis racket; striking a match; hammering a nail and using 
a toothbrush were considered to be primary actions and using scissors; threading a 
needle; sweeping with a broom; using a shovel; dealing cards and unscrewing a jar 
lid were considered to be non-primary actions.  Annett (1970) devised these 8 new 
handedness groups based on these primary and non-primary actions.  These groups 
were based on empirical evidence of differences between the hands on a hand skill 
task.  Classification group 1 consisted of pure right-handers and individuals were 
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classed as this if they indicated that they did not use the left hand for any actions at 
all on the questionnaire.  Group 2 were classed as right-weak left and were those 
who used their right or either hand for all actions but used the left hand for either 
sweeping with a broom; using a shovel or threading a needle (all of these are non-
primary actions).  Group 3 were classed as right-mild left and these individuals were 
right-handed writers but they unscrewed the lid off a jar with the left hand.  Group 4 
were classed as right-moderate left and were right-handed writers who used the right 
hand or either hand for all actions but used the left hand for dealing cards.  Group 5 
were classed as right-strong left and used the right hand for writing but used the left 
hand for any one of the primary actions.  Group 6 were classed as left-strong right 
and were left-handed writers with strong right-hand preferences for any of the 
primary actions.  Group 7 were left-handed for any primary actions and right-handed 
for any other actions.  Finally, group 8 were pure left-handers and exclusively used 
the left or either hand to perform all 12 actions on the handedness questionnaire and 
did not use the right hand at all.  Annett (1985) revised these classifications and 
deleted category 5 and redefined categories 3 and 4 to incorporate the original class 
5 (this is the version that can be seen in figure 3.1 above).  All of the left-handed 
classifications (groups 6, 7 and 8) stayed the same, as did classifications 1 and 2 for 
right-handers.   
 
Annett (1998b) added that if an individual could be classified in more than one group 
then the left most case would take precedence.  For example, if an individual was 
classed as falling in to group 2 and group 4 then their final allocation would be to 
group 4 as this is more favoured to the left.  In the revised classification system group 
3 was amended from right-mild left to right-moderate left, which was defined by right-
handed writers who perform any one primary action using the left hand or unscrew 
the lid off a jar using the left hand.  Category 4 was redefined as right-strong left (the 
original class 5) and this was revised to include right-handed writers who perform at 
least two primary actions with the left hand and/or deal playing cards with the left 
hand.  These classes took in to account degrees of hand skill but in some cases one 
category may have more strongly dextral people in it even though the category does 
not suggest this.  For example, those in class 2 could be more dextral than those in 
class 1 as many people in class 1 could perform many of the actions with either 
hand. 
 
Annett (1995) concluded that dividing participants in to sub-groups of left- and right-
handers offer a reliable method of analysing the different degrees of left- and right-
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handedness.  This approach contrasts with those who examine degrees of hand 
preference using a laterality quotient or a 5-point likert scale.   
 
However, there are problems with Annett’s classification system.  Peters (1998) says 
that there are too many classifications and it is not only confusing and sometimes 
complex to follow which category each individual fits in to, but also in order to 
examine differences between the sub-groups there would have to be an adequate 
number of participants in each category so that comparisons could be made and this 
would require many participants and certain sub-groups will be much more common 
than others.  Nevertheless, Annett’s handedness questionnaire has been found to be 
one of the most valid handedness questionnaires and also one of the most used, as 
it is quick and simple to administer and score when the classifications are kept to a 
minimum. 
 
3.2.5. Peters (1990) 
 
Peters (1990) distinguished between three hand preference classification groups.  He 
examined the throwing performances of left- and right-handers using a procedure 
used by Ponton (1987) who reported that left-handers who showed a tendency to 
prefer the left hand for a number of preference activities showed motor performance 
that was inferior to the performance shown by left-handers with more inconsistent 
preferences.  Peters and Servos (1989) failed to replicate these findings but did find 
that classifying left-handers in to sub-groups in this way not only showed that these 
sub-groups differed in degree of preference but also in performance asymmetries.  
Peters (1990) found that ‘strong’ left-handers showed a strong relationship between 
hand preference and hand performance and thus referred to them as consistent left-
handers, whereas weaker left-handers tended to show very little relationship between 
the their hand preference and their hand strength, Peters referred to this group as 
inconsistent left-handers.  He then simplified the groups into: Consistent right-
handers who write and throw with the right hand; consistent left-handers who write 
and throw with the left hand and inconsistent left-handers, those who write with the 
left and throw with the right hand.  He does not include a category for inconsistent 
right-handers as he indicated that it was a very rare occurrence that someone would 
write with the right but throw with the left and therefore there would not be enough 
people in a category of this type.  Peters went on to say that the exclusion of the 
inconsistent right hand category was because it is possible to explain right-handed 
writing and left-handed throwing in terms of environmental pressures against the left 
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hand as the writing hand and a neutral attitude towards the throwing hand but no 
equivalent environmental explanation can be given for individuals who throw with the 
right and write with the left (Peters, 1996).  Peters justifies the use of the inconsistent 
left-handed group in the study as he states that almost a third of all left-handers are 
inconsistent left-handers (Murphy & Peters, 1994). 
 
This classification system is advantageous as it is quick to assess and uses two 
items (writing and throwing) that have been shown to be strong predictors of hand 
preference.  However, one criticism is that Peters states that there is no need for an 
inconsistent right-handed group as it is rare to find a right-handed writer who throws 
with the left hand but there may be a group of these people who do throw with the left 
and write with the right thus there is need to include an inconsistent right hand 
category. 
 
3.2.6. Peters (1998) 
 
After Peter’s (1990) consideration of consistent and inconsistent hand preferences he 
examined questionnaire measurement of hand preference and studied what made an 
effective, valid and reliable questionnaire. 
 
Peters (1998) stated that the most effective questionnaires should contain three 
things.  Firstly, items that cover both skilled and unskilled activities, secondly, a 
sufficient number of questions to allow for an element of variability over different 
items and thirdly, they should allow for responses to be made on a ranked scale 
rather than on a forced choice left/right scale.  Peters stated that one major 
advantage of using a questionnaire that encompassed all of the above factors was 
that it would be flexible enough to accommodate a variety of classification schemes 
of handedness.  Peters also stated that within this questionnaire there should be face 
validity; construct validity and external validity (see section 3.5. for more details on 
validity).   
 
Peters (1998) also researched what the optimal length of a questionnaire measuring 
hand preference should be.  Peters (1998) said that there was an assumption by 
many researchers that the longer a questionnaire was the more activities it would 
cover and it would therefore give a realistic but variable measurement of hand 
preference.  Annett (1985) added though that the more items participants are asked 
about on handedness inventories the more complicated it becomes.  However, the 
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number of items in these questionnaires varied considerably across researchers – 
Singh and Kundu (1994) cited in Peters (1998) used an 87-item questionnaire, 
Messinger and Messinger (1995) used a 55-item questionnaire while Steenhuis and 
Bryden (1989) started out with a 60-item questionnaire that was finally reduced to a 
32-item questionnaire.  Peters added that short questionnaires (ones that have 10 
items or less) have also been found to be effective as they can still discriminate 
between groups of left- and right-handers and they are quick to complete (e.g. Peters 
& Servos, 1989).  However, criticisms against short questionnaires have included 
that there is little data in order to make comparisons of handedness groups or be 
able to split the groups effectively from only 10 (and sometimes fewer) items.  Peters 
(1998) stated that the optimum length for a questionnaire was around 30 items so 
that it was long enough to get enough discrimination between items and allow 
multiple handedness groups to be distinguished but also short enough to complete 
quickly and effectively without containing additional questions that were perhaps 
ambiguous and not useful for determining handedness.  One last advantage of using 
longer questionnaires is that the shorter questionnaires can be incorporated within 
the questionnaires and thus checks can be made on more than one handedness 
scale to measure hand preference.   
 
Peter’s (1998) questionnaire contained 25 items these items were: drawing; knife; 
comb hair; pick up a very small object; pick up a book; screw in a light bulb; dial a 
pushbutton phone; wave goodbye; pet dog or cat; wash face with cloth; pick up a 
heavy object; pick up a heavy suitcase; bat baseball; write; brush teeth; throw ball; 
hold tennis racket; hammer in a nail (which holds the hammer); scissors; strike 
match; thread needle; sweep with broom; shovel with large shovel; deal cards and 
unscrew the lid off a jar (see appendix 2).  This questionnaire contains all 12 of 
Annett’s (1970) handedness inventory statements and 8 out 10 of Oldfield’s (1971) 
(and therefore Bishop et al.’s., 1996) statements.  Although Peters only included 8 
out of the 10 EHI items he substituted unscrewing the lid of a jar for opening a box lid 
and hammering in a nail for eating with a spoon (although for the questionnaire used 
in my thesis these have been changed back to the original EHI items in order to be 
able to make direct comparisons – see section 3.7).  Peters (1998) administered his 
questionnaire twice and used a different scoring system each time.  The first time he 
used a 5-point likert scale that ranged from always left, mostly left, hand, mostly right 
and always right and was scored 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively.  Peters then gave his 
participants 6 motor tasks to complete (these included various peg moving, button 
pushing and tapping tasks) before administering the questionnaire for a second time.  
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The second version of the questionnaire contained forced choice responses so that 
the participant could only respond using left hand, right hand or either hand.  Peters 
found that three of the items included in his 25-item inventory did not aid in the 
discrimination of handedness and were therefore removed from his analysis, these 
were: sweep with a broom; shovel with a large shovel and bat a baseball.   
 
In conclusion, Peters (1998) examined what made a good hand preference 
questionnaire and used this to design a questionnaire that acknowledged these 
results.  He concluded that a hand preference questionnaire should not have too 
many items but should have enough so that variance could be accounted for 
(somewhere in the region of 25 to 30 statements according to Peters).  He also 
argued that the most effective questionnaires are ones that are flexible enough to 
allow a range of classification schemes to be measured within the questionnaire (e.g. 
Annett’s classifications and the EHI).  Peters concluded that the use of a 5-point 
scale was more effective on a handedness questionnaire than a forced-choice 3 –
point scale because the use of a 3-point scale lost much of the variance in the data 
whereas a 5-point scale examined strength as well as preference of individuals and 
allowed distinct sub-handedness groups to be formed within each left-handed and 
right-handed group. 
 
3.2.7. Edinburgh Handedness Inventory  Oldfield (1971) 
 
The Edinburgh handedness inventory (EHI) originally consisted of twenty items. 
However, Oldfield (1971) revised this and 10 of the 20 items were used as the final 
shortened version of the EHI (see appendix 1).  The aim of this revised questionnaire 
was to act as a simple and brief method of quantitatively measuring handedness.  
Individuals were asked to indicate their hand preference for each item by placing a 
cross (+) in the appropriate column (left or right).  If the individual wanted to indicate 
a strong hand preference for a particular action the placed two crosses (++) in the 
appropriate column and if they wanted to respond with an ‘either’ response they 
placed a cross in both columns.  Where an action required two hands (e.g. striking a 
match) individuals were given direct instructions as to what hand was being asked 
about (so for example when striking a match they would be asked which hand held 
the match rather than the box).  The 10 items in this questionnaire were writing, 
drawing, throwing, scissors, toothbrush, knife (without fork), spoon, broom (upper 
hand), match (hand holding match), and box lid (hand lifting lid).  An example of 
responses to the EHI is given below.  
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L  R 
1. Writing      ++ 
2. Drawing     ++ 
3. Throwing     +  + 
 
The above example shows someone who is strongly left-handed for writing and 
drawing but chooses either hand for throwing.   
 
In order to score the questionnaire the number of crosses placed in the left column 
are added up and the number of crosses in the right column are added up.  A 
laterality quotient is then calculated using the following formula: 100(R-L)/(R+L). 
 
The total number of left crosses are subtracted from the total number of right crosses 
and are divided by the total number of left and right crosses added together.  This 
score is then multiplied by 100 to give a laterality quotient between 100 and –100.  
Thus someone who responds with two crosses for each action in the left column on 
the  questionnaire would have 20 crosses in the left and 0 crosses in the right thus 
their formula would be 100(0-20)/(0+20) which would give a total of –100 for the 
laterality quotient which would reveal a strong, consistent left-hander.  This scoring 
system is very similar to the 5-point scale used by questionnaires such as Crovitz 
and Zener (1962) where two crosses in the right column equate to ‘always use the 
right hand’ and one cross in the left column would equate to ‘left hand most of the 
time’.  Oldfield suggests that the higher the laterality quotient is the stronger the hand 
preference is so scores close to 100 depict a strongly right-handed person and 
scores close to –100 depict a strongly left-handed person.  Oldfield (1971) does not, 
however, split the laterality quotients down in to different strengths of handedness 
and speculates that a low negative score is a weak left-hander and such like.  He 
does add that someone with a laterality quotient of about +31 to +40 would have 
quite a moderate tendency towards left-handedness although they would be right-
hand dominant.  However, only about half of the people who scored within this range 
responded that they had any tendency towards left-handedness.  Oldfield himself 
admitted that the EHI was not ideal but was adequate for quantitatively measuring 
handedness particularly among large groups of people, as it is very quick and very 
simple to administer and complete.   
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However, criticisms have been made against the EHI and the use of laterality 
quotients to classify handedness.  One of the biggest critics of this system is Annett 
(e.g. Annett, 1985; 1995; 1998).  Annett (1985) stated that a major criticism of this 
type of inventory and scoring system was that actions that differ considerably in skill 
and in frequency of left hand use are assigned the same scores no matter what the 
action is.  For example, writing which is considered to be a skilled activity, and one 
that is proposed to strongly predict hand preference, is treated in the same fashion 
and is scored in the same way as unscrewing the lid off a jar, which is considered to 
be a non-skilled action and one that many right-handers perform with the left hand.  
Annett (1995) also states that using a 5-point scale to depict how often someone 
does an action (i.e. always or most of the time) is unreliable as many actions are 
automatic and thus individuals will probably not be able to predict how often and with 
which hand they perform them and will therefore not always give an entirely accurate 
response.  Another problem with this is, as previously mentioned, males are more 
likely to choose ‘most of the time’ responses than females and thus males will appear 
to have weaker hand preferences than females even though this is not necessarily a 
true indication of their hand preference (e.g. Annett, 2002).  One final criticism of the 
EHI is that the format of the questionnaire is set in such a way that it allows for a 
response bias to occur.  Thus if the participant wanted to respond with the right hand 
for each question then they would respond ‘right hand’ for each individual action.  In 
many questionnaires there is some form of reverse scoring or counterbalancing of 
the actions in order to avoid this response set being made.  Some questionnaires 
may ask which hand is at the bottom of the broom so that a right handed person will 
normally respond ‘left hand’ and thus this avoids responding with the right hand for 
each question and is totalled by a reverse scoring system for these particular 
questions.  
 
3.2.8. Bishop, Ross, Daniels & Bright (1996) 
 
Bishop et al. (1996) examined the measurement of hand preference across three 
groups of right-handers.  In order to distinguish the different groups they used the 
questions of the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971) but used a five 
point likert scale (right hand always to left hand always) rather than the crosses used 
in the original EHI. From this Bishop et al., devised their own categories of right-
handers.  They defined exclusive strong right-handers (Rs) as individuals who always 
used their right hands for at least 8 out of the 10 items on the EHI and who used their 
right hands most of the time for the remaining items.  Bishop et al. defined exclusive 
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weak right-handers (Rw) as those who used the right hand most of the time for at 
three or more activities on the questionnaire and always used the right hand for the 
remaining items.  The third categories of right-handers were described as 
predominant right-handers (Rp).  Predominant right-hander were described as those 
that preferred to use their right hands for most of the activities on the questionnaire 
but used their left hand for at least one of the activities.  As Bishop et al. only 
examined the different categories of right-handers in their study they did not outline 
the division of left-handed groups.   
 
Therefore in the course of the thesis when groups are examined and categorised in 
relation to how they would be using other studies and questionnaires the left-handed 
group when being divided according to Bishop et al.’s categories will be done so 
using the same rules as those applied to the right-handed group but substituting left 
hand where the original used right hand.  For example, a strong left-hander (Sl) 
would be someone who always used the left hand for at least 8 out of the 10 items on 
the EHI and used their left hand most of the time for the remaining items.  Thus, even 
though Bishop et al. use a 5-point likert scale for the questionnaire they do not 
impose a numerical score but instead apply a similar technique as someone like 
Annett who states that applying a numerical score often does not reflect the true 
hand preference of the individual especially if they use a mixture of the left and right 
hands and also depending on whether they state they use a particular hand all of the 
time or only most of the time as this can change the scores considerably.  The 
handedness questionnaire used by Bishop et al. (the EHI – Oldfield, 1971) is one of 
the most widely used handedness inventories and thus has been extensively 
examined for reliability and validity.  However, one major criticism against the EHI is 
the use of the laterality quotient and the somewhat often-inaccurate measurement of 
hand preference from this score.   
 
Bishop et al., though avoid this criticism by applying a different scoring system to the 
EHI by using a 5-point scale in order to examine strength of preference but not 
quantifying the score in any way.  Thus, there is no numerical score attached to this 
measurement and categories are defined by the number of times the dominant hand 
is used.  One criticism against the way that Bishop et al. have divided the categories 
of right-handedness is that there is room for much variance within the categories 
weak right-handers and predominant right-handers.  A weak right-hander is defined 
as using the right hand most of the time for 3 or more activities and always using the 
right hand for the remaining activities.  However, a weak right-hander could range 
Chapter 3: Review of measurement and categorisation of handedness 
 122 
from someone who used their right hand most of the time for only 3 activities and 
always used their right hand for the other 7 activities to someone who used their right 
hand most of the time for 9 items out of 10 and only used their right hand always for 
the other 1 remaining item.  Thus, there is much variance within the weak right-
handedness category.  Similarly in the predominant right-hander category the basic 
definition is that the individual prefers to use the right hand for most items but uses 
the left hand for at least one item.  Again, there may be a lot of variance within this 
category.  For example, one individual in this category may be someone who uses 
the right hand for 9 items out of 10 and uses the left hand for the other items while 
another may use the right hand for only 6 of the items and use the left hand for the 
other 4 items.  This latter individual would appear to be much more left-handed (or 
much less right-handed) that the first individual outlined but they would be classified 
in the same handedness group.  Also, it would depend on which items the individuals 
were ‘performing’ left-handed and which ones were right-handed as some of the 
items on the questionnaire are better predictors of handedness than others (e.g. 
writing and drawing are better predictors than sweeping with a broom, Peters, 1998).   
 
One final criticism is that in the predominantly right-handed category, Bishop et al. do 
not clearly state whether using the right hand for most items counts equally whether 
the individual states that they always use the right hand or if they use the right hand 
most of the time.  In the other two categories they specify how many actions have to 
be performed with the right hand always and the right hand most of the time.  A 
summary of the handedness inventories and classifications outlined in this section 




Therefore, in summary different forms of handedness inventories have been 
described in the section above.  It can be seen that these differ not only on the items 
that they consist of but also in the number of questions/statements they have and the 
way in which they participants are asked to respond.  For example, McManus only 
asks about the writing hand; Annett asks 12 questions and asks participants to 
respond if they use the left, right or either hand; Oldfield (1971) asks 10 questions but 
participants have to respond using crosses and a laterality quotient is calculated; the 
Crovitz-Zener scale (1962) consists of 14 statements and asks participants to 
respond on a 5-point scale to examine strength of handedness; Peters (1990) 
examines consistent and inconsistent handed preferences by means of throwing and 
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writing and Peter’s (1998) questionnaire consists of 25 items and contains most of 
the statements from the previously mentioned inventories and can be responded to 
either on a 5-point scale or on a 3-point forced choice scale (left, right or either).  It 
has been said that longer handedness questionnaires have the advantage of 
attaining a distribution of scores that is more normal shaped (but bimodally so) than 
J-shaped (e.g. McManus, 2002) and thus may be one reason why there is a link 
between hand preference and hand skill as hand skill is also normally distributed 
(see section 3.6. for more details on hand skill). 
 
McManus (1984) stated that he was not convinced that questionnaires properly 
differentiated different 'types' of handedness, and certainly not the large numbers of 
sub-types that have been proposed by Annett (1970). He added that even the 
differentiation of 'skilled' and 'unskilled’ activities would often be difficult to separate 
and define and this would probably change across researchers.  Therefore, in 
conclusion, there are a variety of handedness inventories available and some are 
more widely used than others.  However, as many inventories measure different 
aspects of handedness (for example, some only look at skilled actions while others 
look at a broad range of skilled and unskilled actions) and categorise handedness 
groups in many different ways then it is the prerogative of each individual researcher 
to consider what they want to measure and what the most effective way of achieving 
this would be. 
 
In summary, I think that perhaps although accurate measurements of handedness 
can be achieved through tests of hand skill it is quicker, easier and valid to use 
measurements of hand preference in order to categorise handedness.  Tests of hand 
skill can be time consuming, particularly if they are part of a test battery while hand 
preference questionnaires are quick and easy to both administer and quantify.  
Therefore, it was decided to use a hand preference questionnaire to measure 
handedness in my thesis.  It was decided that the best questionnaire to use was that 
of Peters (1998) (see sections 3.7. & 3.8. for further details).  The reason for this was 
that the questionnaire was made up of all of the items in Annett’s (1970) 
questionnaire and almost all of the items in Oldfield’s (1971) EHI questionnaire (and 
the missing two questions were added in in order to cover all questions) alongside a 
number of additional items that could be used to determine hand preference.  This 
way a number of handedness measurements could be taken within this questionnaire 
and responses could be categorised according to Peters; Oldfield and Bishop.  It was 
decided to use the 5-point likert scale in order to collect data on the strength of 
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handedness; however, due to lack of numbers in some of the categories the data 
were eventually merged to make simple left and right categories. 
 
3.3. Problems with handedness inventories 
 
Annett (1998a) stated that ‘a source of reliability is that researchers assume that they 
know what handedness is and proceed to classify people on the basis of their own 
particular tests or questionnaires, without recognising the small variations in the 
questions asked and the criteria of classification can yield very different estimates.’ 
(p. 65). 
 
The most common approach to measure handedness is to produce a number of 
different manual activities to which an individual indicates a preferred hand and these 
are summed to produce a score of handedness.  These are usually quick to 
administer and can therefore be used to measure many people at one time.  
However, Bishop, et al. (1996) stated that it is important to note that the hand 
preference of an individual can vary hugely across the handedness inventories. They 
cited the Crovitz-Zener scale (1962), Annett’s (1970) handedness questionnaire and 
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) as examples of how 
handedness fluctuates according to the scale used.  They also stated that many 
people are unaware which hand they use to perform some activities until they are 
actually presented with a handedness questionnaire and are often surprised by the 
outcome of the questionnaire. Bishop et al. stated that because it is the case that 
people don’t know which hand they use to perform certain activities, then it is difficult 
for them to respond on a questionnaire such as Crovitz-Zener (1962) as to the 
strength as well as the direction of hand preference.  That is, if people are unsure 
which hand they use to perform certain activities then it might be difficult for them to 
accurately state whether they use a particular hand ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’. 
Bishop et al. (1996) also stated that not much attention has been devoted to the 
assessment of handedness. Bishop (1990) stated that there is an urgent need for a 
standard method of quantifying laterality.  
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(gives a ‘don’t know’ 
option) 
14 Many items are reversed 
to avoid a response set 
and make participants 
think about their answers. 
Responses could be 
deemed unreliable due to 
being asked how often 
they performed certain 
actions. 
Annett (1970) 
+ updated versions 
 
Left, right or either 12 Widely used and tested for 
reliability & validity.  Quick 
& simple to administer & 
score. Can be simplified & 
altered depending on 
number of participants and 
degrees of handedness 
being measured 
Often thought to have too 
many different 
classifications.  Can be 
complex and confusing.  
Need a large number of 
participants in order to 
have a sufficient number 




Indicates strength of 
preference by placing 
crosses in columns 
10 Quick & easy to 
administer.  Reliable & 
widely used. 
Laterality quotient can be 
ambiguous & is not widely 
used.  Questionnaire could 
be susceptible to a 
response bias. 
Waterloo 
Bryden et al. (1977) 
 
5-point likert scale 
(uni-manual questions) 
36 Includes many questions 
in order to determine 
strength of hand 
preference 
Many of these questions 
are ambiguous & very 




Writing hand only N/A Very simple. Does not discriminate 
within categories.  Does 
not consider people who 
may have ‘switched’ 
handedness 
     





Writing and throwing 
hand only 
N/A Quick to assess.  The 2 
measures are strong 
predictors of handedness. 
May not cover all 
preferences as there are 
only 3 categories and 
inconsistent right-handers 
are not included.   
 









Quick & easy to 
administer.  
 Reliable & widely used. 
Does not use the Laterality 
quotient & adopts a wider 
classification system 
 
There are a number of 
different categories for left- 
and right-handers and this 
there is room for much 




5-point scale and also a 
forced choice scale 
25  
(but reduced to 22 after 
analysis) 
Flexible enough to 
accommodate additional 
handedness inventory 
scales within it.  Has a 
wide variety of uni-manual 
& bi-manual actions.  
Carried out twice when 
administered & is 
regarded as reliable. 




The above table summarises the main points of each of the main handedness inventories and measurements described in this chapter.  The 
measurements range from a single action (writing – McManus (1985) to the 36 items of the Waterloo handedness inventory (Bryden et al. 
(1977).   Each inventory has a number of advantages and disadvantages however, the inventories of Annett (1970) and Oldfield (1971) remain 
those which are most commonly used.   
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However, questionnaires designed to test handedness are not without their 
problems.  Marchant, McGrew and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1995) stated that many of these 
questionnaires might be of dubious validity (see section 3.5.).  Raczkowski, Kalat and 
Nebes (1974) said that it is unsafe to assume that a subject who says he uses one 
hand for a particular task actually does so.  Participant’s memories may be 
inaccurate or they may answer uncertain items in the same way that they answer 
most others.  Questionnaire items should therefore be tested for reliability and validity 
before they are included in the questionnaire.  However, in terms of measurement of 
handedness, questionnaires are still the most widely used because they are quick 
and convenient and straightforward to use. 
 
Bourassa, McManus and Bryden (1996) reported that one problem that occurs 
through using handedness inventories to measure hand preference is that the 
participant often gets caught up in some form of response set, that is if they answer 
right-hand always for a few statements then they will often continue this response 
style without fully considering the individual statement for the remainder of the 
questionnaire.  Steps are often taken to address this and statements within a 
questionnaire are often balanced or asked in such a way so that they have to think 
about a particular hand if the action being asked about requires the use of both 
hands – i.e. when using a needle and thread the individual can be asked which hand 
holds the needle or which hand holds the thread, alternatively the individual may be 
asked to respond to which hand moves depending on whether they move the thread 
through the needle or whether they place the needle on top of the thread.  In asking 
about particular actions in such a way this helps avoid drawing the individual into 
responding that (s)he uses the same hand for each individual action.  Bradshaw 
(1989) added that another problem with handedness inventories is that not only do 
people respond using solely their dominant hand but also others respond with 
deliberate use of their non-preferred hand (even when they wouldn’t normally use 
this hand).   
 
Another problem with handedness inventories is that according to Bryden (1977) 
men are more likely to answer that they do something ‘most of the time’ rather than 
‘always’ when given the choice in the five-point scales.  This could cause potential 
problems as if they are right-handed but choose the ‘right hand most of the time’ 
option then this reduces their overall handedness score and their total score may be 
lower in some cases than a left-hander who does some things with their left hand but 
also uses their right hand ‘always’ to do other actions and therefore would have a 
higher overall total score.  Alternatively, it could lead to men claiming that they are 
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left-handed when they only perform a few activities with their left hand but they are 
not identifying the strong right-handedness categories for other actions.  Bishop 
(1990) also states that questionnaires that claim to measure strength of preference 
(e.g. using 5-point scales) are actually not measuring strength but more consistency 
of hand preference. 
 
Therefore, in summary there are many problems with using handedness inventories 
and most of the problems occur through the different measurements used.  These 
include the number of questions used and could also relate to the type of question 
used  (see section 3.2.6. for a review of the optimum number of questions to include); 
the numerous methods of scoring the questionnaires (see section 3.3. for a 
summary) and the different categories of handedness depending on the type of 
inventory used.  This therefore causes confusion among those trying to define 
handedness as the specific inventory used could alter the classification of 
handedness due to the different questions and scoring systems within different 
handedness inventories.  Finally, one pattern that tends to become apparent when 
reviewing handedness is that right-handers tend to show a more strong and 
consistent hand preference compared to left-handers who often show a more 
variable and weak hand preference and this may often be more exaggerated 
depending on the type of inventory used and show much further divisions between 
the handedness group just by the type of questions asked in the inventory. 
 
 
3.4. Validity and reliability of self-report hand preference inventories 
 
Peters (1998) suggested that handedness questionnaires should have face validity 
and construct validity.  That is, these questionnaires should reflect both ‘common 
understanding’ of handedness in terms of preferences of everyday activities and 
stand in a meaningful relation to the self-classification of individuals (face validity) 
and that a questionnaire should relate to some underlying theoretical concept of 
handedness (construct validity).  Peters (1998) added that a handedness 
questionnaire also needs external validity where there is a focus on the relationship 
between preference and performance of the hand(s).  Annett (1985) stated that right-
handers are usually found to be more consistent in their hand preferences than left-
handers who are often found to have inconsistent hand preferences.  Annett 
questioned whether most left-handers could be considered as mixed-handers due to 
this inconsistency of hand preference.  Thus, in hand preference questionnaires it is 
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more likely that the correlation between right-handers who complete the 
questionnaire twice will be stronger than the correlations between left-handers as 
they are more likely to either give inconsistent information as their preferences are 
mixed in many cases or give fluctuating information about the strength of preference 
and the hand of preference for certain actions if their preferences are inconsistent. 
Annett (1985) also states that using laterality quotients to define handedness is not 
reliable.  She states that it is impossible to assign numerical values to all activities in 
the questionnaire when some items refer to skilled actions while others refer to 
unskilled actions.  Thus she concludes that there is little internal validity within 
questionnaires that use this system.  Annett adds that as the individual themselves 
decide on their degree of strength of hand preference then this in itself is probably 
not an accurate estimate and there is often an increased number of ‘either’ 
responses which are often taken to be much inflated than is really the case.   
 
In handedness research, convenience often overrides validity, according to Marchant 
et al. (1995), “It is easier to ask a subject to disclose her hand preference by ticking a 
box on a questionnaire than to ask them to perform a set of tasks in a controlled 
setting” (p240).  It is thus easier to induce these performances artificially than to 
observe a subject behaving spontaneously in everyday activities in the real world.  
But, each step removed from the real world introduces chances for error and “makes 
more difficult a functional explanation of laterality as a product of natural and cultural 
selection” (Marchant et al, 1995, p240). 
 
Raczkowski et al.  (1974) argue that it is unlikely that a person who says that they 
use a particular hand to perform an action actually does so when completing a paper 
and pencil questionnaire (without having the equipment to act out the items 
available).  That is a person may say that they hammer with their left hand when 
asked but when presented with a hand preference questionnaire and a hammer to 
act out the actions they might discover that they actually hammer with their right 
hand.  This is particularly the case when a person is unsure of which hand they use 
and they often either guess which hand they use (which is often inaccurate) or they 
respond that they use the same hand as the majority of their other answers on the 
questionnaire (again which can be inaccurate).  Raczkowski et al. therefore state that 
questionnaires should always be checked for reliability and validity in order to avoid 
inaccurate responding as much as possible.  They examined the reliability of 
questionnaire items by asking participants to complete a handedness questionnaire 
(questionnaire 1) and then one month later they asked the same participants to 
complete the same questionnaire again (questionnaire 2).  The percentage of 
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responses on questionnaire 1 that corresponded with responses on questionnaire 2 
was examined.  Cases were discarded if a participant responded that they used 
either hand on one questionnaire but not on the other as this indicated a lack of a 
definite preference for this action by the participant.  They noted that a change of 5% 
or less was regarded as fairly consistent while a change of 14% or above was 
regarded as poor.  Raczkowski et al. (1974) concluded therefore that in general test-
retest reliability is reasonable amongst handedness questionnaires.  It has been 
found that reliability and validity within questionnaires differ according to the actions 
that are entailed in the questionnaire.  For example, some items within the 
questionnaire have high validity and reliability.  Annett (1985) found that the most 
valid and reliable items in her questionnaire were writing, drawing, using a tennis 
racket and using a toothbrush.  However, actions that require two hands are often 
considered to be weak on reliability and validity, for example, striking a match or 
sweeping with a broom.  Annett (1998b) states that the way in which a handedness 
questionnaire is administered can also have an effect on whether it is deemed 
reliable or not.  She noted that children were often tested individually when given 
tests of hand preference and hand skill but groups such as students are often given 
this kind of task to complete in a practical class where they time and observe each 
other in pairs and thus there are a number of different ‘researchers’ recording 
measurements compared with a consistent person recording the measurements of 
those taking part in an individual setting.  Therefore there might be some form of 
discrepancy in the measurements taken in the groups or there might be more chance 
of inaccurate performance in a laboratory setting due to inconsistent instructions by 
different people and inconsistent timings and measurements being recorded.   
 
 
3.5. Determining hand preference using proficiency measures 
 
An alternative way to measure a person’s hand preference is to get them to perform 
a specific motor task or a series of tasks with each hand individually and note which 
hand the person performs more efficiently with (Provins & Cunliffe, 1972).  These 
tasks are often referred to as tasks of hand skill and numerous arguments exist as to 
whether hand preference and hand skill are the same thing or whether they measure 
something different (see section 3.7. for a review).  Annett’s (e.g. 2002) right shift 
theory was founded upon asymmetry of hand skill.  She found that this asymmetry 
occurred because in most cases there is a difference in skill between the hands.  
Annett said that the distribution of hand skill is continuous and is normally distributed 
but there is a shift to the right in this distribution and in other cases (i.e. more skilled 
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left-handers) there is a normal distribution with no shift that is symmetrical around 0 
(see chapter 2 for more details of the right shift theory).  Borod, Caron and Koff 
(1984) found that left- and right-hander’s scores on a variety of hand skill measures 
were normally distributed and were similar in range and overall scores.  Bishop 
(1989) argues that testing the proficiency of each hand allows fine distinctions 
between the hands to be identified.  She adds that using tests of hand skill are often 
more reliable as they consist of tasks where the individual has not been specifically 
taught unlike some of the items on a handedness inventory where the individual may 
have been taught to use a specific hand to do something or may have been forced to 
use a specific hand (e.g. using the right hand for writing).  Bishop adds that the 
distribution of hand skill (unlike that of hand preference) tends to be normally 
distributed with there being very discrete differences in skill between the hands in 
many cases.  She adds that tests of hand skill can pick up very fine and subtle 
differences between the hands and thus even slightly more skill in one hand can bias 
that side and make it the dominant or preferred side for any unimanual task.   
 
One of the simplest and most often cited motor tasks used to determine hand 
preference is the grooved pegboard used by Annett (e.g. 1985; 2002).  This test 
comprises of a wooden block with a row of ten pegs in it and a row of ten 
corresponding holes for the pegs to fit in to (the two rows are parallel).  The task 
requires the participant to transfer all of the pegs from one row to the other using only 
one hand and only moving one peg at a time.   Five trials are carried out with each 
hand and the order that these are completed in is counterbalanced for handedness. 
The time taken to complete each trial is measured from the time that the first peg is 
moved until the last peg is placed in the final hole.  The mean score for the right hand 
and the left hand trials is calculated and the difference between the two hands is 
noted.   
 
Other tests of hand skill involve handwriting.  Provins and Cunliffe (1972) tested hand 
skill by asking their participants to write the alphabet six times, as one continuous 
word, as quickly as possible.  Participants did this with one hand and then with the 
other.  The time taken to write the entire alphabet was recorded and upon the 
completion of the six trials with each hand the mean score for each hand was 
calculated.  Provins and Cunliffe (1972) noted that there would be large practice 
effects involved with this type of hand skill test as the preferred hand would be 
trained for writing and should therefore be much quicker than the non-preferred hand.  
However, handwriting is seen to be one of the most reliable measures of hand skill.  
Borod et al. (1984) looked at a number of tests of hand skill involving strength; speed 
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and accuracy.  To measure strength participants had to squeeze a dynamometer that 
calculated the grip strength of each hand.  Tasks of speed included placing dots in 40 
circles and marking targets in very small squares.  Finally, tests of accuracy included 
simultaneous writing in which the participant had to write the numbers 1 to 12 with 
both hands at the same time in vertical columns on paper with their eyes closed.  
Scores were given to correctly written, legible numbers.  Bishop et al. (1996) 
introduced three tests of relative hand skill using groups of right-handers. She looked 
at peg moving, tapping speed and reaching (see Bishop et al. (1996) for a review of 
these).   
 
Some researchers have found that tests of hand skill are reliable while others have 
questioned their reliability.  Annett, Hudson and Turner (1974) found that test-retest 
measures for various tests of hand skill have been adequate.  They found that 
significant test-retest reliability was found for each hand and for the differences 
between the hands.  Annett (1976) argued that using a test of hand skill, such as her 
peg-moving task, lead to a more advanced measure of handedness.  However, 
Provins and Cunliffe (1972) examined a hand skill task similar to Annett’s peg-
moving task and found that there was very little test-retest reliability.  They found that 
out of seven hand skill tasks (dexterity; handwriting; darts; tapping; ratchet; hand grip 
strength and grip strength endurance) five were not significantly reliable.  They 
concluded that the most reliable tasks of hand skill were handwriting and tapping.   
Peters (1990) added that tapping might vary in differences between the hands 
depending on the force of the tapping being done.  Tapley and Bryden (1985) tested 
hand skill with the task of placing dots in circles as quickly as possible.  They found 
that this test was a highly reliable measure of hand skill and that it correlated with 
measures of hand preference.  With respect to the reliability of measures of hand skill 
Bishop (1989) stated that the strength of the reliability depended upon the specific 
task used to measure hand skill.   
 
An advantage of using hand skill measurements to measure handedness is that it 
avoids many of the problems that occur while using handedness inventories such as 
which items to use in the questionnaire or how to quantify or collate the scores on it.  
However, selecting an appropriate hand skill task can also be difficult.  Tasks of hand 
skill cover a variety of different measurements and thus it depends on what 
measurement is taken as to what conclusions can be drawn.  Different measures that 
can be taken include speed, strength, dexterity and steadiness (Bishop, 1990).  It has 
been found that some of these aspects of hand skill correlate higher with hand 
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preference than others (e.g. hand preference does not correlate highly with strength, 
Bishop, 1990).   
 
Tests of hand skill tend to reveal that the preferred hand tends to be faster and more 
accurate than the non-preferred hand.  It has been proposed that the bigger the 
difference in skill between the hands (as measured by, for example, time), the 
stronger the preference is for the more skilled hand over the less skilled hand.  
Therefore, the smaller the difference in skill between the hands, the less difference 
there is for preference of one hand over the other.  However, this pattern is not 
always accurate.  It is often found that the right hand of left-handers is faster or 
stronger in tests of hand skill.  One explanation for this could be, as previously 
mentioned, that the right hands of left-handers have a certain element of skill as they 
have had to adapt to the right-handed world and therefore needed to perform certain 
skilled actions with their right hands.  Also, even if the right hand of left-handers is not 
more skilled in these tasks than the left hand, in general, it is more skilled than the 
non-preferred hand of right-handers again because of the need for left-handers to 
use their right hands to perform some actions.  This, however, is not the case for the 
left hands of right-handers.  Murphy and Peters (1994) examined hand strength and 
found that right-handers have a clear difference between the hands with the right 
hand being much stronger than the left whereas they found that left-handers did not 
show this clear hand strength asymmetry.  
 
One disadvantage of hand skill measurements is where handedness inventories are 
quick and easy to administer, tests of hand skill are often time consuming and can 
only be used on one person at a time.  Also, tests of hand skill often require 
equipment or apparatus, which can often result in it not being portable while 
handedness inventories rarely require any equipment and can be easily ported.  
However, Tapley and Bryden (1985) conducted a study in which they devised a test 
of hand skill that could be administered to groups at a time.   This, therefore, 
addresses the problem that only individuals can be tested on measures of hand skill.  
Another disadvantage is that there could be practice effects when carrying out tests.  
Many researchers try to carry out hand skill tasks that have little familiarity to the 
participants in order to avoid practice effects but as hand skill tasks have to be 
carried out at least twice (and in some cases twice with each hand if something like 
side of task is being controlled for) then it is difficult to avoid these practice effects.  
However, Bryden and Allard (1998) found that extended practice of hand skill tasks 
benefited both hands (with slightly more bias to the preferred hand) thus practice 
effects did not overtly favour one hand and this was not a major reason to avoid hand 
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skill tasks.  Also, Annett et al. (1974) found that practice improved the speed of each 
hand but did not alter the difference in skill between the hands. 
 
Therefore although tests of hand skill seem to measure handedness as effectively as 
hand preference questionnaires it can be seen from this section that tests of hand 
skill are not without problems.  Measurements are not always accurate, as some 
results may have come about by chance.  For example, a person may be more 
skilled with the right hand but complete a peg-moving task faster with the left hand on 
the trials that were being measured.  Also, the additional factor that most left-handers 
have a certain amount of skill in their right hands can also affect the results in tests of 
hand skill.  The following section will compare and contrast measurements of hand 
preference and hand skill. 
 
 
3.6. Hand preference versus hand skill 
 
Annett (1985) stated that handedness is firstly a matter of skill rather than 
preference.  She proposed that evidence of a right shift in humans could be 
demonstrated using a peg-moving task of hand skill.  Annett et al. (1974) stated that 
the degree of hand preference was determined by the distribution of hand skill. 
 
Researchers investigating human handedness often make use of hand preference 
inventories, but many feel that responses to such questionnaires are highly 
subjective and have sought more direct and objective measures (Bryden, McManus 
& Bulman-Fleming, 1994).  Annett (1985) stated that using a peg-moving task was 
valuable because it has been shown to be reliable and related to other measures of 
handedness (mainly hand skill).  One problem is that some researchers (e.g. Porac & 
Coren, 1981) state that measures of hand skill do not correlate well with measures of 
preference as assessed by questionnaires.  However, Corballis (1997) stated that 
there is a strong relationship between hand preference and hand skill.  He added that 
people identified as left- or right-handed for hand preference are almost always 
classified with the same preference for hand skill and vice versa.  Bryden et al. 
(1994) has shown that skill measures are reasonably related to preference measures 
that assess the same activity.  However, differences between the hands for different 
skills may be relatively unrelated to one another because an individual who prefers a 
specific hand to carry out unimanual activities in a number of different situations will 
always use that hand even when it is uncomfortable or awkward to do so.  
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Performance, according to Borod et al. (1984) involves tests such as strength, speed 
and accuracy.  But Provins and Magliaro (1993) stated that handedness 
characteristics of individuals consist of determining the preferred hand in carrying out 
a range of manual activities or by recording different achievements of both hands on 
one task.  Hand skill tends to apply to activities that require a bit more concentration 
and ‘skill’ whereas hand preference often refers not only to skilled actions on a 
handedness questionnaire but also in some cases to a number of unskilled actions.   
Annett cites that there is a relationship between hand preference and hand skill.  
Annett (1985) found that individuals who were placed in to groups according to their 
strength of hand preference had an almost perfect correlation between their 
handedness strength scores and their performance on a peg-moving task.  Also, 
Peters (1998) suggests that hand preference and performance are closely linked. 
 
Although some researchers accept that hand preference measurements (i.e. 
questionnaires) and hand skill measurements are essentially measuring the similar 
things, other researchers are strongly against this viewpoint and maintain that these 
measurements are completely separate entities.  Two of the biggest advocates of 
this view are Porac and Coren (e.g. 1981).  They stated that hand skill, hand strength 
and hand proficiency are all separate aspects of the behaviour of handedness.  
Porac and Coren found that although there was a positive relationship between hand 
preference and hand skill that the strength of the correlation was not as strong as 
was often claimed (with a correlation co-efficient of around 0.6 often cited).  Porac 
and Coren (1981) also noted that there must be a difference between hand 
preference and hand skill because the distribution of the two concepts are so 
different (J shaped for hand preference and normally distributed for hand skill). 
 
Bishop (1989) described the discrepancies between hand preference and hand skill 
measures.  She stated that hand preference and hand skill measurements are 
imperfectly correlated (with a correlation co-efficient of around 0.7 for a 5 item 
questionnaire and 0.72 for a 9 item questionnaire). However, she states that although 
the distributions of hand preference and hand skill are very different it does not 
necessarily mean that hand preference and hand skill do not share similar origins.  
However, Bishop (1990) added that although these correlations were not strong, they 
were not weak enough to say that there was no form of relationship at all.   But, 
Bishop et al. (1996) cited that the differences between the distributions of hand 
preference and hand skill were evidence that they did not measure the same thing.   
Bishop (1989) used a model to illustrate these discrepancies.   In this model Bishop 
set out to argue that these correlations between hand preference and hand skill 
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(although not perfectly correlated) are not inconsistent with the view that hand 
preference is related to hand skill in that hand preference indirectly depends on hand 
skill.  Bishop also examined the notion that the differences in distribution between 
hand preference and hand skill supposed that they could not be related.  However, 
the model studied whether the probability that one hand will be preferred for a given 
activity is proportional to the relative proficiency of the two sides (for details of the 
model see Bishop, 1989).  Bishop concluded that the findings of the relationship 
between hand preference and hand proficiency do not go against the view that 
preference is determined by proficiency but she does state that they are not the 
same thing.  Also, McManus (1985) stated that it is not clear if strength of hand 
preference is reflected in hand skill performance and thus proposes that in some 
cases preference and performance may not be closely linked.  He adds that this may 
be because in early development hand preference precedes hand skill.  
 
There are both advantages and disadvantages for why it is better to determine 
handedness by means of preference questionnaires or by tests of hand skill.  One 
advantage of using questionnaires is that large groups can be assessed at the same 
time or can even be assessed from a distance (which would also be advantageous 
for examining cultural differences of hand preference).   In contrast to this, tests of 
hand skill usually involve only being able to test people individually.  
 
Gangestead and Yeo (1994) stated that tests of hand skill show much finer 
differences between the hands than questionnaires do.  They added that 
questionnaires might not show up any differences between those who are weakly 
right-handed and those who are strongly right-handed but a test of hand skill will pick 
up this difference and determine the strength of an individual’s hand preference.  
However, there are problems with this.  Some tests of hand skill may pick up on 
differences between the hands and these may be in the ‘correct’ direction, that it if a 
person prefers the right-hand then they will be more skilled with this hand.  However, 
in many cases when individuals take part in tests of hand skill it is often the case that 
the ‘non-preferred hand’ comes out as the one that is quicker and is therefore 
considered to be more skilful because it is faster in terms of fine manual dexterity.  
Being more skilled with one hand and preferring the other hand was a concept 
backed up by McManus, Murray, Doyle and Baron-Cohen (1992).  They found that in 
a study with children with autism; children with mental retardation and a group of 
normal controls that only 50% of the children with autism were concordant for hand 
preference and hand skill (that is 50% of the children preferred the same hand that 
they were more skilled with while 50% preferred the opposite hand to the one that 
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they were most skilled with), 92% of the children with mental retardation were 
concordant and 90% of the normal control group were concordant for hand 
preference and hand skill. 
 
However, when considering differences between hand skill in left- and right-handers 
one confound has to be addressed.  Those who are left-handed will often have a 
fairly skilled right hand but those who are right-handed will often have a highly 
unskilled left hand.  One reason for this is that because the world is designed for 
right-handers most things are designed for right hand use and thus left-handers have 
to adapt in order to get by in this right-handed world.  Left-handers therefore 
ultimately have some element of skill in their right hands but as right-handers very 
seldom have to use their left hands then they are not as skilled, in most cases, as 
either their own right hand or the right hand of a left-hander.  Thus it seems to be that 
in order to get a fully comprehensive measurement of handedness both measures of 
hand preference and hand skill have to be taken in to consideration. 
 
Bishop (1990) assessed whether measurements of hand preference or hand skill 
would give the most accurate measurement of handedness and proposed that the 
most important decision to make should be based on validity.  However, Bishop 
states that the validity of the measure has to relate to what it is going to be used for, 
i.e. is it valid for the particular purpose that is being examined.  Thus, she proposes 
that, as many researchers will have different purposes that they need to measure 
handedness for and there will be much variability between studies then different tests 
of hand preference and hand skill will be valid (or not) in accordance to the individual.  
Bishop (1990) concludes the debate on hand preference and hand skill by declaring 
that the two concepts do not measure the same thing.  She states that handedness 
inventories can lack validity in many cases and are often difficult to quantify and 
assign categories to.  Bishop adds that handedness inventories only reflect 
someone’s preference for a number of actions on a questionnaire and does not 
indicate how skilled a person’s left or right hand is.  She states that measures of 
hand skill are probably more reliable than measures of hand preference but much 
work needs to be done to examine tests of hand skill for reliability and validity.   
  
Therefore, it can be concluded from this that although there tends to be a difference 
in skill between the left and right hands that this is not always the case.  In most 
cases a person’s preferred hand is the one with which they are most skilled with but 
in a small number of cases the opposite is found (and this could either be caused by 
the person being genuinely more skilled with this hand or it could have occurred by 
Chapter 3: Review of measurement and categorisation of handedness 
 138 
chance).  This could particularly be the case for left-handers who could genuinely be 
just as skilled or more skilled with their right hands.  Therefore in order to gain as 
accurate a measurement as possible of a person’s hand preference it would perhaps 
be best to carry out a test of hand skill and a handedness questionnaire.  However, 
as previously mentioned a test of hand skill would have been too time consuming for 
the purposes of my studies as there were several additional components to each 
experiment.  Therefore a handedness questionnaire was given, as it was quick to 
administer and contained a sufficient amount of information in it in order to categorise 
participants in to handedness groups. 
 
 
3.7. Current Questionnaire – adapted version of Peter’s (1998) 
 
The questionnaire used during this thesis was that of Peters (1998) (for details of this 
questionnaire see appendix 2), this originally only had 25 items in it but was changed 
in order to include all of the items from the main handedness inventories.  These 
inventories were the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971); Annett’s 
(1970) handedness questionnaire; Peter’s (1990) essential two items (writing and 
throwing) used to distinguish between consistent and inconsistent handedness 
alongside and Peter’s (1998) handedness questionnaire.  Bishop et al. (1996) also 
suggested a different method of categorising hand preference (see section 3.2.7.) but 
used the Edinburgh handedness inventory to illustrate this rather than devising a 
questionnaire of her own (this categorisation method is also included in the analysis 
of the ‘Fastest Finger First’ study and the Computer Task outlined in Chapter 6, see 
appendices 15 and 22 for these additional analyses).  The two items that Peter’s 
(1998) inventory lacked which were included within the other main questionnaires 
(the EHI – Oldfield, 1971) were ‘with which hand do you use to eat with a spoon’ and 
‘with which hand do you use to open a box lid’.  Peters (1998) chose to omit these 
items and substitute them with hammering in a nail and unscrewing the lid off a jar 
but in order to have the direct set of EHI items within this questionnaire, Oldfield’s 
original items were added again. After these items were added the revised version of 
Peter’s questionnaire became a 27-item inventory.  The same five-point scale as the 
one used by Peter’s (1998) was used which ranged from ‘right hand always’ through 
to ‘left hand always’.  A score of 2 was given for each ‘right hand always’ response 
and –2 was given for each ‘left hand always response’.  A total score was calculated 
and individuals were divided in to simple handedness groups of left-handers and 
right-handers where a positive score was regarded as showing a right-hand 
preference and a negative score indicated a left-hand preference.  It was decided to 
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use the 5-point scale that Peters used rather than using the forced choice scale that 
he used when he administered the questionnaire for a second time as this scoring 
system was more effective for examining degrees of preference. Also, Peters (1998) 
stated that distinctions for many of the handedness items would be lost with a simple 
forced choice scale of left, right or either.  In addition in my for the study 1 and study 
3 in Chapter 6 and the first state study in Chapter 7 each handedness group (left and 
right) was divided in to sub-groups.  Strong left-handers were considered as those 
scoring –35+and strong right-handers were those scoring 35+.  Those scoring 
between -34 and –1 were regarded as mixed left-handers and those scoring between 
34 and 1 were regarded as mixed right-handers.  Analyses were done to see if 
strength of hand preference had an effect on performance (see appendices 15, 22 
and 28).  However, it was found that when the handedness groups were split in to 
these sub-categories that there were often not high enough numbers in each 
category in order to compare the performances of each group and thus it was 
decided to still measure handedness on the 5-point scale but to keep the categories 
broad in order to have enough participants for analysis in each group.  Participants 
who wrote with the left hand but upon completion of the questionnaire fell in to the 
right-handed category were excluded from the analysis as there were not enough 
people in this category in order to examine and analyse performances (there were no 
participants who wrote with the right hand but were categorised as left-handed after 
completion of the questionnaire).  Therefore in most of the experiments carried out 
during the thesis the simple dichotomy of left-handedness and right-handedness was 
kept in order to get as many participants as possible to make a direct comparisons 
(although a third group of mixed-handers may be examined at a later date).  There 
was an element of difficulty obtaining enough left-handed participants (who were also 
divided in to groups of males and females) to participate in the study especially as 
they were taking part voluntarily and more importantly as they are infrequent within 
the population (only 10% of the population are left-handed) and thus the sub-
divisions of the groups would have required many more participants than was 
possible to obtain. 
 
The results obtained in experiments 1 and 3 in my thesis were not only measured 
using the adapted Peter’s inventory (the original choice of method for measuring 
handedness) but also by a number of other inventories such as that of Annett (1970) 
and Oldfield (1971).  Statistics were performed on this data and in general they 
remained consistent suggesting that we can interpret our results based on different 
handedness questionnaire measurements.  For some of the results for experiment 3 
some findings were only significant using certain handedness inventories and not 
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others.  When analysing the state/trait data (see appendix 28) only the groups who 
were classified in the strong handedness groups (e.g. EHI strong, Annett consistent, 
Waterloo strong) showed a significant difference in state anxiety between left and 
right-handers.  Those who were in the weak/mixed classification groups failed to 
show a difference between groups.  It therefore suggests that how handedness is 
measured could affect results.  For a more detailed account of these results see 
appendix 28. 
 






40 participants took part in this reliability study, 31 were right-handed, 26 females 
and 5 males (as measured by the adapted version of Peter’s 1998 questionnaire) 
and 9 were left-handed, 8 females and 1 male.  Participants were selected via 
convenience sampling.  There were originally 51 participants but 11 were excluded 
from the analysis as they only took part in 1 testing session. 
 
3.8.3. Materials and apparatus 
 
A copy of Peter’s (1998) adapted handedness questionnaire was given to the 
participants in both testing sessions.  A copy of this questionnaire can be found in 
appendix 2.  On the second testing session participants were provided with the props 
mentioned on the questionnaire.  These were a pen (to illustrate drawing and 
writing), a knife, a comb, a box of matches (which illustrated striking a match and 
picking up a small object), a book, a light bulb, a phone, a stuffed toy dog (to illustrate 
stroking a dog or cat), a face cloth, a bag (to illustrate picking up a suitcase), a 
baseball bat, a toothbrush, a ball, a tennis racket, a hammer and a nail, scissors, a 
spoon, a needle and thread, a brush, a shovel, a deck of cards, a shoebox (to 




Participants were given the first questionnaire during a Psychology laboratory class.  
Participants were asked to imagine that their hands were empty and to state which 
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hand they would normally use to do each of the subsequent actions on the 
questionnaire (for example writing and combing hair).  No props were given to act out 
these actions with.  Participants were given an identification number to put on their 
questionnaire when they were finished and they handed the completed questionnaire 
in to the experimenter.  One week later the same procedure was carried out again.  
However, when the participants were given the questionnaire they were also 
provided with a series of props with which to act out each action with.  Participants 
were instructed to act out every action (even if they were certain that they used a 
particular hand) in order to fill in the questionnaire in a consistent manner.  Again the 
identification number of each participant was entered on the questionnaire and once 
they had competed all of the hand preference actions the questionnaires were 
submitted.  The experimenter scored each questionnaire and each participant was 
given two had preference scores and correlations were carried out in order to 




A Spearman’s rho correlation was carried out and it was found that there was a 
significant strong positive relationship between the total handedness scores from 
week 1 and the total handedness scores from week 2 Rs(40) = 0.82, p<0.001.   
 
This finding suggests that the questionnaire scores did not differ too much across the 
individuals from week 1 to week 2.  However, there were some fluctuations in the 
scores and this tended to be caused by the choice of the ‘always’ and ‘most of the 
time’ responses.  Although the choice of hand preference for each item did not 
change choosing the ‘most of the time’ response would reduce the score by 1 for 
each item or similarly choosing the ‘always’ response in place of the ‘most of the 
time’ response would increase scores by for each item.  Therefore using a likert scale 
in order to measure the strength of hand preference is perhaps not always the most 
effective method.  Perhaps using a forced choice of left hand, right hand or either 
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Chapter 4: Impulsivity and planning 
 
 
4.0. Summary of the main aims of the thesis 
 
One key concept central to my thesis is the reported differences in response styles 
between left- and right-handed monkeys and apes (e.g. Cameron & Rogers, 1999; 
Hopkins & Bennett, 1994).  These findings suggested that fundamental differences 
exist in the way(s) that these primates interact with the world which are related to 
handedness.  It has been noted that very few human studies have reported 
differences between left- and right-handers’ behaviour and their interaction with the 
world and therefore the main aim of my thesis is to investigate the response styles of 
human left- and right-handers towards a variety of different novel tasks.  The 
investigation of these potential response style differences will be carried out over a 
series of experiments, which will be designed according to the findings of each 
preceding experiment in order to investigate the potential response style differences 
in humans.   
 
4.1. Aims of Chapter 
 
Recent primate laterality research has indicated that right-handed primates take less 
time to respond to novel objects than left-handed primates (e.g. Hopkins & Bennett, 
1994 and Cameron & Rogers, 1999).  It was postulated that this response style 
difference might also be evident in humans (Rogers, 1999).  Therefore a study was 
devised in order to test this (the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi) and this will be outlined in 
this chapter.  Thus as it has been reported that right-handed primates approach 
novel objects quicker than left-handers it could be interpreted that right-handed 
primates are more impulsive in their behaviours than left-handers.  This chapter will 
therefore briefly review some of the current impulsivity literature and will examine 
different definitions of impulsivity and details of how it can be measured as a prelude 
to the study.  This chapter will also examine possible reasons for why it might be 
expected that there could be a difference in the approach to novel problem-solving 
behaviour between left- and right-handed humans and will cover existing planning 
literature, emotional processing, stress and anxiety and the issue of novelty as 
possible reasons or explanations for this. The Tower of Hanoi experiment will then be 
introduced and covered. The chapter will conclude by discussing the findings of the 
Tower of Hanoi and impulsivity experiments.   
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4.2. General introduction 
 
Recent primate laterality research has indicated that right-handed marmoset 
monkeys take less time to respond to novel objects (within a novel environment) than 
their left-handed counterparts (Cameron & Rogers, 1999).  Thus, it appears that the 
introduction of a novel object initiates some form of delay in the response of left-
handers compared to right-handers.  This finding was also supported by Rogers 
(1999) who found a difference in approach behaviour to a novel object between left-
handed and right-handed marmosets and by Hopkins and Bennett (1994) who found 
that left-handed chimpanzees were slower to respond to novel objects than right-
handed chimpanzees.  Rogers (1999) suggested that these findings could be 
accounted for due to the differences in hemispheric specialisation for processing 
novel stimuli and controlling emotional responses.  She proposed that the left 
hemisphere controls exploratory behaviour while the right hemisphere is associated 
with inhibitory or avoidance behaviour and thus this would suggest that right-handers 
would be influenced by the dominant left hemisphere and would be more likely to 
demonstrate exploratory behaviour while left-handers would be more likely to be 
controlled by the right hemisphere and demonstrate avoidance behaviour.  Davidson 
(1992) also states that approach or exploration behaviour is related to the left 
hemisphere while avoidance behaviour is linked with activation of the right 
hemisphere.  Although Rogers’ (1999) findings were on marmoset monkeys she 
hypothesises that the same may be true for non-human primates.   
 
Existing evidence that supports Roger’s (1999) and Davidson’s (1992) views is the 
Valence-Specific Hypothesis of emotional processing.  This hypothesis suggests that 
the left hemisphere is specialised for processing positive emotions while the right 
hemisphere is specialised for processing negative emotions.  This could therefore be 
linked to Rogers and Davidson’s suggestion that the right hemisphere is associated 
with avoidance behaviour (or negative emotions) and the left hemisphere is 
associated with approach behaviour (or positive emotions).  An additional link to the 
right hemisphere being associated with negative emotions or avoidance behaviour is 
that one of the emotions that may be evident in a novel situation is an increased level 
of anxiety.  Several studies have reported that left-handers are more anxious than 
right-handers (e.g. Orme, 1970; Hicks & Pellegrini, 1978; Davidson & Schaffer, 1983; 
Dillon, 1989).  Thus, it was decided to test Roger’s suggestion that the findings of a 
difference in the behaviour of left- and right-handed marmosets towards novel 
objects or problem solving may also exist in humans.  To do this a novel problem-
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solving task had to be used and the Tower of Hanoi was used as this is a widely 
used problem-solving task and is relatively easy to measure participants’ responses 
to it.  As the Tower of Hanoi is not only a problem-solving task but is more explicitly a 
task of planning (although there are conflicting arguments whether this is really the 
case, see section 4.3.1. for details of this) then an additional possibility if there is a 
delay in responding between left- and right-handers is that one group may be 
planning the solution to the problem more than the other and therefore the issue of 
planning has to be considered.  Also, as the findings of Hopkins and Bennett (1994) 
and Cameron and Rogers (1999) suggested that left-handers took longer to respond 
to a novel problem it was decided to examine whether right-handers may be more 
impulsive in general than left-handers and therefore two measurements of impulsivity 
were included.  The first measurement was the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (version 11, 
e.g. Patton, Stanford and Barratt, 1995), a self-report questionnaire and the second 
impulsivity measurement was a matching figures reaction time computerised task.   
 
 
4.3. Introduction to the Tower of Hanoi study – Experiment 1 
 
In human psychology few studies have examined the role of hemispheric dominance 
in relation to approach behaviour.  However, Cameron and Rogers (1999) recently 
found in a study of primates that hemispheric dominance, as demonstrated by hand 
preference, might play a major role in demonstrating differences in how individuals 
interact with their surroundings.  Rogers (1999) suggested that these findings could 
be the same for humans.  Thus, a study was devised to test if this was the case for 
humans and potential reasons for why this might be the case are examined.  The 
Tower of Hanoi problem-solving experiment is outlined here and the findings are 
discussed. 
 
4.3.1. The Tower of Hanoi and planning 
 
The Tower of Hanoi (TOH) disk transfer task is often used to look at peoples’ 
planning or thought strategies (Welsh, 1991).   It is a tool which is used widely to 
examine problem solving behaviour (Goel & Grafman, 1995).  The versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi task used in different studies have varied considerably (Spitz, Minksy 
& Bessellieu, 1984) but typically the task consists of three pegs of equal length and 
disks of different sizes and different colours stacked on one or more peg(s).  The task 
can be performed with various numbers of disks.  The easiest version consists of 
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three disks but as additional disks are added the task becomes very difficult to 
complete. The peg (or pegs) on which the disks are stacked to begin with is known 
as the start state and the order in which the disks have to be when the task is 
complete is the goal state. The task is completed when the participant places the 
same tower from the initial ring stack on the empty goal peg by following a series of 
rules.  There are three rules that must be followed when completing this task; only 
one disk can be moved at a time; all disks that are not being used must remain on a 
peg and a larger disk must never be placed upon a smaller disk.  According to 
Bishop, Aamodt-Leeper, Cresswell, McGurk and Skuse (2001) The Tower of Hanoi 
gives a quantitative index of planning ability as the numbers of steps used to solve 
the task are easily measured.    
 
A similar tool to the Tower of Hanoi that is often used to examine planning is the 
Tower of London.  The Tower of London (TOL) was introduced by Shallice (1982) in 
order to identify planning impairments in patients with frontal lobe lesions.  It has also 
been frequently used to identify problems with planning aspects of executive function 
(Anderson, Anderson & Lajoie, 1996).  It has also been suggested that the planning 
component of this task is created due to thinking ahead to ensure that the task is 
solved as efficiently as possible (Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock & Polkey, 
1997).  Owen (1997) states that the TOL requires planning because if an early 
incorrect move is made then it can make the task virtually unsolvable unless the 
participant can undo all of the moves that they have performed up until the wrong 
move. The Tower of London consists of a number of different coloured balls (ranging 
from 2 to 6) that are placed on three pegs of differing sizes.  Once again, an initial 
state and a goal state are set and the participant has to rearrange the balls on the 
pegs to match the goal-state.  In order to solve the Tower of London correctly, only a 
certain number of balls can be placed on each peg (Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell & 
Stine, 1999).  According to Owen (1997) the TOL is thought to depend more heavily 
on planning than spatial abilities.  Ward & Allport (1997) developed a five-disk Tower 
of London for normal participants.  It is similar to that of the Tower of Hanoi in that the 
disks are graduated in size however, it is different from the Tower of London as disks 
are used rather than balls. The disks are stacked on one peg of three (all pegs are of 
equal length).  The aim of the revised Tower of London is similar to the Tower of 
Hanoi in that participants have to transfer the disks from the initial peg to the same 
order on the goal peg.  Participants must obey the rules of moving only one disk at a 
time and must never place a larger disk on top of a smaller disk.   
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According to Scholnick & Friedman (1993) the Tower of Hanoi is an ideal piece of 
apparatus to measure planning as people can control the outcomes of their plans.  
The Tower of Hanoi and the Tower of London have been taken to be tests of 
planning ability and poor performance on them is often interpreted as inefficient 
planning ability (Gilhooly, Phillips, Wynn, Logie & Della Sala, 1999; Phillips, Wynn, 
Gilhooly, Della Sala & Logie, 1999).  Goel, Pullara & Grafman (2001) state that in 
order to solve the task efficiently it appears that participants have to look several 
moves ahead and plan the solution in their heads before physically moving any 
disks. Thus, both the Tower of London and Hanoi tasks are viewed as measures of 
planning ability, with successful and efficient performance on the tasks depending on 
the subject’s ability to plan ahead, by making a correct series of moves instead of 
making individual moves that are independent of other moves (Welsh, 1991).    An 
important factor when solving the TOH and TOL is working memory as participants 
are often required to mentally make the moves first before physically doing so and 
therefore need to hold these moves in memory while carrying them out.  Phillips et al. 
(1999) state that the demands on working memory will be huge as planning an 
effective solution to the Tower of London requires the participant to come up with a 
plan then remember the plan while executing it.  However, Goel & Grafman (1995) 
believe that the TOH does not necessarily measure planning or the ability to ‘look 
ahead’.  They say that the interpretation of what people mean by ‘planning’ is often 
confused and so the definition is so vague that every cognitive activity can be 
interpreted as involving planning.   They believe that having the ability to look ahead 
or plan is not necessary or sufficient to solve the TOH.  Goel and Grafman believe 
that the main issue in solving the Tower of Hanoi is the realisation on the participants’ 
part that a ‘backwards’ move has to be made in order to solve the problem in the 
optimum number of moves.  Given that performance on the TOH & TOL tasks has 
frequently been believed to be dependent on the ability to plan ahead (Goel et al. 
2001), a number of studies have examined whether instructing subjects to plan 
ahead does actually improve performance on the TOH and TOL tasks  (Ward & 
Allport, 1997; Gilhooly et al., 1999; Phillips, Wynn, McPherson & Gilhooly, 2001).   
 
In some studies no instructions about pre-planning are given, but in others 
participants are asked to make a full mental pre-plan before beginning the task 
(Phillips et al., 2001). Work by Ward & Allport (1997) instructed participants to plan 
their whole sequence of moves mentally before they began physically solving the 
task.  Kafer & Hunter (1997) follow this by stating that since the participant has to 
perform the task in a minimum number of moves they therefore have to try to solve 
the problem before attempting the solution.  Participants are sometimes informed 
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what the minimum number of moves is to solve the task and in other studies this 
information is not given (Phillips et al., 2001).  Gilhooly et al. (1999) adopted a “think 
aloud” method for their participants while solving the Tower of London.  This was 
done to obtain data on participants’ planning processes before they moved any disks 
of the task.  Gilhooly et al. found that there were often discrepancies between the 
plan that people make before the execution of moves and the actual moves that they 
make.  They also found that when people were instructed to think out loud that it 
slowed down planning and moving but did not change the participant’s approach to 
the task. Gilhooly et al. concluded that some people do make mental plans but rather 
than solely using this plan throughout the task they seem to plan as they go along 
and add parts of their pre-plan. In other versions of the Tower of Hanoi and Tower of 
London there is no explicit emphasis on planning (Phillips et al., 2001).  The idea is 
to instruct the participant how to go about solving the task by indicating that they will 
begin with the initial state and have to end up with the goal state and outline the rules 
that they must follow while carrying out the task.  In the present study there is no kind 
of planning instruction given and the participant can solve it in any way as long as 
they obey the rules. 
 
In Phillips et al.’s (2001) study participants were assigned to one of three conditions – 
a plan condition, where they had to construct a mental plan of the minimum number 
of moves needed to solve the task; an inform condition, where they were told the 
minimum number of moves needed to solve the task and then asked to construct a 
mental plan, and a control condition where no specific planning instructions were 
given.  Phillips et al. were interested to see if those who were given no planning 
instructions would plan for a shorter period of time than the two groups that were 
given planning instructions.  They were also interested to see if the participants in the 
two planning conditions would complete the task in fewer moves than the control 
condition if pre-planning was vital for efficient performance on the Tower of London.  
It was found that those in the planning conditions spent more time making plans than 
those in the control condition but there was no effect of instructions to plan on how 
efficiently participants completed the task.  This is an unexpected finding as it 
suggests that, contrary to earlier suggestions (e.g. Goel et al., 2001), completing the 
TOH efficiently does not appear to depend on making a plan prior to beginning the 
task.  Moreover, that planning before beginning the TOH task may not improve task 
performance.  
 
One possible explanation of this finding is that participants were unable to make 
accurate pre-plans prior to starting the task and that is why they showed no 
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improvements in performance. In a follow up experiment, Phillips et al. (2001) 
investigated whether people were able to plan mentally by examining their ability to 
identify various intermediate states of an optimum mental plan.  They found that 
participants could make accurate pre-plans for up to two sub-goals ahead but not for 
three.  Phillips et al. therefore concluded that people could make effective mental 
plans but only for a limited number of moves. However, mental pre-planning is not 
necessarily more effective in terms of quicker performance or a more accurate 
solution.    They concluded that accurate performance on the Tower of London 
depends largely upon on-line planning – planning carried out during the execution 
phase (Ward & Allport, 1997) – in that decisions made during planning can be 
subject to change during the process of the task. This supports Gilhooly et al.’s 
(1999) earlier findings that showed that efficient performance on the TOH depends 








How people think about a novel object or situation may be concerned with how they 
approach it.  Some people may have a greater tendency to consider a situation and 
plan what they might do before approaching and responding whereas others may 
respond immediately (see 4.3.1. for more details on planning).  Planning can be 
defined as the process that encompasses the mental generation, evaluation, and 
selection of action sequences so as to effectively meet some future goal (Scholnick & 
Friedman, 1993; Gilhooly et al. 1999).  Baker, Rogers, Owen, Frith, Dolan, 
Frackowiak and Robbins (1996) suggest that the essence of planning is the 
attainment of a goal through intervening steps that do not necessarily lead directly to 
that goal. Thus, like most problem solving tasks, tasks that require planning typically 
consist of a starting state, a goal state, and a set of intermediate states, which people 
have to negotiate in order to complete the plan.  Owen (1997) states that a basic 
requirement of many cognitive and motor tasks is having the ability to plan ahead.  
He goes on to say that in cognitive planning a goal is achieved through a series of 
intermediate steps that do not always directly lead to the goal but aid to solve the 
task.  Thus, it is important in the current study to examine the approach of the 
participants towards the Tower of Hanoi task.  The Tower of Hanoi is often used as a 
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planning task but in this context it is used as a problem-solving task and participants 
will not be instructed to plan in any way.  Therefore, if there is a difference in 
approach between left- and right-handers towards the Tower of Hanoi then planning 
may be one possible reason why this is the case.  However, no current literature has 
examined or reported if there are any existing differences in planning strategies 
between left- and right-handers.  This issue will be further examined in chapter 7. 
 
4.4.2. Motor control 
 
Motor control is predominantly located in the hemisphere contralateral to the 
dominant hand (Shallice, 1982). Thus, if an individual is right-handed, then final 
control of motor action is by the left hemisphere and the opposite is true for left-
handers.  The results of many studies have suggested that there are differences in 
cognitive processing between left and right-handers, with left-handers often cited as 
superior in skills normally associated with right hemisphere dominance, such as 
maths (Annett & Manning, 1990) and visuo-spatial tasks such as mental rotation 
(Annett, 1992; Bishop, 1990). Conversely right-handers are often cited to excel at 
tasks predominantly controlled by the left-hemisphere, such as verbal tasks 
(Corballis, 1991).  If handedness and hemispheric dominance can influence 
performance on a range of purely cognitive measures it is also possible that it 
influences the motor behaviour of an individual when that individual interacts with the 
world. That is, handedness is possibly the most direct expression of hemispheric 
dominance and therefore any influence of hemispheric dominance on cognition may 
be most apparent in the control of motor behaviour.  
 
There are strong reasons to believe that lateralisation differences in cognition may be 
most strongly expressed as differences in motor control between left and right-
handers.  Corballis (1998) argues that evidence for cerebral asymmetries is more 
likely to be found in motor systems rather than perceptual systems (but see Rogers & 
Andrew (2002) for an alternative viewpoint).  Whereas perceptual asymmetries are 
revealed only under restricted conditions, such as brief displays, motor asymmetries 
are readily apparent in almost all motor behaviour, including reaching, grasping, 
speech production (but less so for speech comprehension), and facial expression. In 
fact most motor behaviour is asymmetrical, with approximately 90 percent of humans 
preferring their right hand and being more skilled at using that hand (e.g. Amunts, 
Jäncke, Mohlberg, Steinmetz & Zillies, 2000; Amunts, Schlaug, Schleicher, 
Steinmetz, Dabringhaus, Roland & Zillies, 1996).  Such a consistent and obvious 
asymmetry does not exist for perceptual processing. 
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Corballis suggests that organisms may be at a disadvantage if their perceptual 
system is substantially asymmetrical, with any bias in processing on one side of the 
perceptual field potentially making the organism vulnerable to attack or unable to 
locate prey (but see Rogers, 2000, & Vallortigara, 2000).  In contrast, a number of 
advantages might be conveyed by motor asymmetries as opposed to perceptual 
asymmetries.  For example, motor lateralisation may be important in fast sequential 
actions where the transfer of information between the hemispheres could delay 
responding. In addition ‘lateralisation would also eliminate the possibility of 
interhemispheric conflict, especially in internally generated actions’ (Corballis, 1998, 
p153). Thus, motor asymmetries are readily apparent, highly consistent, and could 
potentially provide the most direct measure of processing differences between right- 
and left-handers. 
 
Roger’s (1999) findings extend earlier work by Hopkins and Bennett (1994) who 
found that both female chimpanzees, and chimpanzees with a left-hand preference, 
were slower to approach novel objects than male chimpanzees, or those with a right-
hand preference.  
 
It can be noted, however, that contradictory findings have been reported by Watson 
and Ward (1996) who investigated temperament and problem solving in the small-
eared bush baby (Otolemur garnettii). They found that left-handed subjects were less 
inhibited in their approach to novel objects than right-handed subjects.   
 
4.4.3. Emotional Processing 
 
Evidence which supports Rogers (1999) and Davidson’s (1992) view that approach 
and avoidance behaviour may be controlled by different hemispheres comes from 
studies that have examined how each hemisphere processes positive and negative 
emotions. Two conflicting theories have been proposed to explain the role of each 
hemisphere in emotional processing. One view, known as the Right-Hemisphere 
Hypothesis, suggests that all emotional information is processed by the right 
hemisphere (Borod, 1993). However, an alternative view is the Valence-Specific 
Hypothesis, which suggests that the left hemisphere is specialised for processing 
positive emotions whereas the right hemisphere is specialised for processing 
negative emotions (Silberman & Weingartner, 1986; Jansari, Tranel & Adolphs, 
2000). If the valence hypothesis is correct then it could be the case that the right 
hemisphere is associated with avoidance behaviour (negative emotions) and the left 
hemisphere with approach behaviour (positive emotions) (Davidson, 1993).  Hopkins 
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and Bennett (1994) argue that approach behaviour is associated with positive 
emotions, controlled by the left hemisphere, and that avoidance behaviour is 
associated with negative emotions, controlled by the right hemisphere. Such a view 
is supported by evidence showing that monkeys with extreme right-frontal activity 
exhibit more fearful behaviour than those with extreme left-frontal activity (Kalin, 
Larson, Shelton & Davidson, 1998). This result lends support to the Valence-Specific 
Hypothesis and also suggests that, in novel situations, left-handers can display a 
form of avoidance behaviour and right-handers can display a form of approach 
behaviour. 
 
4.4.4. Stress and Anxiety 
 
If right-hemisphere activation is associated with avoidance behaviour and negative 
emotional states then it may be expected that left-handers show other negative 
emotions in novel situations, such as increased anxiety.  Although no study has 
examined laterality and anxiety in novel situations several studies have found left-
handers to be more anxious than right-handers (Orme, 1970; Hicks & Pellegrini., 
1978; Davidson & Schaffer, 1983). However, other studies have produced a variety 
of results, including no relationship between hand preference and anxiety (Beaton & 
Moseley, 1984; Merckelbach, de Ruiter & Olff, 1989) or increased anxiety in strongly 
left and right-handed people compared to mixed-handers (Wienrich, Wells & 
McManus, 1982). 
 
Stronger support for the view that right hemispheric motor control may be associated 
with anxiety and shyness, and consequently approach behaviour, comes from 
studies with primates and human infants. Westergaard, Champoux, and Suomi 
(2001a) found that left-handed preference in infant rhesus monkeys is associated 
with greater levels of the stress hormone cortisol. Moreover, high cortisol levels at 6 
months were predictive of a left-hand bias at both 6 months and 12 months of age 
(Westergaard, Byrne & Suomi, 2000). Based on these findings they argue that 
greater stress during infancy can cause a left-handed preference in rhesus monkeys. 
However, an alternative explanation of this finding might be that left-handedness, and 
right hemisphere motor dominance, increases anxiety and stress rather than stress 
causing the hand preference.  Also, Westergaard, Chavanne, Houser, Cleveland, 
Snoy, Suomi and Higley (2004) recently found that there was a positive relationship 
between handedness index scores in female rhesus macaques and concentration 
levels of the stress hormone cortisol.  That is, the higher the handedness score 
(where a positive score indicates a right-hand preference and a negative score 
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indicates a left-hand preference) the higher the level of cortisol is.  This contradicts 
the previous findings of Westergaard et al. (2001a) who reported that left-hand 
preference in infant macaques is associated with higher levels of cortisol.  The hand 
preference of each macaque was determined over 50 trials by independent 
researchers who examined the food reaching of the individuals.  
 
This interpretation is supported by results from EEG studies with human infants. 
Temperamentally anxious human infants who exhibit shyness and behavioural 
inhibition to novel situations have been found to show greater right-hemisphere 
frontal activation compared to left frontal activation (Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins 
& Schmidt, 2001; Schmidt, Fox, Schulkin & Gold, 1999; Schmidt & Fox, 1996; 
Calkins, Fox, & Marshal, 1996). Behaviourally inhibited infants show greater right 
frontal activation as early 4 months (Schmidt & Fox, 1996) and greater right frontal 
EEG activity has been found to be associated with shyness in 7 year olds (Schmidt, 
et al., 1999).  In addition, differences in right and left frontal activity at 4 months of 
age are predictive of sociability in infants during the second year of life (Schmidt & 
Fox, 1996).  These results provide strong converging evidence that indicates that 




4.5. Aims of the current study 
 
The Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task was employed in this study to measure and examine 
approach behaviour in left and right-handed participants to a novel problem.  In order 
to complete the standard 3-disk TOH task participants have to make a number of 
movements that could be easily and readily recorded and measured. Thus, 
completion of the TOH task provides a measure of motor behaviour in a novel 
situation. In addition, as completion of the task is believed to require planning (e.g. 
Goel et al., 2001) it was expected that participants might delay initiating their first 
move during a pre-planning stage. It was expected that if left-handers take longer to 
initiate motor responses in novel situations then they might take longer to make the 
first move in comparison to the right-handers. Thus, it was predicted that the time to 
initiate the first move on the TOH might be follow a similar pattern to the time it takes 
primates to initiate responding to novel objects.  That is, it is predicted that as left-
handed primates take longer to respond to novel tasks and objects then left-handed 
humans might reflect this response style.   Also, if left-handers take longer during the 
Chapter 4: Impulsivity and planning 
 153 
pre-planning stage of the TOH then it is possible that this will lead to performance 
benefits in comparison to right-handers.  Goel et al.  (2001) suggest that to be able to 
solve the TOH efficiently participants have to plan several moves ahead before 
physically moving any disks and state that poor performance on the task reflects a 
deficiency in planning ability. Therefore, a competent performance on the Tower of 
Hanoi may depend on the ability to delay initial responding and to plan a few moves 
ahead in this time.  Also, a 3-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi was used in order for 
participants to be able to solve the problem effectively.  The issue of complexity and 
the Tower of Hanoi is addressed in chapter 7. 
 
Alternatively, any delay in initiating the first move could simply result in the left-
handers taking longer to complete the task in comparison to the right-handers. 
Phillips et al. (2001) examined planning instructions and performance on the Tower 
of Hanoi. They found that participants who were instructed to make full mental plans, 
planned longer than those not instructed to plan, but this had no effect on how 
effective a person was at solving the task. ‘Planning/initiation’ time in the current 
study begins when the Tower of Hanoi is shown to the participant and ends when the 
first disk is moved.  Solution time includes planning time and the time taken to solve 
the task. 
 
4.5.1. Theoretical rationale for Tower of Hanoi study and hypotheses 
 
Recent evidence from research with primates suggests that right hemisphere motor 
control is associated with a more cautious cognitive style in novel situations whereas 
left hemisphere motor control is associated with a bolder approach (Rogers, 1999).  
Similarly right hemisphere activation is associated with behavioural inhibition, 
shyness and avoidance behaviour in human infants (Schmidt et al., 1999) and 
increased levels of stress in macaques (Westergaard, Lussier, Suomi & Higley, 
2001). As hand preference is potentially the most direct measure of hemispheric 
dominance it is hypothesised that handedness will influence the behavioural 
response of individuals towards the Tower of Hanoi. It is predicted that as left-
handers seem to be more cautious at responding in novel situations (Hopkins & 
Bennett, 1994; Cameron & Rogers, 1999; Rogers, 1999) then they would be slower 
to initiate responding on the Tower of Hanoi in comparison to right-handers. In 
addition, based on Hopkins and Bennett’s (1994) finding that females may also be 
more cautious in novel situations it was also expected that the female participants 
would delay their first move. No predictions are made on the number of moves taken 
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to solve the task or the time taken to complete it as there are no previous 
experimental findings on which to makes these.   
 
The reason for using the Tower of Hanoi as the task was that Cameron and Rogers 
(1999) used a problem-solving task which involved marmosets working out how to 
get mealworms out of a large tank containing a number of tubes and therefore the 
time taken to start touching the apparatus to try and retrieve the mealworms was 
considered as the most important measurement.  Therefore in order to have a 
relatively similar human parallel a problem solving task that could be potentially 
worked out first was needed to mirror the measurements of Cameron and Rogers.  It 
was decided to use the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi as this is a relatively simple task and 
the complexity of the task was not of the utmost importance.  In fact the task needed 
to be relatively simple so that it would be relatively simple for all participants.  
Hopkins and Bennett (1994) used a series of novel objects and let the chimpanzees 
in their sample approach them.  This latency time was considered as their most 
important measurement.  Therefore in order to fuse both the procedures of Cameron 
and Rogers and Hopkins and Bennett a problem-solving task was needed for this 
current experiment and it had to be novel.  All participants in the current experiment 
will be asked if they have seen or done the Tower of Hanoi before in order to ensure 
that the task is novel to all participants. 
 
The dependent variables in the current study are the time taken to make the first 
move on the Tower of Hanoi; the number of moves taken to solve the Tower of Hanoi 






90 participants took part in the study. However, 6 participants who stated that they 
were left-handed but revealed a right-hand preference when they had completed the 
handedness questionnaire were excluded from the analysis, leaving 84 participants, 
37 of whom were male and 47 were female. All participants were university staff and 
students at the University of Abertay Dundee.  42 participants were left-handed (23 
females and 19 males) and 42 participants were right-handed (24 females and 18 
males). All participants had normal colour vision and normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity. 
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4.6.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
The Tower of Hanoi consisted of three white pegs in a row, one of which had three 
coloured rings of differing sizes stacked on it (The largest ring was purple, the 
medium ring was green and the smallest ring was blue) (see figure 4.4).  A digital 
stopwatch with a split-time function was used to measure participant’s completion 
times and a screen was used to conceal the Tower of Hanoi apparatus prior to them 
starting the task. A Tower of Hanoi scoring sheet was used to record the time taken 
to move the first disk, the time taken to complete the task, the number of moves 
taken to complete the task and the number of errors made (see appendix 7 for a 
copy of this).  A set of instructions detailing the rules of the Tower of Hanoi was also 
given to participants.  The instructions stated that there would be three disks on one 
peg and the aim was to get the disks on to the peg at the other end in the same order 
using the following rules: only one disk can be moved at a time; a bigger disk could 
never be placed on top of a smaller disk and only the dominant hand could be used 
to move the disks (see appendix 6a and appendix 6b for a copy of the instructions).  
There were two instruction sheets as the side of the disks was counterbalanced 
across participants with half of the sample starting with the disks on the right and half 
of the sample starting with the disks on the left (the order was also balanced within 
sex and handedness groups).  Hand Preference was assessed using Peter’s 
(adapted) (1998) handedness questionnaire. 
 
 
Initial State      Goal State 
 





Prior to beginning the Tower of Hanoi task participants were presented with a set of 
instructions depicting the initial state and the goal state and outlining the rules to be 
followed.  The Tower of Hanoi apparatus was hidden behind a screen so that the 
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participant could not begin planning the solution to the task until they were instructed 
to do so. The participant was given no planning instructions and no indication of how 
many moves the task could be solved in. All participants were tested individually. The 
direction was counterbalanced, 50% did left to right and 50% right to left and all 
participants were instructed to use their preferred hand to move the TOH disks. 
When the participant indicated that they understood what was expected, the screen 
was removed and the stopwatch was started. The time taken until the participant 
moved or touched the first disk was recorded, as was the number of moves they 
made and the time it took them to complete the task (along with the number of errors 
made). Participants then completed Peter’s (1998) handedness inventory to get an 
accurate measure of their hand preference. Six participants, who used their left-hand 
to complete the TOH, but showed right hand dominance on the handedness 
inventory, were excluded from the analysis (leaving a final sample of 84 participants). 
Participants who had completed the Tower of Hanoi before were also omitted from 





Table 4.1: Mean time (in seconds) taken for participants to move the first disk of the 
Tower of Hanoi (initiation time) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 6.8  (10.6) 1.5  (1.1) 4.1  (5.9) 
Female 5.2  (5.2) 1.5  (0.9) 3.3  (3.1) 
Overall 6.0  (7.9) 1.5  (1.0)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males took the longest time on average to 
touch or move the first disk on the Tower of Hanoi; this was followed by left-handed 
females who took an average of 5.18 seconds to move the first disk.  Right-handed 
males took an average of 1.5 seconds to move the first disk with right-handed 
females taking exactly the same time at 1.5 seconds.  The left-handed males and the 
left-handed females had the most variable scores with standard deviations of 10.6 
and 5.2 respectively.  Males on average took longer than females to move the first 
disk (4.1 vs. 3.3 seconds) and left-handers took longer on average than right-handers 
to move the first disk (6.0 vs. 1.5 seconds). 
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A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs. female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on the time taken by participants to move the first disk on the 
Tower of Hanoi task.  There was a significant main effect of hand preference F(1,80) 
= 12.98, p<0.01 with left-handers taking significantly longer to move the first disk 
compared to right-handers (6.0 seconds Vs. 1.5 seconds). However, the effect of sex 
was not significant F(1,80) = 0.399, p>0.05 and the interaction between hand 
preference and sex also failed to reach significance F(1,80) = 0.370, p>0.05.  
 
Because the variance was unequal across groups, it was possible that the observed 
effect was due to outliers. To check, outliers that were 2.5 standard deviations above 
or below the mean were removed and the data was re-analysed. This resulted in the 
removal of the data from 5 participants (2 male left-handers and 3 female left-
handers) (n=79).  
 
 
Table 4.2: Mean time (in seconds) taken for participants to move the first disk of the 
Tower of Hanoi (with standard deviations in parentheses) with outliers 2.5 standard 
deviations or more above the mean removed. 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 3.3 (2.0) 1.5  (1.1) 2.4 (1.5) 
Female 3.4 (2.0) 1.5  (0.9) 2.5 (1.4) 
Overall 3.3 (2.0) 1.5  (1.0)  
 
The above table shows the mean time taken by each group to touch or move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi with the data removed from those participants who 
scored 2.5 standard deviations above or below the mean in order to control for 
variance within the sample.  The table shows that female left-handers now took the 
longest time to move the first disk followed by male left-handers.  Male right-handers 
and female right-handers still scored lower than the left-handed groups.  Left-handers 
overall still took longer to move the first disk than right-handers and males took 
slightly longer than females to move the first disk.  
 
With this variance removed the effect of handedness on time to move the first disk 
was still significant F(1, 75) = 27.89, p<0.01 with the mean time for left-handers (3.3 
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Table 4.3: Mean number of moves taken by participants to solve the Tower of Hanoi 
(with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 9.0 (3.1) 9.2 (3.0) 9.1 (3.0) 
Female 10.4 (4.6) 14.2 (5.5) 12.3 (5.0) 
Overall 9.8 (3.8) 11.7 (4.2)  
 
The above table shows the number of moves taken by participants to solve the 
Tower of Hanoi and on average left-handed males took the least number of moves to 
solve it (9 moves) followed by right-handed males who took an average of 9.2 
moves.  Left-handed females took an average of 10.4 moves to solve the task and 
the right-handed females who took 11.7 moves took the highest number of moves on 
average.  Right-handers took more moves on average to solve it than left-handers 
and females took more moves on average than males. 
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on the mean number of moves taken to complete the Tower 
of Hanoi task. There was a significant main effect of sex F(1,80) = 11.53, p<0.01 with 
males taking significantly fewer moves to solve the task than females (average of 9.1 
moves Vs. 12.3 moves). There was also a significant effect of handedness F(1,80) = 
4.58, p<0.05 with left-handers taking significantly fewer moves to solve the Tower of 
Hanoi than right-handers (average of 9.8 moves Vs. 11.7 moves).  The interaction 
between handedness and sex approached significance F(1,80) = 3.85, p=0.053.  
 
This marginal effect was analysed further by conducting two additional ANOVAs, one 
for male subjects and one for female subjects. For the males the effect of 
handedness did not reach significance F(1,35) = 0.028, p>0.05, with left-handers 
taking a similar number of moves, on average, to right-handers (9 Vs. 9.2). For the 
females, however, there was a significant effect of handedness F(1,45) = 6.878, 
p<0.012, with left-handed females taking significantly fewer moves than right-handed 
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Table 4.4: Mean execution time (completion time minus initiation time) (in seconds) 
taken by participants to solve the Tower of Hanoi (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 22.4  (13.2) 24.0  (10.6) 23.2  (11.9) 
Female 27.2  (17.5) 41.1  (29.8) 34.1 (23.6) 
Overall 24.8 (15.3) 32.5 (20.2)  
 
The above table shows the time taken by participants to complete the Tower of Hanoi 
task when the ‘planning’ time or time taken before making the first move is not 
included.  The table shows that right-handed females took the longest time to solve 
the task followed by left-handed females.  Right-handed males took less time that the 
two female groups to solve the task and left-handed males solved the task in the 
shortest time.  Males solved the task quicker than females and left-handers solved 
the task quicker than right-handers.  All standard deviations were relatively large 
which indicated that the time taken to solve the Tower of Hanoi within each group 
varied to a great extent. 
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on the mean time taken to complete the Tower of Hanoi task 
(complete time minus ‘planning/initiation time’).  There was a significant main effect 
of sex F(1,80) = 6.97, p<0.05, with males completing the task faster than females.  
The effect of handedness approached significance F(1,80) = 3.74, p=0.057 and the 
interaction between handedness and sex was not significant F(1,80) = 2.49, p>0.05. 
 
Table 4.5: Mean time (Total time taken to solve TOH including ‘planning’/‘initiation’ 
time) (in seconds) of participants to solve the Tower of Hanoi (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 29.2  (14.1) 25.5  (11.1) 27.3  (12.6) 
Female 32.3  (19.9) 44.3  (30.7) 38.3  (25.3) 
Overall 30.8  (17.0) 34.9  (20.9)  
 
The above table shows the total time taken from when the Tower of Hanoi was 
unveiled to the participant until it was completed.  The table shows that right-handed 
females took the longest on average to solve the Tower of Hanoi when ‘thinking’ or 
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‘planning’ time was also included in the solution time.  Left-handed females took an 
average of 32.34 second to complete the Tower of Hanoi including ‘initiation time.  
Left-handed males took an average of 29.17 seconds and the quickest time to 
complete the Tower of Hanoi including ‘initiation’ or ‘planning’ time, were achieved by 
the right-handed males who took an average of 25.49 seconds.  On average, males 
took less time than females to complete the Tower of Hanoi and left-handers took 
less time on average than right-handers.  All standard deviations were relatively large 
which indicated that the total time taken to solve the Tower of Hanoi within each 
group varied to a great extent – especially within the right-handed female group. 
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on the mean time taken to complete the Tower of Hanoi task 
(completion time including initiation time).  There was a significant main effect of sex 
F(1,80) = 5.54, p<0.05, with males completing the task faster than females.  The 
effect of handedness failed to reach significance F(1,80) = 0.787, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between handedness and sex was not significant F(1,80) = 2.807, p>0.05. 
 
 
The main findings of Experiment 1 were: 
 Left-handers took significantly longer to move the first disk on the Tower of 
Hanoi than right-hander.  This was also the case when all outliers were 
removed. 
 There was a significant main effect of sex on the number of moves taken to 
solve the task with males taking significantly fewer moves than females. 
 There was a significant main effect of handedness on the number of moves 
taken to solve the task with left-handers taking significantly fewer moves than 
right-handers. 
 When initiation time was not included in the total completion time there was a 
significant main effect of sex with males completing the task faster than 
females.  The main effect of handedness approached significance (0.057) 
with left-handers completing the task faster than right-handers. 
 When initiation time was included in the total completion time there was a 
significant main effect of sex with males completing the task faster than 
females.  There was no main effect of handedness. 
 





In line with predictions, and in accord with previous work with primates, the left-
handers were slower than the right-handers to initiate a response to a novel task. 
This finding supports the view that left-handers possess a more cautious cognitive 
style and that they are more likely to consider their actions before taking them 
(Hopkins & Bennett, 1994; Cameron & Rogers, 1999; Rogers, 1999). This indicates 
that hemispheric dominance possibly influences motor response style in humans. 
 
The difference in time to initiate responding (or ‘thinking’ or ‘planning’ or ‘initiation’ 
time as it has been termed over the course of the thesis), between the left and right-
handers suggests that the two groups adopted a different approach strategy to this 
novel task. Superficially it appeared that left-handers tended to study the problem 
before beginning it.  This hesitation made by left-handers before beginning the task 
concords with the work of Cameron and Rogers (1999) who found that right-handed 
marmosets took less time to respond to novel objects compared with left-handed 
marmosets.  The work of Hopkins and Bennett (1994), with chimpanzees, also 
supports the findings that left-handers are slower to approach novel stimuli than right-
handers and that the right hemisphere seems to be associated with a more cautious 
cognitive style compared to the left-hemisphere which might be associated with a 
more bold and impulsive cognitive style.  Thus a point which should also be 
addressed is that perhaps left-handers are not slower to respond but right-handers 
are actually quicker to respond and are therefore more impulsive.  This issue is 
considered in sections 4.9 to 4.13 of this chapter.   
 
Goel et al. (2001) suggest that completion of the TOH requires participants to plan 
ahead before making moves. The possibility that left-handers planned more is 
suggested by the finding that they solved the TOH in significantly fewer moves than 
the right-handers.  Clearly, additional time devoted to planning could have resulted in 
this performance enhancement. Although superior performance on the TOH may 
indicate greater planning it does not necessitate its occurrence, as Phillips et al., 
(2001) have found little relationship between planning and performance on the TOH.  
 
If left-handers planned more than the right-handers this may have influenced the 
results of the present study. It is possible that the left-handers took more time to 
make the first move because they decided to plan more than the right-handers. Thus, 
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a decision to plan directly caused the delay in the left-handers first move. However, 
there is no evidence in the handedness literature to suggest that left-handers have a 
greater tendency to plan in comparison to right-handers and so the issue of planning 
in left- and right-handers must be researched further (see chapter 6). Moreover, even 
if left-handers planned for longer it would remain unclear what the underlying cause 
of the decision to plan might be. A suggestion, consistent with the existing literature, 
is that left-handers take longer to make a motor response in a novel situation due to 
increased caution and behavioural inhibition (Rogers, 1999; Hopkins & Bennett, 
1994). 
 
It can be noted that, while a decision to plan may not have caused the left-handers to 
delay their first move, the presence of that delay provided the left-handers with 
additional time to plan if they chose to use it in that way. This may be the reason why 
the left-handed females, for example, took fewer moves to complete the TOH task 
than the right-handed females. Thus, it is possible that greater planning enabled the 
left-handers to solve the TOH in fewer moves than the right-handers, although the 
cause of the delay may not have been due to planning. 
 
It was also found that the male participants completed the TOH task in fewer moves 
and faster than the female participants. They did not, however, take longer to initiate 
their first move in comparison to the females, which suggests that they did not spend 
more time planning their solution compared to the females. It is possible that, as 
males have been reported to have superior visuo-spatial abilities than females (e.g. 
Siegel-Hinson & McKeever, 2002), this enabled them to solve this task more 
efficiently.  
 
Another argument that could explain differences in response initiation between the 
left and right-handers found in the present study is that it was caused by the use of a 
visuo-spatial planning task. It has been suggested that right hemisphere dominance 
is associated with superior spatial abilities (Annett, 1992; Bishop, 1990). While 
evidence for a relationship between handedness and visuo-spatial abilities has been 
mixed and inconsistent (Annett, 2002) it remains a possibility that the visuo-spatial 
nature of the task caused the differences in response initiation. For example, it might 
be the case that when confronted with a visuo-spatial task, participants who have 
strong visuo-spatial abilities delay responding and rely on visuo-spatial imagery to 
partially solve the task prior to making a move. As a consequence the delay in the 
left-handers could have been a direct result of their superior spatial ability. While the 
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results of the present study do not discount this argument, additional findings (see 
chapter 6) suggest that this is not the case.  
 
A delay in making a response in a novel situation, or to a novel task, may convey 
obvious survival advantages. A more conservative approach strategy may be clearly 
safer than a bolder and more dangerous approach strategy. Thus, the consistent and 
continuing presence of left-handedness within human populations, and its presence 
in other primates, may be due to the fact that there are some important advantages 
associated with being left-handed and it is not a semi-pathological state as often 
presented in the literature (Harris & Carlson, 1988).  The effect of different approach 
strategies is probably most evident during food gathering and foraging.  In some 
dangerous situations, a cautious approach is advantageous because it is safer, 
whereas in other situations, where there is little danger, the safer approach looses 
out to a bolder approach because the bold individuals will get most of the food. 
Clearly, selection pressure would favour individuals with a naturally cautious, right-
hemisphere dominant approach style, in some situations. This may account for the 
continuing presence of left-handedness in human populations. 
 
Converging evidence from a number of fields suggests that the right-hemisphere is 
more involved in processing negative emotional information and that right-
hemisphere activation is associated with temperamental shyness, anxiety, and 
behavioural inhibition in human infants (Schmidt et al., 1999), and behavioural 
inhibition in primate’s motor responses to novel objects (Hopkins & Bennett, 1994; 
Rogers, 1999; Cameron & Rogers, 1999). Thus, research consistently indicates that 
right hemisphere dominance, or activation, can result in behavioural inhibition. As 
behavioural inhibition is a key characteristic of increased anxiety (Gray, 1982) it is 
possible that increased anxiety in the left-handers caused them to delay their initial 
move.  The approach behaviour exhibited by left and right-handers could be 
attributed to personality differences between the two groups.  A common finding of 
research on hand preference and personality is that left-handers seem to be more 
anxious than their right-handed counterparts (e.g. Orme, 1970; Hicks & Pellegrini, 
1978; Davidson & Schaffer, 1983; Dillon, 1989).  If this is the case then this may help 
explain the hesitation made by left-handers when presented with a novel situation or 
object, i.e. they may be more apprehensive about the situation than right-handers.  
Orme (1970) found that left-handers tended to worry more while one of Dillon’s 
(1989) key findings was that left-handers are worried by factors such as how they do 
at school and time pressures.  Left-handers may therefore be more susceptible to 
worry about their performance on the TOH and therefore think about it more before 
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tackling it.   Also, as it appears that the right hemisphere may be associated with 
negative emotions and the left hemisphere with positive emotions then the valence 
hypothesis needs to be further examined with respect to differences between left- 
and right-handers.  Jansari et al.  (2000) conducted a study of emotional processing 
but only used right-handed participants and concluded that the valence hypothesis 
was supported when identifying positive and negative emotional faces (see chapter 5 
for more details). 
 
An interpretation of the findings of this study is that a dominant right hemisphere may 
elicit negative emotions, such as increased anxiety, in participants who are 
confronted with novelty. Thus, left-handers may show increased levels of state 
anxiety, but not trait anxiety, when confronted with a novel task. It is possible that 
inconsistent results in the literature, with regard to anxiety and laterality, may have 
been due to previous studies failing to discriminate between trait and state anxiety. 
The present findings suggest that left-handers may only exhibit greater anxiety in 
particular states and situations, but may not have greater trait anxiety (see chapters 6 
and 7 for details of these studies).  
 
 
4.9. Impulsivity – Experiment 2 
 
4.9.1. Definitions of Impulsivity 
 
There are numerous existing definitions of impulsivity in the literature.  However, 
there is also a lack of agreement within this literature on how impulsivity can be 
conceptualised (Finn, Justus, Mazas & Steinmetz, 1999).  Barratt (1985) said that 
one of the principal problems of impulsivity was that there is no generally accepted 
definition of it.  When defining impulsivity, Evenden (1999) pointed out that definitions 
will vary from one culture to another and over time and would depend on the age of 
the person involved.  Evenden (1999) concludes by saying that one reason that there 
is confusion over the definition of impulsivity is that there is not only one type of 
impulsive behaviour. 
 
According to Helmers, Young and Pihl (1995) definitions of impulsivity vary across 
studies, some examples of definitions include ‘the failure to evaluate a situation as 
risky or dangerous’ (Eysenck & McGurk, 1980), ‘the inability to plan ahead’, (Eysenck 
& Eysenck, 1977) and ‘the failure to withhold a response that will lead to punishment 
or a deficit in passive avoidance learning’ (Gray, 1983), (cited in Helmers et al., 
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1995).  According to Evans, Searle and Dolan (1998) there are two approaches to 
impulsivity.  Evans et al. (1998) argue that the first type of impulsivity is one that is 
concerned with dealing with the tendency to act 'on impulse' whereas the other 
approach is concerned with individual's reports of their impulses and behaviours.  
Evans et al. go on to state that the individual may feel an increasing level of arousal 
before committing an impulsive act. 
 
Barratt & Patton (1983) defined impulsivity as acting without adequate reflection, spur 
of the moment reactions, taking risks and trying to get things done quickly.  Patton, 
Stanford and Barratt (1995) said that impulsiveness could be split into three sub-
traits, these were motor impulsiveness, defined as 'acting without thinking', cognitive 
impulsiveness, defined as 'making quick cognitive decisions' and non-planning 
impulsiveness, defined as 'present orientation or lack of futuring' p769. 
Dickman’s (1990) research focused on impulsivity as a personality trait.  Dickman 
(1990) proposed that two types of impulsivity existed, functional impulsivity and 
dysfunctional impulsivity.  Functional impulsivity is associated with enthusiasm and 
adventurousness and is thought to be beneficial to the individual.  The other type of 
impulsivity suggested by Dickman (1990) was dysfunctional impulsivity.  Dickman 
described dysfunctional impulsives as people who have a tendency to engage in 
behaviours that have negative consequences.   
 
Thus impulsivity can be defined in a number of ways but a common definition 
appears to be one of acting without little foresight or without thinking about any 
negative consequences in most cases to the individual (e.g. Patton et al. (1995)).  It 
is this definition of impulsivity that will be considered for the following study.   
 
4.9.2. Measuring impulsivity 
 
The evaluation of impulsivity has been based on the use of many different 
instruments (self-reports scales, rating scales and performance/behavioural 
measures).  Barratt (1983) states that the best way to evaluate impulsiveness is to 
use one single measure.  However, one problem with many existing measurements 
of impulsivity, according to Carrillo-de-la-Pena, Otero and Romero (1993), is that 
they do not appear to evaluate or measure the same things (see section 4.9).  This 
led Carrillo-de-la-Pena et al. to conclude that there is a lack of agreement across the 
different measurements of impulsivity and this could cause problems with the validity 
of some of the instruments used.  One reason why self-report scales of 
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impulsiveness are mainly used is, according to Barratt & Patton (1983) because tests 
of impulsiveness do not correlate well together. 
 
One of the most widely used measurements of impulsivity is the Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale (BIS).  The Barratt Impulsivity Scale was developed initially to separate 
impulsiveness from anxiety (Evenden, 1999).  The BIS 11 is a thirty item self-report 
scale designed to measure general impulsiveness (Patton at al., 1995).  Barratt 
(1994) suggests that there are three sub-traits in the BIS 11, “ideomotor” 
impulsiveness, which involves acting without thinking, a careful planning sub-trait 
involving paying attention to details and a future orientated “coping stability”.  
Ideomotor impulsivity and planning related impulsivity have been consistently 
identified in previous versions of the BIS.  A total score is calculated for each 
participant on the BIS and this is their impulsivity score (see sections 4.11. and 4.12. 
for details of the BIS used as a self-report measurement of impulsiveness in the 
current study. 
 
Other measurements of impulsivity exist that do not consist of self-report 
questionnaires. The Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT) (Kagan, 1966) consists 
of a series of ten figures in which the subject is required to identify one of six very 
similar pictures to a 'target' picture (cited in Helmers et al., 1995).  According to Miller 
and Byrnes (1997) this is one of the most widely used measures of impulsivity.  The 
computerised impulsiveness-matching program used in the current study was an 
adapted version of the Matching Familiar Figures Test (see section 4.11 for details of 
this).  As previously mentioned this task was used, as it is one of the most widely 
used measures of impulsivity which is not a self-report measurement.  However, 
stimuli from Cooper and Podgorny (1976) were adapted and used, as they were 
suited to the matching aspect of the task.  Additional behavioural measures include 
The Porteus Maze (Porteus, 1965) which consists of measuring the number of times 
the pencil is lifted or touches the boundaries of the maze (cited in Helmers et al., 
1995) and The ‘Draw a Line Slowly’ Task (Rohrbeck & Twentyman, 1986 cited in 
Helmers et al., 1995), which is a test that measures inhibition of motor activity.  The 
subject is required to draw a line from the top to the bottom of a very thin column 
without crossing the edges as slowly as possible and the time taken to do so is 
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4.9.3. General impulsivity 
 
Dickman (1990) believes that impulsivity should not always be thought of as a 
negative concept.  He states that when an experimental task is very simple, a high 
impulsive person's quick responses will have a very small cost in terms of the 
number of errors made (Dickman & Meyer, 1988).  Dickman and Meyer (1988) 
proposed that highly impulsive people claim that they act with little foresight but it has 
been found that impulsives often respond slower than non-impulsive participants in 
experimental tasks.   It has also been suggested that highly impulsive individuals 
spend less of the preparation time focusing on the task that they are about to 
complete.  It has been suggested that low impulsives are superior on tasks which 
require fixation of attention, but Dickman and Meyer (1988) suggests that on a task 
where attention has to be switched very quickly, then high impulsives will perform 
better (Evenden, 1999).  Also, males on average score higher than females on 
impulsiveness and therefore demonstrate a higher base rate of risk taking behaviour 
(Patton et al., 1995).   
 
 
4.10. Aims, rationale and hypotheses of the impulsivity study 
 
Cameron and Rogers (1999) found that left-handed marmosets took longer to 
respond to novel objects than right-handed marmosets.  As it was found that left-
handers took longer to respond then it was proposed that right-handers were 
therefore, on average, responding more quickly and thus were more impulsive in 
their approach to objects.  Therefore the following study (section 4.4.) was set up 
firstly to see if right-handers reported themselves to be more impulsive than left-
handers (using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11, Patton et al., 1995) and 
secondly, when presented with a computerised matching task whether they would be 
quicker in their responses than left-handers.  A mixed design was used where left-
handed and right-handed male and female participants completed a matching task 
and the Barratt Impulsiveness Questionnaire.  
 
The reason for using the computerised matching task was that it was a common and 
reliable measurement of impulsivity.  The stimuli were adapted from an impulsivity 
study by Cooper and Podgorny (1976) but these researchers had only used right-
handed participants.  Similarly, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale is the most often 
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used self-report impulsivity scale and this has been extensively tested both for 
reliability and validity. 
 
For the matching task the independent variable was the similarity of the shape being 
presented to that of the target stimuli. The dependent variables were the time taken 
(in milliseconds) to match the shapes (impulsivity measurement) and the number of 
errors made when matching the stimuli. The dependent variable on the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Questionnaire was the total score of participants’ ratings for the thirty 
questions (self report impulsivity measurement).   
 
It was hypothesised that right-handers would have higher self-report impulsivity 
scores than left-handers and right-handers would respond more quickly (or faster) on 
the computerised matching task. 
 
 




84 participants took part in this study, 37 were male and 47 were female.  All 
participants were staff and students of the University of Abertay.  42 participants 
were left-handed (23 females and 19 males) and 42 participants were right handed 
(24 females and 18 males).  Handedness was measured using the adapted version 
of Peters’ (1998) handedness questionnaire.  All participants had normal colour 
vision and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  
 
4.11.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
a) Matching Task 
 
 A Power Macintosh computer with a colour monitor and a standard keyboard was 
used to present the stimuli and measure response latency (in milliseconds) and 
accuracy (number of errors made). The software used for creating and running the 
experiment was PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, and Provost, 1992).  
 
The matching task consisted of 80 trials (10 practice trials and 70 experimental 
trials). The stimuli were adapted from Cooper and Podgorny’s (1976) alternative test 
forms shapes (see appendix 3 for the full set of shapes).  These shapes consisted of 
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five target shapes that differed in the complexity of their design.  The simplest shape 
had six points and the complexity ranged over eight points, twelve points and sixteen 
points to the most complex shape which had twenty-four points (See figure 4.1. for 
an example).   Each target shape had 7 different reflected versions of it (see figure 
4.2. for one sequence) ranging from very similar to the target shape to a complete 
reflection of it (see Cooper and Podgorny, 1976, for details of this procedure). The 
five target shapes were each matched up twice with their identical shape and twice 
with each of the 7 reflections of it (thus resulting in 80 stimuli). The order of these 
pairs was randomly presented on screen (10 trials were used as practice trials and 
70 as experimental trials).   During each trial a small star (*) was presented on screen 
to alert the participant that a stimulus was about to appear and then one of the target 
shapes was presented for 500 ms that was then followed by a black square (acting 
as a mask) for a further 500 ms and then a second shape. The participants pressed 
‘B’ on the keyboard if they thought the second shape (which was either one of the 
reflections of the target shape or the target shape itself) matched the first shape and 
pressed the ‘N’ key if they thought there was a mismatch (see figure 4.3 for examples 
of a match and a mismatch).  The second shape remained on the screen until a 
response was made.  Once a full trial was completed the process began again with 
another stimulus and shape pairing.  Prior to completing the matching task 
participants were given a set of instructions detailing what they were required to do 
(see appendix 4). The instruction sheet contained details of one sequence that the 
participant was going to be presented with and how they should respond.  The 
participant was told that when they pressed a key to begin they would see a star (*) 
flashing briefly in the centre of the screen, this would indicate that they were about to 
be presented with a stimulus. The stimulus would consist of an abstract black shape 
in a circle that would be flashed in the centre of the screen.  The stimulus would then 
be replaced by a black square again flashing briefly (500 ms) on the screen and 
finally another shape that would either be the same or similar to the stimulus would 
be presented.  If the participant thought that the shape was the same as the stimulus 
then they were instructed to press the key ‘B’ and if they thought that the shape was 
different from the stimulus the they were instructed to press the key ‘N’.  To aid the 
understanding of what participants should expect they were given a diagram of one 
sequence of the task.   
 
 








Figure 4.3: One full sequence ranging from the target stimuli (on the left) through to 
the complete reflection (on the right). 
 
 
                           
            Match                        Mismatch 
 
Figure 4.4: A matching and non-matching sequence of the matching task stimuli. 
 
 
b) Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Questionnaire (version 11) was used (see appendix 5).  
This consisted of thirty questions measured on a four-point scale ranging from 
rarely/never, occasionally, often, to almost always/always.  The questions asked 
included ‘I squirm at plays and lectures’, ‘I don’t pay attention’, ‘I concentrate easily’, 
‘I am a steady thinker’ and ‘I act on impulse’. The statements were given scores of 
four for almost always/always, three for often, two for occasionally and one for 
rarely/never.  Questions 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 26 were reverse 
questions and therefore were scored one for rarely/ never, two for occasionally, three 
for often and one for almost always/always.  Therefore the more impulsive a person 
was the higher their score would be and the less impulsive a person was then the 
lower their score would be. 
 
4.11.3. Procedure   
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Each participant was firstly given the adapted Peter’s handedness questionnaire 
(1998) so that their hand preference could be measured and results could be 
analysed accordingly (see chapter 3, section 3.7 for details of this).  Participants 
were then informed that they were going to be given a self-report questionnaire and 
were asked to respond to each of the 30 statements on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale 
(version 11).  Participants were not directly informed that this scale was measuring 
impulsivity but the title on the questionnaire cited that it was an impulsivity scale (see 
appendix 5).  Participants were asked to indicate which one of four scaled responses 
(rarely/never; occasionally; often and almost always/always) best reflected 
themselves in relation to each impulsivity question – for example, in response to “I 
concentrate easily” if this was not the case then the participant should respond with 
either the ‘occasionally’ or ‘rarely/never’ response.  Upon completing each of the 
thirty statements, participants were then asked to complete the next part of the study. 
 
Participants were informed that the next part of the experiment would be done using 
the computer and were asked if they had any form of visual impairment that might 
affect their performance on the task.  If the participant indicated that their vision was 
suitable to participate then they were presented with an instruction sheet that outlined 
what the matching program would entail (see appendix 4).  If the participants 
indicated that they understood what they had to do (They were also given the 
opportunity to ask any questions if they did not understand something) and were 
happy to continue then they were informed that they would be given a practice task.  
The practice trials consisted of 10 trials and upon completion of these if the 
participant was comfortable to continue then they were given the 70 experimental 
trials to complete.  If a participant indicated that they were not happy after the 
practice trials they were given the opportunity to complete the practice trials again or 
were told that they were free to withdraw from the experiment at any time (no 
participants chose this option). When they completed this task participants’ scores 
were recorded giving details of whether they were correct or wrong, the reaction time 
in milliseconds of how long it took the participant to respond and whether the shape 
was the same or different to the stimulus.   The ten practice trials were omitted from 
the analysis.  After the participant had completed the matching task they were given 










4.12.1. Hand preference 
 
Table 4.6: Mean hand preference scores of participants (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 
Sex and hand preference Mean hand preference 
score 
Left-handed male -27.4 (14.5) 
Left-handed female -28.5 (11.3) 
Right-handed male 32.9 (8.7) 
Right-handed female 32.5 (9.1) 
 
Table 4.1. shows that left-handed females, on average, had slightly stronger left-
hand preferences than left-handed males (-28.48 vs. –27.42 respectively) and left-
handed males also had more variable hand preference scores than left-handed 
females.  There was very little difference between right-handed male and right-
handed female’s scores although right-handed females had more variable scores 
than right-handed males 
 
4.12.2. Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) 
 
Table 4.7: Mean Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) scores of participants (with 
standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Sex and hand preference Mean BIS score 
Left-handed male 70.4 (13.2) 
Left-handed female 69.0 (10.9) 
Right-handed male 68.2 (9.4) 
Right-handed female 65.2 (11.2) 
 
Table 4.2 shows the mean Barratt impulsiveness scale scores of all participants.   It 
shows that, on average, left-handed males report themselves to be the most 
impulsive group followed by left-handed females and right-handed males.  The least 
impulsive group, on average, is the right-handed females.  The most variable group 
is the left-handed males followed by right-handed females; left-handed females (and 
the least variable group are the right-handed males. 
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A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on participants’ responses to the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale. This revealed no significant main effect of hand preference F(1, 80)=0.821, 
p>0.05, and no significant main effect of sex F(1, 80)=1.583, p>0.05.  In addition, the 
interaction between hand preference and sex was not significant F(1, 80)=0.110, 
p>0.05. 
 
4.12.3. Matching Task 
 
Table 4.8: Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) of participants for the matching task 
(with standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 1005.9 (243.5) 899.1 (321.1) 952.5 (282.3) 
Female 990.1 (222.1) 886.0 (201.1) 938.0 (211.6) 
Overall 998.0 (232.8) 892.5 (261.1)  
The above table shows that left-handed males took the longest, on average, to 
respond to the matching task stimuli followed by left-handed females.  Right-handed 
males took less time to respond than left-handed males or females but were slower, 
on average, than right-handed females.  Overall, males took longer to respond than 
females and left-handers took longer to respond than right-handers. 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex 
(male Vs female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the mean reaction 
time (in milliseconds) for the matching task. There was a significant main effect of 
hand preference F(1, 80) = 3.843, p=0.05 (or p=0.025 one-tailed) with left-handers 
taking significantly longer, on average, to respond to the shapes than right-handers.  
The effect of sex was not significant F(1, 80) = 0.207, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between hand preference and sex also was not significant F(1, 80) = 0.019, p>0.05. 
 
Table 4.9: Mean number of errors made by participants on the matching task 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Left Right Overall 
Male 9.3 (4.8) 9.4 (5.1) 9.3 (5.0) 
Female 9.7 (5.7) 9.4 (4.9) 9.5 (5.3) 
Overall 9.5 (5.2) 9.4 (9.5)  
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The above table shows that all groups, on average, made a similar amount of errors 
on the matching task.  Left-handed females made most errors and left-handed males 
made the least number of errors but the difference between the highest number of 
errors made by one group and the lowest number made was minimal.  Overall, males 
made fewer errors than females and right-handers made fewer errors than left-
handers but these differences were very minimal. 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) between subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on the number of errors made on the matching task. The 
effect of sex was not significant F(1, 80) = 0.014, p>0.05 and the effect of hand 
preference was not significant F(1, 80) = 0.001, p>0.05.   The interaction between 




The main findings of Experiment 2 were: 
 There were no significant main effects of sex or handedness on the self-
report impulsivity scores.  However, left-handers reported themselves to be 
more impulsive than right-handers. 
 
 Left-handers took significantly longer to respond to the matching task than 
right-handers.  There were no sex effects. 
 
 There were no main effects of handedness or sex on the number of errors 





In line with predictions the left-handers were slower than the right-handers to initiate 
a response on the computer-matching task. This finding supports the view that left-
handers perhaps possess a more cautious cognitive style and that they are more 
likely to consider their actions before taking them (Hopkins & Bennett, 1994; 
Cameron & Rogers, 1999; Rogers, 1999). This indicates that hemispheric dominance 
possibly influences motor response style in humans.  However, very little work has 
been carried out with handedness and impulsivity and therefore it is difficult to 
explain these findings. 
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With respect to the self-report measurement of impulsivity (the Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale) right-handers reported themselves to be less impulsive than left-handers, thus 
the prediction that right-handers would be more impulsive than left-handers was not 
supported.  Also, although the difference between the self-report impulsivity scores of 
left- and right-handers was in the opposite direction than that predicted, the 
difference was not significant.  The impulsivity-matching task was designed to 
measure participants’ reaction times and test for differences between left- and right-
handers.  It was found that there was a significant main effect of hand preference on 
the reaction times with left-handers having significantly slower reaction times than 
right-handers.  This therefore supports the hypothesis that right-handers are more 
impulsive than left-handers and also relates to the hypothesis that left-handers will 
take longer to respond than right-handers on a problem-solving task as predicted for 
the Tower of Hanoi study.  Therefore, although the self-report behaviour of the left- 
and right-handers did not suggest that there was any difference in impulsivity 
between them, the matching task designed to test reaction times and impulsiveness 
of the participants did suggest that there was a difference and this difference was in 
the direction that was predicted.  However, one issue that may confuse the argument 
a little is that of novelty.  Although the participants would not have completed the 
exact task before as it was designed specifically for the experiment, they may have 
completed some form of similar reaction time task to the current task.  Thus is it 
cannot be guaranteed that novelty may be a contributing factor to the differences 
found in this task compared to those found in the Tower of Hanoi task.  The issue of 




To conclude, the present findings reported in the Tower of Hanoi study and the 
Impulsivity study demonstrated that left-handers showed inhibitory behaviour in 
response to a novel task. This finding adds to the existing evidence that suggests 
that left-handedness is associated with increased anxiety and avoidance behaviour in 
novel situations. An important implication of these findings is that differences in 
cognitive processing and motor behaviour, between left and right-handers, may be 
partly due to differences in emotional states expressed by novel performance tasks.  
 
Each of the possibilities that have been outlined in the discussion for the Tower of 
Hanoi study (section 4.2) will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters 
where studies have been devised to test each possible explanation of what caused 
the delay in response to a novel problem in left-handers but not in right-handers.  The 
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issue impulsivity was examined in section 4.9 onwards of this chapter, emotional 
processing will be examined in chapter 5; planning will be examined in chapter 6 
through a series of tasks and the issues of novelty and stress will be addressed in 
chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5: Emotional Processing 
 
 
5.0 Aims of Chapter 
 
One possible explanation of the Tower of Hanoi study reported in Chapter 4 was that 
there was a possible difference in emotional processing between left- and right-
handers that might account for the differences in the way that they interact with the 
world.  In Chapter 4 it was found that there was a difference in the time taken to 
move the first disk of the Tower of Hanoi and left-handers on average took 
significantly longer to do this than right-handers.  Thus possible explanations were 
considered as to why this delay in left-handers occurred.  One reason cited was that 
there might be a difference in the emotional processing of left- and right-handers and 
the Valence-Specific hypothesis was used to explain this.  Thus, in this chapter a 
more detailed investigation of possible differences between left- and right-hander’s 
emotional processing will be conducted using a partial replication of Jansari, Tranel 
and Adolph’s (2000) free-viewing laterality task.  
 
 
5.1. The right hemisphere hypothesis of emotion and the valence 
specific hypothesis of emotion 
 
Many studies have suggested that the right hemisphere of the brain has a greater 
role in the processing of emotional information than the left hemisphere (Ley & 
Bryden, 1979; Levy, Heller, Banich & Burton, 1983; Christman & Hackworth, 1993; 
Leslie, Johnson-Frey & Grafton, 2004). This research has used both brain-damaged 
and normal participants and has examined the role of the right hemisphere in both 
the perception and expression of affect. For example, patients with right hemisphere 
damage are more impaired than those with left hemisphere damage at recognising 
emotions conveyed by facial expressions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1996). In addition, it is believed that emotions are expressed more intensely on the 
left side of the face because the right hemisphere has a greater role in the control of 
emotional expression (Sackeim, Gur, & Saucy, 1978; Heller & Levy, 1981; Kowner, 
1995). 
 
With normal participants the majority of studies in this area have used the divided 
visual field technique to present faces with different emotional expressions. In 
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support of findings from patient studies it has been found that there is a right 
hemisphere advantage (left visual field) in the perception and interpretation of 
emotional expressions (Ley & Bryden, 1979; Mandal & Singh, 1990; Strauss & 
Moscovitch, 1981). Leslie et al. (2004) asked participants to view or imitate a series 
of emotional faces and found that when the emotional faces were viewed that the 
right hemisphere was activated however, when the participant was imitating a series 
of faces (both positive and negative) there was bilateral activation of the 
hemispheres.  The view, however, that the right hemisphere is preferentially involved 
in the processing of all emotional information has been questioned on a number of 
occasions. Many studies have suggested that hemispheric biases in the processing 
of emotional information may depend on the valence of the emotion conveyed by that 
information (Tucker, 1981; Ahern & Schwartz, 1979, 1985; Reuter-Lorenz & 
Davidson, 1981; Davidson 1992). For example, Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson (1981) 
found that when happy faces were presented to the left hemisphere they were 
perceived more quickly compared with sad faces. Conversely sad faces presented to 
the right hemisphere were perceived faster than happy faces. They concluded that 
there was a valence-specific laterality effect, with a left hemisphere advantage for the 
perception of positive emotions and a right hemisphere advantage for the perception 
of negative emotions.  The findings of the Tower of Hanoi experiment in Chapter 4 
were explained through the possibility of difference in temperament and behaviour 
influenced by the dominant hemispheres of left- and right-handers.  Therefore it is 
possible that because left-handers have a more dominant right hemisphere they are 
more heavily driven and influenced by the inhibitory or emotional nature of the right 
hemisphere.  Additionally, if the valence specific hypothesis of emotional processing 
is supported, then more specifically left-handers might be driven more by the 
negative emotional influences exhibited by the right hemisphere. This pattern is the 
opposite for right-handed individuals. 
 
However, the validity of the valence hypothesis is a source of debate within the 
literature. A number of earlier studies have not supported Reuter-Lorenz and 
Davidson’s (1981) results. For example, Ley and Bryden (1979) in a dichotic listening 
task obtained a left ear advantage (right hemisphere) for the emotional judgement of 
messages, regardless of the emotional content of the message (whether it was 
happy, sad, angry, or neutral). In addition, other studies have suggested that both 
hemispheres are involved in the processing of positive emotions whereas the 
processing of negative emotions is lateralised in the right hemisphere (Mandal, 
Tandon & Asthana, 1991). For example, Borod, Koff, Perlman-Lorch, and Nicholas 
(1986) found that patients with right hemisphere damage were more impaired at 
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perceiving negative emotions, but not positive emotions, than were patients with left 
hemisphere damage. More recently Asthana and Mandal (2001) found right 
hemisphere superiority in the perception of sad facial expressions but no 
lateralisation effects for the perception of happy expressions. These results suggest 
that the processing of negative emotions is more lateralised in the right hemisphere 
whereas positive emotions are processed bilaterally. 
 
Other work, however, supports the view that hemispheric differences in the 
processing of emotional information depend upon the valence of the specific emotion 
(Davidson, 1992; Davidson, 1993). Evidence for valence-specific laterality effects 
have been obtained for both the expression of emotions (Ross, Homan & Buck, 
1994) and experiencing emotions (Jones & Fox, 1992). Moreover, Davidson, 
Mednick, Moss, Saron, and Schaffer (1987) found that the perceived intensity of 
happy and sad facial expressions depends upon the hemisphere they are presented 
to, with faces being perceived as happier if they are presented to the left hemisphere. 
However, this effect may depend upon the handedness of the participants as Heller 
and Levy (1981) found that right-handed, but not left-handed, participants perceived 
faces as happier when presented in the left visual field. Finally, a study by Jansari et 
al. (2000) provides further support for the valence-specific hypothesis. This study 
differed from previous work in that it examined laterality effects for emotional 
processing under free-viewing conditions. They used a task similar to that employed 
by Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson (1981), which required participants to discriminate 
emotional expressions in pairs of faces. The faces were morphed so that the 
differences in emotional expression between the faces ranged from very subtle to 
clear. In support of the valence hypothesis Jansari et al. found more accurate 
discrimination of faces with positive emotional expressions when they were 
presented on the right hand side than when they were presented on the left hand 
side. Conversely, greater accuracy in discrimination was found for faces with 
negative expressions when they were presented on the left hand side rather than the 
right hand side. These findings suggest that laterality effects in emotional processing 
are valence-specific and that they are present under free-viewing conditions. 
 
One explanation for the often-contradictory findings within the literature has been 
proposed by Van Strien and Van Beek (2000) who suggest that the different results 
may have been caused by the different types of task used. Borod (1993) proposed 
that the posterior regions of the right hemisphere are specialised for identifying the 
type of emotion conveyed by stimuli (e.g. facial expression, prosody) by extracting 
the meaning of the emotion cues (e.g. smile, intonation pattern). This interpretation 
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occurs in the posterior regions of the right hemisphere irrespective of the valence of 
the emotion. However, when experiencing emotions, Borod (1993) suggests that the 
anterior region of the left hemisphere is preferentially involved in experiencing 
positive emotions whereas anterior regions of the right hemisphere are involved in 
experiencing negative emotions. Van Strien and Van Beek (2000) argue that studies 
that have required participants to match emotional expressions of faces will show a 
right hemisphere advantage because posterior regions of the right hemisphere can 
carry out this predominantly perceptual task. However, in discrimination tasks such 
as those used Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson (1981), which require participants to 
judge which of two images of the same face expresses an emotion, then anterior 
regions of each hemisphere are utilised. In this case valence–specific laterality 
effects emerge because in order to do the task successfully anterior regions of the 
hemispheres are used to experience the particular emotion conveyed by the face and 
successfully make the discrimination.  
 
If Van Strien and Van Beek’s account is correct then the more perceptual an emotion 
judgement task is then the less likely it will be that there will be a valence-specific 
laterality effect. However, the more a task relies on the judgement of emotional 
expressions then the more likely it will be that a valence-specific laterality effect 
emerges. Some support for this view comes from a study conducted by Safer (1981) 
who found a left visual field superiority when participants had to judge whether two 
facial emotions were the same or not. Importantly the left visual field advantage 
increased when participants were instructed to empathise with the expressed 
emotion rather than simply verbalise what the emotion was. 
 
 
5.2. Gender and emotional processing 
 
One reason why evidence in support of the valence hypothesis has been inconsistent 
may be because most studies have ignored the influence of the participant’s gender. 
The majority of research that has examined differences in brain lateralisation 
between males and females has indicated that lateralisation of certain types of 
processing is more pronounced in males than in females. It appears that in males 
there is a right hemisphere advantage for non-verbal tasks and a left hemisphere 
advantage for verbal tasks, whereas females show less clear laterality effects on 
these tasks (Hellige, 1993; Iaccino, 1993; Hausmann & Gunturkun, 1999; Davidson, 
Cave a& Sellner, 2000 ; Inglis and Lawson, 1981).  
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Given that sex differences in lateralisation exist it is possible that hemispheric 
functioning differs between males and females for the processing of emotional stimuli 
(Eviatar, Hellige, & Zaidel, 1997; Sanz-Martin & Loyo, 2001). For example, Ladavas, 
Umilata, and Ricci-Bitti’s (1980) found that females showed a left visual field 
superiority in discriminating emotions while males show no consistent asymmetries in 
emotional discrimination. In addition, Burton and Levy (1989) found that females, but 
not males, perceived faces with negative emotions fastest when presented in the left 
visual field and faces with positive emotions fastest when presented to the right 
visual field. These results indicate that females are more lateralised for emotional 
processing than males. Findings by Van Strien and Van Beek (2000) support this 
view. They examined the influence of sex and handedness on ratings of emotion in 
laterally presented cartoon faces. They found no effect of handedness but found that 
sex influenced ratings of emotion, with females rating neutral and mildly positive 
faces as more positive when they were presented in the right visual field compared to 
when they were presented in the left visual field. For the males the visual field did not 
affect how they rated the faces. These results, and those of Burton and Levy (1989), 
suggest that the valence hypothesis may depend upon the sex of the subject, with 
only females showing the valence-specific laterality effect. It is also possible that 
some of the conflicting results within the literature may have been caused by gender 
differences in emotional processing. Unfortunately, in Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson’s 
original study the number of male and female participants was not reported and thus 
sex effects were not examined.  
 
Van Strien and Van Beek’s results, however, conflict with those of Jansari et al. 
(2000) who found the valence-specific laterality effect in both male and female 
participants. The different results could be due to different tasks used, with Van 
Strien and Van Beek presenting cartoon faces briefly whereas Jansari et al. 
presented real faces under free viewing conditions. Thus, the issue of whether the 
valence specific laterality effect is sex specific is unresolved. One of the purposes of 
the present study was to determine whether the valence-specific effect applies only 
to female participants, when completing the same free-viewing task as used by 
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5.3. Handedness and emotional processing 
 
A further factor that may influence asymmetries in emotional processing is the 
handedness of participants. Differences in cortical organisation and processing 
between left- and right-handers have been reported and it is conceivable that these 
differences influence the lateralisation of emotional processing (Everhart, Harrison, & 
Crews, 1996). Many studies have avoided the handedness issue by selecting only 
right-handed participants (e.g. Esslen, Pascual-Marqui, Hell, Kochi & Lehman, 2004). 
While findings have been inconsistent, there is some evidence to suggest that right- 
and left-handers may have different asymmetries for emotional processing. For 
example, Reuter-Lorenz, Givis, and Moscovitch (1983) found that left-handers who 
did not show an inverted handwriting posture had an opposite pattern of valence 
asymmetry from right-handers and inverted left-handers. In addition, Everhart, et al.  
(1996) showed that left-handers had a right visual field bias for rating neutral 
expressions more negatively. This suggests that the processing of negative emotions 
is more strongly lateralised in the left hemisphere for left-handers. In contrast, 
however, Van Strien and Van Beek (2000) found no influence of handedness on the 
rating of emotional expressions as conveyed by cartoon faces. Thus, it is unclear 
whether handedness influences asymmetries in emotional processing. Moreover, it is 
likely that there are complex interactions between handedness, sex, and cortical 
organisation (Eviatar et al., 1997), which may only be clarified when these factors are 
studied in relation to one another.  
 
To summarise, while some results indicate that the right hemisphere is predominantly 
involved in the processing of all emotions (Ley and Bryden, 1979), substantial 
evidence suggests that each hemisphere has a bias for processing emotions of a 
particular valence (Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1981; Jansari et al. 2000; Davidson, 
1992; 1993; Van Strien & Van Beek, 2000). It is also possible that there is a valence-
specific laterality effect for females but not males (Van Strien and Van Beek, 2000), 
with females preferentially using the right hemisphere to process negative emotions 
and the left hemisphere to process positive emotions. Conflicting findings in this area 
may have been caused by some studies only using male participants (Asthana & 
Mandal, 2001) or failing to analyse the influence of sex (Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 
1981). Finally, the effect of handedness on the lateralized processing of emotional 
expressions have produced inconsistent findings, with some studies reporting an 
effect (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 1983; Everhart et al., 1996) whereas other have found 
no effect (Van Strien & Van Beek, 2000). 
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5.4. Experiment 3 – Discrimination of emotional faces 
 
In view of the contradictory findings within the literature the aim of the present study 
is to extend previous work and examine the effects of sex, and handedness on the 
lateralised processing of emotional expressions. The main purpose of the study is 
firstly to determine whether the valence-specific laterality effect applies to left- and 
right-handers on emotional processing in free viewing conditions.  This effect is also 
investigated with males and females.  Secondly, if there is a difference between 
emotional processing in left- and right-handers then can it be linked to possible 
cognitive or behavioural differences between the handedness groups? 
 
As the effect of handedness on lateralised emotional processing has revealed 
conflicting results in the literature no clear predictions can be made.  However, it is 
proposed that if there are any differences present that left-handers will be more 
accurate and quicker when processing negative faces while right-handers will be 
more accurate and quicker when processing positive faces.  Also, it is predicted that 
valence specific effects would be present in female participants but not males (this is 
in accordance with Van Strien & Van Beek’s, 2000 findings).  The findings of Van 
Strien and Van Beek stated that clearer valence effects emerge when the 
comparisons of emotional expression are more subtle rather than obvious, thus, the 
largest effects may be more likely to occur when the discrimination between two 
faces is at its most difficult (for example, in the current study a ‘happy’ neutral face 
vs. a happy face morphed at the 5% level rather than a morph at the 25% level).   
 
The independent variables in the current study are the levels of morphing of the 
emotional faces (with 5 levels: 5%; 10%; 15%; 20% & 25%), the side of presentation 
on screen of the emotional faces (with 2 levels: left hand side of the screen and right 
hand side of the screen) and the valence of the faces (with 2 levels: positive 
emotional faces (the positive emotions were happy and surprise) and negative 
emotional faces (the negative emotions were sad, disgust, fear and anger)).  The 
dependent variables in the current study are the accuracy of identifying the emotional 
faces (measured in number correct) and the reaction time (in milliseconds) taken to 





Chapter 5: Emotional Processing 
 184 
5.4.1. Rationale for experiment 3 
 
It has been proposed that a difference in approach strategies towards a novel task 
might have been caused by differences in hemispheric specialisation in left- and 
right-handers (e.g. Rogers, 1999).  More specifically, the dominant right hemisphere 
of left-handers is associated with inhibitory behaviour and the dominant left 
hemisphere of right-handers is associated with exploratory and approach behaviour.  
In accordance with this the valence hypothesis of emotional processing proposes 
that the left hemisphere is specialised for positive emotions and the right hemisphere 
is specialised for negative emotions.  Therefore if the valence hypothesis is 
supported then it would be expected that left-handers would display a more negative 
and inhibitory behavioural style and right-handers would display a more positive and 
impulsive behavioural style caused by their right hemisphere and left hemisphere 
dominance respectively.   Previous studies examining emotional processing have 
predominantly use right-handed participants (e.g. Jansari et al, 2000) and therefore 
patterns of emotional processing and potential differences between left- and right-
handers are unclear. 
 
It is hypothesised that if there is evidence to support the valence specific hypothesis, 
left-handers will identify more negative faces both faster and more accurately when 
presented on the left of the screen.  Additionally, right-handers will identify positive 
faces both faster and more accurately when presented on the right hand side of the 
screen.  If the right hemisphere hypothesis is supported then it would be expected 








78 participants were used in this study. 35 were right-handed (17 males and 18 
females) and 43 were left-handed (19 males and 24 females). All participants were 
staff and students of the University of Abertay Dundee. All had normal colour vision 




Chapter 5: Emotional Processing 
 185 
5.5.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
a) Hand Preference  
 
Hand preference was measured using the adapted version of Peters’ (1998) 
handedness inventory (appendix 2).  The mean handedness score of left-handers in 
this study was -24.79 (12.7) and the mean handedness score of right-handers was 
37.95 (11.31). 
 
b) Discrimination task 
 
Ekman & Friesen’s (1976) pictures of facial affect were used as stimuli. The same 
male face  (J.J.) was used to create all of the stimuli - the neutral expression and the 
six emotions (two of which were positive (happiness, surprise) and four of which were 
negative (fear, sadness, disgust and anger)).  (See appendix 8 for a copy of Ekman 
& Friesen’s unmorphed stimuli).  
 
In replication of Jansari et al., the Morph 2.5 software (Gryphon Software, 1997) was 
used to create the stimuli by morphing the neutral face with the emotional face. The 
morphing procedure consisted of identifying corresponding features on both faces. 
Once these features had been identified the morphing process was carried out and 
the two faces were merged to create one morphed image. The morphing process 
was carried out on each of the six emotional expressions and five different levels of 
morphing were used (5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%). For example, the happy 
expression was morphed at 5% with the neutral expression, so 5% of the morph was 
the happy expression and 95% was the neutral expression. At this level of morphing 
the expression was extremely subtle, showing a very faint emotion. The highest level 
of morphing consisted of 25% of an emotional expression and 75% of the neutral 
expression (See figure 5.2 for examples of these morphing levels and appendix 9 for 
a full set of morphed pictures). Jansari et al. used the same 5 morph levels and 
reported that there was a ceiling effect after the third level (15%) thus it was decided 
to keep the morphing levels in the current study constant with Jansari et al.’s. study.  
The 5 morphs for each of the 6 emotional expressions gave a set of 30 morphed 
faces (see appendix 9).  These 30 morphed faces were then put in to a Superlab 
(version 1.4) program and were arranged so that 60 different stimuli were created 
(see appendix 10).  For each emotion the morphed face at each level  (5%-25%) was 
placed on the left hand side of the screen with the neutral face on the right and then 
the emotive face was placed on the right hand side of the screen with the neutral 
face on the left.  The corresponding emotion label was placed at the centre of the top 
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of the screen and the participant was asked to identify which face showed that 
emotion (they responded either ‘left’ or ‘right’ using specified keys). Thus, for each 
emotion 10 different stimuli were created (for example a happy face morphed at the 
5% level would be presented firstly on the left of the screen and the label ‘happy?’ 
would be added and then the same process would occur with the 5% happy morph 
face on the right hand side of the screen.  This would then occur for each morph from 
10% to 25% on the left hand side and the right hand side of the screen giving 2 
stimuli per morph level emotion). A total of 60 stimuli were therefore created.  
Additionally, in order to examine if there was any effect of the emotion label given on 
how participants responded, 2 control stimuli were included per emotion.  These 
control stimuli consisted of 2 identical neutral faces side by side with one of the six 
emotion labels at the top (for an example see figure 5.1. and for a full set of control 
stimuli see appendix 11).  Thus, for the emotion ‘happy’ 2 neutral faces side by side 
were created and the ‘happy’ label was added beside them.  This was done twice 
and added to the existing ‘happy’ stimuli.  These control stimuli were also created for 
the remaining 5 emotions giving a final total of 72 stimuli in the program.  The 
Superlab program randomised the order that the stimuli were presented in.  A short 
practice trial was created that consisted of 6 random trials so that the participant 
could familiarise themselves with the process and the appropriate response keys. 
 
An instruction sheet detailing what the participant would be required to do was also 
used.  The instruction sheet showed an example of a pair of faces and the participant 
was informed that they would be shown a pair of faces on the computer screen with 
one of six emotion labels and that they had to decide whether the face on the left 
hand side or the face on the right hand side of the screen showed that emotion.  
Participants were told that there were two positive emotions, either happy or surprise, 
and four negative emotions, sad, anger, fear and disgust.  For a full copy of these 
instructions see appendix 12.   
 
A Compaq laptop computer with a coloured screen and standard keyboard was used 
to present the face stimuli and measure accuracy. The software used for creating 









   
 
 
Figure 5.1: An example of a double neutral control trial. 
 
Both pictures are identical and show the neutral face without any morphing.  The 
emotional label ‘sad’ is added so that the participant is forced to choose whether they 
think that the face on the left or the face on the right is depicting the emotion ‘sad’. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Examples of stimuli. Pair A shows a neutral face on the left and a happy 
face on the right at the 5% morph level.  Pair B shows a neutral face on the left and a 














   
 
 
Figure 5.3: The face on the left hand side shows a neutral face while the face on the 
right hand side of the screen shows a surprise face morphed at the 25% level. 
 
The participant is shown this and asked to identify whether the face on the left hand 




Participants were presented with a set of instructions that outlined what the task 
would entail.  An example of one pair of faces and the relevant emotion was shown 
to the participant and they were informed that they would perform six practice trials 
before completing the full program.  For each trial the participants were presented 
with two faces. The faces were presented side by side and each face was 16 cm x 11 
cm and the participants sat approximately 40 cm from the screen. On the screen, 
directly above the mid-point between the two faces, a label indicating one of the six 
emotions was presented simultaneously with the faces (see figure 5.3. for an 
example). The participants were instructed to select the face which best depicted the 
emotion corresponding to the emotion label. They were instructed to press ‘Z’ if they 
thought the emotion face was on the left, and press ‘M’ if they thought it was on the 
right. After each response the stimuli were removed from the screen and a mask was 
presented for 700 ms until the next trial began.  
 
There were 72 experimental trials. For 60 trials one of the two faces was a neutral 
face and the other face was an emotion morph expressing the same emotion as the 
emotion label. To counterbalance the side of presentation, each one of the 30 
morphs was shown twice, once to the left of the neutral face and once to the right of 
the neutral face. A further 12 control trials were also included to determine whether 
there was a response bias in participants, with them preferentially selecting the right 
or left side. These trials consisted of presenting two identical neutral faces with an 
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emotion label. Even though the faces did not differ the participants were required to 
select the face that they thought best depicted the emotion label. Each of the emotion 
labels was presented twice. The order of presentation of the 72 trials was 
randomised.  After completing the discrimination task the participants completed the 





Analysis was partially based on Jansari et al.’s. procedure.  However, Jansari et al. 
only analysed the first 3 morph levels for each emotion whereas in the current study 
all 5 levels of the morphs were analysed.  Also, the participants in Jansari et al.’s. 
study responded to the faces verbally but in the current study participants responded 
using the computer program thus the current study has a series of reaction time data 
which was analysed.  Jansari et al.’s’ control tasks were also different from the 
double neutral trials that were carried out and thus the analysis of these trials was not 
based on their analysis.  Finally, when analysing the data emotions were regarded as 
either positive or negative (valence) rather than as single emotions (for example sad, 
fear or anger). 
 
5.6.1. Accuracy data 
 
Table 5.1: Mean accuracy scores (in percentages) for each condition at each of the 
five levels of morphing (ranging from 5% to 25%). 
 
 Left Handed Right Handed 
 Female Male Female Male 
Positive 
Left 
45, 70, 77, 85, 
91 
68, 71, 84, 81, 
79 
55, 69, 67, 69, 
86 




77, 79, 85, 89, 
96 
66, 71, 79, 74, 
79 
58, 78, 78, 88, 
91 




53, 64, 64, 68, 
76 
59, 58, 53, 66, 
71 
58, 68, 65, 71, 
75 




37, 46, 54, 67, 
76 
61, 45, 62, 67, 
71 
42, 42, 53, 60, 
80 
59, 53, 65, 73, 
82 
MEAN 53, 65, 70, 77, 
85 
63, 61, 69, 72, 
75 
53, 64, 66, 72, 
83 















Table 5.1 shows that overall the most accurate group was the right-handed males 
(with an average accuracy level of 72.4%) followed by the left-handed females (70% 
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accuracy) and the left-handed males and the right-handed females scored, on 
average, around the same level of accuracy overall (68%).  Overall, males scored 
slightly higher on accuracy levels of discriminating emotions than females (70.2% vs. 
68.8%) and right-handers were slightly more accurate overall than left-handers (70% 
vs. 69%).  Overall morph levels show that on the 5% morph level regardless of the 
emotion being shown (valence) or the side of the screen that the emotional picture 
was presented on that right-handed males were most accurate at spotting the 
emotion (an average of 65%) followed by left-handed males (63%) and left-handed 
females and right-handed females were both accurate at choosing the 5% morphed 
emotion face, on average, 53% of the time.  Left-handed females were most accurate 
at spotting the emotion at the 10% morph level (65%) followed by right-handed 
females (64%) and left-handed males and right-handed males were accurate at 
identifying the 10% emotion morphs 61% of the time.  The most accurate group 
identifying the 15% morph level emotional faces was the right-handed males (75% 
accuracy) and the least accurate group was the right-handed females (66% 
accuracy).  The most accurate group identifying the 20% morph level emotional faces 
was the left-handed females (77% accuracy) and the least accurate group was the 
right-handed females and the left-handed males (72% accuracy).  Finally, overall, the 
most accurate group identifying the 25% morph level emotional faces was the right-
handed males (87% accuracy) and the least accurate group was the left-handed 
males (75% accuracy).  
  
With regard to the valence of the emotion, on average, all groups were more 
accurate at identifying the positive emotions than the negative emotions.  With 
respect to the side of the screen that the face was presented on, positive faces 
presented on the right side of the screen were more accurately identified than 
positive faces presented on the left hand side of the screen.  This pattern (or the 
opposite pattern) was not so apparent when negative faces were presented on the 
left hand side and the right hand side of the screen.  Accuracy scores were similar 
regardless of the side of the screen that the negative faces were viewed on.   
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 5 (sex (male Vs. female) 
handedness (left Vs. right) side (left Vs. right) valence (positive Vs. negative) 
morphing (5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%)) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the 
mean accuracy data. Sex and handedness were between-subject factors and side, 
valence, and morphing were within-subject factors. 
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This showed a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 74) = 79.66, p<0.0001, with 
participants more accurately classifying positive emotions (mean = 77%) compared 
to negative emotions (mean = 61%). As expected there was also a main effect of 
morphing, F(4, 296) = 40.43, p<0.00001, reflecting greater accuracy in detecting 
emotions as the emotional expression became stronger (see table 5.1). There was 
also a significant two-way interaction between morphing and sex F(4, 296)= 4.37, p< 
0.0020. This was due to the females being significantly less accurate than the males 
at the 5% morph level F(1, 74) = 10.40, p<0.0019, (females 53%: males 64%), but 
being as accurate as the males at the 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% morph levels (p > 
0.05).  There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
 
Table 5.2: Mean accuracy scores (in percentages) for each condition collapsed 
across levels of morphing. (Standard deviations are in parentheses). 
 
 Left Handed Right Handed 
Emotion & side 
of presentation 
Female Male Female Male 
Positive 
Left 
74 (19) 77 (13) 69 (13) 77 (16) 
Positive  
Right 
85 (15) 73 (24) 78 (22) 85 (13) 
Negative  
Left 
65 (14) 61 (20) 66 (19) 62 (13) 
Negative 
Right 
55 (17) 61 (20) 56 (15) 66 (13) 
 
The above table shows that right-handed males and left-handed males were the 
most accurate groups, on average, at identifying positive emotional faces when they 
were presented on the left hand side of the screen.  When the positive emotional 
faces were presented on the right hand side of the screen right-handed males and 
left-handed females were the most accurate, on average, at identifying them (85% 
accuracy level).  Right-handed females were most accurate at identifying negative 
faces on the left hand side of the screen (an average accuracy level of 66%) and 
right-handed males were most accurate at identifying negative faces on the right 
hand side of the screen (an average accuracy level of 66%).  Each group had a 
higher accuracy level, on average, for identifying positive emotions rather than 
negative emotions.   
 
To examine these differences a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (sex (male vs. female), handedness 
(left vs. right), side (left vs. right), valence (positive vs. negative) mixed-model 
ANOVA was conducted.  The main effects of handedness, sex, and side, failed to 
reach significance (all F’s < 1). However, there was a significant two-way interaction 
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between side and valence, F(1, 74) = 8.17, p<0.0055, which was qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction between side, valence, and sex, F(1, 74) = 7.67, p< 
.0071. This three-way interaction was examined by conducting two further ANOVAs, 
one for the male participants and one for female participants.  These are shown in 
figures 5.4. and 5.5. below. 
 
Figure 5.4: Female’s discrimination accuracy as a function of side and emotional 
valence (positive, negative). 
 
Analysis of the performance of the females showed a significant effect of valence, 
F(1, 40) = 55, p <0.0001, reflecting greater accuracy for detecting positive emotional 
expressions (mean = 76%) compared with negative emotions (mean = 61%). In 
addition, for the female participants, there was a significant side X valence 
interaction, F(1, 40) = 15.44, p< 0.0003, which was examined further by conducting 
two additional ANOVAs, one for negative emotions and one for positive emotions. 
The analysis of negative emotions in the female participants revealed a significant 
effect of side, F(1, 40) = 10.66, p< 0.0022, demonstrating that females were 
significantly more accurate at detecting negative emotions when they were presented 
on the left side (mean = 65%) compared to when they were presented on the right 
side (mean = 55%). Similarly, for positive emotions the female participants also 
showed a significant effect of side, F(1, 40) = 5.92, p< 0.019, reflecting greater 
accuracy at detecting positive expressions presented on the right side (mean = 82%) 
compared to the left side (mean = 72%). Thus the female participants demonstrated 
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Figure 5.5: Male’s discrimination accuracy as a function of side and emotional 
valence (positive and negative). 
 
The analysis of the performance of the male participants also showed a significant 
main effect of valence, F(1, 34) = 29.63, p<0.0001, which was due to greater 
accuracy at classifying positive (mean = 78%) versus negative (mean = 62%) 
emotions. However, in contrast to the females, the male participants failed to show a 
significant valence X side interaction, F(1, 34) = 0.01, p >0.05, with the accuracy of 
the males at detecting each type of emotion being unaffected by the side that the 
faces were presented at (figure 5.5). Therefore, the significant 3-way interaction 
between side, valence, and sex, obtained in the main analysis, was due to the female 
participants, but not the males, showing the valence-specific laterality effect. 
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5.6.2. Reaction time data  
 
Table 5.3: Overall mean reaction times (in milliseconds) for positive and negative 
emotions (valence) presented on the left and right hand side of the screen (with 
standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Side  
 Left Right Total 
Positive 3782 (2182.91) 3777 (1993.45) 3780 (2088.2) 
Negative 4440 (2462.68) 4253 (2511.64) 4346 (2487.2) 
Total 4111  (2322.8) 4015 (2252.55)  
 
The above table shows the mean reaction times overall for valence and the side of 
the screen that the emotional face was presented on.  Overall, the reaction times for 
identifying positive emotions were on average quicker than identifying negative 
emotions (3779.54 vs. 4346.25 milliseconds).   
 
To examine these overall differences a 2 X 2  (valence (positive vs. negative) and 
side (left vs. right) within subjects ANOVA was carried out.  There was a significant 
main effect of valence F(1, 77) = 31.979, p<0.01 with positive emotions being 
identified significantly faster than negative emotions.  There was no significant main 
effect of side F(1, 77) = 1.287, p>0.05 and the interaction between valence and side 
failed to reach significance F(1, 77) = 0.707, p>0.05. 
 
Table 5.4: Mean reaction time scores (in milliseconds) for each condition collapsed 
across all levels of morphing (with standard deviations in parentheses) for each sex 
and handedness group. 
 
 Left Handed Right Handed 
 Female Male Female Male 

































The above table shows the mean reaction time scores for each sex and handedness 
group in relation to the valence of the emotion shown and the side of the screen that 
it was presented on.  On average, the right-handed females were the fastest at 
identifying positive faces on the left hand side of the screen and left-handed males 
were the slowest at identifying positive faces on the left.  Right-handed males 
responded the quickest to positive faces on the right hand side of the screen but left-
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handed females and right-handed females had similar mean reaction times to this 
group 
 
Table 5.5: Overall sex and handedness mean reaction time scores (in milliseconds) 
for valence and side (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Female Male Left Right 
Positive Left 3488  (1229.6)  4144  (2946.1)  4012  (2684.4)  3514  (1380.1) 
Positive Right 3494 (1206.0) 4124  (2641.6) 4022  (2503.6) 3491  (1115.5) 
Negative Left 3909  (1470.6)  5093  (3204.2) 4762  (3066.1) 4065  (1435.7) 
Negative Right 3752  (1465.6)  4867  (3305.8) 4793  (3095.7) 3622  (1376.1) 
 
The above table shows that females were quicker than males on average at 
identifying positive faces on the left hand side of the screen and that right-handers 
were quicker than left-handers at identifying positive faces on the left of the screen.   
 
In order to examine the differences presented in tables 5.4 and 5.5. a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 
(sex (male vs. female), handedness (left vs. right), side (left vs. right), valence 
(positive vs. negative) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted.  The main effect of side 
failed to reach significance F(1, 74) = 1.239, p>0.05. The main effect of handedness 
approached significance F(1, 74) = 2.865, p=0.095 and the main effect of sex 
approached significance F(1, 74) = 3.404, p=0.069.  The main effect of valence was 
significant F(1, 74) = 33.616, p<0.01 with reaction time being significantly faster for 
positive faces than negative faces.  The two way interaction between valence and 
sex was significant F(1, 74) = 7.051, p<0.05 and the two way interaction between 
valence and handedness was also significant F(1, 74) = 4.903, p<0.05.  The two-way 
interaction between valence and side failed to reach significance F(1, 74) = 1.347, 
p>0.05 and the three way interaction between valence, handedness and sex also 

































Figure 5.6: Interaction plot of sex and valence on the mean time taken to identify the 
emotional faces. 
 
The two-way interaction between sex and valence was further examined by carrying 
out pairwise comparisons firstly for males and then for females.  There was a 
significant difference between male’s reaction times for positive faces and negative 
faces t(35) = 4.790, p<0.01 with reaction times being faster for positive than negative 
faces (4134 vs. 4980 milliseconds respectively).  There was also a significant 
difference between female’s reaction times for positive and negative faces t(43) = 
3.026, p<0.01 with female’s reaction times being faster for positive faces than 





























Figure 5.7: Interaction plot of handedness and valence on the mean time taken to 
identify the emotional faces. 
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The two-way interaction between handedness and valence was also examined using 
pairwise comparisons.  There was a significant difference between left-hander’s 
reaction times for positive faces and negative faces t(41) = 5.102, p<0.01 with 
reaction times being faster for positive than negative faces (2.514 vs. 4777.1 
milliseconds respectively).  There was also a significant difference between right-
hander’s reaction times for positive and negative faces t(36) = 2.515, p<0.05 with 
right-hander’s reaction times being faster for positive faces than negative faces 
(3502.8 vs. 3843.6 milliseconds respectively).   
 
5.6.3. Control condition – double neutral trials 
 
For the control trials the two faces were identical but the emotion label differed and 
the participants were required to select the side that they thought the ‘emotional’ face 
was on. As the faces were identical there should have been no systematic 
differences between the sides chosen, with participants selecting either side 50% of 
the time on average.  
 
Table 5.6: Response scores (in percentages) for the double neutral control condition 
 
 Side chosen 
 Left Right 
Positive label 41% 59% 
Negative label 56% 44% 
 
Table 5.6. shows that when the label given to the two neutral control faces was 
positive (happy or surprise) then 41% of participants indicated that the emotional face 
was on the left hand side of the screen while 59% of participants indicated that the 
emotional face was on the right hand side of the screen.  When the two neutral faces 
were given a negative label (sad, disgust, fear or anger) then 56% of participants 
indicated that the emotional face was on the left hand side of the screen while 44% of 
participants indicated that the emotional face was on the right hand side of the 
screen.  When comparing the side of the screen chosen, the left hand side of the 
screen was chosen more often to identify negative emotions (56% of participants 
chose the left hand side of the screen to identify negative emotions whereas only 
41% of participants chose the left hand side of the screen to identify positive 
emotions) and the right hand side of the screen was chosen more often to identify 
positive emotions (59% of participants chose the right hand side of the screen to 
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identify positive emotions whereas only 41% of participants chose the right hand side 
of the screen to identify negative emotions vs. 44%). 
 
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (sex (male Vs. female) handedness (left Vs. right) side (left Vs. right) 
valence label (positive Vs. negative)) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the 
response data for the control trials. The main effects of sex, side, handedness, and 
valence label failed to reach significance (all F’s <1). However there was a significant 
interaction between valence label and side, F(1, 74) = 9.42, p< 0.01, demonstrating 
that the emotional label influenced the side selected even when the faces were 
identical (see table 5.6 & figure 5.8). 
 
The valence label X side interaction was analysed further by conducting separate 
analyses for each valence label. For the negative label there was a significant effect 
of side, F(1, 74) = 3.84, p<0.05, with participants selecting the left side more than the 
right side (56 % Vs. 44 %). For the positive label there was also a highly significant 
effect of side, F(1, 74) = 7.23, p<0.001, with participants selecting the right side more 
frequently than the left side (59 % Vs. 41%). Thus, the valence of the label caused a 
response bias in participants when the faces did not differ in emotional expression, 
with participants selecting the face on the left more frequently when the label was 
negative and the face on the right more frequently when the label was positive. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Percentage of faces chosen on each side in double neutral as a function 
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 The main findings of experiment 3 were: 
 There were no overall main effects of handedness on either accuracy or 
reaction time for positive or negative emotional faces. 
 
 All groups (male, female, left- and right-handers) were significantly more 
accurate at identifying positive emotions than negative emotions. 
 
 Positive faces presented on the right hand side of the screen were identified 
significantly more accurately than when they were presented on the left side 
by female participants.  This effect was not found in male participants.  
 
 Participants identified the more strongly morphed faces (15%; 20% & 25% 
morphs) significantly more accurately than they identified the weaker 
morphed faces (5% & 10% morphs). 
 
 Males were significantly more accurate at identifying the emotions when 
morphed at the 5% level than females but there were no differences between 
the accuracy of males and females on any other morph levels.   
 
 Positive emotions were identified significantly faster than negative emotions 
for all sex and handedness groups. 
 
 There was no significant main effect of side on the time taken to identify the 
emotions. 
 
 In the control condition there was an effect of the emotion label on the face 
that the participant chose even though both faces were identical.  When a 
positive emotional label was presented participants selected the face on the 
right side of the screen significantly more than they selected the face on the 
left side of the screen.  When a negative emotional label was presented 
participants selected the face on the left side of the screen significantly more 
than they selected the face on the right side of the screen.   
 
 The main finding in this study was that females showed a valence specific 
laterality effect.  With respect to handedness effects the study proved fairly 
inconclusive. 




Overall it was found that there were no clear handedness differences on the 
discrimination of both the accuracy and the time taken to identify emotional faces.  
Therefore the hypotheses the right-handers would be faster and more accurate at 
identifying positive faces on the right hand side of the screen than left-handers was 
not supported.  Also, the hypothesis that left-handers would be faster and more 
accurate at identifying negative faces presented on the right hand side of the screen 
was not supported.  However, it was found that all participants were more accurate at 
discriminating positive emotions than negative emotions in general showing that the 
expressions of happiness and surprise were easier to identify than the expressions of 
disgust, fear, anger, and sadness. This replicates Jansari et al.’s (2000) results which 
also found participants to be more accurate at identifying positive emotions.  It was 
also found that participants identified positive emotions significantly faster than they 
identified negative emotions.  This was the case regardless of the sex or hand 
preference of the participant.   
 
It was found in this study that females showed the valence-specific laterality effect 
whereas the males did not. Females discriminated negative expressions more 
accurately when they were presented on the left-hand side and discriminated positive 
expressions more accurately when they were presented on the right-hand side. 
However, there was no effect of the side that the emotional faces were presented on 
on reaction time.  Discrimination of facial expressions by the male participants was 
unaffected by side of presentation (see Rodway, Wright, & Hardie, 2003, for a full 
explanation of results). These results replicate those of Van Strien and Van Beek 
(2000) however they used a restricted viewing, emotional ratings task, whereas the 
current study used a free viewing system. The findings also demonstrate that Van 
Strien and Van Beek’s results were not caused by the use of cartoon faces as the 
use of real faces in this study resulted in the same pattern of results. An important 
implication of these results is that previous reports of a valence-specific laterality 
effect, for example by Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson (1981), may have been caused 
by female participants within their sample, which remained undetected because the 
effect of sex was not analysed. Finally, the results do not support the view that the 
right hemisphere selectively processes negative emotions and both hemispheres are 
involved in processing positive motions, as suggested by Asthana and Mandal 
(2001).  
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The findings of this study partially replicate Jansari et al.’s (2000) results by showing 
that laterality effects can be obtained in free viewing conditions. An important 
difference is that in this study the valence-specific laterality effect was limited to the 
female participants. As more participants were used in the present experiment 
compared to Jansari et al.’s (78 Vs. 28) the difference in results might have been due 
to a difference in power between the studies. However, Van Strien and Van Beek 
(2000) only used 32 participants and found evidence of the valence-specific laterality 
effect for the female participants but not the males. It is possible that Van Strien and 
Van Beek’s emotional rating task, which consisted of presenting cartoon faces for 
150 ms, is more sensitive than the free viewing task used by Jansari et al., and in this 
study. Thus, it remains possible that the sex specific nature of the valence-specific 
laterality effect only emerges when a study has enough power. 
 
The finding that reaction times were significantly faster for positive faces than 
negative faces is supported by Hartikainen, Ogawa and Knight (2000) who found that 
reaction times to pleasant (or positive) stimuli were significantly faster than reaction 
times to unpleasant (or negative) stimuli. Burton and Levy (1989) found that females, 
but not males, perceived faces with negative emotions fastest when presented in the 
left visual field and faces with positive emotions fastest when presented to the right 
visual field.  However, in the current study there was no significant effect of sex on 
the time taken to respond to the emotional faces, although females responded faster 
on average for both positive and negative emotional faces than males.  There was 
also no effect of the side (of the screen) that the face was presented on the reaction 
time taken to respond regardless of the sex of the participant and thus this fails to 
support Burton and Levy’s argument that negative emotions would be perceived 
fastest when presented in the left visual field and positive emotions would be 
perceived fastest when presented to the right visual field 
 
Very few studies have examined handedness with respect to emotional processing 
and some studies (such as Jansari et al., 2000) only use right-handed participants. 
In the current study handedness did not influence the lateralised processing of 
emotional expressions. This finding replicates Van Strien and Van Beek’s results (but 
with a larger number of participants and under free viewing conditions) and indicates 
that left- and right-handers do not differ in the way that they process emotional 
expressions. Previously Everhart et al. (1996) found that handedness influenced the 
evaluation of the emotional content of faces when presented in different visual fields. 
However, in Everhart et al.’s study handedness only affected the rating of neutral 
stimuli, rather than faces with emotional expressions. Thus, the present findings do 
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not conflict with Everhart et al.’s findings, and they suggest that the lateralised 
processing of emotional information is not affected by handedness.  
 
A possible explanation of Everhart et al.’s (1996) results is that handedness does not 
influence the processing of emotional expressions but can increase the intensity and 
type of emotions felt in various situations. For example, it has been found that right-
hemisphere activation is associated with negative emotional states. Thus, 
temperamentally anxious human infants, who exhibit shyness and behavioural 
inhibition to a novel situation, show greater right-hemisphere frontal activation 
compared to left frontal activation (Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins &Schmidt, 2001; 
Schmidt, Fox, Schulkin & Gold, 1999; Schmidt & Fox, 1996, Calkins, Fox & Marshal, 
1996). If right-hemisphere activation (and possibly left-handedness) is associated 
with stronger emotional states (Hellige, 2001), then left-handers may be more 
inclined to rate neutral stimuli as having greater emotional content, as in Everhart et 
al.’s (1996) study. 
 
As only the female participants showed the valence-specific laterality effect this 
suggests that females are more lateralised, than males are, for both the perception 
and interpretation of emotional expressions. This result is in concordance with other 
findings (E.g. Burton & Levy, 1989; Van Strien & Van Beek, 2000; Voyer & Rogers, 
2002; Bourne, 2005). If females are more lateralised for perceiving emotional 
expressions then it might be expected that they may show superiority in emotional 
discrimination in comparison to males. Although other studies using auditory stimuli 
have indicated that this may be the case (Voyer & Rogers, 2002), the present results 
found no evidence for a female superiority in accuracy. In fact, while there was no 
overall difference in accuracy between males and females, the males were superior 
when the emotional discrimination was most difficult (5% morphing). This indicates 
that males may be more sensitive than females to extremely subtle changes in 
emotional expression. 
 
An important finding of the present study is that for the control trials the emotional 
label caused a bias in responding to faces that were identical. If the emotion label 
was positive the participants selected the right side more frequently than the left side. 
Conversely, if the emotion label was negative the participants selected the left side 
more than the right side. A probable explanation of this finding is that participants 
associated the left side with ‘negative’ and the right side with ‘positive’ and when they 
were required to guess their responses reflected this bias. The association of left with 
‘bad’ and right with ‘good’ is a strong association that has been prevalent throughout 
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history and within many cultures. For example, it is traditional for ‘evil’ characters in 
the theatre to always exit and enter the stage on the left, whereas ‘good’ characters 
use the right side of the stage (Coren, 1992). Moreover, in practically every culture 
being left-handed has been viewed negatively with each culture’s term for left-
handed carrying negative connotations (e.g. worthless in old English, clumsy in 
French, sinister in Italian) (Springer & Deutsch, 1993). Although the association 
between left and ‘bad’ is likely to have occurred unconsciously in participants it is 
plausible that this caused the bias in responding to identical faces. 
 
A further implication of these findings is that the more difficult the emotional 
discrimination is, either due to brief presentation, or subtle differences between 
stimuli, then the more participants will guess and the more likely it is that the 
response bias will occur. The valence-specific laterality effect may emerge when the 
difficulty of a task is increased so that participants guess more frequently. As 
previously mentioned, Van Strien and Van Beek (2000) also suggest that the 
valence-specific laterality effect emerges when a task requires a difficult 
discrimination of emotions, rather than an easier perceptual matching of emotions.  
 
The present results, however, provide mixed support for the response bias 
hypothesis. If increased discrimination difficulty increases the response bias, then the 
valence-specific laterality effect should have interacted with the degree of morphing, 
with a larger effect for the most difficult discrimination level. This interaction was short 
of significance in the main analysis and was due to valence-specific laterality effects 
at the 5% and 10% morph levels, but no such effect at the 15%, 20%, and 25% 
levels. This result therefore supports the view that a response bias for difficult 
discriminations may contribute to the valence-specific effect. 
 
A final factor which may have influenced the present findings is that the stimuli were 
of a male face. The valence-specific effect may have been present in females 
because the males were either less able, or less willing, to analyse the emotional 
expression of a male face and this is perhaps why no difference was found between 
left- and right-handers. However, this is unlikely because the male participants were 
as accurate as the females at discriminating emotions. Also, it can be noted that Van 
Strien and Van Beek (2000) and Jansari et al. (2000) used male faces as stimuli. 
Thus, the different findings between these studies cannot be due to the use of male 
faces. Finally, as suggested by Van Strien and Van Beek, it appears unlikely that the 
use of male faces has affected results in this area because other studies have found 
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that the sex of the face does not interact with the sex of the participant (e.g. Hugdahl, 
Iverson & Johnsen, 1993; Cutler, Gilgen & Gilpin, 1985).  
 
To conclude, the present study found that the valence-specific laterality effect, in free 
viewing conditions, only applied to female participants and there were no effects of 
handedness. This suggests that females are more lateralised for the processing of 
emotional facial expressions than are males, with the left hemisphere devoted to 
processing positive emotions and the right hemisphere devoted to processing 
negative emotions. Conflicting findings within the literature may have been caused, in 
part, by ignoring the influence of sex on emotional processing. It is possible that the 
sex specific nature of the valence laterality effect is apparent when the task is 
sensitive, or when a large number of participants are used. Moreover as a free 
viewing task was used the results suggest that these findings apply to natural viewing 
conditions.   
 
However, there was no evidence that handedness influences the lateralised 
processing of emotional information. Evidence for a role of handedness has been 
weak and inconsistent and the present findings, and those of Van Strien and Van 
Beek, strongly suggest that handedness does not influence the lateralised 
processing of facial affect.  These findings have an effect on the current body of 
research.  It was suggested in Chapter 4 that a difference in emotional processing by 
left- and right-handers might be one reason for why there was a difference in 
response styles observed towards novel objects by left- and right-handers.  In order 
for this idea to be supported it would have been expected that left-handers would 
have been more accurate and faster at identifying negative emotional faces 
(particularly on the left hand side of the screen) and right-handers would have been 
more accurate and faster at identifying positive emotions (whether this depends on 
the side of the screen would be dependent on whether the right hemisphere 
hypothesis or the valence-specific hypothesis was supported).   
 
However, failure to find a difference between the emotional processing on a series of 
faces between left- and right-handers does not rule out that left- and right-handers 
react to novel objects differently due to some form of emotional response difference.  
The findings of this study suggest that left- and right-handers perceive and recognise 
emotions similarly, however, this does not necessarily mean that they experience 
emotions similarly and this could be an important factor in determining differences in 
response styles which needs to be further investigated.  A link between emotional 
processing and inhibitory or avoidance behaviour could be an important factor in this 
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study.  As the right hemisphere is regarded to be the ‘emotional hemisphere’ of the 
brain then it is suggested that left-handers will respond more emotionally than right-
handers (again the type of emotion – positive or negative- or all emotions depends 
on whether the right hemisphere hypothesis or the valence specific hypothesis is 
supported) (Davidson, 1993).  As the right hemisphere is linked to inhibitory and 
avoidance behaviour and the left hemisphere is associated with approach and more 
impulsive behaviour then this may still be a contributing factor in what caused the 
delay in the novel problem-solving task in Chapter 4.  Any differences in emotional 
responses between left- and right-handers may have been caused by something 
much more specific such as anxiety or inhibitory behaviour and these issues will be 
examined in Chapter 7.   
 
Finally, the participants demonstrated a response bias when required to discriminate 
between identical faces, suggesting that the left-hand side is associated with 
negative emotions whereas the right side is associated with positive emotions. This 
response bias requires further investigation as it may have contributed both to 
valence-specific laterality effects and the conflicting results within the literature. 
Future research needs to be aware that this response bias can produce laterality 
effects that are not caused by differences in the way the hemispheres process 
emotional information.   
 
Thus, in relation to the proposition that possible differences between the emotional 
processing of left- and right-handers may have influenced their behaviour in relation 
to the solving of the Tower of Hanoi problem in Chapter 4 it appears that these 
differences, at least from the present study, are not apparent.  As previously stated in 
Chapter 4 two conflicting theories have been proposed to explain the role of the 
hemispheres in emotional processing. The Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis suggests 
that all emotional information is processed by the right hemisphere (Borod, 1993) 
while the Valence-Specific Hypothesis suggests that the left hemisphere is 
specialised for processing positive emotions whereas the right hemisphere is 
specialised for processing negative emotions (Silberman & Weingartner, 1986; 
Jansari et al., 2000). It was proposed that if the valence hypothesis is supported then 
it could possibly be assumed that the right hemisphere is associated with avoidance 
behaviour (negative emotions) and the left hemisphere with approach behaviour 
(positive emotions) (Davidson, 1993).   However, it appears from the current study 
that there is no clear handedness pattern to support the valence hypothesis and thus 
it is difficult to draw conclusions or support the emotional processing argument when 
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considering possible reasons for differences in behaviour towards the solving of the 
Tower Hanoi and other problem solving tasks. 
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Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning 
 
 
6.0. Aims of Chapter 
 
One explanation for the difference in the response of left- and right-handers towards 
a novel problem in Chapter 4 (the 3-disk ToH task) was that perhaps left- and right-
handers were approaching the problem differently and that those solving it more 
effectively were people who made a plan either before or during the solving.  Thus 
the aim of this Chapter is to investigate this potential explanation further.  This 
chapter will outline a number of different tasks that were designed to examine 
whether there was any evidence of planning by participants before they responded to 
a task.  More specifically, if any planning was observed then were there any 
differences between left- and right-handers?  Different types of planning tasks will be 
discussed (for example, a sorting task, which like the Tower of Hanoi (Chapter 4) 
was a ‘manual’ task  (although that task also had a slight spatial element to it and so 
there is the possibility that the results were due to a superior right hemisphere spatial 
ability in left-handers).  In order to examine whether there was a difference in 
planning strategies between the two groups, two tasks of planning were devised 
along with an additional task of spatial ability in order to examine whether the type of 
task used was also a contributing factor.  This Chapter will mainly concentrate on the 
methods and results for each of these studies and findings will be discussed.  As 
there was a detailed overview of planning in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.1) then this will 
not be covered again in this section.  However a brief outline of planning and motor 





6.1.1. Planning   
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. planning can be defined as a process that 
requires mental thinking, evaluation and a resulting action so as to effectively meet 
some future goal (Scholnick & Friedman, 1993; Gilhooly, Phillips, Wynn, Logie & 
Della Sala,1999).  How people think about a novel object or situation may be 
concerned with how they approach it.  Some people may have a greater tendency to 
consider a situation and plan what they might do before approaching and responding 
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whereas others may respond immediately.  However, for the purposes of this chapter 
a review of planning will not be given as a detailed summary of planning research 
and definitions are given in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.  One potential reason given for 
the difference found between the difference in approach behaviour of left- and right-
handers towards a novel task (the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi) outlined in Chapter 4 was 
that left-handers might be planning a solution or at least their first few moves before 
making their first response.  This idea was also thought to be feasible as left-handers 
took significantly fewer moves to solve the task than right-handers and therefore left-
handers planning their first few moves could have influenced this more effective 
solution.   Therefore In order to test this idea further a series of tasks were devised to 
investigate whether there was any evidence of planning.   
 
6.1.2. Motor planning 
 
As previously stated (see chapter 4) it has been proposed that planning a right-
handed movement is always faster than planning a left-handed movement, perhaps 
due to a form of attentional asymmetry in motor planning. Thus a delay in motor 
planning with the left hand is hypothesised to cause a delay in response initiation in 
left-handers. The difficulty with this reported finding is that evidence suggests that 
movement planning is faster with the left hand in right-handed participants 
(Barthelemy & Boulinguez, 2001). Therefore, right-handed participants are faster at 
pointing and reaching when using their left hand in goal directed movements, 
suggesting ’right hemisphere dominance for movement planning’  (Barthelemy & 
Boulinguez, 2001, p1). If it is the case that the right hemisphere is dominant for 
movement planning then it would be expected that left-handers exhibit more planning 
behaviour than right-handers because of the contralateral control of the hemispheres. 
 
A further argument that could explain differences in response initiation between left 
and right-handers is the type of task used.  For example the Tower of Hanoi is 
considered to be a visuo-spatial planning task whereas the sorting task (used in this 
current study) is not. It has been suggested right hemisphere dominance is 
associated with superior spatial abilities (Annett, 1992; Bishop, 1990). While 
evidence for a relationship between handedness and visuo-spatial abilities has been 
mixed and inconsistent (Annett, 2002) it remains a possibility that a visuo-spatial task 
could cause differences between left- and right-handers in response initiation. For 
example, it might be the case that when confronted with a visuo-spatial task, 
participants who have strong visuo-spatial abilities delay responding and rely on 
visuo-spatial imagery to partially solve the task prior to making a move. As a 
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consequence the delay in the left-handers could have been a direct result of their 
superior spatial ability (this possibility is examined in this chapter, section 6.10. – see 
experiment 6).  
 
 
6.2. Current studies 
 
The following section will outline 3 experimental studies designed in order to 
investigate possible planning differences between left- and right-handers.  In 
addition, the final study will examine possible spatial differences between the 2 
groups. 
 
6.2.1. Rationale and hypotheses for experiment 4 – manual sorting task 
 
In the manual sorting task (experiment 4) participants will be asked to make 
categories out of a series of cards (20 in total).  This task further investigates the 
response style behaviours of left- and right-handers when given a novel task.  This 
study will aim to both investigate and add further support to the findings reported in 
experiment 1 (Chapter 4, section 4.3.).  The manual sorting task was used, as it is 
still important to use a manual task in order to investigate the original findings found 
on the Tower of Hanoi study.  However, as the Tower of Hanoi is a strong spatial 
task then this could have affected the findings in the first experiment due to the 
nature of the task and therefore a task that could be easily solved but without a 
strong spatial component was used.  Therefore, the manual sorting task was devised 
as it was felt that part of a solution could be planned if this was what the participant 
wanted to do and also it did not have a large spatial element to it and had more of a 
sequencing element.   
 
The dependent variables for this task were the time taken to move the first card (in 
seconds) and the total time taken to complete the task (in seconds).  The most 
important dependent variable here is how long the participant takes to move the first 
card, as this will be how initiation time is defined. 
 
It is hypothesised, based on the findings of experiment 1, that left-handers will take 
longer to move the first card than right-handers and that there will be no difference in 
the time taken to solve the task by left- and right-handers. 
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80 participants took part in this study (38 were right handed (18 males and 20 
females) and 42 were left-handed (18 males and 24 females).  All subjects were staff 
and students of the University of Abertay Dundee.  All participants had normal 
coloured vision and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.   
 
6.3.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
An instruction sheet was given which informed participants that they were going to be 
presented with a series of 20 cards and that their task was to sort them in to 4 
categories each with 5 cards in it.  Participants were also informed that each 
category should follow a rule determined by them and that they would be asked to 
write down the rules for each category at the end of the task (see appendix 17 for a 
copy of this).  20 individual coloured cards measuring 14.5cm by 10cm were used.  
The cards contained pictures of 20 different animals ranging from a cat to a monkey 
(see figure 6.1 below and appendix 16 for a full set of the cards).  A board measuring 
89cm x 54cm was used to place the cards into categories on.  This was split into four 
sections and labelled category 1, category 2, category 3 and category 4 (see 
appendix 18).  A stopwatch was used to time how long the task took and how long 
the participant took to move the first card of the task. Finally, a data sheet was used 
to record the time it took the participant to move the first card and to make all four 
categories (see appendix 19).  Participants were also asked to write down the rule of 
each category on the recording sheet along with details of their name, course and 
hand preference. 
 









Participants were presented with a set of instructions outlining what they were going 
to be asked to do for the manual sorting task (see appendix 17).  They were informed 
that they were going to be presented with a series of 20 cards and that their task was 
to sort them in to 4 categories each with 5 cards in it.  Participants were also 
informed that each category should follow a rule determined by themselves and that 
they would be asked to write down the rules for each category at the end of the task.  
The cards consisted of twenty pictures of different animals and each card had a 
picture of the animal and its name in words at the bottom of the card (see appendix 
16 for copies of the stimuli).  The set of cards was laid out on a table and concealed 
with a large board in order to keep them novel to the participant.  When the 
participant indicated that they understood what was required, the board concealing 
the cards was removed and the stopwatch was started.  The time taken to move the 
first card was written on the recording sheet.  Once the participant had completed the 
task and had satisfactorily placed the cards into four categories, the time taken to 
complete this was recorded.  The participant then had to write down the four rules 
that applied to the four categories that they had made.  It should be noted that there 
were a number of possible solutions to this task rather than a single solution. 
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6.4. Results:  Experiment 4: Manual sorting/categorisation task 
 
Table 6.1: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first card of the 
sorting/categorisation task (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left-handed Right-handed Total 
Male 15.5 (24.1) 4.3 (3.8) 9.9 (17.9) 
Female 6.1 (4.0) 3.6 (2.9) 5.0 (3.7) 
Total 10.2 (16.5) 3.9 (3.3)  
 
Table 6.1 shows that left-handed males took the longest time on average to start the 
sorting task (with a mean time of 15.5 seconds) and they took more than twice the 
time taken by left-handed females who took the second longest to start (6.1 
seconds).  Right-handed males started the task 4.3 seconds while right-handed 
females were quickest to start the task in an average of 3.6 seconds.  Left-handers 
took more than twice as long to begin the task than right-handers (10.2 seconds vs. 
3.9 seconds) and males rook almost twice as long to begin the task than females (9.9 
vs. 5.0 seconds).  The variance within the right-handed males and females and the 
left-handed females is all similar but the left-handed males have a large standard 
deviation and thus this could be attributed to one or two participants who might have 
taken a much longer time than the rest of the group to begin the task. 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 X 2 (handedness (left v right) by sex (male 
v female) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time taken to move the 
first card of the sorting task.  There was a significant main effect of hand preference 
F(1, 76) = 6.649, p<0.05, with left-handers taking significantly longer to move the first 
card than right-handers (10.8 seconds v 3.95 seconds).  The effect of sex 
approached significance F(1, 76) = 3.502, p=0.065 and the interaction between sex 
and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 76) = 2.711, p>0.05.   
 
As the standard deviation for the left-handed males in the previous table was very 
large compared with the rest of the groups (24.1) two outliers were removed.  These 
both belonged to left-handed male participants.  The times taken by these two 
participants to make the first move on the card-sorting task were 84.7 and 75.4 
seconds.  With these participant’s data removed the table below shows the average 
times taken by each group to move the first card on the card-sorting task.   
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Table 6.2: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first card of the categorisation 
task (with standard deviations in parentheses) (with outliers removed). 
 
 Left-handed Right-handed Total 
Male 7.4 (5.3) 4.3 (3.8) 5.75 (4.8) 
Female 6.1 (4.0) 3.6 (2.9) 5.0 (3.7) 
Total 6.66 (4.6) 3.9 (3.3)  
 
The above table shows that with outliers removed left-handed males still took the 
longest to move the first disk on the card-sorting task.  Left-handed females and 
right-handed males followed this.  Right-handed females took the least time to begin 
the task.  Left-handers took longer to make the first move than right-handers and 
males took longer to make the first move than females. 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 X 2 (handedness (left v right) by sex (male 
v female) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time taken to move the 
first card of the sorting task (with outliers removed).  There was a significant main 
effect of hand preference F(1, 74) = 9.384, p<0.01, with left-handers taking 
significantly longer to move the first card than right-handers (6.66 seconds v 3.9 
seconds).    The effect of sex was not significant F(1, 74) = 1.050, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 74) = 
0.142, p>0.05.   
 
Table 6.3: Mean time taken (in seconds) to complete the categorisation task (with 
standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left-handed Right-handed Total 
Male 117.0 (54.0) 76.3 (32.0) 96.7 (48.4) 
Female 80.7 (44.4) 97.4 (49.0) 88.3 (46.8) 
Total 96.2 (51.4) 87.4 (42.7)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males took the longest to complete the task 
followed by right-handed females (117 and 97.4 seconds respectively).  Left-handed 
females and right-handed males were the quickest to complete the task (80.7 and 
76.3 seconds respectively).  Overall, left-handers took longer to solve the task than 
right-handers (96.2 v 87.4 seconds) and males took longer than females to solve the 
task (96.7 v 88.3 seconds).  When the outliers from the two left-handed males were 
removed this reduced the mean time taken by left-handed males to complete the task 
to 106.8 (47.9) seconds but this was still slower than all other groups.  The total time 
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taken by left-handers once the outliers were removed was 91.1 (47.0) seconds 
(again this was still slower than the total time taken by right-handers) and the total 
time taken by males was 90.7 (42.5) seconds, which was marginally slower than the 
time taken by females (88.3 seconds) 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 X 2 (handedness (left v right) by sex (male 
v female) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time taken to complete 
the sorting task.  There was no significant main effect of hand preference F(1, 76) = 
1.359, p>0.05 and no significant main effect of sex F(1, 76) = 0.552, p>0.05 however 
the interaction between sex and handedness was significant F(1, 76) = 7.830, 






































Figure 6.2: Interaction plot showing the time taken (in seconds) by males and 
females and left- and right-handers to solve the card-sorting task. 
 
The above plot shows that right-handed males took less time to solve the card-
sorting task than right-handed females.  However, left-handed males took more time 
to solve the card-sorting task than left-handed females.  Thus the interaction is 
caused by the inverse performance of the handedness groups within the sexes.  
Right-handers perform better in the male group whereas left-handers perform better 
Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 215 
within the female group.  The biggest difference occurs between the left- and right-
handers within the male group.   
 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to see if the difference between left- and right-
handed males on the time taken to solve the card-sorting task was significant.  It was 
found that there was a significant difference with male right-handers taking 
significantly less time to solve the task than male left-handers F(1, 25) = 7.569, 
p<0.01. 
 
An additional one-way ANOVA was carried out with left- and right-handed females.  It 
was found that the difference between the two groups in the time taken to solve the 
task was not significant F(1, 43) = 1.413, p>0.05.   Therefore the difference between 
the left- and right-handed males had an effect on the significant interaction.   
 
Table 6.4: Mean time taken (in seconds) to complete the categorisation task minus 
initiation time (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left-handed Right-handed Total 
Male 101.5 (44.4) 72.1 (30) 86.8 (40.2) 
Female 74.5 (42.4) 93.8 (48.9) 83.3 (45.9) 
Total 86.1 (44.8) 83.5 (43.2)  
 
The above table shows that when the initiation time is taken away from the 
completion time that left-handed males still take the longest to complete the task 
followed by right-handed females then left-handed females and right-handed males 
solved this the quickest.   
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 X 2 (handedness (left v right) by sex (male 
v female) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time taken to complete 
the sorting task minus the initiation time.  There was no significant main effect of 
hand preference F(1, 76) = 0.288, p>0.05 and no significant main effect of sex F(1, 
76) = 0.077, p>0.05 however the interaction between sex and handedness was 
significant F(1, 76) = 6.556, p<0.05.   


















































Figure 6.3: Interaction plot showing the time taken (in seconds) by males and 
females and left- and right-handers to solve the card-sorting task minus the initiation 
time. 
 
The above plot shows that right-handed males took less time to solve the card-
sorting task when initiation time was not included than right-handed females.  
However, left-handed males took more time to solve the card-sorting task than left-
handed females.  Thus the interaction is caused by the inverse performance of the 
handedness groups within the sexes.  Right-handers perform better in the male 
group whereas left-handers perform better within the female group.  The biggest 
difference occurs between the left- and right-handers within the male group.   
 
The main findings of Experiment 4 were: 
 Left-handers took significantly longer to move the first card than right-handers 
 
 This was also the case when all outliers were removed 
 
 There were no effects of sex or handedness on the time taken to complete 
the task 
 
 There was a significant sex X handedness interaction on the time taken to 
complete the task where right-handed males solved the task significantly 
faster than left-handed males.  There was no difference between females on 
the time taken to solve the task 
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6.5. Experiment 4: Discussion 
 
It was hypothesised for the sorting task that left-handers would take longer than right-
handers to move the first card of the task.  This hypothesis was supported with left-
handers taking significantly longer to move the first card than right-handers.  Two 
participants in the left-handed male group were outliers in the sample and upon 
removing their data from the analysis the results still showed a significant difference 
between left- and right-handers on the time taken to move the first card of the task.  It 
was also hypothesised that left-handers would complete the task significantly faster 
than right-handers.  This hypothesis was not supported and the direction of the 
results was the opposite of that predicted with right-handers solving the task, on 
average, faster than left-handers.  Males took more time, on average, to solve the 
sorting task.   
 
Since this task has a visuo-spatial element then the results of the time taken to 
complete the task were perhaps somewhat surprising.  Males often outperform 
females at visuo-spatial tasks (e.g. Annett, 2002) and this was not found to be the 
case in the current study.  Superior performance on a visuo-spatial task between was 
reported in chapter 4 where males outperformed females during the Tower of Hanoi 
task (a visuo-spatial task).  It would also be expected that left-handers would exhibit 
a superior visuo-spatial performance than right-handers and this was the case in the 
Tower of Hanoi study reported in chapter 4.  However, this was not found to be the 
case in the current study as right-handers completed the task faster both overall and 
when initiation time was not included in the completion time.  However, these 
differences were not significant.    Further investigation of visuo-spatial abilities and 
sex and handedness are considered in the computer program part of these three 
studies (study 3).    
 
Another possible reason for the significant difference occurring between left- and 
right-handers on the time taken to move the first card could again be due to the fact 
that the task was novel.  As the participants had never seen the cards to be sorted 
before and were instructed that the cards could be organised in any manner they 
wished in their categories (as long as they attributed a viable rule to these) then the 
task was considered novel to the participants.   
 
Similarly to the Tower of Hanoi findings (see chapter 4, sections 4.3. – 4.7. for 
details) there was a significant difference between left- and right-handers on the time 
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taken to make the first response but not on the time taken to solve the sorting task.  
This therefore suggests that it was unlikely that planning was occurring in the time 
before making the first response.   If planning was occurring it would be expected 
that the group who was planning for longer would also solve the task significantly 
faster.  However, in this case the left-handers took longer to start the task but right-
handers solved it, on average, in less time thus is it unlikely that the time taken 
before making the first response was spent planning.  Again, the work of Gilhooly et 
al. (1999) can aid in the explanation of why right-handers took less time to start the 
task but completed it faster.  It is possible that right-handers were planning during the 
task and therefore completed the task faster than left-handers.  However, there was 
no way to examine this concept specifically since the task did not have a final goal 
state or require an optimal number of moves.  If the task had had an optimal number 
of moves then the time taken between executing each move could have been 
examined to see if there was any evidence of a plan being made in addition to 
measuring the number of moves taken to solve a task.  The only way that this could 
be achieved on this task would be to have counted the number of times each 
participant moved the cards to form their categories but this measurement was not 
recorded.    
 
Additional strategies that may have occurred during this initial delay could again have 
been connected to the stress and anxiety argument that suggests that novel tasks 
have a more adverse effect on left-handers and increase their anxiety levels.  
Alternatively, participants may have been surveying the cards and looking to see 
what each card depicted but did not necessarily form any sort of groupings within the 
set of cards during this time and thus this would not have made a difference to the 
time taken to complete the task.   
 
 




This study is based on the ‘fastest finger first’ game on the television programme 
‘Who wants to be a millionaire’ where contestants have to answer a question by 
arranging a series of responses in order (for example – ‘put the following words in to 
alphabetical order…’).  The computer program in this study gives a random series of 
both 3 and 6 response questions (in order to see if a more complex task affects the 
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results or the planning of the responses) and the participant has to arrange these in 
order according to the question.  The participant is shown the question on the screen 
first and they have to press the space bar when they are comfortable with what the 
question asks and want to see the answers.  This is done in order to see if one of the 
groups will study the question for longer.  The independent variable in this study is 
the number of options that the questions have (either 3 or 6) and the dependent 
variables for this task are the time taken to read/consider the question before seeing 
the answers (in milliseconds), the time taken to respond to the first answer after 
being presented with them (in milliseconds), the time taken to sequence all of the 
answers (in milliseconds) and the number of questions answered correctly.   
 
6.6.2. Rationale and hypotheses for experiment 5 
 
This is based on the concept of the ‘fastest finger first’ sequencing task on ‘Who 
wants to be a millionaire’.  This task is included as an extension to the manual sorting 
task (experiment 4, section 6.3.).  However, this task differs from the manual-sorting 
task as it focuses more on sequencing a series of answers, there is only one solution 
to each task and it varies the complexity of the questions between 3 and 6 
responses.  The reason for using this task was that previous experiments in this 
thesis had suggested that there was a difference in initiation time between left- and 
right-handers. However, only on some of the tasks was there a performance 
difference.  Therefore these performance differences could have been caused by 
participants, for instance, planning a solution during the initiation time.  With this in 
mind this experiment aims to examine responses towards two conditions, one that 
would require relatively more planning than the other (3 options and 6 options).  If 
there is evidence of planning then a longer initiation time would be expected in the 6 
option condition.  If there is no difference then evidence of planning is not supported. 
 
It was hypothesised that left-handers would read the question for longer than right-
handers.  The reason for this hypothesis was that it was thought that left-handers 
would be more anxious about the novelty of the question and want to feel 
comfortable with what was being asked (particularly as the questions alternated in 
what they were asking, for example some asked them to put things in alphabetical 
order while other questions asked for responses in reverse alphabetical order).  It is 
also hypothesised that left-handers will take longer to respond to the 3 option 
questions than right-handers and it is hypothesised that left-handers will take longer 
to respond to the 6 option questions than right-handers.  Also, it is hypothesised that 
left-handers will solve each task faster than right-handers (particularly if there is 
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evidence of planning).  Finally, if there is evidence that left-handers are taking longer 
to respond to the questions (illustrated by the time taken to make their first response) 
then it is hypothesised that left-handers will get more questions correct than right-
handers both for 3 and 6 options. 
 
 




80 participants took part in this study (40 male and 40 female).  Of these, 40 
participants were left-handed (20 males and 20 females) and 40 participants were 
right-handed (20 males and 20 females).  All participants had normal colour vision 
and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
 
6.7.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
A Compaq laptop computer with a coloured screen and standard keyboard was used 
to run the sequenced answers computer program.  The software used to run the 
program was Superlab Pro v1.2 for windows.  20 stimuli were prepared in Microsoft 
paint.  These stimuli consisted of a question and a series of answers which the 
participant had to sequence in the correct order to answer the question.  The 
questions were written in point size 22 Ariel font and were made bold and coloured 
blue.  The answers were also prepared in point size 22 Ariel font and were bold but 
these were coloured pink and centred.  Half of the questions had 3 answers to 
sequence (these were numbered 1 to 3) and half of the questions had 6 answers to 
sequence (these were numbered 1 to 6) (see appendix 14 for details of these 
stimuli).  Each question was displayed on its own in the centre of the screen to allow 
the participant to read it.  When they were happy with what the question asked they 
pressed any key to reveal the answers that had to be ordered in relation to the 
question.  The number keys 1 to 6 were used as response keys and were labelled 
with orange and yellow stickers with the corresponding numbers on them.   Finally, 
an instruction sheet detailing that the participant was going to see a series of 
questions which asked them to sequence the responses according to what the 
question asked was given (see appendix 13).  The instructions also informed the 
participant that the number of responses would either be 3 or 6 and an example of a 
3-response question and a 6-response question was given. 
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Figure 6.4: An example of a 3-response question from the ‘Fastest Finger First’ task 
 
 





Participants were given a set of instructions detailing what the ‘fastest finger first task’ 
would entail.  They were informed that they were going to be shown a series of 
questions that ask for the responses to be ordered in a number of different ways 
(according to the question).  The instructions also stated that half of the questions 
would have 3 responses and the other half would have 6 responses but that the 
questions would be presented randomly.  Participants were then told that they would 
be shown the question on its own first and when they were happy to continue and 
reveal the responses then they had to press any key.  The keys on the computer 
were numbered 1 to 6 and participants were informed that they had to use the 
corresponding number keys to make their responses.  The participants were then 
given an example of a 3-option question and a 6-option question.  Finally, 
participants were asked if they had any questions about the study.  When they felt 
comfortable with what they had to do for the task they pressed a key to begin the 20 
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trials. On completion of this task participants were thanked for their participation and 
were informed of the purpose of the study.   
 
 
6.8. Results: Study 1 ‘Fastest Finger First’ 
 
6.8.1. Time spent looking at the question 
 
Table 6.5: Mean time spent looking at the question (in milliseconds) by each sex and 
handedness group (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 4180 (1181.3) 4801 (721.3) 4491 (951.3) 
Female 4047 (1168.3) 4537 (1243.5) 4292 (1205.9) 
Total 4113 (1174.8) 4669 (982.4) 4391 (1078.6) 
 
The above table shows that, on average, right-handed males looked at the question 
the longest, followed by right-handed females then left-handed males.  Left-handed 
females looked at the question for the shortest amount of time.  Also, males looked at 
the question longer than females and right-handers looked at the question longer 
than left-handers.   
 
In order to see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v 
handedness) ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 
0.402, p>0.05. There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 3.146, p>0.05 
and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance 
F(1, 72) = 0.043, p>0.05. 
 
6.8.2. First response (initiation time) 
 
Table 6.6: Mean time taken (in milliseconds) to make the first response to questions 
with 3 options by each sex and handedness group (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 6309 (3851.0) 5648 (2102.7) 5978  (2976.9) 
Female 6700 (3856.9) 6118 (2008.7) 6409 (2932.8) 
Total 6504 (3853.9) 5883 (2055.7)  
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The above table shows that for questions that contained 3 options to be ordered as 
answers, left-handed females, on average, took the longest to make their first 
response to the question followed by left-handed males and then right-handed 
females.  Right-handed males responded the quickest.  Left-handers overall took 
longer to make their first response than right-handers and females took longer than 
males to make their first response.   
 
In order to see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v 
handedness) ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 
0.345, p>0.05. There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.720, p>0.05 
and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance 
F(1, 72) = 0.003, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.7: Mean time taken (in milliseconds) to make the first response to questions 
with 6 options by each sex and handedness group (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 6643 (4427.2) 6359 (3130.8) 6501 (3779.0) 
Female 7440 (4842.0) 7673 (3498.9) 7557 (4170.5) 
Total 7041 (4634.7) 7016 (3314.8)  
 
The above table shows that for questions that contained 6 options to be ordered as 
answers, right-handed females, on average, took the longest to make their first 
response to the question followed by left-handed females and then left-handed 
males.  Right-handed males responded the quickest.  There was very little difference 
between the first response times of left-handers and right-handers and females took 
longer than males to make their first response.   
 
In order to see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v 
handedness) ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 
1.229, p>0.05. There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.001, p>0.05 
and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance 
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Table 6.8: Mean first response times (in milliseconds) for each sex and handedness 
































The above table shows that for each group the first response times to the questions 
with 6 options were longer than the first response times for the questions with 3 
options.  The total times showed that overall the first response times for 6 options 
were, on average, longer than the first responses to the questions with 3 options. 
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question the within 
factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between factors.  A 
significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 11.92, p<0.01 where first 
response times to the 6 option questions were longer than first response times to the 
3 option questions (6869.5 ms vs. 6194.2 ms respectively).  However, the main effect 
of sex failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.8333, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  
handedness F(1, 69) = 0.158, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness 
also failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.033, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of 
options to the questions had an effect on first response time but sex or handedness 
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6.8.3. Number Correct 
 
Table 6.9: Mean number correct for each sex and handedness group along with 













































The above table shows that on 3 options the right-handed males scored the highest 
number correct followed by left-handed females then right-handed females and left-
handed males scored the lowest on the 3 option questions.  Right-handed males also 
scored the highest on the 6 option questions followed again by left-handed females 
then right-handed females and left-handed males again had the lowest number 
correct.  In total, right-handed males scored the highest number of questions correct 
on average.  The next highest score was achieved by left-handed females then right-
handed females and left-handed males scored the lowest number correct, on 
average, overall. 
 
To see if these differences were significant a 2 x 2 (sex vs. handedness) ANOVA 
was carried out. For 3 options, there was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.821, 
p>0.05.  There was also no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.955, p>0.05 and 
the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 
72) = 1.577, p>0.05.  For 6 options there was no main effect of sex F(1, 72)  = 0.015, 
p>0.05, no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 2.34, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.885, 
p>0.05.   
 
A 2X2 (sex vs. handedness) ANOVA was also conducted for the average number of 
questions correct over 3 and 6 options.  There was no main effect of sex (1, 72) = 
0.295, p>0.05 and no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 2.25, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 1.58, 
p>0.05. 
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In addition, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as 
the within factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
factors.  The main effect of question on the number correct approached significance 
F(1, 69) = 3.583, p=0.063 where the number correct for the 6 option questions were 
lower than the number of questions correct for the 3 option questions (12.86 vs. 
12.34 respectively on average).  However, the main effect of sex failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 0.295, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  handedness F(1, 69) 
= 2.246, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 1.575, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options for the 
questions approached a significant effect on the number of questions correct but sex 
or handedness played no part in this effect – it appeared to be the complexity rather 
than sex or handedness. 
 
6.8.4. Total time taken 
 
Table 6.10: Mean total time taken (in milliseconds) for male and female, left and 
right-handers to answer questions with 3 options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 7761 (4281.0) 7667 (2496.3) 7717 (3503.8) 
Female 8472 (4307.2) 7675 (1945.5) 8084 (3350.6) 
Total 8116 (4251.0) 7671 (2196.6)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question with 3 options.  Left-handed males, right-handed females and 
right-handed males all took similar times, on average, to solve the 3 option questions.   
Females took longer than males, on average, to solve the 3 option questions and left-
handers took longer to solve the questions than right-handers.  
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.196, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.301, p>0.05 and the interaction 
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Table 6.11: Mean total time taken (in milliseconds) for male and female, left and 
right-handers to answer questions with 6 options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 



















The above table shows that left-handed females, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question with 6 options.  Right-handed females took the next longest 
followed by left-handed males and right-handed males took the least amount of time 
to solve the 6 option questions.  Females took longer than males, on average, to 
solve the 6 option questions and left-handers took longer to solve the questions than 
right-handers. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.323, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.077, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.002, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.12: Total time taken (in milliseconds) for male and female, left and right-
handers to answer questions overall (with standard deviations in parentheses). (3 
and 6 options averaged). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 14808 (8008.8) 14547 (3566.7) 14678 (5787.8) 
Female 15960 (8225.8) 14933 (3595.2) 15447 (5910.5) 
Total 15384 (8117.3) 14740 (3580.9)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question when the time for 3 and 6 options was averaged.  Left-handed 
males, right-handed females and right-handed males all took similar times, on 
average, to solve the 3 and 6 option averaged questions.  Females took longer than 
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males, on average, to solve the averaged 3 and 6 option questions and left-handers 
took longer to solve the questions than right-handers. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.266, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.187, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.066, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.13: Comparison of mean total time taken per option to answer the questions 
between 3 options and 6 options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Male Right Male Left Female Right 
Female 
Total 





















The above table shows that for each group the mean total time for the questions with 
6 options were longer than the mean total time for the questions with 3 options.  The 
total times showed that overall the times for 6 options were, on average, longer than 
the mean total time for the questions with 3 options. 
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the within 
subjects factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
subjects factors.  A significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 261.336, 
p=0.000 where mean total time taken to answer the 6 option questions was 
significantly longer the mean total time taken to answer the 3 option questions 
(14336.8 ms vs. 7894.1 ms respectively).  However, the main effect of sex failed to 
reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.288, p>0.05 as did the main effect of handedness F(1, 
69) = 0.147, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness also failed to 
reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.036, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options to the 
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6.8.5. Total time minus planning time  
 
Table 6.14: Mean time taken to solve the question minus ‘initiation time’ (first 
response time) for male and female, left and right-handers for questions with 3 
options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 1451 (742.2) 2019 (1564.4) 1735 (1153.1) 
Female 1772 (715.8) 1556 (444.1) 1664 (580.0) 
Total 1611 (729.0) 1788 (1004.1)  
 
The above table shows that when first response time was removed from total time 
taken to solve the question (for 3 options) right-handed males took the longest to 
solve the question although their scores had much greater variance as the standard 
deviation was more than double that of the other groups.  Right-handed females, left-
handed females and left-handed males all took similar times to solve the questions 
when ‘initiation time’ was removed.  This indicates that right-handed males have, on 
average, a shorter initiation time, as their total time to complete the whole question 
when initiation time is included was the shortest along with right-handed females.  
Males and females solved the questions in similar times when ‘initiation time’ was 
removed and left and right-handers also solved the questions in similar times when 
the ‘initiation time’ was removed. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.103, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.632, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 3.120, 
p>0.05.  
 
Table 6.15: Mean time taken to solve the question minus ‘initiation time’ (first 
response time) for male and female, left and right-handers for questions with 6 
options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 7451 (3529.8) 7400 (2799.7) 7426 (3164.8) 
Female 7536 (3720.5) 6842 (1281.2) 7189 (2500.9) 
Total 7494 (3625.2) 7121 (20340.5)  
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The above table shows that when first response time was removed from total time 
taken to solve the question (for 6 options) right-handed males, left-handed females 
and left-handed males all took similar times to solve the questions when ‘initiation 
time’ was removed.  Right-handed females took the shortest time when initiation time 
was removed.  Males and females solved the questions in similar times when 
‘initiation time’ was removed and left and right-handers also solved the questions in 
similar times when the ‘initiation time’ was removed. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.113, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.278, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.208, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.16: Mean time taken to solve the question minus ‘initiation time’ in 
milliseconds (first response time) for male and female, left and right-handers overall 
(with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 4451 (2035.5) 4710 (1830.2) 4580 (1932.8) 
Female 4654 (2075.7) 4199 (758.9) 4426 (1417.3) 
Total 4553 (2055.6) 4454 (1294.5)  
 
The above table shows that overall (when total time minus ‘initiation time’ is averaged 
across 3 and 6 options) right-handed males took the longest to complete the 
questions closely followed by left-handed females and then left-handed males.  
Right-handed females completed the questions in the fastest time when initiation 
time was taken away from total time.  Males and females took similar time to answer 
the questions when initiation time was taken away.  Also, left- and right-handers 
completed the questions in very similar times. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.138, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.056, p>0.05 and the interaction 
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Table 6.17: Comparison of mean total time minus initiation time between 3 options 
and 6 options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 






























The above table shows that for each group the mean total time minus initiation taken 
to solve the questions with 6 options were longer than the time minus initiation time 
for the questions with 3 options.  The total times showed that overall the mean total 
time minus initiation time for 6 options was, on average, longer than the total time 
minus initiation for the questions with 3 options.  
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the within 
subjects factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
subjects factors.  A significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 307.091, 
p=0.000 where mean total time minus initiation time for the 6 option questions was 
significantly longer than total time minus initiation for the 3 option questions (7307.8 
ms vs. 1700 ms respectively).  However, the main effect of sex failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 0.138, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  handedness F(1, 69) 
= 0.056, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 0.741, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options to the 
questions had an effect on total time taken minus initiation time  to solve each 
question, however, this is a straightforward common sense argument that responding 
to more options will take longer. 
 
6.8.6. Time per response  
 
Table 6.18: Mean time per response for male and female, left and right-handers for 
questions with 3 options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2587 (1427.0) 2555 (832.1) 2571 (1129.6) 
Female 2824 (1435.7) 2558 (648.5) 2691 (1042.1) 
Total 2705 (1431.4) 2557 (740.3)  
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The above table shows that each of the four groups took a similar time, on average, 
to make each individual response to the question for 3 options.  Left-handed females 
took slightly longer but left-handed males, right-handed males and right-handed 
females took very similar times, on average, per response.  Males and females also 
took similar times per response, on average.  Females took slightly longer per 
response than male.  Left-handers took slightly longer per response than right-
handers.  
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.659, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.585, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.666, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.19: Mean time per move for male and female, left and right-handers for 
questions with 6 options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2819 (1535.1) 2752 (591.1) 2785 (1063.1) 
Female 2995 (1625.9) 2903 (710.3) 2949 (1168.1) 
Total 2907 (1580.5) 2827 (650.7)  
 
The above table shows that each of the four groups took a similar time, on average, 
to make each individual response to the question for 6 options.  Left-handed females 
took the longest but left-handed males, right-handed males and right-handed females 
also took very similar times, on average, per response.  Males and females also took 
similar times per response, on average.  Females took slightly longer per response 
than males and left-handers took slightly longer per response than right-handers. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.571, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.783, p>0.05 and the interaction 
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Table 6.20: Mean time per move for male and female, left and right-handers overall 
(with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2703 (1461.0) 2653 (635.6) 2678 (1048.3) 
Female 2909 (1504.2) 2730 (656.4) 2820 (1080.3) 
Total 2806 (1491.5) 2692 (646.0)  
 
The above table shows that when averaging the time per response for 3 and 6 
options left-handed females took the longest time per response, they were closely 
followed by right-handed females and left-handed males. Right-handed males took 
the shortest time per move on average.  Females took slightly longer, on average, 
per response than males and left-handers took slightly longer per response than 
right-handers. 
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.272, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.176, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.057, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.21: Comparison of mean time per move between 3 options and 6 options 
(with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 






























The above table shows that for each group the mean time per response for the 
questions with 6 options were longer than the mean time per response for the 
questions with 3 options.  The total times showed that overall time per response for 6 
options was, on average, longer than time per response for the questions with 3 
options.  
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A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the within 
subjects factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
subjects factors.  A significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 13.606, 
p=0.000 where time per response for the 6 option questions were significantly longer 
than time per response for the 3 option questions (2867 ms Vs. 2631.4 ms 
respectively).  However, the main effect of sex failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 
0.176, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  handedness F(1, 69) = 0.272, p>0.05.  The 
interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 
0.057, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options to the questions had an effect on 
mean time per response but sex or handedness played no part in this effect – it 
appeared to be the complexity rather than sex or handedness. 
 
The main findings from experiment 5 were: 
 There were no effects of sex or handedness on the time taken to look at the 
question. 
 
 There were no effects of sex or handedness on the time taken to make the 
first response to a question (both for 3 and 6 options). 
 
 First response times overall were longer for 6 options than 3 options. 
 
 There were more correct responses for questions with 3 options than 
questions with 6 options (this approached significance). 
 
 There were no sex or handedness effects for the time taken to complete the 
questions. 
 
See appendix 15 for additional analyses of this task and for analyses using different 
handedness inventories.   
 
 
6.9. Experiment 5: Discussion 
 
It was hypothesised for the ‘fastest finger first’ task (study 1) that left-handers would 
take longer than right-handers to make their first response to the 3-option questions. 
It was found that there was no significant difference in the time taken by this group to 
make the first response and this hypothesis was not supported.  However, the 
findings were in the direction predicted as left-handers took an average of 700 
Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 235 
milliseconds longer to make their first response than right-handers.  No significant 
sex differences were found either but females took longer, on average, to make their 
first response.  It was also hypothesised that left-handers would take longer to make 
their first response to the 6-option questions than right-handers.  This hypothesis was 
not supported, as the first response time taken by each handedness group was, on 
average, almost identical.  Females were slower than males to make the first 
response to the 6-option questions but this difference was not significant.  The final 
hypothesis for this study was that left-handers would look at the question longer than 
right-handers before choosing to reveal the answers.  This hypothesis was not 
supported.  It was found that right-handers looked at the question for longer than left-
handers and this difference was in the opposite direction of what was predicted.  It 
was also found for each sex and handedness group that the time taken to make the 
first response on the 3-option questions was significantly faster than the time taken to 
make the first response to the 6-option questions.   
 
One reason for the finding that left- and right-handers took an almost identical time to 
make their first response to the 6-option questions may be because the sequencing 
of this number of answers is complex.  As an average of 7 seconds occurred before 
the participant made their first response to 6 option questions, a number of things 
may have been happening during this time. Participants might have been planning 
the sequence of answers to the question asked in a similar way to solving a problem 
solving task such as the Tower of London (e.g. Morris et al., 1997; Goel et al., 2001) 
or they might have been searching for the first response only during this time.  
Participants might have been examining what the question asked or simply just have 
been thinking but making no specific plan to answer the question.  Additionally, 
sequencing 6 options places a moderate load on short-term memory capacity (the 
participant has to remember which responses they have already used or may make a 
mistake and use the same response twice) it is therefore unlikely that a full plan is 
being made before participants are responding (e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 2002).  A 
more probable explanation is that the participant is looking over the relatively 
complex sequence and identifying the first one or two responses and then using an 
on-line planning strategy to complete the sequence (and plan the rest of the 
sequence out as they go along by responding using one or two answers at a time at 
a steady pace rather than giving the 6 responses in rapid succession which would be 
more evident if planning had taken place before the first response was made).  
Phillips et al. (2001) reported that the most accurate solutions often depended on on-
line planning during the solving phase rather than planning a solution before 
beginning a task.  This suggests that there would be more evidence of a pattern of 
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responses during the solving if on-line planning was occurring rather than a large 
delay at the beginning followed by a quick execution time. Thus, as this task was 
relatively complex it would be expected that this would be the case for the 
participants regardless of their hand preference.  However, the 3-option task would 
not be expected to place as much of a load on short term memory capacity (Eysenck 
& Keane, 2002) and the possibility of planning the whole sequence before making 
the first response would be possible in most cases (especially as both handedness 
groups took an average of around 6 seconds before making the first response which 
would suggest again that planning could possibly be happening here).  However, left-
handers took longer, on average, to make the first response on the 3-option 
sequence than right-handers did.   
 
One possible explanation for this could be that the simplicity of the task may have 
affected the performance of the left-handed group (see chapter 7 for additional 
details).  As sequencing the 3 options in this task was relatively simple then the left-
handed group may have felt pressurised or anxious to make sure that they did such a 
simple task correctly.  However, there is no existing research that has examined this 
concept and thus this idea is speculative.  The issue of anxiety and performance in 
left-handers has been examined in a number of studies (see chapter 4 and chapter 7 
for more details).  Conflicting results have been reported with some studies reporting 
that left-handers are more anxious than right-handers (e.g. Dillon, 1989) while others 
report that there is no difference between the two groups (e.g. French & Richards, 
1990).  However, work by Cameron and Rogers (1999) reported that novel objects 
could affect the performance of left-handers and that novelty resulted in increased 
anxiety in many cases.  Thus, it would be expected in this series of studies that the 
more novel tasks could affect the stress levels of the participants and might also 
contribute to the attitude towards the different tasks that the participant is asked to 
perform.  In the case of the ‘fastest finger first’ task it can be argued whether or not 
this is a novel task.  It is probable that most of the participants taking part in the study 
had all seen ‘Who wants to be a millionaire’ before and thus most participants would 
be familiar with the ‘fastest finger first’ game and would be aware of the rules and 
what the task required.  The only thing that differed between the current task and that 
of the television show (except that the television show only gives one ‘fastest finger 
first’ question to the contestant) was that in the television show the contestant is 
asked to put 4 answers in to a sequence and here participants are asked to either put 
3 or 6 answers into a sequence.   
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Therefore in order to take into account the possibility that stress caused by the 
novelty of the task could have affected the behaviour of the participants before 
making the first response then it would have to have been ensured that the task was 
novel to participants.  Because this task was not necessarily novel to the participants 
then this might have been the reason why no differences were found between the 
two different handedness groups.  However, it could also be argued that the task was 
novel because the format was similar to that used on the television show but the 
participants had not had experience of responding to the actual question and 
sequence using a keyboard or similar device (although again this can be argued 
against as the game exists for games consoles and thus some people will be familiar 
with this scenario).  Another argument that the task was novel is that the 
experimenter created the questions and thus they were novel to the participant.   
 
When examining overall completion time of the 3 option questions, left-handers took 
longer than right-handers to complete these.  However, when initiation time was not 
included in this time left-handers completed the questions faster than right-handers.    
This suggests that left-handers were perhaps thinking about their solution or even 
their first response before starting to solve the question.  However, neither difference 
was significant.  Additionally, as Phillips et al. (2001) suggest, making a plan does 
not necessarily result in a superior performance and therefore it cannot be assumed 
that just because left-handers took longer to start but completed the task quicker that 
this was due to planning.  A different pattern was found for the 6 option questions.  It 
was found that left-handers took slightly longer in total to complete the 6 option 
questions overall and they also took longer when initiation time was not included in 
completion time.  This suggests that even if planning was occurring during the 
initiation time that is was no more effective in the solution of the task than the 
performance of the right-handers.  Gilhooly et al. (1999) reported that efficient 
performance on a task depends primarily on planning during the task rather than 
making a pre-plan before starting the task.  Based on this, there was either very little 
evidence of planning in the current study or if there was any evidence of planning 
then the left- and right-handers must have been making equally effective (or equally 
ineffective) plans.  In conclusion, although the fastest finger first task can be classed 
as measuring planning this still may not be the reason for the initial delay that was 
made by some participants before they began and an alternative reason may be 
attributed to novelty or stress.  It could also be the case that the participant was 
merely surveying the answers but not specifically planning the sequence to answer 
the question asked.   
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The final task is a task which examines (amongst other types of questions) the 
spatial abilities of left- and right-handers.  This takes the format of a computerised IQ 
test.  A series of questions regarding numbers and language are also given but the 
most important questions to investigate spatial ability are the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (RPM) pictures and the 3-D mental rotation questions (see appendix 21).  
The mental rotation questions are a direct measure of being able to manipulate a 
series of shapes in space and to be able to form 3-dimensional shapes mentally from 
the 2-dimensional stimuli.  The Raven’s Progressive Matrices are a measure of 
spatial reasoning and thus this is why they were chosen to include in this task.  
Walker and Mauney (2004) report that the spatial reasoning and spatial cognition 
used when solving Raven’s Progressive Matrices is related to a person’s ability to be 
able to mentally store information and be able to visualise objects and be able to 
manipulate and rotate these in order to solve the task.  The independent variable in 
this task is the type of problem given, this had four levels: word problem, number 
problem, Raven’s Progressive Matrices and 3-D mental rotation/shape building.  The 
dependent variables are the time taken to respond to each problem (in milliseconds) 
and the accuracy of the answers to each problem.   
 
6.10.2. Rationale and hypotheses for experiment 6 
 
Because a difference was found between left- and right-handers in the time taken to 
begin the Tower of Hanoi in Chapter 4 (a spatial task of planning) it was proposed 
that one possible explanation for this delay could be planning (whereby participants 
thought about their strategy or first response before making contact with the 
apparatus).  However, although there was a possible planning difference it could not 
be ruled out that the difference could be attributed to the spatial nature of the task. 
Therefore, additional tasks were devised to address this issue. This current study 
was designed to assess the spatial abilities of left and right-handers (Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices and space relation problems).  It is thought that if one group 
has superior spatial abilities than the other then this complicates any potential 
inferences made about left-handers planning more than right-handers and it might 
just be that left-handers are simply better at solving the task because of its nature.  
However, reaction times will also be recorded as part of experiment 6 and will be 
used to see if there is a difference between the times taken to respond to the 
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problems.  The reason for using the number based questions and the language-
based questions was to investigate firstly whether left- and right-handers differed on 
the time they took to respond to these. Secondly, as the literature often cites that left-
handers have superior mathematical abilities (e.g. Annett, 2002) and that right-
handers have superior language abilities (e.g. Bishop, 1990) then this issue will also 
be investigated as part of this experiment.   
 
It is hypothesised that left-handers will score higher on the number of spatial 
questions correct than right-handers.  It is also hypothesised that left-handers will 
respond to the spatial questions significantly faster than right-handers.   Additionally, 
it is hypothesised that left-handers will be more accurate on the mathematical 
questions and that right-handers will be more accurate on the number questions.  No 









A total of 81 participants took part in this study (40 male and 41 female).  Of these, 
42 participants were left-handed (20 males and 22 females) and 39 participants were 
right-handed (20 males and 19 females).  All participants had normal colour vision 
and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
 
6.11.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
The state anxiety inventory and the trait anxiety inventory (STAI - Speilberger, 1983) 
were given to participants before they completed the computer task (see appendices 
26a and 26b).  However, this is described and discussed as part of Chapter 7 (see 
sections 7.3. and 7.4. for a description and the results of the STAI).   The adapted 
version of Peter’s (1998) handedness inventory was also given (details of this can be 
found in Chapter 3 and a copy of this can be found in appendix 2).   
 
An instruction sheet for the computer task was given to participants and this informed 
them that they were going to be presented with 4 different types of tasks which were 
number questions, word questions, space relation (mental rotation) questions and 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices questions.  Participants were given an example of 
each type of task and informed that they should respond using the appropriate 
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number keys (see appendix 20).  The computer program consisted of 36 trials.  10 
word trials, 10 number trials, 8 Raven’s Progressive Matrices and 8 ‘Mental Rotation’ 
trials (see appendix 21).  The word trials consisted of statements such as ‘Hot is to 
cold as rich is to….’ and the participant was given four options with which to answer 
it.  The number trials consisted of a series of numbers such as 1, 2, 3, 4… and the 
participant had to identify the next number in the sequence (with the aid of 4 
choices).  For the ‘mental rotation’ task the participant was shown a folded out shape 
which could be constructed to make a 3-dimensional shape.  The participant had to 
mentally try and build the shape to obtain the correct answer.  Finally, Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices consisted of a series of patterns and the final step was omitted.  
The participant was given a series of choices as to which response would fit the 
pattern.  The number of choices given ranged from four to eight.  The trials were run 
as part of a Superlab program (version 1.2) and were run on a Compaq laptop. A 
blank screen was shown for 700 milliseconds after each trial.  The stimuli for the 
word and number trials were adapted from the AH4 (Heim, 1973) and the stimuli for 
the 3-D shape building was adapted from the Differential Aptitude Tests (form S) 




Participants were given the Peter’s (1998) handedness Inventory to begin the study 
with.  This was given first in order to allow the participants to feel at ease with the 
experimenter before they were presented with the STAI.  Participants were instructed 
to fill out the handedness questionnaire reporting the hand that they preferred to 
perform a series of actions with.  Half of the participants (males and females and left 
and right-handers) were given the instructions for the computer task next and the 
other half of the sample was presented with the state instructions for the STAI 
(responding to the statements according to how they felt right at that moment).  
Those who did not receive the instructions for the computer task were told that they 
were going to complete a computer task but first would be presented with a self-
evaluation questionnaire.  They were told to read the instructions carefully and 
complete the questionnaire accordingly.  Those who were given the instructions for 
the computer task first were told to read through the instructions as if they were going 
to go ahead with the task.  When they were familiar with the instructions the 
participants were presented with the state form of the STAI to do prior to beginning 
the task.  The STAI (state instructions) were presented before and after the 
instructions for the computer task in order to see if knowing what the task was going 
to entail would affect the responses to the STAI compared to not knowing what the 
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computer task was going to entail (the results for this can be found in Chapter 7, 
section 7.4.).  When the participants completed the STAI (state) they were given the 
instructions for the computer task to read through (if they had already read them as 
part of the post-instruction group they were encouraged to read over them again).  
When the participants indicated they were happy with the instructions for the task 
they began.  The 36 trials (10 word, 10 number, 8 RPM and 8 3-D folding) were 
presented randomly and participants had to respond using the number keys on the 
keyboard.  The number choices for the word and number trials ranged from 1 to 4.  
The 3-D folding shapes were presented as A, B, C, and D on the computer program 
but participants were instructed to respond using 1, 2, 3, 4 where 1 corresponded 
with A, 2 with B, 3 with C and 4 with D.  The Raven’s Progressive Matrices had a 
number of choices ranging from 4 to 8.  For the trials containing 8 answers, 
participants had to respond using keys 1 to 8.  When the computer task was 
completed the final part of the study involved the trait instructions of the STAI.  Again 
participants were presented with the questionnaire and instructed to read the 
instructions carefully and respond to the statements according to the instructions.  
This time the participants had to respond to the statements according to how they 
generally feel about how the questions related to them.  Completion of this signalled 
the end of the experiment. 
 
 
6.12. Results: Experiment 6: Computer task 
 
a) Correct responses  
 
Table 6.22: Mean number of correct responses on the mental rotation (3D shape 
building) questions (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 3.7 (1.7) 3.1 (1.6) 3.37 (1.7) 
Right-handed 2.7 (1.6) 2.4 (1.3) 2.51 (1.4) 
Total 3.2 (1.6) 2.7 (1.5)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males and females got more mental rotation 
questions correct, on average, than right-handed males and females.  Also, males 
got more mental rotation questions correct, on average, than females and left-
handers got more mental rotation questions correct than right-handers. 
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 A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the number of correct responses made by participants on the mental rotation part 
of the computer program.  There was a significant main effect of handedness F(1, 
77) = 4.701, p<0.05 with left handers (on average) getting more mental rotation 
answers correct than right handers.  There was no significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 
0.609, p>0.05 and also there was no significant interaction F(1, 77) = 0.157, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.23: Mean number of correct responses made by participants on the number 
questions (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 8.5 (1.2) 8.6 (1.1) 8.5 (1.1) 
Right-handed 8.2 (1.6) 8.3 (1.7) 8.2 (1.6) 
Total 8.3 (1.4) 8.4 (1.4)  
 
The above table shows that all groups got, on average, around 8 out of 10 of the 
number questions correct.  Females scored slightly higher than males (a difference of 
only 0.08) and left-handers scored slightly higher than right-handers (a difference of 
only 0.17).  
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the number of questions participants answered correctly on the number part of the 
computer task.  There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 0.052, 
p>0.05.  There was no significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 0.061, p>0.05 and there 
was no significant interaction F(1, 77) = 0.061, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.24: Mean number of correct responses made by participants on the Ravens 
Progressive Matrices questions of the computer task (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 5.5 (1.5) 4.6 (1.8) 5.1 (1.6) 
Right-handed 5.3 (1.8) 5.1 (2.0) 5.2 (1.9) 
Total 5.4 (1.6) 4.9 (1.9)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males scored, on average, the highest 
number of Ravens Progressive Matrices correct while left-handed females scored the 
lowest number, on average.  Males got more Ravens Progressive Matrices questions 
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correct, on average, than females and right-handers got slightly more correct, on 
average, than left-handers. 
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the number of RPM questions participants answered correctly.  There was no 
significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 0.779, p>0.05.  There was also no 
significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 1.287, p>0.05 or any significant interaction F(1, 77) 
= 0.524, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.25: Mean number of correct responses on the word questions of the 
computer task (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 8.8 (1.8) 8.9 (1.0) 8.8 (0.9) 
Right-handed 9.3 (0.7) 8.8 (0.9) 9.1 (0.8) 
Total 9.0 (1.3) 8.9 (0.9)  
 
The above table shows that each group scored just under an average of 9 questions 
correct out of 10 except for right-handed males who scored and average of 9.25 
questions correct out of 10.  Males got slightly more questions correct, on average, 
than females and right-handers got slightly more questions correct, on average, than 
left-handers. 
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the number of correct word questions participants answered correctly during the 
computer task.  There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 1.048, 
p>0.05.  There was no significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 0.266, p>0.05 and the 











Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 244 
b) Reaction times 
 
Table 6.26: Mean reaction time (in milliseconds) taken by participants to complete 
the questions (regardless of topic) of the computer task (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 



















The above table shows that left-handed males took the longest to respond to all 
questions on the computer task and right-handed males took the least time, on 
average, to respond.  Males responded, on average, in less time than females and 
right-handers took less time to respond than left-handers. 
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the overall mean time that participants took to respond to the computer task 
stimuli.  There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 1.983, p>0.05 and 
the effect of sex was not significant F(1, 77) = 0.123  p>0.05.  The interaction also 
failed to reach significance F(1, 77) = 0.952, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.27: Mean reaction time (in milliseconds) taken by participants to complete 
the metal rotation questions of the computer task (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 



















The above table shows that right-handed males responded the quickest, on average, 
to the mental rotation questions and left-handed females took the longest to respond 
to these questions.  Males responded quicker to the mental rotation questions than 
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females on average while right-handers responded quicker to the mental rotation 
questions than left-handers). 
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the time taken to respond to the mental rotation questions of the computer task.  
There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 1.844, p>0.05 and no 
significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 0.285, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and 
handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 77) = 0.793, p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.28: Mean reaction time taken by participants to complete the number 
questions of the computer task (with standard deviations in parentheses).  
 











 16575  
(6169.5) 






The above table shows the mean time taken to respond to the number questions.  
Right-handed males were quickest, on average, to respond while right-handed 
females took the longest, on average, to respond.  Males took less time to respond to 
the number questions than females on average and left-handers took less time, on 
average, to respond to the number questions than right-handers.  
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the time taken by participants to respond to the number questions of the computer 
task.  There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) =0.377, p>0.05.  There 
was no significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 0.712, p>0.05 and there was no significant 
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Table 6.29: Mean reaction time taken by participants to complete the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices questions of the computer task (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 



















The above table shows that left-handed females took the longest, on average, to 
respond to the Ravens Progressive Matrices questions and right-handed males took, 
on average, the shortest time to respond.  Males took less time to respond to the 
Ravens Progressive Matrices questions than females and right-handers took less 
time to respond, on average, than left-handers. 
 
A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the time taken to respond to the RPM questions of the computer task.  There was 
a significant main effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 5.222, p<0.05 with right-handers 
responding significantly faster, on average, than left-handers.  There was no 
significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 0.235, p>0.05 and there was no significant 
interaction between sex and handedness F(1, 77) = 0.098 , p>0.05. 
 
Table 6.30: Mean reaction time (in milliseconds) taken by participants to complete 
word questions of the computer task (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 



















The above table shows that left-handed males took the longest to respond to the 
word questions, on average and left-handed females took the least time.  Females 
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took less time, on average, to respond to the ‘word’ questions than males and right-
handers took less time, on average, to respond to the questions than left-handers. 
 
 A 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on the time taken by participants to respond to the word questions of the computer 
task.  There was no significant effect of handedness F(1, 77) = 0.560, p>0.05.  There 
was no significant effect of sex F(1, 77) = 2.859, p>0.05 and there was no significant 
interaction between sex and handedness F(1, 77) = 2.038, p>0.05. 
 
The main findings of Experiment 6 were: 
 
 When analysing all questions together there were no effects of sex or 
handedness on the number correct. 
 
 The effect of handedness on the time taken to respond to the questions 
overall approached significance with right-handers responding faster than left-
handers. 
 
 The only significant result when looking at the number correct for each 
individual type of question was found on the mental rotation questions.  Left-
handers were significantly more accurate than right-handers.  There were no 
other sex or handedness effects for any of the other types of question. 
 
 The only significant result when looking at the reaction times for each 
individual type of question was found on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
questions.  Right-handers responded significantly faster than left-handers to 
these questions.  There were no other sex or handedness effects for any of 
the other types of question. 
 
Additional analyses were carried out on these data and this can be found in appendix 
22.  Additional analyses include some re-analysis using different handedness 






Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 248 
6.13. Experiment 6: Discussion 
 
The computer task was used predominantly in order to examine the visuo-spatial 
elements of the task.  This was done to investigate whether the nature of the task 
used (visuo-spatial) had any strong effects on the findings.  It was hypothesised that 
left-handers would get more visuo-spatial questions correct than right-handers.  This 
hypothesis was supported for the mental rotation questions where left-handers got 
significantly more answers correct than right-handers.  There was no significant 
difference between left- and right-handers on the number of Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices questions correct and right-handers scored, on average, slightly higher than 
left-handers on the number of questions correct.  However, it could be argued 
whether or not there was a strong visuo-spatial element to the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices task (Walker & Mauney, 2004) and this could therefore affect the responses 
given (if the RPM is a strong spatial task then it would be expected that left-handers 
would score higher but it could also be suggested that this is a task of pattern 
recognition rather than a spatial task and this could therefore support the original 
predictions).  Raven’s Progressive Matrices are thought to involve the visual 
manipulation of a series of stimuli  (Walker & Mauney, 2004) and thus it is argued 
that this is a strong case for the task being considered as a spatial task rather than a 
task of pattern recognition.  It was also hypothesised that left-handers would respond 
significantly faster to the spatial questions than right-handers.  This hypothesis was 
not supported, however, left-handers did, on average, respond quicker than right-
handers to the mental rotation questions.  This supports the prediction that left-
handers would be superior at solving the spatial questions as they not only solved 
more questions accurately but they also solved them in less time suggesting that 
they found this type of question easier as demonstrated by the quicker but more 
accurate responses given.  On the other hand, right-handers got more of the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices questions correct than left-handers and the average response 
from right-handers was quicker than that of left-handers, it could be suggested that 
right-handers show a better ability at this type of task, which could possibly be 
pattern recognition.   
 
For the ‘number’ questions and the ‘word’ questions it was hypothesised that there 
would be no difference between the two groups for the number of questions correct 
and for the reaction times to these two types of question.  It was found that left-
handers, on average, got more ‘number’ questions correct than right-handers but this 
difference was not significant.  It was found, however, that right-handers got more 
‘word’ questions correct than left-handers but again this difference was not 
Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 249 
significant. This therefore supports the hypothesis that there would be no difference 
in the number of correct responses to the ‘number’ and ‘word’ questions.  With 
respect to the time taken to respond to these questions left-handers took longer, on 
average, to respond to the ‘number’ questions than right-handers and right-handers 
took longer than left-handers to respond to the ‘word’ questions.  These findings were 
not significant.  It has been reported that left-handers have better mathematical 
abilities than right-handers (e.g. Annett & Kilshaw, 1982) and thus this could help 
explain why left-handers got more ‘number’ questions correct than right-handers.  
Left-handers were however slower to respond to these questions than right-handers 
but this could have occurred due to the fact that the left-handed group were more 
accurate and took more time to work the answers to the questions out.  Right-
handers are often said to excel in language tasks due to the dominance of the left 
hemisphere (e.g. Bishop, 1990; Corballis, 1991) and thus this would potentially 
explain why the right-handed group scored more correct answers on the ‘word’ 
questions than the left-handed group.   
 
For the overall responses to the computer task where both correct and wrong 
responses were measured it was found that left-handers, on average, took longer to 
respond to the stimuli than right-handers but this difference was not significant.  
Females also took longer, on average, to respond to the stimuli than males and again 
this difference was not significant.  Left-handers took longer, on average, to respond 
to each individual type of question with the exception of the number questions than 
right-handers.  Females took longer, on average, than males to respond to each 
individual type of question except for the ‘word’ questions.  However, there were no 
significant main effects found for the time taken to respond to each of the stimuli 
except on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices where it was found that right-handers 
responded significantly quicker, on average, than left-handers.   
 
One reason why there might not have been any differences found was firstly that the 
task was computerised and thus it is often encouraged in these type of tasks to 
respond as quickly as possible and thus the participants might have been aiming for 
quick response times over accuracy.  Another reason why there might not have been 
any differences between the groups might have been because the reaction times 
included both correct responses and errors and if a participant did not know the 
answer to one of the questions they might have pressed any key in order to go on to 
the next question and thus a very fast reaction time would be recorded.  If a 
participant made a number of errors and used this strategy when they were unsure of 
an answer then this could have resulted in a much quicker average reaction time – 
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particularly compared to a participant who worked through each answer and took 
longer to respond.   
 
Although this task was not designed specifically as a planning task it can still be 
examined with respect to how long participants took to respond to each question.  
However, as the questions require one specific answer and in many cases the 
answer needs to be calculated or worked out then it could be argued that this task 
purely examines the spatial, numerical and language abilities of the participants.  The 
task was designed mainly for the purpose to see if left-handers excelled over right-
handers at spatial tasks and it appears that on 3-d mental rotation and shape folding 
left-handers performed better.  Nevertheless, left-handers did not solve the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices more effectively, which are also thought to demonstrate spatial 
ability, more effectively.  Another reason why there might have been very few 
differences between all of the groups during this task (both in the number of answers 
correct and the time taken to respond to the questions) is because the task was not 
necessarily novel to the participants.  Although many of the questions would not have 
been seen before in the same program, it is possible that most of the participants 
would have encountered these, or very similar, questions during IQ tests or school 
tests.  Therefore it could be argued that this task was not particularly novel to the 
participants.  One factor that was affected by this was upon giving the participant a 
set of instructions to brief them on what the task would involve when they saw the 
mental rotation example, a few participants stated that they could not ‘do those kinds 
of tasks’ and thus when they were shown these specific questions possibly did not try 
to solve them and just guessed the answer quickly.  Some participants reported this 
verbally after they completed the task.  
 
 
6.14. Overall conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the planning abilities of left- and right-handers were examined here but 
it is still unclear whether or not a true planning difference exists between the groups. 
The computer-based task (experiment 6) was designed to examine the visuo-spatial, 
language and mathematical abilities of the participants.  Thus the task was not 
directly designed as a planning task as in most cases there was only a single correct 
answer to a question and therefore the response was a reaction time rather than an 
indication of planning.  On the questions such as the Ravens Progressive Matrices 
planning had to be carried out in order to solve the task to be able to make the choice 
of which option was the correct answer (there was no sequencing – there was only 
Chapter 6: Cognitive abilities and planning  
 251 
one correct answer).  Therefore this task was perhaps not an adequate 
measurement of planning.  However, on the fastest finger first task the answers had 
to be put in to a sequence and therefore there was the possibility that some 
participants might have planned out the sequence in their heads before making their 
responses while others might have responded using a trial and error strategy.  The 
sorting task was a possible measure of planning as participants had the opportunity 
to inspect all cards first and make solving decisions without even having to move a 
card.  Other participants may have moved the cards without any thought or planning 
to try and form appropriate categories.  Again, although the sorting task could be 
classed as a possible measure of planning this still may not be the reason for the 
delay made by some participants before they began and this could also be attributed 
to novelty or stress (see chapter 7 for follow up work to this).   
 
Another possible reason why there was a difference in the time taken to start the 
manual sorting task (experiment 4) but not the ‘fastest finger first’ task (experiment 5) 
or computer task (experiment 6) could have been influenced by motor planning.  As 
the manual sorting task required the participants to physically move the cards rather 
than press keys on a computer like the other two tasks did, this might have affected 
the results.  Evidence has suggested that the right hemisphere is dominant for 
movement planning and therefore it would be expected that because of the 
contralateral control of the hemispheres that left-handers would show more evidence 
of planning behaviour than right-handers.  It would therefore be expected in a manual 
task that this behaviour would be demonstrated and the findings of the current study 
appear to lend support the findings reported by Barthelemy and Boulinguez (2001).  
In a computerised task, however, this behaviour would not be expected due to the 
brief responses made using the keys of the keyboard.  This is supported by Corballis 
(1998) who states that motor lateralisation may be important for fast, sequential 
actions.  
 
Further analysis for this study could be done looking at the time taken to make each 
response. If the time taken per response in the sequence was faster then it would be 
thought that planning might have occurred and the answers would have been given 
rapidly. If the time per answer was longer then this would suggest no evident 
planning as it would indicate that the participant was looking for each answer after 
giving the previous response.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that novelty is potentially a very important factor when 
examining the response styles of left- and right-handers.  The type of task is also 
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very important as when the tasks are computerised participants seem to respond 
much quicker than when the tasks are manual and this might not be a true reflection 
of how participants would normally respond to these tasks (participants are often 
instructed to respond quickly to computerised tasks).  In the current studies it could 
be argued that both computerised tasks were not entirely novel to the participants 
and thus in order to investigate these idea further a completely novel computerised 
task would have to be devised where the participant was also instructed that 
accuracy was as important as speed on the task in order to avoid the quick response 
times.  A difference in response time was found between the left- and right-handers 
on the manual sorting task and this task was novel to the participants as well as a 
manual task which could have affected how the participants responded to it.  
However, although left-handers took longer to respond it could be argued that 
planning was not necessarily occurring during this time as there was no evident sign 
of this from their completion time (in that they took longer than right-handers).  If 
planning had been occurring during the pause before the first response was made 
than it would be expected that left-handers would solve the task faster than right-
handers and this was not the case as right-handers solved the task, on average, in 
around 9 seconds faster than left-handers.  It therefore seems that a planning 
explanation is not supported by these tasks but planning cannot be fully dismissed 
and further experiments need to be carried out using different tasks in order to 
investigate this (see Chapter 8, section 8.3.).  However, It is possible that the left-
handers are displaying increased anxiety levels towards a novel task and this 
potential explanation is investigated in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, one problem with this discussion in that it is mainly speculative.  Because 
there is currently very little existing research in this area then it is difficult to 
theoretically justify the present findings and therefore suggestive explanations are 
made in some areas. 
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Chapter 7: Novelty, anxiety and performance 
 
 
7.0. Aims of Chapter  
 
This chapter seeks to further examine the reasons behind why left- and right-handers 
differed in their responses towards novel problems.  More specifically, this chapter 
will examine the possibility that the difference in response behaviour between left- 
and right-handers found in Chapter 4 was caused by differences in the anxiety levels 
of left- and right-handers. This chapter will outline existing personality and anxiety 
literature with regards to handedness and will also introduce literature on the 
Behavioural Inhibition System and the Behavioural Activation System as part of a 
study on behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation and handedness.  This 
study was carried out after the initial self-report anxiety study (see section 7.3. of this 
chapter).  Also outlined in this chapter will be a brief introduction to task complexity 
and task novelty which forms part of the final experiment.  The issue of novelty will be 
discussed with respect to novel problem solving and literature related to novelty and 
handedness will be considered.  The problem-solving task used to examine task 
novelty and task complexity will once again be the Tower of Hanoi.  However, as this 
task was extensively described in Chapter 4 an introduction to the task will not be 
included here.  However, a full description and explanation of the specific study will 
be outlined in section 7.10. of this chapter.  Thus 3 separate experiments will be 
covered in this chapter.  
 
 
7.1. Context & overview from other chapters 
 
Chapter 4 examined a problem-solving task in humans following previous work 
carried out by Cameron and Rogers (1999) who found that there was a difference 
between left- and right-handed primates in their approach to a novel problem-solving 
task.  The task (the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi) in Chapter 4 revealed that there was a 
difference in the way that left- and right-handers approached the problem in that left-
handers took significantly longer to start the problem than right-handers did.  
Following on from this, possible reasons for why this difference occurred were 
proposed and a series of studies to test these possible explanations were devised.   
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The main reasons that were proposed were: 1. There could be a difference in the 
emotional processing of left- and right-handers that could cause differences in how 
they react due to the nature of the dominant hemisphere in each group.  This could 
also be affected by which hypothesis of emotional processing is supported (the 
valence hypothesis and the right hemisphere hypothesis). 2. There could be a 
difference in planning between the two groups in that one group may be more likely 
to think the problem through before solving it.  Due to the pause by the left-handers 
before responding (and their more efficient solving of the problem) it was thought that 
left-handers might have been planning their solutions.  3.  There could be a 
difference in the behaviours and personalities of left- and right-handers in that one 
group may be more impulsive or extrovert than the other (in this case it was 
hypothesised that the right-handers would be more impulsive or extrovert) or 
alternatively one group may be more prone to stress and anxiety than the other 
group (it was hypothesised that the left-handed groups would exhibit higher anxiety 
levels).  The emotional processing explanation was examined in Chapter 5 and the 
planning explanation was examined in Chapter 6.  Personality was briefly addressed 
in Chapter 4 by means of an Impulsivity questionnaire and task. 
  
Emotional processing was examined through a discrimination task which required the 
participants to choose which of two faces showed an emotion, these faces were 
presented on both the right hand side and the left hand side of the screen (see 
Chapter 5 for details and results of this).  The issue of planning was examined 
through a series of tasks including a manual sorting task and a computerised sorting 
task (see chapter 6 for details and results of these).  Impulsivity was examined using 
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale for self-report levels of impulsivity and through a 
computerised matching task to examine reaction times (see Chapter 4 for details of 
this).  This means that the final issue to be examined is anxiety and this will be 
examined in the current chapter.   
 
Anxiety (both state and trait anxiety) will be measured using the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI - Speilberger, 1983).  Once again the Tower of Hanoi will be used as 
the problem solving task but this time additional conditions will be added such as 
novelty (where each participant will do the Tower twice but one group will complete 
the 4-disk tower twice while the other group will complete the 3-disk tower first and 
then the 4-disk tower afterwards).  By introducing these conditions novelty is 
addressed because the participant will either complete the 3- or 4-disk tower and 
then after completing a few additional tasks they will have to complete another tower.  
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Therefore, performance on the first tower will be treated as how participants respond 
to the tower when it is a novel task and the response to the second tower will 
examine the participant’s response to the problem when it is no longer novel. A 
straight forward comparison can be made when the participant completes the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi both times, however, some might argue that completing the 3-disk 
Tower of Hanoi followed by the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi does not directly measure the 
issue of novelty and this will be addressed in sections 7.7. and 7.8.5. (as it may be 
argued whether or not a 4-disk Tower is a different task completely from the 3-disk 
Tower or if it is a variant of the same task).  The second issue to be addressed using 
the Tower of Hanoi in this study is that of task complexity.  The performance of half of 
the participants will be examined on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi against the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi (within the condition) and thus the issue of how participants approach 
a relatively simple problem compared with a relatively complex problem is 
addressed. This problem is not only addressed with respect to the differences in 
strategy (if any) that the participants use but also with the issue of novelty and 
participant’s anxiety levels before completing each tower.  Additionally, the 
approaches by participants between the tasks with respect to task complexity will be 
examined, as half of the participants will complete the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first 
while the other half will complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first.  
 
 
7.2. Experiment 7: Stress and anxiety Introduction 
 
7.2.1. Stress and anxiety 
 
 A common finding of research on hand preference and personality is that left-
handers are reported to be more anxious than their right-handed counterparts (e.g. 
Orme, 1970; Hicks & Pellegrini, 1978; Davidson & Schaffer, 1983; Dillon, 1989).  If 
this is the case then this may help explain previous research findings (e.g. Cameron 
& Rogers, 1999; Hopkins & Bennett, 1994) that have reported a delay by left-handers 
when presented with a novel situation or object, i.e. they may be more apprehensive 
about the situation than right-handers.  Therefore with to respect to the current 
chapter self-report state and trait anxiety measurements will be recorded as part of 








Coren (1992) cited previous work carried out by Blau (1946) who stated that left-
handers are negative people who refuse to co-operate due to resistance to become 
right-handed.  From this Blau stated that psychiatrists should use the left-handed 
population to examine personality difficulties.  Numerous studies (e.g. Orme, 1970; 
Stein, 1973; Lester, 1987 & Camposano, Corail & Lolas, 1991) have examined the 
concept of personality with respect to left- and right-handedness and more 
specifically, whether or not personality differences exist between the two groups.  
Orme (1970) and Stein (1973) reported that left-handers generally exhibited more 
independence than right-handers but they also reported them to be unstable in their 
characteristics. Lester (1987) reported that left-handed females were less extraverted 
than right-handed females while Camposano et al. (1991) reported that left-handed 
males scored significantly higher on the lie scale of the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory than right-handed males. It has also been reported in numerous studies 
(e.g. Poreh, 1994; Poreh, Levin, Teves & States, 1997 & Shaw, Claridge & Clark, 
2001) that groups who demonstrate a mixed-hand preference often show increased 
levels of disorders such as schizophrenia.  Other studies (e.g. Spere, Schmidt, 
Riniolo & Fox (in press)) refer to handedness groups as right-handers and non-right-
handers and this therefore takes into account groups of mixed-handers.  Spere et al. 
found that mixed-handers had higher levels of shyness than strong right-handers. 
Only a few studies of handedness and personality related measures have been 
conducted with the normal population with most focussing on anxiety or depression, 
thus, a brief overview of personality and handedness will be presented here and 
more specifically review of the anxiety literature will be presented with respect to 
handedness.   
 
7.2.3. Handedness and general personality 
 
Coren (1994) reported that personality differences observed between left- and right-
handers might be due to the prejudice and discrimination which left-handers 
experience from some areas of society.  Coren added that this prejudice experienced 
by left-handers might have led to a change in their attitudes with the group displaying 
lower self-esteem or a more aggressive nature as a consequence.  In Coren’s (1994) 
study left-handers reported themselves as being more arrogant and cunning as well 
as cold hearted and cruel.  Coren (1994) added that left-handers are exposed to 
numerous situations in society that may lead to an increase in their stress or 
frustration levels (such as technological or physical problems which prevent them 
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from carrying out every day activities easily – such as using a tin opener).  Coren 
assessed hand preference in his study using the lateral preference inventory (a 4-
item questionnaire that asks which hand the individual uses to draw, throw a ball, use 
a rubber on paper and deal a card).  Coren only used participants who used the 
same hand for all 4 actions (and termed this a consistent right- or a consistent left-
hand preference).  Coren used the Interpersonal Adjective Scale which consisted of 
a series of pairs of personality traits and the participant was asked to choose the trait 
that they thought best described him or her most accurately.  Coren found that there 
were self-reported personality differences between left- and right-handers and more 
specifically that left-handers reported themselves to be more feisty, forceful and loud.  
This therefore contradicts the findings which report that left-handers are found to be a 
more anxious group overall (e.g. Hicks & Pellegrini, 1978).   
 
However, one problem with Coren’s study was that the instrument used consisted of 
a list of forced choice words which may not have necessarily been accurate in their 
descriptions of some of the participants.  The findings of these aforementioned 
studies could have important implications for the current study and the studies 
carried out in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  It is possible from the findings on handedness 
and personality research that left-handers may develop a sense of low self-esteem 
caused by the constant frustration that they come up against a series of tasks and 
situations that they often cannot do or certainly cannot do as well as they would have 
perhaps liked (again with something as simple as using a tin opener).  If this is the 
case then perhaps many left-handers have a belief they cannot perform some tasks 
efficiently and thus with respect to the studies carried out as part of the thesis they 
may believe that they will not be very good at a task or may worry that they will not 
complete it.  This may have an effect particularly when the task is relatively 
straightforward and therefore the pressure on the left-handers may possibly be 
elevated due to the pressure to be able to complete this.   
 
Studies on personality and handedness have also focussed upon depression.  
Overby (1994) found that there was a link between handedness and depression.  In 
his study he found that depressed women were at least twice as likely to be left-
handed or ambidextrous than right-handed.  However, one problem with determining 
handedness in studies such as that of Overby’s is that the participants indicated their 
hand preferences without having it measured by any form of inventory or test of hand 
skill therefore resulting in many cases in an inaccurate preference (this can be a 
problem, see chapter 3).  Bruder, Quitkin, Stewart, Martin, Voglmaier and Harrison 
(1989) reported that there was a higher incidence of left-handedness in groups 
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(especially females) who had mild to moderate levels of depression.  They added, 
however, that, there was a larger representation of strong right-handedness in a 
sample of people (both males and females) with melancholic unipolar depression 
compared to a sample of normal controls.  However, work by Davidson and Schaffer 
(1983) contradicted these findings as they reported that there were no significant 
differences on depression scores among a group of right- and left-handed college 
students.  Davidson and Schaffer (1983) examined the relationship between 
handedness and depression using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).  One 
criticism of these findings was that Davidson and Schaffer did not study the hand 
preferences of a group of depressed college students and thus the patterns of 
handedness within this group were ignored.   
 
7.2.4. Anxiety and stress 
 
Numerous studies that have examined personality and handedness have focussed 
specifically on anxiety in relation to handedness.  One common finding is that left-
handers are often found to be more anxious than right-handers (e.g. Hicks & 
Pellegrini, 1978; Orme, 1970).  However, there are many conflicting results in this 
area of research and these are reported in this section.  Orme (1970) reported that in 
a study of young adults that left-handers described themselves to be more 
introverted and shy than right-handers.  Additionally, Hicks and Pellegrini (1978) 
found that groups of left-handers and mixed-handers were significantly more anxious 
than groups of right-handers.  However, this finding was partially supported and 
partially dismissed by Wienrich, Wells and McManus (1982) who reported that 
strongly right-handed and strongly left-handed individuals were found to be 
significantly more anxious than those with a weak or mixed hand preference of any 
kind.  Wienrich et al. (1982) found that females were significantly more anxious than 
males.  They also found two conflicting results with respect to handedness.   
 
When handedness was considered as a binary factor (left-handers v right-handers) 
there was no difference found between the two groups’ anxiety scores.  However, 
when strength of handedness was considered it was found not that there was a 
difference between left- and right-handers’ anxiety scores but there was a difference 
between those with strong hand preferences (both left and right) and those with 
weaker hand preferences (considered in the study as mixed-handedness).  Wienrich 
et al. reported that those with a strong left- or right-hand preference had significantly 
higher anxiety scores than those who were considered to be mixed-handers 
(handedness in this study was measured using the Briggs and Nebes (1976) 
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adaptation of Annett’s handedness inventory).  Wienrich et al. propose that one 
reason for the difference in anxiety scores between strong left- and right-handers and 
those of mixed-handers might be because mixed-handers have a tendency to select 
more neutral responses on questionnaires or use negative responses to 
questionnaires that used wording such as ‘very’ or ‘always’  (Wienrich et al. classifies 
these statements as extreme wording).  Therefore, if mixed-handers are adopting this 
strategy then the total anxiety scores will be lower due to the neutral and negative 
responses.  Wienrich et al. conclude by proposing that the issue of mixed-
handedness should be addressed when examining future work on anxiety with 
respect to handedness.   
 
Davidson and Schaffer (1983) stated that left-handedness occurs through some form 
of dysfunction to the left hemisphere and thus this results in a greater susceptibility to 
anxiousness.  French and Richards (1990) propose that there is a discrepancy 
between the results of Wienrich et al. and of the results of Beaton and Moseley 
(1984) because only the trait measurement of anxiety is used in their studies.  If they 
had included state measurements of anxiety then the results might have been 
different.  Dillon (1989) hypothesised that the stronger the individual was lateralised 
to the left the higher their worry score would be.  Dillon found that left-handed 
individuals tended to worry more than right-handers and more specifically they worry 
about things such as how they are performing at school or college and about their 
relationships with others.  Merckelbach, de-Ruiter and Olff (1989) carried out 2 
studies looking at handedness and anxiety.  The first study looked at left- and right-
handed university students and their responses to the Fear Questionnaire and the 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory.  They found that there was no difference 
in phobic fears between left- and right-handers in this study.  The second study 
examined patients with anxiety disorder and a group of control participants.  It was 
found that there was no relationship between left-handedness and anxiety.   
 
Work by Beaton and Moseley (1984) failed to support the findings of Hicks and 
Pellegrini. Beaton and Moseley measured hand preference using Annett’s (1970) 
handedness inventory.  They divided their participants in to Annett’s 8 sub-groups of 
hand preference (See chapter 3, section 3.2.4. for details of this) and analysed the 
handedness data according to these categories.  Beaton and Moseley found that 
there was no relationship between anxiety scores and the hand preference classes.  
They also found that there was no relationship between anxiety and handedness 
when the hand used for writing determined handedness.  One reason for using 
classes of hand preference rather than dividing the sample in to left- and right-
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handers was that previous findings could be examined that found that the strength of 
hand preference was important when examining anxiety (e.g. Wienrich at al., 1982).  
One problem with using the 8 classifications of Annett is that there are uneven 
numbers across the categories and thus proposed hypotheses and analysis is made 
more difficult.  For example there are 127 participants in Beaton and Moseley’s 
sample that fall in to classification 1 (classification 1 is a pure right-hander) while only 
10 participants fall in to classification 5 (primarily right-handed with some left hand 
actions).  It should also be noted that Annett (1998) revised her hand classification 
system and deleted one category (classification 5) leaving 7 categories.  Thus, 
results such as those of Beaton and Moseley could be reanalysed using the new 
classification system.  Another problem is that the number of left- and right-handers 
are not equal in the sample and thus it is difficult to make handedness assumptions 
when the group sizes are vastly different.  For example, in Beaton and Moseley’s 
study there are 49 left-handed participants in total across the 3 left-handedness 
categories while there are 198 right-handed participants across the 5 right-
handedness categories.  Beaton and Moseley addressed the unequal number of 
participants across the 8 categories by carrying out non-parametric statistics on their 
data but they did not address the unequal numbers of left- and right-handers and 
thus it is more difficult to draw conclusions from the data.  However, using the writing 
hand of an individual is not a dependable measure of hand preference as a person 
may have been forced over to use the right hand rather than the left or they might do 
most things with the left hand but use the right hand for writing and thus this would be 
an inaccurate measurement of hand preference and would also be inaccurately 
reflected in the anxiety score.  Beaton and Moseley also stated that it was possible 
that Hicks and Pellegrini found a difference in anxiety scores between left- and right-
handers because there was an imbalance in the ratio of males to females in their 
sample.  As Hicks and Pellegrini did not state the number of males and females then 
Beaton and Moseley state that there could be a higher number of females than males 
in the sample thus causing higher anxiety levels (Wienrich et al. reported a significant 
effect of sex on anxiety in their study with females being significantly more anxious 
than males).   
 
French and Richards (1990) replicated and extended Beaton and Moseley’s (1984) 
study.  Beaton and Moseley reported that there was no relationship between 
handedness and anxiety using the trait questionnaire of the STAI to measure anxiety 
and measuring handedness by means of Annett’s (1970) questionnaire.  French and 
Richards extended this study by including the state anxiety questionnaire of the STAI 
as well as using the trait questionnaire.  They also addressed the issue that mixed-
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handers tended to use the neutral responses rather than choose the extreme choices 
on a questionnaire and stated that there is very little support to back this point up.  
French and Richards finally addressed the issue of the sample used by Beaton and 
Moseley.  Beaton and Moseley reported that the anxiety scores of their participants 
were much higher than average and French and Richards noted that in many cases 
the scores of a number of patients diagnosed with anxiety had much lower scores 
than the majority of participants used in this study and thus Beaton and Moseley’s 
sample must be questioned.  However, Beaton and Moseley (1991) reported in a 
follow up study that the unusually high anxiety scores scored by their participants 
was due to a discrepancy in the scoring of the trait questionnaire.  Beaton and 
Moseley had reversed some of the scoring of the items on the trait questionnaire that 
should not have been reversed and thus this resulted in a much higher trait anxiety 
score.   
 
French and Richards measured handedness in their study using the Annett (1970) 
inventory and asked the participants to complete the state and trait anxiety 
questionnaires of the STAI.  Therefore there were 8 different handedness groups in 
their study (see Chapter 3, figure 3.1. for details of Annett’s classifications).  Analysis 
revealed that there was no difference between handedness groups for either state or 
trait anxiety.  French and Richards also looked at the data of the males and females 
in the group and found that there were no differences between them on their state or 
trait scores.  The final factor that was investigated by French and Richards was the 
statement that mixed-handers respond using more neutral and less extreme 
responses.  They examined the response patterns made by each participant on the 
questionnaires (the scale on the state and trait questionnaire is a 4-point scale – see 
section 7.3. of this Chapter and appendices 23 & 24 for more details of this) and 
proposed that lack of response to points 1or 4 would indicate more neutral 
responses.  Analysis revealed that there was no difference between the handedness 
groups on the number of extreme responses given and thus no evidence that the 
more mixed-handed groups used more neutral responses than those with strong 
hand preferences (both left and right).  This was the case for both the state and trait 
anxiety scales.  French and Richards conclude by stating that in their sample there is 
no relationship between sex and anxiety or between handedness and anxiety for 
both state and trait measures.   
 
However, with respect to the response style on the questionnaires and the finding 
here that there was no difference between the handedness groups and extreme 
responses, French and Richards concluded by stating that there may be a bias in 
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other handedness questionnaires on how to group mixed-handers and thus different 
groups may reveal different results.  One confound with French and Richard’s work is 
that in order to get a large enough sample to analyse they collected data from five 
different groups and merged their scores.  Beaton and Moseley (1991) reanalysed 
their original data and found that their data supported that of French and Richards 
(1990).  The reanalysis of the data still supports the original (1984) findings of Beaton 
and Moseley that there is no relationship between handedness and anxiety.  Beaton 
and Moseley (1991) also examined the response patterns to the trait questionnaire in 
their study as done previously by French and Richards and found that there was no 
difference between the response of left-handers and right-handers on this.  
Consistent left-handers and consistent right-handers were those falling in to 
categories 1 (right handed) or 8 (left-handed) on the Annett (1970) inventory, 
participants falling in to categories 2 to 7 were considered to be mixed-handed of 
some degree.  However, this wide classification of mixed-handedness may also 
result in problems as there is a very big difference between someone in class 2 who 
uses the right-hand for almost everything except a broom, a spade and a needle and 
someone in class 7 who uses the left hand for what Annett classes as primary 
actions (writing, throwing, tennis racket, match, hammer and toothbrush) and uses 
the right hand for any other action.  Finally, Kovac (2000) reported that people with 
unpronounced or crossed preferences had higher levels of neuroticism and anxiety.  
 
Sex differences and anxiety is a widely researched topic.  One common finding is 
that females are more anxious than males (e.g. Wienrich et al. 1982), however, many 
researchers have also found that there is no difference in anxiety scores between 
males and females (e.g. Merckelbach et al., 1989; French & Richards, 1990).  
However, as this is not the main focal point of the chapter then this will not be 
expanded upon in any detail. 
 
7.2.5. Measurement of anxiety 
 
Another important factor that has to be taken in to account when examining studies 
of anxiety is the method used to measure anxiety.  This is important as different 
measurements may give different results.  One of the most frequently used scales, 
as well as one of the most reliable scales, is the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI - 
Speilberger, 1983).  This scale consists of a state anxiety questionnaire which 
requires the participant to respond to a series of statements about how they are 
feeling right at that moment in time (for more details of this questionnaire see section 
7.3. & appendix 23).  The trait anxiety questionnaire gives participants a number of 
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statements to respond to about how they generally feel (see appendix 24).  Hicks 
and Pellegrini (1978) and Wienrich et al. (1982) measured anxiety using the Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953) while Beaton and Moseley measured anxiety using the 
Trait scale from the STAI and Dillon (1989) used the student worry survey.  The 
student worry survey consists of 35 items that ask about topics such as school; 
relationships; health and appearance and social acceptance.  Individuals are asked 
to respond using two five-point scales – the first scale is concerned with the 
frequency of how often the individual experiences the topic of the statement, this 
ranges from 0 (never) to 4 (always).  The second scale is concerned with intensity 
and how much or how deeply the statement affects the individual (this again ranges 
from 0 (never to 4 (a great deal).   
 
Merckelbach et al. (1989) used a fear questionnaire to examine anxiety; they found 
that there was no difference between left- and right-handers and anxiety scores.  
However, in many cases again it can be argued that each different questionnaire is 
measuring a different concept.  Beaton and Moseley only used the trait scale of the 
STAI while Merckelbach et al. used a fear questionnaire which does not necessarily 
measure anxiety and certainly not anxiety towards a specific task or event.  Also, the 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale is a common measurement of anxiety but does not 
measure the same concept as the Student Worry scale carried out by Dillon (1989).  
In order to draw conclusions on handedness and anxiety standardised tests that 
have been shown to be both reliable and valid measurements of anxiety would need 
to be used rather than a number of different tests, some of which do not directly 
measure anxiety. 
 
Wienrich et al. (1982) state that various self-report measurements of anxiety such as 
the Manifest Anxiety Scale result in higher anxiety scores for females.  This could be 
due to a number of proposed reasons and Wienrich et al. state that one reason is 
that females more readily take part in psychology experiments.  Rosenthal (1965) 
adds that females who take part in psychology experiments are more anxious than 
those who do not take part in psychology experiments but he doe not carry out a 
specific study in order to arrive at this conclusion.  However, if certain inventories do 
result in higher scores for females then this could affect the overall result when 
combined with handedness and once again the choice of inventory used could result 
in a different conclusion from a separate study using an alternative inventory.  Thus, 
it is important to be consistent in the measurement used when measuring 
personality, and more specifically for the purposes of this chapter anxiety, as the 
choice of measurement may result in different findings. 
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To conclude, numerous studies have been carried out in order to examine specific 
personality differences between left- and right-handers and in particular if anxiety 
differences occur.  Findings of these studies have been mixed as a number of 
studies have reported that anxiety differences do exist with left-handers scoring 
significantly higher anxiety scores than right-handers (e.g. Orme, 1970; Hicks et al., 
1978; Dillon, 1989) while others have reported that there are no differences between 
anxiety scores of left- and right-handers (e.g. Beaton & Moseley 1984; Merckelbach 
et al., 1989; French & Richards, 1990).  However, most of these studies measure 
anxiety differently and it is therefore difficult to draw definite conclusions from these 
results.  In order to be able to make firm inferences consistent measurements of 
anxiety (and in some cases handedness) would have to be undertaken to ensure that 
valid conclusions could be drawn. 
 
7.2.6. Other aspects of anxiety and handedness 
 
Studies carried out with primates and human infants add support that right 
hemispheric motor control may be associated with anxiety and shyness, and 
consequently approach behaviour. Westergaard, Champoux, and Suomi (2001) 
found that there was an association between left-handed preference and higher 
levels of the stress hormone cortisol in infant rhesus monkeys. Adding to this, 
Westergaard, Byrne and Suomi (2000) reported that high cortisol levels at 6 months 
were predictive of a left-hand bias at both 6 months and 12 months of age.  Based on 
these findings Westergaard et al. argue that greater stress during infancy can cause 
a left-handed preference in rhesus monkeys.  
 
However, an alternative explanation of this finding might be that left-handedness, and 
right hemisphere motor dominance, increases anxiety and stress rather than stress 
causing the hand preference.  Additionally, Westergaard, Chavanne, Houser, 
Cleveland, Snoy, Suomi and Higley (2004) recently reported that there was a positive 
relationship between handedness scores in female rhesus macaques and 
concentration levels of the stress hormone cortisol (see Westergaard et al., 2004 for 
how handedness was measured and indexed).  That is, the higher the handedness 
score (where a positive score indicates a right-hand preference and a negative score 
indicates a left-hand preference) the higher the level of cortisol is.  This contradicts 
the previous findings of Westergaard et al. (2001) who reported that left-hand 
preference in infant macaques is associated with higher levels of cortisol.   
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These findings are supported by results from EEG studies with human infants. 
Temperamentally anxious human infants who exhibit shyness and behavioural 
inhibition to novel situations have been found to show greater right-hemisphere 
frontal activation compared to left frontal activation (e.g. Fox, Henderson, Rubin, 
Calkins & Schmidt, 2001; Schmidt, Fox, Schulkin & Gold, 1999). Behaviourally 
inhibited infants show greater right frontal activation as early 4 months (Schmidt & 
Fox, 1996) and greater right frontal EEG activity has been found to be associated 
with shyness in 7 year olds (Schmidt, et al., 1999).  Additionally, differences in right 
and left frontal activity at 4 months of age are predictive of sociability in infants during 
the second year of life (Schmidt & Fox, 1996).  These results provide strong 
converging evidence that indicates that right hemisphere activation, or dominance, is 
associated with behavioural inhibition in novel situations.  The issue of novelty will be 
discussed in more detail in section 7.10. 
 
7.2.7. Rationale for experiment 7 and hypotheses 
 
Orme (1970) found that left-handers tended to worry more while one of Dillon’s 
(1989) key findings was that left-handers are worried by factors such as how they do 
at school and time pressures.  In order to investigate these findings the current 
experiment was devised to investigate both state and trait anxiety.  Most studies only 
include data on trait anxiety and therefore it is important to see if the task itself may 
have an effect on the participants’ current anxiety levels (state anxiety).  In order to 
investigate both types of anxiety, Speilberger’s (1983) STAI will be used. 
 
This questionnaire used in this current study is a simple self-report measure of state 
and trait anxiety.  Participants will be asked to fill in the STAI (Speilberger, 1983) 
while taking part in an additional experiment (computerised IQ test – see Chapter 6, 
section 6.10. for details of this study).  Participants are asked to fill out the state 
anxiety questionnaire before they complete a computerised problem-solving task 
(half of the participants are given the state questionnaire before they see the 
instructions and the other half are given the state questionnaire after they see the 
instructions for the computerised test).  Participants will also be asked to complete 
the Trait anxiety questionnaire during the experimental session and handedness is 
assessed using the Peters (1998) adapted handedness inventory.   
 
Therefore, in the self-report anxiety task it is proposed that if left-handers are more 
worried by factors such as how they perform in tests and under time pressure that 
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left-handers will report themselves to be more anxious in the test situation than right-
handers (state anxiety questionnaire).  With respect to the trait anxiety questionnaire, 
as many studies report that left-handers are generally more anxious than right-
handers, it is hypothesised that left-handers will have higher trait anxiety scores than 




The idea of anxiety and handedness was originally carried out in conjunction with the 
computerised IQ test outlined in Chapter 6, section 6.10. (however, in order to report 
all anxiety results together and give a comprehensive discussion of the findings the 
anxiety part of the study carried out in conjunction with the computerised IQ test 
reported in Chapter 6 will be reported here).  Half of the participants were given the 
STAI before they received the instructions detailing what they would be required to 
do and the other half of the participants were given the instructions of the task they 
were required to do first and then were given then STAI to complete.  This was done 
in order to examine whether there was any difference in self-report anxiety levels 
between the group who were naive as to what the task was going to be and the 




81 participants took part in this study.  40 were male and 41 were female.  41 
participants were left-handed (20 males and 21 females) and 40 participants were 
right-handed (20 males and 20 females) as measured by the adapted Peters (1998) 
handedness inventory.   
 
7.3.2.  Materials 
State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Speilberger, 1983) 
The STAI consisted of 20 state questions and 20 trait questions (see appendices 23 
and 24, respectively).  For the state questions, participants were instructed that they 
would be given statements that had been used to describe people.  They were told to 
answer the statements according to how they felt right at that moment.  They were 
told that there were no right or wrong answers but not to spend too much time 
answering each statement.  Participants were given four options with which to 
respond to the statements, they were ‘not at all’; ‘somewhat’; ‘moderately so’ and 
‘very much so’.  The statements included examples such as ‘I am tense’ and ‘I am 
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relaxed’.  The trait questionnaire also contained 20 statements.  This time 
participants were instructed to read the statements and answer them according to 
how they generally feel.  The four previously mentioned options were given again as 
part of the trait questionnaire.  Examples of trait statements included ‘I feel nervous 
and restless’ and ‘I have disturbing thoughts’.  Each STAI item is given a score of 1 
to 4.  For 10 of the state and 11 of the trait statements, a rating of 4 indicates a high 
anxiety level response (e.g. ‘I feel frightened’ and ‘I feel upset’).  For the other 10 
state and 9 trait items on the questionnaire, a high score represents the absence of 
anxiety (e.g. ‘I feel calm’ and ‘I feel relaxed’).  For the absence of anxiety statements 
the scoring is reversed so they are scored 4, 3, 2, 1 instead of the anxiety present 
statements which are scored 1, 2, 3, 4.  The statements that correspond with the 
absence of anxiety in the state condition are 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19 and 20.   
The statements that correspond with the absence of anxiety in the trait condition are 
21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 39.  Scores for the state and trait scales are 
obtained by adding the twenty scores that make up each scale (and accounting for 
the reversed scoring).  Scores for each scale can vary between 20 and 80.  Space is 




Participants were given the Peter’s (1998) handedness Inventory to begin the study 
with.  This was given first in order to allow the participants to feel at ease with the 
experimenter before they were presented with the STAI.  Participants were instructed 
to fill out the handedness questionnaire reporting the hand that they preferred to 
perform a series of actions with.  Half of the participants (males and females and left 
and right-handers) were then given the instructions for the computer IQ task (see 
Chapter 6 for details of this task) and the other half of the sample was presented with 
the state instructions for the STAI (responding to the statements according to how 
they felt right at that moment) without receiving any details of what the task was that 
they would be required to do (the order in which the participants received the 
instructions for the computer task or the state questionnaire was counterbalanced 
according to sex and handedness).  Those who did not receive the instructions for 
the computer task were told that they were going to complete a computer task but 
first would be presented with a self-evaluation questionnaire.  They were asked to 
read the instructions carefully and complete the questionnaire accordingly.  Those 
who were given the instructions for the computer task first were asked to read 
through the instructions (as if they were going to go ahead with the task at that 
moment).  When they were familiar with the instructions the participants were 
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presented with the state form of the STAI to do prior to beginning the task.  The state 
questionnaire instructions were presented before and after the instructions for the 
computer task in order to see if knowing what the task was going to entail would 
affect the responses to the STAI compared to not knowing what the computer task 
was going to entail.  When the participants completed the state questionnaire they 
were given the instructions for the computer task to read through (if they had already 
read them as part of the post-instruction group they were encouraged to read over 
them again).  When the participants indicated they were happy with the instructions 
for the task they began it.  The 36 trials (10 word, 10 number, 8 RPM and 8 3-D 
folding) were presented randomly and participants had to respond using the number 
keys on the keyboard (see Chapter 6, section 6.10. for details of this task).  When the 
computer task was completed the final part of the study involved the trait 
questionnaire of the STAI.  This was presented to all participants at the end of the 
computer task.  Again participants were presented with the questionnaire and 
instructed to read the instructions carefully and respond to the statements according 
to the instructions.  This time they had to respond to the statements in the manner of 
how they generally feel.  Completion of this signalled the end of the experiment. 
 
 
7.4. Results   
 
a) Overall3 - State Anxiety 
 
Table 7.1: Overall State anxiety scores (with standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 36.4 (9.9) 35.5 (8.8) 35.9 (9.3) 
Right-handed 31.7 (6.9) 29.4 (5.9) 31.1 (6.4) 
Total 34.0 (8.4) 32.5 (8.0)  
 
The above table shows that overall (regardless of when the participant completed the 
State questionnaire in relation to receiving the instructions for the computerised IQ 
task) the group with the highest state anxiety score was the left-handed males 
followed by the left-handed females.  The group with the lowest State anxiety score 
was the right-handed females who on average had a state anxiety score of 29.4.  
                                                 
3 Overall means that the state scores taken before the task instructions in half of the 
participants and after the instructions in the other half of the participants were merged in to a 
single score.  
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Males on average had higher state anxiety scores than females (34.01 v 32.51) and 
left-handers had higher state anxiety scores on average than right-handers (35.92 v 
31.08). 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male 
vs. female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state anxiety scores of 
the STAI.  The main effect of handedness was significant F(1, 80) =8.069, p<0.01 
with left-handers showing a significantly higher level of state anxiety than right-
handers.  The effect of sex was not significant F(1, 80) =0.502, p>0.05.  The 
interaction also failed to reach significance F(1, 80) =0.045, p>0.05. 
 
b) Trait Anxiety (overall) 
 
Table 7.2: Overall Trait anxiety scores (with standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 42.5 (10.3) 42.4 (9.2) 42.5 (9.7) 
Right-handed 38.7 (8.9) 39.5 (8.9) 39.1 (8.9) 
Total 40.6 (9.6) 40.9 (9.1)  
 
The above table shows that overall left-handed males and left-handed females have 
the highest trait anxiety scores.  These scores are only marginally higher than the 
average trait anxiety score of right-handed females and right-handed males had the 
lowest trait anxiety score on average (38.7).  Left-handers had a higher average trait 
anxiety score than right-handers (42.46 v 39.09) and male and female trait anxiety 
scores were almost identical (average scores of 40.62 v 40.93 respectively). 
 
To examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male vs. 
female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the trait anxiety scores of the 
STAI.  The main effect of handedness was not significant [F(1, 80) =2.648, p>0.05].  
The main effect of sex was not significant [F(1, 80) =0.023, p>0.05] and the 
interaction also failed to reach significance [F(1, 80) = 0.088, p>0.05]. 
 
c) State questionnaire analysis: before instructions and after instructions.  
 
41 participants (21 left-handers and 20 right-handers) completed the state anxiety 
questionnaire before they were given the instructions for the task and 40 participants 
(20 left-handers and 20 right-handers) completed the state anxiety questionnaire 
after they were given the instructions for the task.  
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Completion of state anxiety questionnaire before seeing instructions for the computer 
task  
 
Table 7.3: Mean state anxiety scores of participants who completed the state 
questionnaire before receiving instructions for the computer task (with standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed  33.7 (10.0) 36.7 (10.5) 35.2 (10.3) 
Right-handed 35.4 (6.9) 28.6 (5.3) 32.0 (6.1) 
Total 34.6 (8.5) 32.7 (7.9)  
 
The above table shows the mean state scores of participants who completed the 
state questionnaire before receiving any instructions for the task they were going to 
complete.  This shows that left-handed females had the highest state anxiety score 
followed by right-handed males and then left-handed males.  Right-handed females 
had the lowest state anxiety scores on average suggesting that this group was the 
least anxious about the current situation out of the four groups.  Left-handers had 
higher mean state anxiety scores than right-handers (35.22 v 32) and males had 
higher state anxiety scores on average than females (34.55 v 32.67).   
 
In order to examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male 
vs. female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state anxiety scores of 
the STAI. These participants completed the state part of the questionnaire before 
they saw the instructions for the computer task.  The main effect of handedness was 
not significant [F(1, 40) =1.453, p>0.05].  The main effect of sex was not significant 
[F(1, 40) =0.501, p>0.05] and the interaction also failed to reach significance [F(1, 
40) = 3.397, p>0.05]. 
 
Trait anxiety questionnaire scores of participants who completed the state anxiety 
questionnaire before seeing the instructions for the computer task. 
 
Table 7.4: Mean trait anxiety scores of participants who completed the state 
questionnaire before receiving instructions for the computer task (with standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed  37.6 (10.4) 43.9 (7.8) 40.8 (9.1) 
Right-handed 39.8 (7.8) 39.6 (11.2) 39.7 (9.5) 
Total 38.7 (9.1) 41.8 (9.5)  
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The above table shows the mean trait scores of participants who completed the trait 
questionnaire before receiving any instructions for the task they were going to 
complete.  This shows that left-handed females had the highest trait anxiety score 
followed by right-handed males and then right-handed females.  Left-handed males 
had the lowest trait anxiety scores on average suggesting that this group was the 
least anxious in general out of the four groups.  Left-handers had marginally higher 
mean trait anxiety scores than right-handers (40.76 v 39.7) and females had higher 
trait anxiety scores on average than males (41.76 v 38.7).   
 
In order to examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male 
vs. female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the trait anxiety scores of 
the STAI.  These participants had completed the state anxiety questionnaire before 
they saw the instructions for the computer task.  The main effect of handedness was 
not significant F(1, 40) =0.129, p>0.05.  The main effect of sex was not significant 
F(1, 40) =1.085, p>0.05.  The interaction also failed to reach significance F(1, 40) = 
1.232, p>0.05. 
 
Completion of state anxiety questionnaire after seeing instructions for the computer 
task  
 
Table 7.5: Mean state anxiety scores of participants who completed the state 
questionnaire after receiving instructions for the computer task (with standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed  37.4 (10.8) 34.1 (6.6) 35.8 (8.7) 
Right-handed 28.8 (4.1) 31.3 (7.2) 30.0 (5.6) 
Total 33.1 (7.4) 32.7 (6.9)  
 
The above table shows the mean state anxiety scores of participants who completed 
the state questionnaire after receiving instructions for the computer task.  Left-
handed males had the highest mean state anxiety score followed by left-handed 
females and then right-handed females.  Right-handed males had the lowest mean 
state scores.  Left-handers had higher average state scores than right-handers 
(35.75 v 30.03) and males had marginally higher mean state scores than females 
(33.09 v 32.69). 
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In order to examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male 
vs. female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state anxiety scores of 
the STAI.  The main effect of handedness was significant F(1, 39) =5.635, p<0.05 
with left-handers reporting themselves to have higher state anxiety scores after 
seeing the instructions for the computer task than the right-handers who saw the 
instructions.  The main effect of sex was not significant F(1, 39) =0.028, p>0.05 and 
the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 
39) = 1.444, p>0.05. 
 
Trait anxiety questionnaire scores of participants who completed the state anxiety 
questionnaire after seeing the instructions for the computer task. 
 
Table 7.6: Mean trait anxiety scores of participants who completed the state 
questionnaire after receiving instructions for the computer task (with standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Male Female Total 
Left-handed 45.8 (9.7) 40.7 (10.6) 43.3 (10.2) 
Right-handed 38.9 (9.9) 39.4 (6.8) 39.1 (8.3) 
Total 42.3 (9.8) 40.0 (8.7)  
 
The above table shows the mean trait anxiety scores of participants who completed 
the trait questionnaire after receiving instructions for the computer task.  Left-handed 
males had the highest mean trait anxiety score followed by left-handed females and 
then right-handed females.  Right-handed males had the lowest mean trait score.  
Left-handers had higher average trait scores than right-handers (43.25 v 39.13) and 
males had higher mean trait scores than females (42.34 v 40.03). 
 
In order to examine these differences a 2x2 (handedness (left vs. right) by sex (male 
vs. female)) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the trait anxiety scores of 
the STAI.  The main effect of handedness was not significant F(1, 39) = 1.965, 
p>0.05.  The main effect of sex was also not significant F(1, 39) =0.618, p>0.05.  The 
interaction also failed to reach significance F(1, 39) =0.898, p>0.05. The participants 
in this group saw the instructions for the computer task before they completed the 
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The main findings from experiment 7 were: 
 
 There was a main effect of handedness on the overall state anxiety scores 
with left-handers reporting themselves to be significantly more anxious at that 
moment than right-handers.  There were no other main effects or interactions. 
 
 There were no significant main effects on the overall trait anxiety scores. 
 
 When given the state anxiety questionnaire before seeing the task 
instructions (the before group) there were no significant main effects or 
interactions. 
 
 There were no significant main effects on the trait anxiety scores of the 
participants in the ‘before’ group. 
 
 When given the state anxiety questionnaire after seeing the task instructions 
(the after group) there was a significant main effect of handedness with left-
handers reporting themselves to be significantly more anxious at that moment 
than right-handers. 
 
 There were no significant main effects on the trait anxiety scores of the 





In this experiment it was hypothesised that left-handers would have higher state 
anxiety scores overall than right-handers.  This hypothesis was supported as left-
handers reported themselves to be more anxious (in their responses to the state 
anxiety questionnaire) at that specific moment than right-handers.  It is difficult to 
draw conclusions about previous studies concerning anxiety and handedness that 
support these findings as most anxiety measurements reported are general anxiety 
measurements and are usually forms of trait or generalised anxiety. Thus studies 
such as Hicks et al.  (1978), Wienrich et al.  (1982) and Beaton and Moseley (1984) 
cannot be directly compared with state anxiety measurements as they only used trait 
measurements of anxiety.  However, French and Richards (1990) used the state 
anxiety questionnaire (Speilberger, 1983) but found that there was no relationship 
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between state anxiety scores and handedness, which does not support the current 
findings.   
 
However, there were a few problems with French and Richards’s study and their 
measurement of state anxiety.  In the French & Richard study the state anxiety 
questionnaire was given alongside the trait questionnaire and a handedness 
questionnaire.  The state questionnaire was not used to measure the mood of the 
participant in relation to a task or situation and thus this differs from the current study 
which measures how the participant feels in relation to a known or unknown 
experimental task that they are about to complete.  Therefore, it is possible that the 
state scores may be lower in French and Richard’s sample for this reason.  Another 
problem with French and Richard’s study was that they did not have a big enough 
sample. Thus they combined five different samples, one of which was composed of 
people attending interview for a place to study psychology at university.  The problem 
with combining the sample is that state measurements of anxiety (according to how 
they felt at that moment in time) were being measured and therefore it is probable 
that the group waiting to be interviewed for a place at university would be more 
anxious than the other 4 groups and this would affect the mean overall state score.  
In addition, French and Richards reported that there were not enough left- or mixed-
handers in each group to analyse the data separately and therefore that is why they 
had to merge the groups but perhaps it would have been best to have just combined 
the four groups of students. One final note on French and Richard’s study is that 
when the handedness scores were split in to Annett’s (1970) handedness 
classifications that there were 211 pure-right-handers while there were only 15 pure 
left-handers.  It therefore makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship 
between handedness and anxiety scores when right-handers heavily populated the 
sample.  Upon examining the mean state anxiety scores of French and Richard’s 
sample consistent left-handers scored lower on state anxiety than right-handers did 
indicating that right-handers were more anxious at that moment in time.  This does 
not support the findings of my current study where left-handers had a higher mean 
state anxiety score than right-handers.  In the current study (study 1) the number of 
male and female left- and right-handers are matched as closely as possible.  
However, the binary categorisation of the sample in to left- and right-handedness 
was used, as there were not enough available participants in order to divide the 
group in to further sub-divisions of handedness.  However, most participants scored 
strongly on the Peters (1998) adapted handedness questionnaire which suggests 
that the sample consisted mainly of strong left- and right-handers. 
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It was also hypothesised that left-handers would score higher on the trait anxiety 
questionnaire than right-handers.  This hypothesis was not supported. This finding 
fails to support the findings of Orme (1970), Hicks and Pellegrini (1978) and Dillon 
(1989) who reported than left-handers were found to be significantly more anxious in 
general (trait anxiety).  However, Hicks and Pellegrini used the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale to measure anxiety while Orme used an emotional instability scale that 
he constructed himself and Dillon used the Student Worry Scale thus in using 
different instruments to quantify anxiety it is difficult to draw parallels with their 
findings as each instrument may measure different elements of anxiety.  The findings 
of the current study, however, support the work of Wienrich et al. (1982); Beaton and 
Moseley (1984); French and Richards (1990) and Beaton and Moseley (1991) who 
used the trait questionnaire of the STAI and found no relationship between trait 
anxiety and handedness (however, see earlier in this section for details about 
Wienrich et al.’s. findings). Left-handers (both males and females) did score higher, 
on average, on the trait questionnaire than right-handers but these differences were 
not significant.  It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
state anxiety scores of left- and right-handers in the condition where the state 
questionnaire was given before the instructions to the computer task.  This 
hypothesis was not supported.  The left-handed females had the highest state scores 
here but right-handed males also had relatively high state scores. It was also 
hypothesised that there would be a difference between the state anxiety scores of 
left- and right-handers in the condition where the state questionnaire was given after 
the instructions to the computer task.  This hypothesis was supported; there was a 
significant effect of handedness where left-handers reported themselves to be 
significantly more anxious than right-handers after seeing the instructions for the 
computer task.  With respect to sex differences and anxiety scores it was found that 
on average males had higher state anxiety scores than females (although this 
difference was not significant) and there was no difference between male and female 
mean trait anxiety scores. These results support previous work by Merckelbach et al. 
(1989) and French and Richards (1990) who also found no sex differences between 
anxiety scores and fails to support Wienrich et al.’s. (1982) finding that females had a 
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Converging evidence from a number of fields suggests that the right-hemisphere is 
more involved in processing negative emotional information (see chapters 4 & 5) and 
that right-hemisphere activation is associated with temperamental shyness, anxiety, 
and behavioural inhibition in human infants (Schmidt et al., 1999), and behavioural 
inhibition in primate’s motor responses to novel objects (Hopkins & Bennett, 1994; 
Rogers, 1999; Cameron & Rogers, 1999). Thus, research consistently indicates that 
right hemisphere dominance, or activation, can result in behavioural inhibition.  Gray 
(1982) suggested that we have two independent neural behavioural systems.  He 
states that these two systems are motivational systems and they influence our 
underlying behaviour.  The first is known as the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) 
and the second the Behavioural Approach (or Activation) System (BAS).  These two 
systems are in more simplistic terms related to either anxiety (BIS) or impulsivity 
(BAS) and it is proposed that the BIS system relates to avoidance behaviour while 
the BAS relates to approach behaviour (Carver & White, 1994). The BIS is related to 
negative, inhibitory stimuli and is activated by reaction to new or unpleasant stimuli 
and signs of frustration.  More specifically, the BIS is sensitive to any form of 
punishment (including non-reward) and reacts to novelty.  Carver and White (1994) 
add that when the BIS is activated that the behaviour of the individual may become 
inhibited in such a way that it may avoid negative outcomes but effect the individual 
in moving towards goals.  If an individual is susceptible to high BIS sensitivity then 
the prospect of a task or situation that involves impending punishment, danger of 
some form or a negative outcome would result in high levels of anxiety in this 
individual.  However, if another person in this situation had low BIS sensitivity then 
they would not experience such levels of anxiety and would probably not be affected 
by the outcome and respond with very little distress compared to the person with high 
BIS sensitivity.  The BIS can also be activated by stressful life events (Gable, Reis & 
Elliot, 2000).  Gray (1981) states that the activation of the BIS makes the individual 
experience negative feelings such as frustration, fear and anxiety.  In addition, 
Stuettgen, Hennig, Reuter and Netter (2005) report that people with high BIS scores 
may be prone to high levels of anxiety but this does not mean that they will display 
constant high levels of trait anxiety.  Stuettgen et al. add that individuals who are 
prone to high anxiety levels possibly adopt a series of coping strategies in order to 
reduce their anxiety levels.  They state that these strategies are behavioural but do 
not give any examples of these.   The BAS, however, is activated by positive stimuli 
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and results in approach behaviour.  This system is related to appetitive behaviour 
and is activated by behaviour such as reward, incentive and non-punishment.  When 
the BAS is activated the behaviour experienced is the opposite from the BIS.  
Behaviour includes moving towards or attaining goals and experiencing positive 
emotions such as happiness and hope (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).   
 
As the BIS is related to anxiety and the BAS is related to impulsivity, Gray (1981) 
suggested that differences in the activation of the individual systems can result in 
personality differences (for example a highly activated BAS system would result in a 
more impulsive person).  In general terms the BIS is related to negative affect while 
the BAS is related to positive affect and the two systems are completely independent 
of one another.  Therefore individuals can experience a number of combinations of 
BIS/BAS sensitivity.  For example, one individual may experience high BAS 
sensitivity but low BIS sensitivity while another may experience low BIS and low BAS 
sensitivity.  Therefore if one specific stimulus were shown then a group of people 
would react in a number of different ways depending on which of the behavioural 
systems were activated and to what extent. These differences in responses are 
thought to be particularly important in determining emotional (and behavioural) 
responses when faced with a threatening situation (Meyer, Olivier and Roth, 2005). 
 
One of the main problems with measuring behavioural activation and behavioural 
inhibition is the lack of a reliable and standardised available measurement.  
Instruments currently used to measure behavioural activation and inhibition include 
the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire which examines extroversion and neuroticism 
scores.  However, one problem with this is that Gray (1981) states that the data 
taken from the EPQ does not effectively fit the theory of behavioural inhibition or 
activation.  He adds that extravert behaviour is not a variant of impulsivity and that 
high levels of impulsivity would lead to extraversion rather than represent the same 
concept.   Other common measurements used are the Trait Anxiety Inventory that is 
commonly used to measure behavioural inhibition (Speilberger, 1983) and the 
Impulsiveness-Venturesomeness-Empathy Scale (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1996), 
which is often used to measure behavioural activation/approach.   Carver and White 
(1994) developed a questionnaire to measure behavioural inhibition and activation 
and this questionnaire is thought to be one of the best attempts at quantifying these 
behaviours and has been widely used. Carver and White developed a BIS/BAS 
questionnaire where 4 different scales were examined.  One scale was devoted 
entirely to the behavioural inhibition system while the other 3 scales were divided in 
to 3 sub-scales of the behavioural activation system.  These scales were reward 
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responsiveness; drive and fun seeking.    One problem with these 3 sub-scales was 
that Carver and White did not make it entirely clear how they divided the scales and 
gave no justification for why only these 3 categories were used.  However, they did 
report that there was a very high reliability factor using these sub-scales.  Carver and 
White reported that individuals scoring highly on the BIS scale were more anxious 
and nervous than those scoring low on the BIS scale.  They also reported that BIS 
scores have been found to predict self-reported anxiety (on the Manifest Anxiety 
Scale), this would suggest that an individual scoring highly on the BIS questionnaire 
would be expected to report a high level of anxiety on a self-report scale (although it 
is not distinguished whether this refers to state or trait anxiety) while another 
individual scoring low on the BIS questionnaire would be expected to have low self-
report levels of anxiety.  Quilty and Oakman (2003), however, state that differences 
between individuals in the activation of the BIS are thought to underlie trait anxiety 
while differences between individuals in the activation of the BAS are thought to 
underlie trait-impulsivity.  
 
7.6.2. Rationale and hypotheses for experiment 8 
 
In relation to the current study, as behavioural inhibition is a key characteristic of 
increased anxiety (Gray, 1981) it is possible that increased anxiety in the left-handers 
caused them to delay their initial move (either to begin problem solving or to 
approach a situation or object).  Therefore it was decided to investigate behavioural 
inhibition and behavioural activation in left- and right-handers.  Behavioural inhibition 
is often cited as being related to anxiety and novelty and therefore this could be 
related to the previous findings found in the Tower of Hanoi study in Chapter 4 
(sections 4.3. – 4.7.).   Additionally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
approach behaviour exhibited by left and right-handers could be attributed to 
personality differences between the two groups (see sections 7.2 to 7.4. in this 
chapter).  Previous research regarding handedness and anxiety has reported that 
left-handers have been found to be significantly more anxious than right-handers, 
thus, with respect to the BIS/BAS questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994) it would be 
expected that left-handers would score higher on the BIS questionnaire than right-
handers as the BIS is related to negative affect and anxiety.  On the contrary, as the 
BAS is related to impulsivity then it could be proposed that right-handers would be 
more impulsive than left-handers on each of the 3 BAS dimensions (although in an 
earlier experiment – see chapter 4, section 4.9. left-handers reported themselves to 
be more impulsive than right-handers).  However, a previous study that examined 
impulsivity using an impulsivity-matching task (see chapter 4, sections 4.11. & 4.12.) 
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reported that right-handers were more impulsive in their responses than left-handers 
to a set of novel stimuli. Little research has been carried out on BIS/BAS and 
handedness so predictions are not based on direct previous findings.   
 
Experiment 8 involves participants completing Carver and White’s (1994) self-report 
BIS/BAS questionnaire.  This is carried out alongside the ‘Fastest Finger First’ task 
reported in Chapter 6 (section 6.7.).  As left-handers are right hemisphere dominant 
and this is linked to the inhibitory system of the brain then it is hypothesised that the 
behavioural inhibition scores of left-handers will be higher than the behavioural 
inhibition scores of right-handers.  As right-handers are left hemisphere dominant 
and this is linked to the behavioural activation system, it is hypothesised that for each 









75 participants took part in this study.  37 were male and 38 were female.  38 
participants were left-handed (19 males and 19 females) and 37 participants were 
right-handed (18 males and 19 females).  All participants had normal colour vision 
and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.   
 
7.7.2. Materials  
 
The adapted version of Peter’s (1998) handedness questionnaire was used (see 
appendix 2). The BIS/BAS questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994) consisted of a list of 
24 statements that the participant was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with.  
For each statement, the participant had to indicate how much they agreed with each 
statement using very true for me; somewhat true for me; somewhat false for me or 
very false for me.  Participants were instructed to respond to all items and not leave 
any blank.  They were also instructed that they should only respond to each 
statement once and to treat each statement as if it were the only item.  For each 
statement a box was given with the four choices in boxes and the participant was 
asked to mark the box with their response.  The scoring system measured the 
participants’ Behavioural Activation levels and behavioural inhibition levels.  All 
questions were scored giving each ‘very true for me’ answer 1 point, each ‘somewhat 
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true for me’ answer 2 points; ‘somewhat false for me’ 3 points and ‘very false for me’ 
answer 4 points.  Questions 2 and 22 were scored using the inverse of the scoring 




Participants were asked to complete the BIS/BAS questionnaire in the same study as 
the ‘Fastest Finger First’ experiment (see Chapter 6 for details of this).  They were 
asked to read the instructions carefully and answer as honestly as they could.  Once 
they had completed the BIS/BAS questionnaire they were asked to read the 
instructions for the ‘Fastest Finger First’ task and complete it when they were ready.  
The ‘Fastest Finger First’ task was described along with the other planning tasks in 
Chapter 6 and the BIS/BAS results are described here as they fit in with the anxiety 
and inhibitory explanations that were proposed in Chapter 4. 
 
 




There were 4 different measurements taken from the questionnaire. 
 
BAS drive, BAS fun seeking, BAS reward responsiveness (all behavioural approach 
system) and BIS (behavioural inhibition system). 
 
Table 7.7: Mean male and female BIS/BAS questionnaire scores (with standard 











Male 10.1 (2.2) 11.6 (1.8) 16.1 (1.8) 20.9(3.7 
Female 10.1 (2.2) 10.8 (1.8) 16.3 (2.2 23.5 (3.5) 
Total 10.1 (2.2) 11.2 (1.8) 16.2 (2.0) 22.2(3.8) 
 
Table 7.7 shows that males and females scored exactly the same on average on the 
BAS drive scale.  Males scored slightly higher on the BAS fun seeking scale but 
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lower, on average, on the reward responsiveness scale.  On the BIS scale females 
scored higher than males. 
 
Table 7.8: Mean left and right-handers’ BIS/BAS questionnaire scores (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
 
 
Table 7.8 shows that right-handers scored, on average, slightly higher than left-
handers on the BAS drive scale.  Right-handers scored slightly higher on the BAS fun 
seeking scale but lower, on average, on the reward responsiveness scale.  On the BIS 
scale left-handers scored higher than right-handers. 
 














10.0 (2.1) 11.6 (2.0) 16.0 (1.8) 20.1 (1.91) 
Female 
right 
10.4 (2.2) 11.0  (2.2) 16.0 (2.4) 22.8 (3.87) 
Male 
left 
10.2 (2.8) 11.6 (1.6) 16.2 (1.9) 21.6 (4.69) 
Female 
left 
9.8 (2.2) 10.6 (1.3) 16.7 (1.9) 24.1 (2.94) 
 
Table 7.9 shows that on the BAS drive scale all scores were, on average, similar.  
Female right-handers scored the highest on this scale and female left-handers 
scored the lowest but there was only a difference of 0.53 between the highest and 










Left 10.0 (2.2) 11.1 (1.6) 16.4 (1.9) 22.8 (4.1) 
Right 10.2 (2.1) 11.2 (2.1) 16.0 (2.1) 21.5 (3.3) 
Total 10.1 (2.2) 11.2 (1.8) 16.2 (2.0) 22.2 (3.8) 
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seeking scale; they were closely followed by male right-handers (only 0.07 behind) 
and them female right-handers.  Female left-handers scored the lowest on the BAS 
fun seeking scale.  All scores were similar on the BAS reward responsiveness scale, 
female left-handers scored the highest and male and female right-handers scored the 
lowest.  However, there was only a 0.68 difference between the highest and the 
lowest score.  On the BIS scale, female left-handers scored the highest (they scored 
on average 24.11 out of a possible 28).  Female right-handers scored the next 




A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on BAS drive scores.  There were no main effects found. F<1. 
 
BAS Fun Seeking 
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on BAS fun seeking scores.  There was a significant main effect of sex F(1, 71) = 
3.981, p=0.05 with males scoring higher than females (mean 11.59 (1.79) vs. 10.76 
(1.78) respectively).  There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 71) = 0.123, 
p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 71), 0.285, p>0.05. 
 
BAS Reward Responsiveness 
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on BAS reward responsiveness scores.  There were no main effects found.  F<1. 
 
BIS   
 
A 2 x 2 (handedness (left Vs. right) by sex (male Vs female)) ANOVA was carried out 
on BIS scores.  There was a significant main effect of sex F(1, 71) = 10.20, p<0.01 
(one-tailed) with females scoring higher than males (mean 23.45 (3.45) vs. 20.86 
(3.65) respectively).  There a significant main effect of handedness F(1, 71) = 2.918, 
p<0.05 (one-tailed) with left-handers having higher BIS scores than right-handers. 
The interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 71) = 
0.009, p>0.05. 
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The main findings from experiment 8 were: 
 There were no main effects or interactions on BAS drive scores. 
 
 There were no main effects or interactions on BAS reward scores. 
 
 Males scored significantly higher on BAS fun questions than females but 
there were no other main effects or interactions. 
 





In this study three different measurements of behavioural activation and a single 
measure of behavioural inhibition were taken using Carver and White’s (1994) 
BIS/BAS Questionnaire.  Males and females scored almost identically on the BAS 
Drive Scale and the BAS Reward Responsiveness Scale but males scored higher on 
the BAS fun seeking scale than females.  With regards to behavioural inhibition 
scores females scored higher than males.  Left and right-handers scored almost 
identical scores on each of the BAS measurements but left-handers scored higher on 
the BIS questions than right-handers.  It was hypothesised that right-handers would 
score higher on the BAS questions than left-handers.  This hypothesis was not 
supported, as almost all BAS scores were identical, on average, for left- and right-
handers and there was no significant main effect of handedness on any of these 
scores.  It was also hypothesised that left-handers would score higher on the BIS 
questionnaire than right-handers.  It was found that on average left-handers did score 
significantly higher on the BIS scores than right-handers (one-tailed p=0.046). It is 
difficult to relate this finding to previous research as, to my knowledge, there is very 
little available literature concerning BIS/BAS and handedness.  However, it was 
expected that left-handers would score higher on the BIS questionnaire as it is 
related to inhibitory behaviour and is also said to reflect anxiety.  A number of 
previous studies (see section 7.2.) have reported that left-handers are more anxious 
than right-handers then it would be expected that left-handers would also therefore 
display a higher BIS score.   
 
Carver and White (1994) reported that the behavioural inhibition system reacts to 
new or novel objects and situations and the presence of such stimuli causes the 
individual to become inhibited in their behaviour in some way.  One prediction in the 
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current study (see next section for details of this) is that there may be an effect of 
novelty on the performance of left- and right-handers and it would be expected that 
left-handers would be more anxious about a novel situation than right-handers (this 
relates back to the dominance of the right hemisphere and the link to shyness, 
anxiety and behavioural inhibition in human infants (e.g. Schmidt et al, 1999) and to 
behavioural inhibition to novel objects in various primates (e.g. Hopkins & Bennett, 
1994; Cameron & Rogers, 1999).  If the aspect of novelty is combined with the 
prospect of a task to complete in which the participant does not know the outcome 
then high levels of anxiety would be displayed by someone with high BIS sensitivity 
(e.g. Stuettgen et al., 2005).   
 
In the current study each participant was informed that they were going to take part in 
a computerised task which was similar to the ‘Fastest finger first’ task on ‘Who wants 
to be a millionaire’  (see chapter 6, section 6.7. for details of this task) and this task 
was novel to all participants and was also timed.  The BIS questionnaire refers to 
general situations (trait) but a state version might also be useful to investigate 
participant’s immediate feelings about a situation.  The BAS is related to impulsivity 
and previous findings (see chapter 4) reported that there was no difference between 
left- and right-hander’s self-report impulsivity scores (Although on the impulsivity 
matching task right-handers responded significantly faster than left-handers to a 
series of stimuli).  However, as previously mentioned, there was no difference 
between left- and right-hander’s responses to the BAS questionnaires thus it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about impulsivity and handedness. 
 
It was also hypothesised that females would score higher on the BIS questionnaire 
than males as females are often reported to have higher anxiety levels than males 
(e.g. Wienrich et al, 1982).  In this study there was a significant effect of sex on BIS 
scores with females scoring significantly higher than males and therefore the 
hypothesis was supported.  It was hypothesised that there would be no difference 
between male and female BAS scores.  However, there was a main effect of sex on 
Bas fun seeking scores with males scoring significantly higher than females.  There 
was no effect of sex however on BAS reward responsiveness or BAS drive.   
 
As research concerning the behavioural inhibition and activation systems is very 
limited, particularly with respect to handedness, it is difficult to discuss these findings 
with respect to previous studies.  However, as the BIS is associated with anxiety or 
inhibitory behaviour and the BAS with impulsivity then conclusions can be drawn 
using these concepts.  It can be concluded that again there was a difference between 
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left- and right-hander’s inhibition scores with left-handers displaying higher inhibition 
scores (BIS) than right-handers.  This adds to the growing body of evidence that 
currently exists which reports left-handers as being a more anxious or inhibited 
population, in general, than right-handers.  This is also backed up in the current 
series of experiments through two different studies involving state anxiety scores 
(see sections 7.3. & 7.10. of this chapter) where left-handers report themselves in the 
test/experimental situation to feel more anxious than right-handers.  However, this is 
not the case for trait anxiety.  Females are often reported to be more anxious than 
males (again see Wienrich et al., 1982) and this again was found using the BIS 
questionnaire.  Very little literature also exists concerning impulsivity and 
handedness (see chapter 4, section 4.9.) however it would be expected that right-
handers would be more impulsive than left-handers and this in terms of the BAS 
questions of the questionnaire was not found to be the case.  A final aspect that 
needs to be explored further is the concept of novelty in relation to anxiety. The 
following study examines whether novelty affects anxiety levels in left- and right-
handers.  
 
Future studies will examine the correlation between BIS scores and state/trait anxiety 
scores in relation to handedness where, based on current literature and findings, it 
would be expected that generally those with high BIS scores would also score highly 
on state/trait anxiety and with respect to handedness left-handers would score higher 
on BIS questionnaire and on anxiety questionnaires. 
 
 
7.10. Experiment 9: Tower of Hanoi (novelty and complexity) and stress 




The first task that participants were asked to complete was Peter’s revised 
handedness questionnaire (1998) and participants were asked to answer the 28 
questions and a handedness score was calculated from their responses.   
 
A detailed overview of the Tower of Hanoi was outlined in Chapter 4 (see section 4.3) 
and therefore this will not be covered again in this section.  However, more 
specifically this brief introduction will outline the current experiment and focus upon 
the issues of task novelty, task anxiety and task complexity. 




With respect to anxiety and novelty of a task Suddon and Link (1959) carried out a 
study using left- and right-handed participants to operate a machine (the Toronto 
Complex Coordinator).  Left-handers in this study were allowed 5 minutes practice on 
the machine while right-handers were given no practice.  Suddon and Link found that 
the left-handers’ performances were better than those of right-handers (in that the 
made fewer errors).  Suddon and Link proposed that the left-handers’ experience of 
previously operating the machine might account for their superior performance on it.  
However, they conclude by proposing that left-handers might experience less anxiety 
in completing this task as the machine is designed for right-handed use and therefore 
the task is ‘unnatural’ to the left-hander and thus this will lead to the expectation that 
the left-hander should not be able to operate the machine and therefore any success 
in performance will be acknowledged whereas right-handers would be expected to be 
able to operate the machine and thus there would be added pressure for them to be 
able to do so.   
 
This logic contradicts several other studies that report that if a task is new or 
unnatural to a left-hander then this will increase their anxiety levels (e.g. Cameron & 
Rogers, 1999). Most of these studies involve non-human participants.   As previously 
reported, Cameron and Rogers (1999) found that there was a difference between 
left- and right-handed marmosets in their response behaviour towards a novel object 
in that left-handers took significantly longer to approach and touch the novel object.   
Roger’s (1999) replicated this finding and reported a difference in approach 
behaviour to a novel object between left-handed and right-handed marmosets.  
These findings extend earlier work by Hopkins and Bennett (1994) who found that 
left-handed chimpanzees were slower to approach novel objects than right-handed 
chimpanzees.  However, Watson and Ward (1996) who investigated temperament 
and problem solving in the small-eared bush baby found contradictory results. They 
found that left-handed bush babies were less inhibited in their approach to novel 
objects than right-handed subjects.   
 
Thus, it appears that the introduction of a novel object may influence the delay in the 
response of left-handers compared to right-handers.  This finding was also supported 
by Rogers (1999) who found a difference in approach behaviour to a novel object 
between left-handed and right-handed marmosets and by Hopkins and Bennett 
(1994) who found that left-handed chimpanzees were slower to respond to novel 
objects than right-handed chimpanzees.  Rogers (1999) suggested that these 
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findings could be accounted for due to the differences in hemispheric specialisation 
for processing novel stimuli and controlling emotional responses.  She proposed that 
the left hemisphere controls exploratory behaviour while the right hemisphere is 
associated with inhibitory or avoidance behaviour and thus this would suggest that 
right-handers would be influenced by the dominant left hemisphere and would be 
more likely to demonstrate exploratory behaviour while left-handers would be more 
likely to be controlled by the right hemisphere and demonstrate avoidance behaviour.  
Davidson (1992) also states that approach or exploration behaviour is related to the 
left hemisphere while avoidance behaviour is linked with activation of the right 
hemisphere.  Although Rogers’ (1999) findings were on marmoset monkeys she 
stated that this finding could possibly also be attributed to humans.   
 
However, although this work supports the proposal that the right hemisphere is 
associated with fear and avoidance behaviour and is linked to the inhibitory system, 
Goldberg, Podell and Lovell (1994) have reported conflicting findings.  Goldberg et al. 
found that the right hemisphere appears to be involved in preference for novelty.  
They report that the right hemisphere is more spontaneous and unreflective and 
indicate that it does not effectively organise information but instead uses a type of 
trial and error system.  Goldberg et al., however, reported that the left hemisphere is 
concerned with a preference for familiarity and is more reflective and organised when 
processing information.  This contradicts previous findings that have indicated that 
they delay in response to novel objects by left-handers might have been caused by 
the inhibited, emotional dominant right hemisphere.  If the findings of Goldberg et al. 
are supported then it would be expected that when exposed to a novel object or 
problem then right-handers would be more likely to delay their response while they 
thought logically about the problem or situation.  Left-handers in this scenario would 
be expected to be spontaneous and not think about the problem or situation and 
show no delay before approaching this situation.  The findings from the Tower of 
Hanoi experiment in experiment 4 contradict the findings of Goldberg et al. (1994) in 
that the opposite behaviour pattern was displayed.  Right-handers were found to 
begin the task significantly quicker and also displayed more of a trial and error 
system to the solving (in that they took more moves to solve the problem than left-
handers).  Left-handers took longer to start the problem and displayed a more logical 
approach in their solving strategies thus failing to support Goldberg et al.’s. findings. 
 
Goldberg (2001) more recently reported that left-handers appear to be more 
responsive to novelty than right-handers.  This work contradicts the previous non-
human findings of Cameron and Rogers (1999) and Hopkins and Bennett (1996) and 
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Rogers (1999) in that the left-handed primates in each study reacted to the novel 
environments and objects by avoiding them or taking longer to approach them rather 
than approach them, as Goldberg would suggest.  This point made by Goldberg is 
particularly important in relation to the findings of Hopkins and Bennett and Cameron 
and Rogers as he states that monkeys are more attracted to novelty than humans. 
Goldberg reported in a Cognitive Bias study that left-handed males preferred different 
shapes rather than similar shapes and concluded that this group were novelty 
seekers rather than preferring familiarity.  However, the type of novelty that Goldberg 
reports is a different kind of novelty from the type that is examined in the current 
studies.  Previous studies such as Cameron and Rogers (1999) examined novel 
objects and situations rather than novel or familiar shapes. This could explain why 
Goldberg et al. concluded that left-handed males are novelty seekers.   
 
Finally, Goldberg (2001) states that the left hemisphere is associated with cognitive 
routines and the right hemisphere is associated with cognitive novelty.  Therefore, 
those who are left hemisphere dominant would be expected to display more cautious 
behaviour with respect to novelty whereas those who are right hemisphere dominant 
would be expected to be less cautious and more at ease in novel situations if 
Goldberg’s work is supported. Again this contradicts the findings of previous primate 
studies concerning handedness and novelty. 
 
7.10.3. Test Anxiety 
 
One final factor that should be considered when examining differences in anxiety 
between left- and right-handers, that links to state anxiety, is test anxiety.  Test 
anxiety, as defined by Friedman and Bendas-Jacob (1997) is “A specific category of 
anxiety observed in evaluative situations.  It is an affect or feeling of apprehension 
and discomfort accompanied by cognitive difficulties” (p1035).  Hembree (1988) 
states that high levels of test anxiety are correlated with deficits in cognitive 
performance.  However, Hembree adds that deficits on performance due to task 
anxiety can be deduced by the complexity of the task.  That is, the more complex the 
task the more anxious a person who experiences test anxiety may become. 
 
Few studies have been carried out on test anxiety and handedness, however, 
Mueller, Grove and Thompson (1991) examined differences in test anxiety between 
left- and right-handers.  They found that that there were no differences for men or for 
women for the worry or the emotionality part of test anxiety and they concluded that 
high-test anxiety did not affect left-handers any more than it affected right-handers.   
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Friedman and Bendas-Jacob (1997) developed the Friedben test anxiety scale 
(FTA).  The scale consists of 23 statements and within this there are 3 sub-sections 
that measure social derogation; cognitive obstruction and tenseness.  Friedman and 
Bendas-Jacob state that common behaviours associated with test anxiety include 
anticipated fear or danger about something that is so far unknown to the individual; a 
variety of physiological responses such as arousal or distress and unclear cognitive 
thinking.  Test anxiety has been described as containing two main components, 
worry and emotionality.  The individual relates the worry component to negative 
thoughts and possible failure while the emotionality component relates to the 
physiological side such as the feelings of anxiety or tension about the test situation. 
 
These findings could be related to previous state anxiety findings, however, in order 
to gain more insight in to the concept of handedness and test anxiety further studies 
would have to be carried out.  At present there are very few conclusions that can be 
drawn on this topic but further work could be carried out, for example, during a series 
of examinations using the Friedben test.   
 
7.10.4. Task complexity 
 
One factor that has to be taken in to account when considering anxiety levels and 
problem solving is that of task complexity.  As Hembree (1988) stated, it is more 
likely that higher levels of anxiety will be produced when the task is more complex.  
However, Druckman and Swets (1988) stated that simple tasks require a high state 
of arousal by participants in order for them to remain focussed on the task that they 
have to complete whereas more complex tasks require a lower level of arousal. They 
add that as task complexity increases then the level of arousal should decrease.   
 
Fink and Neubauer (2004) suggest that the easier a task was that introverts were 
more likely to display a lower cortical activation (suggesting that they were not as 
stressed) as compared with extraverts.    However, in more complex test conditions 
there was more cortical activation in introverts as compared with extraverts.  This 
work is based on Eysenck’s arousal theory, which suggests that extraverts are 
generally less cortically aroused than introverts.  However, this theory has been 
challenged and it has been suggested (e.g. Gale, 1973) that arousal levels might be 
altered accordingly by the experimental test conditions and these will vary across 
different experiments and depending on the individual.   
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A suggestion, consistent with the existing literature, is that left-handers take longer to 
make a motor response in a novel situation due to increased caution and behavioural 
inhibition (Rogers, 1999; Hopkins & Bennett, 1994).   
 
7.10.5. Rationale and hypotheses for experiment 9 
 
An implication of the findings of the first Tower of Hanoi study carried out in Chapter 
4 was that a dominant right hemisphere might elicit negative emotions, such as 
increased anxiety, in participants who are confronted with novelty. Thus, left-handers 
may show increased levels of state anxiety, but not trait anxiety, when confronted 
with a novel task. It is possible that inconsistent results in the literature, with regard to 
anxiety and laterality, may have been due to previous studies failing to discriminate 
between trait and state anxiety. The findings from experiment 7 suggest that left-
handers may only exhibit greater anxiety in particular states and situations and 
therefore this has to be investigated further. In the current experiment task novelty 
and task complexity will be investigated.  Many of the tasks that have been carried 
out during this thesis are novel tasks, however, if differences have been reported 
using these tasks then it cannot be certain that the novelty of the task is having a 
direct effect.  Therefore in order to directly examine task novelty an identical task will 
be carried out twice in order to see if there is a difference in the approach behaviour 
of participants across the tasks.  Additionally, as the task might become much more 
simple the second time then an additional condition will be added in order to examine 
not only the issue of task novelty (by doing the same task twice although it is a 
different version) but also task complexity.  The current study will examine 
participants’ state anxiety levels both in relation to the novelty of the task and the 
complexity in order to see if there is a difference firstly between left- and right-
handers and also to see if the novelty or the complexity of the task increases or 
decreases state anxiety levels. 
 
Experiment 9 looks at problem solving performance on the Tower of Hanoi (along 
with task novelty and complexity) and self-report anxiety measurements. It is 
hypothesised that left-handers will take longer to move the first disk on the first trial 
(the novel trial) of the Tower of Hanoi than right-handers.  However, it is predicted 
that there will be no difference in the time taken to move the first disk of the second 
trial of the Tower of Hanoi between left- and right-handers.  It is also predicted that 
left-handers will have a higher state anxiety score than right-handers before 
completing the first Tower of Hanoi trial but there will be no difference between the 
state scores of left- and right-handers before completing the second trial of the Tower 
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of Hanoi.  Additionally, left-handers’ state anxiety scores will be higher before 
completing the first Tower of Hanoi than before completing the second Tower of 
Hanoi but there will be no difference between right-handers’ state scores before 
completing the first and second trial of the Tower of Hanoi.     Finally, it is predicted 
that there will be no difference between the trait anxiety scores of left- and right-
handers.   
 
To conclude, the findings in chapter 4 supported the work of Cameron and Rogers  
(1999) and Hopkins and Bennett (1994) that demonstrated that left-handers showed 
some form of inhibitory behaviour in response to a novel task. This finding adds to 
the existing evidence that suggests that left-handedness is associated with increased 
anxiety and avoidance behaviour in novel situations. An important implication of 
these findings is that differences in cognitive processing and motor behaviour, 
between left and right-handers, may be partly due to differences, possibly in anxiety, 
expressed by novel performance tasks.  These factors are examined in the current 
experiment. 
 
7.10.6. Current study 
 
There are two conditions in the Tower of Hanoi experiment.  The first condition 
consists of presenting the participant with a four-disk Tower of Hanoi the first time 
they do the task and the second time they do the task asking them to solve an 
identical four-disk Tower of Hanoi again.  In the second condition the participant will 
be asked to solve the three-disk Tower of Hanoi as part of the first trial and then for 
the second trial they will be asked to solve the four-disk Tower of Hanoi.  Participants 
are randomly assigned within their sex and handedness groups into these conditions.  
There are three dependent variables for each trial of the Tower of Hanoi study.  The 
first is the time taken (in seconds) to make the first move (or touch the first disk).  The 
second dependent variable is the number of moves taken to solve the Tower of 
Hanoi and the third is the total time taken (in seconds) to solve the Tower of Hanoi.  
This information was recorded for both trials of each participant. 
 
It should be noted that those in the condition of the 3-disk and then the 4-disk are not 
counterbalanced to do the 4-disk and the 3-disk for one main reason.  Given that half 
of the participants do the 4 disk first (50 people) in the 4-disk, 4-disk condition then 
half of the second condition (3-disk, 4-disk) would also have to do the 4 disk first (25 
people) and thus 75 people out of the 100 participants would do the 4 disk TOH first 
compared to 25 out of 100 peopled doing the 3-disk first.  Thus in order to examine 
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the issue on novelty and complexity this is easily done if half of the sample complete 
the 4-disk version first and the other half of the sample the 3-disk version and thus 
direct comparisons can be made.  A third condition where the 3-disk version is 
completed twice would have to be added in order to allow the mixed condition to be 
able to be counterbalanced.  The main problem with this is the lack of available and 
consenting left-handed participants and also the time constraints that are spent 
recruiting this group.   
 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
Participants will complete the twenty questions of the State questionnaire twice and 
the twenty questions of the Trait questionnaire once.  Each question is assigned a 
score either ranging from 1-4 or 4-1 (see materials and apparatus for details and 
appendices 23 and 24 for a copy of the questions).  Thus the dependent variables 
are the total State scores and the total Trait score.   The scores are calculated based 
on the participant’s responses to the questions (in this study two state scores are 
calculated, one before the first Tower of Hanoi trial and one before the second Tower 
of Hanoi trial). 
 
 




100 participants took part in the study.  50 were male and 50 were female.  Of these 
100 participants, 25 were left-handed males, 25 were right-handed males, 25 were 
left-handed females and 25 were right-handed females.  Participants were all staff 
and students of the University of Abertay and Dundee College.  All participants had 
normal colour vision and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  The 
participants volunteered to take part in the study and no payment was made to them.  
There were two conditions as part of the Tower of Hanoi section of the experiment.  
The first condition was the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi followed by the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi as the second task.  The second condition was the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
followed by the same 4-disk Tower of Hanoi as the second task.  There were 54 
participants in the 4-4-disk Tower of Hanoi condition (28 left-handers and 26 right-
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7.11.2. Materials and apparatus 
 
The Tower of Hanoi Task consisted of three pegs and up to four coloured disks 
stacked on one of the pegs (The largest disk was purple, the second largest disk was 
blue, the next was green and the smallest disk was yellow (see appendices 26a & 
26b for details of the 4-disk instructions and appendices 6a & 6b for details of the 3-
disk Tower of Hanoi).    Counterbalancing was carried out so that half of all left-
handed and right-handed participants began the task with the disks stacked on the 
left peg and worked to move all of the disks to the last empty peg on the right.  The 
other half of the left- and right-handers began with the disks stacked on the peg on 
the right side and aimed to stack them all on the empty peg on the left.  The disks 
were stacked on the peg in order of size with the largest one on the bottom and the 
smallest one on the top.  The two empty pegs were there to be used to move the 
rings from the full peg to the last empty peg.  A stopwatch was also required.  The 
stopwatch had a split-time function, which allowed the initial first move time to be 
stored in the watch alongside the total time.  A Sony video camera was also used to 
record each session.  A cardboard cover was used to conceal the Tower of Hanoi.  A 
Tower of Hanoi scoring sheet was also used (see appendix 27) to record the time it 
took the participant to make the first move (on the first and second trials), to record 
the total time if took to complete the Tower of Hanoi on the first and second trial, to 
record how many moves it took to solve the Tower of Hanoi on the first and second 
trials and finally to record any rules that were broken by the participants during the 
trials.  A short form which questioned whether participants had solved the Tower of 
Hanoi before and whether they were aware of the Tower of Hanoi before was also 
given in order to ensure that the task was novel to all participants who were to be 
included in the data analysis.  Instruction sheets for the Tower of Hanoi were also 
given to the participants (see appendices 26a and 26b).  The instructions outlined the 
rules of the Tower of Hanoi and also depicted the initial state and the goal state for 
the participants to see.  Participants were instructed that they were going to see three 
pegs and on one of the pegs there would be a number of disks (either three or four 
depending upon the condition) stacked on it (there were separate instructions for the 
three-disk and the four-disk trial – see appendices 6a and 6b for the three-disk Tower 
of Hanoi instructions).  They were instructed that they had to get all of the disks from 
the initial peg onto the far away peg in the same order that they were stacked in at 
the goal state (smallest to largest) but that there were a number of rules attached 
when they were doing so.  Firstly, only one disk could be moved at a time and 
secondly, a bigger disk could never be placed upon a smaller disk.  The participants 
in condition one (who did the four-disk Tower of Hanoi twice) were given identical 
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instructions the second time they did the task except that it was emphasised that the 
task was exactly the same as the first time that they solved it and exactly the same 
rules applied.  Those who were in the second condition were given the three-disk 
instructions first time and then the four-disk instructions the second time.  For details 
of the STAI (Speilberger, 1983) see section 7.3.).  The revised version of Peter’s 




There were two conditions in the experiment.  Half of the participants were assigned 
to the first condition and the other half to the second condition.  In the first condition 
participants completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first followed by the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi.  The second condition consisted of participants completing the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi first and then completing exactly the same task again later on in the 
experiment.  All other parts of the experiment remained constant throughout the two 
conditions.  Participants were firstly given the revised version of Peter’s (1998) 
handedness questionnaire.  They had to fill in details of their name, course, 
matriculation number, sex and decade of birth on the front of the questionnaire and 
inside they were instructed to assume that their hands were empty and imagine 
which hand they would use to perform a number of actions.  When the handedness 
questionnaire was completed participants were then given a copy of the instructions 
for the problem-solving task that they would be instructed to complete (either the 3-
disk or 4-disk Tower of Hanoi).   
 
After reading the Tower of Hanoi instructions participants were asked to fill in the 
state questionnaire of the STAI.  They were instructed to answer the questions 
according to how they felt right at that time.  Once this was completed participants 
were then instructed to solve the Tower of Hanoi (3- or 4-disk depending on the 
condition that they were assigned to).  The solving of the Tower of Hanoi was video 
recorded in order to check the reliability of the timings at a later date.  The Tower of 
Hanoi was concealed with a large cardboard cover and this was removed when the 
participant was ready to begin the task.  When the participant indicated that they 
understood the rules of the Tower of Hanoi the video camera was started and the 
experimenter instructed them to begin (upon removal of the screen and simultaneous 
starting of the stopwatch).  The stopwatch had a split-time function, which allowed 
two times to be recorded on it at the same time.  When the participant made contact 
with the first disk the experimenter pressed a button on the stopwatch to record this.  
The experimenter also kept a note of the number of moves the participant took to 
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solve the Tower of Hanoi and also how many rules they broke throughout the solving 
process.  When the participant had successfully solved the Tower of Hanoi the 
stopwatch was stopped and the total time taken to complete the task was recorded.  
The trait questionnaire of the STAI was then completed.  For this participants were 
instructed to answer the questions according to how they felt in general.   
 
A second set of Tower of Hanoi instructions was then given to participants.  These 
instructions differed depending on the condition that each participant was in.  
Participants who were in the condition where they did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
twice were given an identical set of instructions to the ones they received the first 
time except this time it was emphasised that the task was exactly the same as they 
did the first time and that the rules and the side that the disks were stacked on 
remained identical to the first trial.  Those in the condition where they completed the 
3-disk Tower of Hanoi first were now given a set of 4-disk Tower of Hanoi instructions 
that outlined the rules (which were identical to the 3-disk task) and showed a picture 
of the initial and goal state.  When participants had read the instructions they were 
issued with another state anxiety questionnaire, which again asked them to complete 
twenty questions according to how they felt right at that moment.  When this was 
completed participants were then asked if they wanted to remind themselves of the 
rules of the Tower of Hanoi again and when they were familiar with them they were 
then asked to complete the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi.  The disks on the 
second Tower of Hanoi were placed at the same side as they had been when each 
participant did their first Tower of Hanoi trial in order to keep the conditions between 
each individual’s performance as consistent as possible over the two trials (even if 
the trials consisted of the 3-disk trial and then the 4-disk trial).  The side of the disks 
was counterbalanced across all participants so that half of the left-handed males 
started from the right when doing the three-disk Tower of Hanoi and the other half of 
the left-handed males who started on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi began with the 
disks stacked on the left peg.  This was the same for the other sex and handedness 
groups across the 3-and 4--disk trials.   The second trial of the Tower of Hanoi was 
again video recorded and this began when the screen was removed from the Tower 
of Hanoi and the stopwatch was started.  The time taken to make contact with the 
first disk was recorded on the split-time stopwatch and the experimenter counted the 
moves that the participant took to solve the Tower of Hanoi (this was able to be 
checked using the video footage).  When the participant successfully solved the 
Tower of Hanoi the time taken to complete it was also recorded along with the 
number of rules that were broken during the trial.  The participant was then asked to 
fill in a short form which asked them if they had ever solved the Tower of Hanoi 
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before or if they were aware of the Tower of Hanoi before now.  This was done in 
order to ensure that the task remained novel to all participants throughout the 
experiment and anyone who had solved the Tower of Hanoi before was excluded 
from the data analysis.  The participant was then informed that that was the end of 
the experiment.  Participants were thanked for taking part in the experiment and were 
offered an explanation of the purpose and aims of the experiment (which most 
participants accepted).  Participants were ensured that their data was confidential 




7.12. Results – Tower of Hanoi (novelty and complexity) and anxiety. 
 
Condition 1: 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (TOH) followed by 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
 
Analysis was carried out on the first condition on the 3-disk and then the 4-disk of 
Tower of Hanoi in the same testing session.  Each group completed the 3-disk and 
then 4-disk version in the same session thus novelty and complexity are examined 
here.   
 
a) First move scores on the 3-disk (condition1) TOH 
 
Table 7.10: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower 
of Hanoi (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2.5 (1.0) 3.1 (3.3) 2.8 (2.4) 
Female 6.3 (4.3) 4.2 (4.2) 5.3 (4.3) 
Total 4.7 (3.9) 3.8 (3.8)  
 
Table 7.10 shows that on average left-handed males started to move the disks of the 
Tower of Hanoi the quickest followed by right-handed males.  Right-handed females 
took an average of 4.2 seconds to move the first disk and the slowest group was left-
handed females.  Males began moving the first disk quicker than females and right-
handers moved the first disk quicker than left-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x handedness) was carried out on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There was a significant 
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main effect of sex F(1, 42) = 5.032, p<0.05 with females taking significantly longer to 
move the first disk than males.  There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 42) = 
0.422, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 42) = 1.657, p>0.05. 
 
Table 7.11: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first disk on the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi as a secondary task (2nd TOH of the session) (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2.7 (2.9) 1.8 (0.6) 2.3 (2.1) 
Female 3.5 (3.3) 2.4 (2.2) 3.0 (2.8) 
Total  3.2 (3.1) 2.1 (1.4)  
 
The above table shows that on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi when initiating 
the 4-disk problem right-handed males took the least time to move the first disk on 
the second trial this was followed by right-handed females.  Male left-handers took 
slightly longer and the slowest group to start moving the first disk was left-handed 
females.   
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi (4-disk) of the 3-
4-disk condition.  There were no significant main effects found for sex F(1, 42) = 
0.787, p>0.05, handedness F(1, 42) = 1.727, p>0.05 or the interaction between sex 
and handedness F(1, 42) = 0.027, p>0.05. 
 
Comparison across the 2 trials 
 
In order to examine whether there was a difference in the time taken to move the first 
disk of the ToH when completing the 3-disk version and then the 4-disk version a 2 
(between) X 2 (between) X 2 (within) mixed model ANOVA was carried out where the 
between subjects factors were sex (male and female) and handedness (left and right) 
and the within subjects factor was the trial of the ToH (1st v 2nd).  There was a 
significant main effect of trial F(1, 42) = 7.758, p< 0.01 with participants taking 
significantly longer to move the first disk on the first trial than the second trial (4.05 
vs. 2.6 seconds), the main effect of sex approached significance F(1, 42) = 4.006, 
p=0.052 (females took longer to move the first disk than males) and the main effect 
Chapter 7: Novelty, anxiety and performance  
 298 
of handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 1.218, p>0.05.  There were no 
significant interactions.   
 
b) Number of moves taken to solve the Tower of Hanoi 
 
Table 7.12: Mean number of moves taken to solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (1st 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 10.5 (4.0) 13.0 (4.4) 11.8 (4.3) 
Female  13.7 (10.4) 12.0 (4.5) 12.9 (8.1) 
Total 12.7 (7.2) 12.5 (4.4)  
 
Table 7.12 shows than on average left-handed females took most moves to solve the 
3-disk Tower of Hanoi followed by right-handed males, right-handed females took an 
average of 12 moves and left-handed males solved the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi in the 
fewest number of moves.  Males on average solved the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi in 
fewer moves than males and right-handers solved the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi in less 
moves than left-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the number 
of moves taken to solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There were no significant main 
effects for sex F(1, 42) = 0.562, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 42) = 0.000, p>0.05 and 
the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 
1.537, p>0.05. 
 
Table 7.13: Mean number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (2nd 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 54.7 (88.6) 30.5 (14.7) 42.6 (63.0) 
Female 26.5 (10.0) 34.8 (17.1) 30.3 (14.1) 
Total 38.2 (57.7) 32.8 (15.8)  
 
Table 7.13 shows than on average left-handed males took most moves to solve the 
3-disk Tower of Hanoi (but they had a very high standard deviation) followed by right-
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handed females), right-handed males took an average of 30.5 moves and left-
handed females solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in the fewest number of moves.  
Females on average solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in fewer moves than males 
and right-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in less moves than left-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the number 
of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There were no significant main 
effects for sex F(1, 42) = 0.876, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 42) = 0.392, p>0.05 and 
the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 
1.620, p>0.05. 
 
A comparison of the number of moves across trials could not be carried out in this 
condition due to the different number of disks used in each trial and therefore no 
direct conclusions can be drawn. 
 
c) Mean time taken to complete the ToH (3-4-disk condition) 
 
Table 7.14: Mean time taken (in seconds) to solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (with 
standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 33.0 (19.2) 40.6 (22.0) 36.8 (20.5) 
Female 47.7 (34.5) 53.2 (41.8) 50.2 (37.3) 
Total 41.6 (29.6) 47.5 (34.1)  
 
The above table shows that on average male left-handers solved the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in the shortest time followed by right-handed males then left-handed females 
and right-handed females who took the longest to solve the Tower of Hanoi.  Males 
solved the Tower of Hanoi quicker on average than females and left-handers solved 
it quicker than right-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time 
taken to solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There were no significant main effects for 
sex F(1, 42) = 2.261, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 42) = 0.428, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 
0.027, p>0.05. 
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Table 7.15: Mean time taken (in seconds) to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (2nd 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 73.1 (61.4) 133.6 (157.6) 103.3 (120.5) 
Female 98.5 (83.4) 117.0 (54.5) 107.0 (70.8) 
Total 87.9 (74.7) 124.6 (110.8)  
 
The above table shows that on average male left-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in the shortest time followed by left-handed females then right-handed females 
and right-handed males took the longest to solve the Tower of Hanoi on average.  
Males solved the Tower of Hanoi slightly quicker on average than females and left-
handers solved it quicker than right-handers.  Once again there was a much higher 
standard deviation among the right-handed male group and this therefore could 
affect the results of this specific group. 
 
Again a 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the 
time taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (trial 2).  There were no significant 
main effects for sex F(1, 42) = 0.024, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 42) = 1.941, p>0.05 
and the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) 
= 0.546, p>0.05. 
 
Time minus initiation (or ‘first move’) time was not calculated as there were no 
significant findings either for first move time or completion time. 
 
Condition 2: 4-disk TOH followed by 4-disk TOH 
 
Participants in this condition completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi as their first trial 
and then completed the same 4-disk Tower of Hanoi as their second trial.  Both 
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a) First move scores on the 4-disk TOH (first trial of condition 2) 
 
Table 7.16: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first disk on the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 2.9 (1.9) 3.9 (3.4) 3.4 (2.8) 
Female 4.6 (3.1) 8.2 (10.0) 6.2 (7.3) 
Total 3.8 (2.7) 6.0 (7.7)  
 
Table 7.16 shows that on average left-handed males started to move the disks of the 
Tower of Hanoi the quickest followed by right-handed males. Left-handed females 
took an average of 4.6 seconds to move the disks and the slowest group was right-
handed females.  Males began moving the first disk quicker than females and left-
handers moved the first disk quicker than right-handers.  This is the opposite pattern 
from the 3-4-disk condition. 
 
A 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x handedness) was carried out on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial).  There was a 
significant main effect of sex F(1, 50) = 3.994, p=0.05 with females taking 
significantly longer to move the first disk than males.  There was no main effect of 
handedness F(1, 50) = 2.312, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and 
handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 0.761, p>0.05. 
 
Table 7.17: Mean time taken (in seconds) to move the first disk on the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi as a secondary task (2nd TOH of the session) (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 1.9 (1.3) 2.2 (1.3) 2.1 (1.3) 
Female 2.4 (1.4) 1.7 (0.6) 2.1 (1.2) 
Total 2.2 (1.4) 2.0 (1.0)  
 
The above table shows that on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi when initiating 
the 4-disk problem right-handed females took the least time to move the first disk on 
the second trial this was followed by left-handed males.  Male right-handers took 
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slightly longer and the slowest group to start moving the first disk on the second trial 
was left-handed females. 
   
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi (4-disk) of the 4-
disk first condition.  There were no significant main effects found for sex F(1, 50) = 
0.002, p>0.05, handedness F(1, 50) = 0.393, p>0.05 or the interaction between sex 
and handedness F(1, 50) = 2.244, p>0.05. 
 
Comparison of 4-disk first moves first trial and 4-disk first move on 2nd trial 
 
In order to examine whether there was a difference in the time taken to move the first 
disk of the ToH when completing the 4-disk version (1st trial) and then the 4-disk 
version (2nd trial) (and thus examining the issue of task novelty) a 2 (between) X 2 
(between) X 2 (within) mixed model ANOVA was carried out where the between 
subjects factors were sex (male and female) and handedness (left and right) and the 
within subjects factor was the trial of the ToH (1st v 2nd).  There was a significant main 
effect of trial F(1, 50) = 15.359, p< 0.001 with participants taking significantly longer 
to move the first disk on the first trial than the second trial (mean score 4.9 vs. 2.1 
seconds), the main effect of sex approached significance F(1, 50) = 3.315, p=0.075 
(females taking longer to move the first disk than males) and the main effect of 
handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 1.601, p>0.05.  There was a 
significant two-way interaction between trial and sex F(1, 50) = 4.465, p<0.05 (see 
appendix 28 for details of further analysis of this interaction) and the two-way 
interaction between trial and handedness approached significance F(1, 50) = 3.047, 
p=0.087.  The three-way interaction between trial, sex and handedness failed to 
reach significance F(1, 50) = 1.599, p>0.05. 
 
b) Number of moves 
 
Table 7.18: Mean number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 22.4 (6.3) 30.5 (12.6) 26.4 (10.6) 
Female  29.4 (11.4)        23.2 (7.3) 26.5 (10.0) 
Total 26.1 (9.9) 26.8 (10.7)  
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Table 7.18 shows than on average right-handed males took most moves to solve the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi (but they have the highest level of variability) followed by left-
handed females, right-handed females took an average of 23.2 moves and left-
handed males solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in the fewest number of moves. 
(This is the same order as the 3-disk TOH from condition 1).  Females and males on 
average solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in almost an identical number of moves 
and left-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in slightly less moves than right-
handers.  
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the number 
of moves taken to solve the first trial of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There were no 
significant main effects for sex F(1, 50) = 0.002, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 50) = 
0.127, p>0.05 however, the interaction between sex and handedness was significant 
F(1, 50) = 7.060, p<0.05.  (See appendix 28 for details of this).  Therefore, the 
significant interaction seems to have been influenced by the performance of left-
handed males and right-handed females who took the fewest moves, on average, to 
solve the 4-diskTower of Hanoi first time.  Also, left-handed females and right-handed 
males took the most moves to solve the Tower of Hanoi and this also contributed to 
the significant interaction. 
 
Table 7.19: Mean number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
(second trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 25.2 (10.5) 22.6 (10.9) 23.9 (10.6) 
Female 26.0 (12.9) 29.8 (10.2) 27.8 (11.7) 
Total 25.7 (11.6) 26.2 (11.0)  
 
Table 7.19 shows than on average right-handed females took the most moves to 
solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi followed by left-handed females, left-handed males 
took an average of 25.24 moves and right-handed males solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in the fewest number of moves.  Males on average solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in fewer moves than females and left-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in less moves than right-handers.   
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the number 
of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There were no significant main 
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effects for sex F(1, 50) = 01.661, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 50) = 0.035, p>0.05 and 
the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 
1.087, p>0.05. 
 
Comparisons were carried out between the number of moves taken to complete the 
first trial and the number of moves taken to complete the second trial of the 4-4-disk 
condition of the ToH.  However, there were no significant main effects and the only 
significant interaction was a three-way sex X handedness X trial interaction.  See 
appendix 28 for this full analysis.  
 
c) Completion time 
 
Table 7.20: Mean time taken (in seconds) to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 80.1 (59.9) 92.4 (40.1) 86.2 (50.1) 
Female 115.7 (66.5) 116.6 (69.4) 116.1 (66.6) 
Total 99.2 (64.8) 104.5 (56.9)  
 
The above table shows that on average male left-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in the shortest time  followed by right-handed males then left-handed females 
and right-handed females who took the longest to solve the Tower of Hanoi.  Males 
solved the Tower of Hanoi quicker on average than females and left-handers solved 
it quicker than right-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time 
taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial).  There were no significant main 
effects for sex F(1, 50) = 3.311, p>0.05 (although this approached significance 
p=0.075) or handedness F(1, 50) = 0.160, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex 
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Table 7.21: Mean time taken (in seconds) to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (second 
trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 57.5 (47.4) 48.7 (28.8) 53.1 (38.7) 
Female 65.9 (44.6) 84.9 (47.8) 74.7 (46.3) 
Total 62.0 (45.3) 66.8 (42.8)  
 
The above table shows that on average male right-handers solved the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi in the shortest time followed by left-handed males then left-handed females 
and right-handed females took the longest to solve the Tower of Hanoi on average.  
Males solved the Tower of Hanoi quicker on average than females and left-handers 
solved it quicker than right-handers.  
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the time 
taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (trial 2).  There were no significant main 
effects for sex F(1, 50) = 3.628, p>0.05 (although this approached significance 
p=0.063) or handedness F(1, 50) = 0.191, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex 
and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 1.416, p>0.05. 
 
Comparison of completion time of trial 1 and trial 2 in the 4-4-disk condition 
 
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted to examine any differences 
between trials on the time taken to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in trial 1 vs. 
trial 2.  This revealed that there was a significant effect of Trial (whether it was trial 1 
or trial 2) on the time taken to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi F(1, 50) = 17.487, 
p<0.001 showing that the time taken to complete the 4-disk ToH was significantly 
longer in the first trial than in the second trial (almost twice as long).  There was a 
significant main effect of sex F(1, 50), 5.424, p<0.05 with males completing the ToH 
significantly faster than females.  However, the main effect of handedness failed to 
reach significance F(1, 50) = 0.272, p>0.05.  There were no significant two-way 
interactions (trial X sex; trial X handedness & sex X handedness all p>0.05) and the 
3-way interaction between trial, sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 
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Comparisons between condition 1 and condition 2 
Comparisons were then made across conditions (3-4-disk vs. 4-4-disk) on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the Tower of Hanoi.  However, the only significant 
difference that was found was that females took significantly longer to move the first 
disk than males regardless of the condition.  A full analysis of all comparisons can be 
found in appendix 28. 
Comparisons could only be made across the conditions for the second trial on the 
other measurements taken on the Tower of Hanoi as the time taken to solve the 
Tower of Hanoi and the number of moves cannot be directly compared on the 3-disk 
version and the 4-disk version.  Thus the 4-disk version when one group did it for the 
first time was compared against the scores of the group that did it for a second time 
to see if there is any effect of the novelty of the task on how efficiently it is solved. 
Thus comparisons were made across the second trial versions of the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi (condition 1 vs. condition 2) on the number of moves taken to solve the task. 
However, there were no significant main effects or interactions.  This analysis can be 
found in full in appendix 28. 
Finally, comparisons were made across the second trials of each condition on the 
time taken to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  The only significant result was that 
there was a main effect of condition on the time taken to solve the task with those 
who did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for a second time solving it significantly faster than 
those solving it for the first time.  There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions.  A full set of results for the time taken to solve the task can be found in 
appendix 28). 
Self-report anxiety (state and trait scores) 
Condition 1: 3-disk TOH followed by 4-disk TOH 
State anxiety scores 
Participants were asked to complete two state anxiety questionnaires during the 
course of the study, one questionnaire was administered after they received and read 
the instructions for the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi and the other state questionnaire was 
administered after participants had received and read the instructions for the 4-disk 
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Tower of Hanoi.  Both questionnaires were completed before the participant 
physically solved each Tower of Hanoi. 
 
Table 7.22: Participant’s mean state score before completing the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 38.8 (3.2) 35.5 (8.7) 37.2 (6.6) 
Female 39.8 (6.7) 32.2 (8.4) 36.2 (8.3) 
Total 39.4 (5.4) 33.7 (8.5)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females have the highest mean state anxiety 
score before completing the 3-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi.  The next highest 
group was the left-handed males.  Right-handed males scored an average of 35.5 
and the group with the lowest state anxiety score was the right-handed females.  
Males scored slightly higher than females on average and left-handers scored higher 
than right-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state 
anxiety score before completion of the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There was a 
significant main effect of handedness F(1, 42) = 6.65, p<0.05 with left-handers 
scoring significantly higher on state anxiety than right-handers before completing the 
3-disk ToH.  There was no significant effect of sex F(1, 42) = 0.307, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 
1.041, p>0.05. 
 
Table 7.23: Participant’s mean state score before completing the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi – second condition of the 3-4-disk condition (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 36.9 (5.0) 33.8 (9.3) 35.4 (7.5) 
Female 35.6 (6.3) 32.9 (11.3) 34.4 (8.9) 
Total 36.2 (5.7) 33.3 (10.2)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males have the highest mean state anxiety 
score before completing the 4-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi (second task after 
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completing the 3-disk task previously).  The next highest group was the left-handed 
females.  Right-handed males scored an average of 33.8 and the group with the 
lowest state anxiety score was the right-handed females.  Males scored slightly 
higher than females on average and left-handers scored higher than right-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state 
anxiety score before completion of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (trial 2 after completing 
the 3-disk TOH previously).  There were no significant main effects found for 
handedness F(1, 42) = 1.368, p<0.05 or sex F(1, 42) = 0.185, p>0.05 and the 




Comparison of state scores between trials of the 3-disk – 4-disk ToH condition 
 
The state scores from trial 1 (3-disk Tower of Hanoi) were examined, with respect to 
sex and handedness, against the state scores from trial 2 (4-disk Tower of Hanoi) 
using a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA (with the trial number being the within subject 
factor –trial 1 and trial 2 and sex and handedness being the between subjects factors 
(male and female and left- and right).  There was a significant main effect of trial F(1, 
42) = 4.894, p<0.05 with the state scores in the first trial being significantly higher 
than the state scores in the second trial.  There was no significant main effect of sex 
F(1, 42) = 0.267, p>0.05 and the main effect of handedness approached significance 
F(1, 42) = 3.714, p=0.06 with left-handers scoring higher overall on the state 
questionnaire than right-handers.  The two-way interaction between trial and sex 
failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 0.004, p>0.05.  The two-way interaction 
between trial and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 42) = 2.596, 
p>0.05 as did the two-way interaction between sex and handedness F(1, 42) = 
0.206, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction between trial, sex and handedness was not 
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Trait anxiety scores 
 
Table 7.24: Mean trait scores of participants that completed the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi first (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 42.1 (8.0) 37.8 (9.3) 40.0 (8.8) 
Female 42.4 (8.8) 38.5 (9.7) 40.6 (9.3) 
Total 42.3 (8.3) 38.2 (9.3)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed males and left-handed females have similar 
mean trait scores followed by right-handed females and then right-handed males who 
have the lowest trait scores on average although all scores are similar.  Males and 
females scored similar trait scores and left-handers scored higher on average then 
right-handers  
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the trait 
scores of participants who completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first.  There were no 
significant main effects for sex F(1, 42) = 0.032, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 42) = 
2.311, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach 
significance F(1, 42) = 0.007, p>0.05. 
 
Condition 2: 4-disk TOH (first trial) followed by 4-disk TOH (second trial) - Self report 
anxiety 
 
State anxiety scores 
 
Participants were also asked to complete two state anxiety questionnaires during the 
4-4-disk ToH condition.  Again, the first questionnaire was administered after 
participants had received and read the instructions for the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first 
trial) and the other questionnaire was administered after participants had received 
and read the instructions for the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (second trial).  Both 
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Table 7.25: Participants’ mean state score before completing the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi (first trial) (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 27.7 (6.0) 32.8 (10.5) 30.2 (8.8) 
Female 33.3 (8.4) 33.0 (9.8) 33.1 (8.9) 
Total 30.7 (7.8) 32.9 (10.0)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females have the highest mean state anxiety 
score before completing the 4-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi (first trial) closely 
followed by right-handed females.  The next highest group was the right-handed 
males who had a mean score of 32.8 and the group with the lowest state anxiety 
score was the left-handed females.  Females scored slightly higher than males on 
average and right-handers scored higher than left-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state 
anxiety score before completion of the first 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There was no 
significant main effect of handedness F(1, 50) = 0.997, p>0.05 or sex F(1, 50) = 
1.453, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach 
significance F(1, 50) = 1.231, p>0.05. 
 
Table 7.26: Participants’ mean state score before completing the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi – second condition (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 26.5 (5.0) 30.8 (9.4) 28.7 (7.7) 
Female 32.5 (9.0) 31.8 (9.6) 32.2 (9.1) 
Total 29.7 (7.9) 31.3 (9.3)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females have the highest mean state anxiety 
score before completing the 4-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi (for the second 
time).  The next highest group was the right-handed females.  Right-handed males 
scored an average of 30.8 and the group with the lowest state anxiety score was the 
left-handed males.  Females scored slightly higher than males on average and right-
handers scored higher than left-handers. 
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A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the state 
anxiety score before completion of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (trial 2 after completing 
the 4-disk TOH previously).  There were no significant main effects found for 
handedness F(1, 50) = 0.636, p>0.05 or sex F(1, 50) = 2.326, p>0.05 and the 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 
1.196, p>0.05. 
 
Comparison of state scores between trials of the 4-disk – 4-disk ToH condition 
 
The state scores from trial 1 (4-disk Tower of Hanoi first time) were examined, with 
respect to sex and handedness, against the state scores from trial 2 (4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi second time) using a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA (with trial number being 
the within subject factor – trial 1 and trial 2 and sex and handedness being the 
between subjects factors (male and female and left- and right).  The main effect of 
trial approached significance F(1, 50) = 3.794, p=0.057 with the state scores in the 
first trial being higher than the state scores in the second trial.  There was no 
significant main effect of sex F(1, 50) = 2.005, p>0.05 and the main effect of 
handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 0.875, p>0.05.  The two-way 
interaction between trial and sex failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 0.240, p>0.05.  
The two-way interaction between trial and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 50) = 0.185, p>0.05 as did the two-way interaction between sex and 
handedness F(1, 50) = 1.312, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction between trial, sex 
and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 50) = 0.011, p>0.05. 
 
Trait anxiety scores 
 
Table 7.27: Mean trait scores of participants who completed the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi first (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Male 34.1 (7.4) 40.3 (10.1) 37.2 (9.2) 
Female 40.7 (7.8) 38.9 (11.1) 40.0 (9.3) 
Total 37.6 (8.2) 39.6 (10.4)  
 
The above table shows that left-handed females and right-handed males have similar 
mean trait scores followed by right-handed females and then left-handed males who 
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have the lowest trait scores on average.  Males had lower trait scores than females 
and right-handers scored higher on average than left-handers. 
 
A 2 x 2 (sex x handedness) between subjects ANOVA was carried out on the trait 
scores of participants that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi twice.  There were 
no significant main effects of sex F(1, 50) = 1.110, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 50) = 
0.780, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach 
significance F(1, 50) = 2.582, p>0.05. 
 
Comparison of state scores and trait scores between the 3-disk TOH condition and the 
4-disk TOH -Self report anxiety. 
 
First state scores 
 
As previously mentioned participants were asked to complete two state anxiety 
questionnaires during the course of the study, the first questionnaire was 
administered after participants had received and read the instructions for the 3- or 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial) and the other questionnaire was administered after 
participants had received and read the instructions for the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
(second trial) (depending on condition).  Both questionnaires were completed before 
the participant physically solved each Tower of Hanoi.  It was found that there was a 
significant main effect of condition on the state scores before the first trial of each 
Tower of Hanoi with state scores being significantly higher before competing the 3-
disk ToH than before completing the 4-disk ToH . Also, there was a significant two-
way interaction between hand preference and condition and further analysis revealed 
that left-handers who completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi as their first trial had a 
lower mean state score than the right-handers, however, left-hander’s mean state 
scores were much higher than right-handers mean state scores before they 
completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  This full analysis can be found in appendix 28. 
 
Second state scores (state 2) 
 
In order to examine the differences for the second state anxiety scores a 2 x 2 x 2 
between subjects ANOVA (sex x handedness x condition) was carried out on the 
self-reported second state scores (either before one group did the 4-disk TOH for the 
first time after previously completing the 3-disk TOH and the other group did the 4-
disk TOH for the second time).  The main effect of sex was not significant F(1, 92) =, 
0.523, p>0.05.  The main effect of handedness was not significant F(1, 92) = 0.098, 
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p>0.05. However, the main effect of condition was significant F(1, 92) = 6.647, 
p<0.05 with state anxiety scores significantly higher when participants completed the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time than when they completed it for a second 
time. The two-way interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach 
significance F(1, 92) = 0.475, p>0.05 as did the two-way interaction between sex and 
condition F(1, 92) = 1.827, p>0.05 and the two-way interaction between hand 
preference and condition F(1, 92) = 1.952, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction 
between sex, handedness and condition failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 0.638, 
p>0.05. 
 
Trait scores   
 
(The trait questionnaire was carried out after both ToH’s in the session had been 
completed).  There were no main effects found when comparing the trait scores from 




The main findings from experiment 9 were: 
 In the 3- then 4-disk condition left-handers reported themselves to be 
significantly more anxious on the state anxiety questionnaire than right-
handers before completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi.  There was no 
difference between left- and right-handers’ state anxiety scores on the trial of 
this condition (the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi).  There were no sex effects. 
 
 In the 3-4-disk condition state anxiety scores were significantly higher during 
the first trial (3-disk) than during the second trial (4-disk), irrespective of sex 
and handedness. 
 
 In the 4- then 4-disk condition there were no significant effects of sex or 
handedness on state scores before the first trial or the second trial.  Left-
handers did score higher before the first trial but not significantly so. 
 There were no effects of sex or handedness on the trait anxiety scores 
irrespective of condition. 
 
 In the 3-4-disk condition there was a significant effect of sex on the time taken 
to make the first move on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi with females taking 
significantly longer than males.  There was no effect of handedness but left-
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handers took longer than right-handers on average.  There were no main 
effects on the second trial (4-disk).  Participants took significantly longer to 
move the first disk on the first trial than they did on the second trial. 
 
 In the 4-4-disk condition there were no significant main effects of sex or 
handedness on the time taken to move the first disk. Participants took 
significantly longer to move the first disk on the first trial than they did on the 
second trial. 
 
 There were no main effects of sex or handedness on the number of moves 
taken to complete the Tower of Hanoi.  This was the case for both trials of the 
3-4-disk condition and both trials of the 4-4-disk condition.  There was a 
significant sex X handedness interaction on the first trial of the 4-4-disk 
condition caused by left-handed males and right-handed females taking fewer 
moves. 
 
 In the 3-4-disk condition there were no main effects of sex or handedness on 
the time taken to complete the Tower of Hanoi.  However, in the 4-4-disk 
condition the main effect of sex approached significance in both trials with 
males completing the task faster than females.  The main effect of 
handedness was not significant, however, left-handers were faster than right-
handers during both trials. 
 
 Females took significantly longer than males to move the first disk regardless 
of condition. 
 
 When comparing the completion times of those doing the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the first time (after completing the 3-disk) with those who completed 
the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for a second time (having just completed exactly 
the same task) those doing the 4-disk Tower for the second time completed it 











The main aim of this study was to try to address some of the unanswered questions 
that existed from the previous studies and cover a variety of key concepts that could 
possibly have contributed to the effects that were reported in preceding chapters.  
These concepts included task complexity and task novelty.  However, since there is 
not a lot of previous literature that relates to the current study, particularly as many of 
the findings were inconclusive, then this discussion will be speculative in places.  An 
overview of the main findings will be outlined and discussed.    
 
It was hypothesised that left-handers would take longer to move the first disk on the 
first trial of the Tower of Hanoi (either the 3-disk or 4-disk version depending on the 
condition that they were in) than right-handers.  There was no significant effect of 
handedness on the time taken to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi 
and this therefore did not support the hypothesis made.  However, left-handers did 
take around one second longer, on average, to move the first disk than right-handers 
and thus although the difference was not significant the delay in moving the first disk 
was in the same direction as the findings in Chapter 4 (with left-handers taking 
longer).  Left-handed females also took the longest to move the first disk but left-
handed males moved the first disk, on average, in the shortest time.  There was a 
significant effect of sex on the time taken to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi with females taking significantly longer to move the first disk than males on 
average.  The findings in Chapter 4 did not show a significant effect of sex on the 
time taken to move the first disk, however, females took marginally longer to move 
the first disk than males.  On the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in the current study (first trial) 
right-handers took longer to move the first disk than left-handers.  Females again 
took longer to move the fist disk than males.  However, the effect of handedness was 
not significant.  This finding was in the opposite direction of what was predicted with 
right-handers taking longer to move the first disk than left-handers.  There was, 
however, a significant effect of sex on time taken to move the first disk with females 
moving the first disk significantly slower than males.     
 
Although left-handers did take longer to touch the first disk on the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi than right-handers this difference was not significant.  This does not replicate 
the findings reported by Wright, Hardie and Rodway (2004) (and thus Chapter 4), 
however, there could be a number of reasons why this was the case.  One reason for 
this might have been the power of the sample.  In the study in Chapter 4, 80 
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participants completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi but in the current study only 40 
participants took part in this condition as another 40 participants had to be recruited 
to take part in the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi condition.  A larger number of participants in 
each condition might have revealed a more robust effect but as it was very difficult to 
recruit sufficient numbers of left-handers in the allocated time then analysis had to be 
carried out with the current numbers.  A future study could address this problem and 
recruit larger numbers of left-handers over a longer period of time.   
 
As previous literature does not investigate the time taken to make the first move on 
the Tower of Hanoi then it makes it more difficult to speculate why there is a different 
pattern between groups.  In Chapter 4 possible reasons given for this delay included 
planning the solution before solving the problem, differences in emotional processing 
between the groups and increased levels of anxiety where participants might pause 
before starting to solve the problem possibly to compose themselves.  These 
possible explanations were proposed with respect to left- and right-handers.  With 
respect to the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi right-handers took almost twice as long to begin 
the task than left-handers.  There is no clear explanation based on previous literature 
why this result was found.  The 4-disk Tower of Hanoi is a much more complicated 
task than the 3 disk version with an optimal solution of 15 moves.  However, as the 
right-handed participants took longer to begin the 4-disk task it might have been that 
they were more anxious about the task or that they were trying to plan their first few 
moves (since the whole solution could not be planned before beginning perhaps due 
to the capacity of short term memory).  However, upon examining the number of 
moves taken to solve the task it was found that left-handers took slightly fewer moves 
than right-handers and thus this suggests that planning was not taking place.  Again 
as reported in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 6 planning a solution before beginning the 
Tower of Hanoi is reported to improve performance and poor performances on this 
task is often interpreted as having made an inefficient plan (Phillips, Wynn, Gilhooly, 
Della Sala & Logie, 1999).  Goel et al. (2001) stated that in order to solve the task 
efficiently the participant had to look a few moves ahead and plan the first few moves 
before making any contact with the task.  However, participants cannot just make 
individual moves especially on a task such as the 4-disk version as a series of sub-
goals need to be made in order to move one disk in many cases (for example, 
moving the purple disk to another peg which sits under three other disks in its starting 
position) (Welsh, 1991).   
 
Therefore, based on the time taken to start the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi right-handers 
took longer but based on the number of moves taken to solve the task and the 
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average time taken to complete it left-handers solved it more efficiently.  This 
suggests that the time taken by the right-handers before beginning was not spent 
planning.  In terms of the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi, left-handers took slightly longer to 
start the task but took slightly more moves, on average, to solve it but completed it in 
less time.  The fact that left-handers took slightly more moves than right-handers 
suggests that the time before starting the task was not spent planning.  However, left-
handers did solve the task, on average in 4 seconds less than right-handers and 
therefore although they did not use an optimal solution to solve the task this finding 
suggests that left-handers were quicker at moving the disks and perhaps 
demonstrating on-line planning (making a plan as they went along) rather than before 
they started.  Therefore, it appears that the pause demonstrated by both left- and 
right-handers could not simply be attributed to planning.  
 
Another reason given for a potential delay in responding to a novel problem was that 
there might be differences in anxiety levels which affect the response styles of left- 
and right-handers.  State and trait measurements of anxiety were measured using 
the STAI (Speilberger, 1983).  It was hypothesised that left-handers would have a 
higher state anxiety score than right-handers before completing the first Tower of 
Hanoi trial.  Three different initial state scores were examined.  Firstly, before 
completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi, secondly, before completing the first trial of the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi, and thirdly, all scores were combined to give an overall initial 
state score before participants completed the Tower of Hanoi for the first time.  In the 
3-disk condition the hypothesis was supported, as there was a significant main effect 
of handedness on state anxiety scores with left-handers reporting themselves to be 
significantly more anxious than right-handers.  There was no effect of sex.  In the 
condition where participants completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first there were no 
significant main effects of sex or handedness on state anxiety scores.  Right-handers 
reported themselves to be slightly more anxious than left-handers and females 
reported themselves to be more anxious than males.  Finally, when all scores were 
combined there were no main effects of sex or handedness on initial state anxiety 
scores.  Relatively few studies exist that examine state anxiety and handedness and 
ones that have been reported do not test state anxiety in conjunction with an 
experimental task so it is difficult to draw conclusions (e.g. French & Richards, 1990). 
As previously reported in this section left-handers took longer to make their first move 
on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi than right-handers did but this pattern did not occur on 
the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  One reason for this might be that the 4-disk version is 
much more complex than the 3-disk Tower and thus both left- and right-handers are 
equally stressed about achieving the solution.  However, right-handers took almost 3 
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seconds longer to begin the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi but the state anxiety scores of the 
left- and right-handers were similar thus these current results suggest that the delay 
taken by right-handers to respond to the 4-disk task cannot simply be explained 
through higher levels of anxiety. The 3-disk Tower of Hanoi is a relatively simple 
problem and therefore it would be expected that participants would begin this quickly 
and not feel anxious about the ability to solve it.  However, as previously stated it 
might be the case that left-handers feel pressurised by the potential failure of not 
being able to solve a simple problem and this might affect their anxiety levels and 
thus cause a delay before they move the first disk.  The finding that left-handers 
reported themselves to be significantly more anxious than right-handers before they 
solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi supports this possibility.   
 
It was also hypothesised that there would be no difference between the state scores 
of left- and right-handers before completing the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi.  
This hypothesis was supported, as there were no main effects of sex or handedness 
on the state anxiety scores before completing the Tower of Hanoi for a second time.  
This adds to the support that the novelty of a task affects left-handers more than the 
complexity of a task.  If complexity affected this group then it would have been 
expected that state scores would have been higher when the complexity of the task 
increased.  Also, this task was not entirely novel to the group as they had already 
completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi and thus this may have also reduced anxiety 
levels.  
 
 A comparison of each handedness group’s performance within their condition was 
carried out.  It was hypothesised that left-hander’s state anxiety scores would be 
higher before completing the first Tower of Hanoi task than before completing the 
second Tower of Hanoi task (again this was examined across both conditions) and 
also that there would be no difference between right-handers’ state scores before 
completing the first and second trials of the Tower of Hanoi. It was found that in the 
condition where the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi was completed first and followed by the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi that left-handers reported themselves to be significantly more 
anxious before the 3-disk task than the 4-disk task.  There was no significant 
difference between the state scores of right-handers however in this condition.  When 
performance was examined in the condition where the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi was 
completed twice there was no significant difference between first and second state 
scores in left-handers but there was a significant difference between right-hander’s 
state scores with them reporting themselves to feel more stressed before completing 
the first Tower of Hanoi than the second Tower of Hanoi.  Thus the hypothesis is 
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supported in the 3-disk-4-disk condition but not in the 4-disk-4-disk condition.  Again 
the reason for this can be attributed to the increased stress levels displayed by left-
handers towards simple tasks in novel situations.  As the 4-disk Tower is much more 
complex this increased level of stress does not seem to be displayed or perhaps the 
task is so complex that on a second trial an equal level of stress is maintained.  
Mataix-Cols and Bartrés-Faz, (2002) state that learning is not evident until around the 
fifth trial and thus if a participant had difficulty solving the 4-disk task the first time and 
then was asked to solve it again then this might maintain their anxiety levels 
especially if they achieved their original solution by a trial and error approach.  This 
however does not explain why right-handers reported themselves to be significantly 
more anxious before taking part in the first 4-disk Tower of Hanoi than when they 
completed the second 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  An explanation of this finding could be 
that the complexity of the task effects the behaviour of right-handers more than the 
novelty of the task and as previously mentioned this issue is currently being 
investigated. 
 
It was also hypothesised that there would be no difference between the trait anxiety 
scores of left- and right-handers in the study.  This hypothesis was supported and 
there was no difference between the trait anxiety scores of left- and right-handers or 
between males and females.  This finding supports a number of previous studies 
which found no difference between trait anxiety in left- and right-handers (e.g. Beaton 
& Moseley, 1984; French & Richards, 1990).  However, this finding fails to support 
findings by Orme (1970), Hicks and Pellegrini (1978) and Dillon (1989).  On the other 
hand, once again it can be argued that the method of measuring anxiety can alter 
these findings and this has to be taken in to account when examining current 
evidence. 
 
Additionally, in the current study there was a difference between males and females 
in the time taken to move the first disk (in both the 3- and 4-disk task) with females 
taking significantly longer to move the first disk than males.  As previously 
mentioned, it has been reported that females have, on average, higher anxiety levels 
than males (Wienrich et al., 1982) and thus levels of anxiety could be a contributing 
factor towards the differences in the approach to the problem between males and 
females.  Another possibility is that the two groups have a different solving strategy 
that is not directly focussed around planning but in the way that they move the disks  
- this is currently being investigated as part of an ongoing study (see Chapter 8, 
section 8.3. for details of this).  The time taken to move the first disk for each group 
on the first trials of the Tower of Hanoi was longer in the 4-disk condition than in the 
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3-disk condition.  This suggests that the complexity of the problem has an effect on 
how an individual will tackle it.  This finding suggests that more thought has to be 
given to the more complex problem.  However, another factor that might affect this is 
whether or not the problem is novel to the participant.  This issue is also being 
currently investigated with the 3-, 4- and 5-disk Towers of Hanoi (see Chapter 8, 
section 8.3.1. number 3). 
 
It was also hypothesised that there would be no difference in the time taken to move 
the first disk of the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi between left- and right-handers. 
Again there were two different groups (both did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi but this 
was novel to one group).  In the condition where the group did the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the first time there were no significant main effects of handedness or sex.  
However, left-handers took longer to move the first disk than right-handers and 
females took longer to move the first disk than males.  This again could be because 
the problem is still novel in the fact that the participants had never solved the 4-disk 
problem before and thus left-handers and females were perhaps more inhibited in 
their approach behaviour than right-handers and males (e.g. Hopkins & Bennett, 
1994).  In the group that did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time the scores 
were very similar for each group.  Males and females took exactly the same time on 
average to move the first disk on the second trial while left-handers were only 
marginally slower than right-handers to move the first disk.  Again there were no 
significant main effects found.  This group did exactly the same task as their first task 
and the lack of differences found between groups in this condition suggests that 
novelty is an important factor in determining individual’s approach behaviours.  It also 
suggests that if levels of anxiety effect an individual’s performance (or the behaviour 
prior to the task) then novelty also has a significant effect on increasing these levels 
in particular groups (i.e. left-handers and females).  Thus the hypothesis that there 
would be no difference in the time taken to move the first disk in the second condition 
of the Tower of Hanoi was supported.  
 
Performance on the first move of the first trial of the Tower of Hanoi was compared 
with performance of the first move on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi for each 
group.  In the group that did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first and then the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi second there was a significant difference between the first move times 
taken by left-handers and females.  This suggests that these groups might have been 
more anxious than the other two groups when faced with the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi 
or alternatively it could mean that the other two groups (males and right-handers) 
were affected more by the complexity of the problem when faced with the 4-disk 
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Tower of Hanoi (this was however not the case as females and left-handers took 
longer to start the 4-disk trial too than the males and right-handers).  The difference 
between the times taken by right-handers and males were not significant.  In the 
group that did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi twice all groups (males, females, left-
handers and right-handers) were significantly slower to move the first disk on the first 
trial of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (when the problem was novel) than on the second 
trial of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  This therefore suggests that the novelty of the task 
causes a more inhibited approach than when the problem is no longer novel.    
 
With respect to task complexity, very little work has been carried out examining this 
in conjunction with handedness.  One of the only studies that examines this issue 
was carried out by Bryden, Pryde and Roy (2000).  They found that the frequency 
with which a participant used their preferred hand was not affected by the complexity 
of the task.  However, Bryden et al. examined hand preferences across a series of 
tasks but were not interested in behavioural responses to these.  Bryden et al. were 
interested in the frequency of use of the preferred hand and the point at which 
someone has to switch to the non-preferred hand in order to complete a task.  
Therefore because the aim of Bryden et al.’s study was to examine hand preference 
on complex tasks this study cannot be used to support the findings in the current 
study on task complexity.  Additionally, in the current Tower of Hanoi study all 
participants were asked to respond with their preferred hand and thus the difference 
in skill between the hands could not be compared.   
 
Comparisons were made on the performances of the individuals in the 2 conditions 
on the time taken to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi and on the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi (both first trials).   It was found that males and females took less 
time to make the first move on the 3-disk Tower than they did on the 4-disk Tower.  
However, left-handers took more time to move the first disk on the 3-disk Tower than 
they did on the 4-disk Tower but right-handers took more time to move the disk on 
the 4-disk Tower than on the 3-disk Tower.  This suggests that left-handers are 
affected more by the novelty of the task rather than the complexity whereas the right-
handers seem to be affected more by the complexity of the task.  Also, although the 
novelty is possibly affecting the performance of left-handers in the approach to the 
task another reason might be that the simplicity of the problem is also affecting left-
hander’s performance.  The 3-disk Tower of Hanoi is a relatively simple task and as 
such a number of researchers do not use the 3-disk task as they report it to be too 
easy for testing purposes (e.g. Mataix-Cols and Bartrés-Faz, 2002) and use a 
minimum of 4-disks when carrying out experiments.  If this is the case then it is 
Chapter 7: Novelty, anxiety and performance  
 322 
possible that the potential to fail to solve this simple task might also have an effect on 
the left-handed group and thus contribute to the pause before making a first 
response and to the increased anxiety levels that they display. The increased time 
taken to make the first move by males and females in the 4-disk condition over the 3-
disk condition could possibly be an effect of the complexity of the task or a possible 
interaction between the novelty of the task and the complexity.  The first move time 
was also examined on the second trials of each group (the 4-disk Tower (first time) 
by one group and the exact same 4-disk Tower (second time) by the other group.  
The males and females completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time took 
longer to make their first move than the males and females who had already 
completed the same 4-disk Tower of Hanoi earlier in the experimental session.  Left- 
and right-handers also took more time to make their first move when completing the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time than the left- and right-handers who were 
completing it for a second time (however, these effects were not significant).  This 
illustrates that task novelty is an important factor when examining the performance 
on the Tower of Hanoi.  In the condition where the group had already completed one 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi task before completing a second every sub-group within this 
condition made their first move quicker than those in the condition where participants 
completed the 4-disk Tower for the first time.  Again it can be argued that as this 
group had already done the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi previously that the 4-disk task was 
not novel to the group.  However, as the solution is different to the 3-disk task and 
more importantly the first move is different then the 4-disk task has to be treated with 
a certain amount of independence from the 3-disk task.   
 
An additional factor that should have been included in order to examine the 
complexity issue more closely was counterbalancing the order of the 3-disk followed 
by 4-disk condition, a group of participants should have completed the 4-disk task 
followed by the 3-disk task.  Thus the novel but complex task would have been 
carried out first and would have been followed by the less complex task which would 
be expected to be solved much more efficiently and in less time.   However, as it was 
difficult to recruit high numbers of left-handed participants (both due to a lack of 
availability and time constraints) this condition could not be conducted (however, this 
is being examined in a current study).   When examining the number of moves taken 
to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (for the first time for one group and the second 
time for the other group) it was found that left- and right-handers took fewer moves to 
solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi when they completed it for the second time than the 
group did that solved the 4-disk Tower for the first time.  Again this suggests that 
although this group had already completed the 3-disk Tower earlier in the 
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experimental session that the 4-disk Tower was still treated with an element of 
novelty whereas the group who had already completed the 4-disk Tower had 
experience of this and solved it more efficiently (although this was only the case for 
males, the other groups only showed a marginal improvement in their performance).  
However, as the average number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk Tower did not 
differ significantly between the two conditions then it can also be argued that there 
was some form of adaptation to the rules of the problem demonstrated by those who 
completed the 3-disk Tower first and that learning was not highly evident across the 
two repeated 4-disk trials.   
 
The time taken to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi was also compared between 
the conditions (those doing the 4-disk Tower for the first time after completing the 3-
disk previously and those doing the 4-disk Tower for the second time after already 
completing the 4-disk trial in the same session).  Males who completed the 4-disk 
Tower for the second time completed the Tower in almost half of the time that those 
completing it for the first time took.  This pattern was also found in right-handers.  
Females also took an average of around 33 seconds less to complete the Tower 
when doing it a second time compared to those doing it for the first time and left-
handers solved the 4-disk Tower on average 36 seconds faster when doing it for the 
second time than those doing it for the first time.  This shows that although the 
number of moves did not improve in the repeated session, the time taken to solve the 
task was much improved.  As the group doing the 4-disk Tower for the second time 
had already experienced exactly the same problem then they knew which rules they 
had to obey and individuals had all successfully solved the task on the first occasion.  
However, those who had previously solved the 3-disk Tower did not have the same 
experience of solving the more complex task that included a number of sub-goals 
and many more moves.  In the 3-disk task one disk for example can be on a single 
peg at all times, however, on the 4-disk task more than one disk has to be at least on 
one peg and this makes the rule of not putting a bigger disk on top of a smaller disk 
important therefore this gives the group who had previously completed the 4-disk 
task the advantage as they had already become familiar with this strategy.  When 
completing the 3-disk Tower this rule is not used as much as the solution is much 
more straightforward.   
 
Therefore, it seems that the issue of novelty is important particularly in left-handers 
but this effect appears to interact with task complexity.  However, the issue of task 
complexity is affected by the simplicity and novelty of the task rather than the 
difficulty.  When the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi is completed for the first time right-
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handers take longer to start this and the anxiety levels of left- and right-handers are 
similar.  However, when the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi is completed for the first time left-
handers take longer to start this and they report themselves to be significantly more 
anxious at that moment than right-handers.  Hembree (1988) stated that the more 
complex the task, the more anxious a person is if they experience test anxiety.  
However, the opposite pattern was found in the current study in that, on average, 
state anxiety was higher before completing the simpler of the two Tower of Hanoi 
tasks (and this was particularly the case for left-handers).  The issue of task simplicity 
can perhaps be related to the findings of Druckman and Swets (1988) who stated in 
order for participants to remain focussed throughout a task they required a high state 
of arousal.  Conversely, they stated that complex tasks required lower levels of 
arousal and thus they concluded that as a task became simpler the level of arousal 
increased.   
 
It is therefore possible that as the left-handed participants had significantly higher 
levels of state anxiety that this might explain why the solved the task more efficiently 
than the right-handers.  Although they took longer to begin the task (which might 
have been caused by high levels of anxiety or possibly time to compose themselves 
before starting) left-handers completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi, on average, in 6 
seconds quicker than right-handers.  This therefore supports Druckman and Swets’ 
findings.  Additionally, Fink and Neubauer (2004) suggested that introverts were 
more likely to display lower stress levels towards easy tasks compared to more 
difficult tasks.  However, in order to investigate this with respect to left- and right-
handers a measurement of introversion or extraversion would need to be taken 
before drawing any conclusions. 
 
In addition, Mueller et al. (1993) found that there were no differences in terms of test 
anxiety scores between left- and right-handers.  However, Friedman and Bendas-
Jacob (1997) stated that test anxiety was a feeling of apprehension in a test situation 
and this could therefore have contributed to the difference between the behaviour of 
left- and right-handers with respect to their state anxiety scores in that left-handers 
were possibly more stressed by the test/experimental situation.  However, Friedman 
and Bendas-Jacob (1997) and Hembree (1988) state that high levels of test anxiety 
are correlated with deficits in cognitive performance.  However, this does not support 
the current findings as left-handers did not perform any worse than right-handers and 
in many cases they showed a superior performance. 
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On the second trials of each condition, the scores (both first move and state anxiety) 
remain around the same in each condition.  On the second trial of the 3-disk/4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi condition left-handers still take slightly longer to begin the 4-disk task 
and have higher state anxiety levels than right-handers but this can be argued that 
the task still has some novelty element to it as it requires a different strategy in order 
to solve it.  Thus, these findings can be linked to the findings of Rogers (1999) and 
Hopkins and Bennett (1994) on novelty which suggest that novelty may influence a 
delay in the response of left-handers possibly caused by inhibitory behaviour 
associated with the right hemisphere.  Additionally, the findings by Goldberg et al. 
(1994) which suggest that a preference for novelty is associated with the right 
hemisphere and therefore left-handers should show a preference for novelty, is not 
supported by these findings. 
 
To conclude, the current chapter examines whether there is a difference between 
state and trait anxiety levels in left- and right-handers and also whether there is a 
difference between behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation scores between 
left- and right-handers.  The findings of these brief studies were used to form 
hypotheses for a study involving task novelty and anxiety using the Tower of Hanoi.  
It was found in the initial state anxiety study that left-handers were significantly more 
anxious than right-handers when asked to report how they were feeling during the 
experimental session (state anxiety) but there was no difference between the groups’ 
trait anxiety scores.  This led onto a follow up study being carried out using the 
Behavioural Inhibition and Behavioural Activation Scales.  As behavioural inhibition is 
seen to be a form of anxiety then it was expected that again left-handers would score 
higher on this scale than right-handers and this was found to be the case.  Thus, 
these two findings suggested that there was an element of increased anxiety in left-
handers and suggestions in an earlier chapter (see chapter 4) postulated that one 
reason for differences between left- and right-handers on a series of tasks could be 
due to increased anxiety levels in left-handers.  It was also suggested (both in 
previous research (e.g. Cameron and Rogers, 1999 and in the current series of 
experiments) that the novelty of the task may also affect the behaviour of the 
participants.  As Cameron and Rogers reported that left-handers were more stressed 
by novel objects and situations than right-handers then it was expected that task 
novelty in the current study would also have an effect on the participants.  One final 
factor that was considered here was task complexity, this issue is currently being 
investigated in more depth in an on-going study (see Chapter 8, section 8.3.) but the 
complexity of the Tower of Hanoi was also varied in the current study in order to see 
if this made participants more anxious or if it had no effect.   It was found that left-
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handers when faced with the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time took longer to 
begin the task than right-handers (but not significantly so) and were significantly 
more anxious about the current situation (state anxiety).  However, when an 
additional group of left- and right-handers were faced with the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
(which was novel to them and they had not completed any Tower of Hanoi before) 
left-handers started the task in less time than right-handers and there was no 
difference between the two groups in their state anxiety levels.  The trait anxiety of 
the participants did not differ.   
 
It therefore is concluded that left-handers appear to be more anxious than right-
handers when faced with a novel situation.  However, the difficulty or complexity of 
the situation also has an effect.  In the condition where the task was more difficult (4-
disk) both groups showed evidence of anxiety but when the task was simple (the 3-
disk Tower of Hanoi), anxiety levels were significantly higher in left-handers (and this 
state anxiety score was the highest, on average, of any of the state anxiety scores 
recorded).  This suggests that left-handers appear to feel inhibited and display an 
anxious reaction to a task that is not only new to them but also more specifically to a 
task that is simple and easy to complete. The potential failure to complete such a 
task could affect and increase left-hander’s anxiety levels.   
 
Finally, as reported by Stuettgen et al. (2005) it is possible that people who 
experience high levels of anxiety adopt a series of behavioural coping strategies in 
order to reduce anxiety.  Thus, the longer delay observed in left-handers before 
beginning some of the tasks could be evidence of coping strategy used to reduce 
their anxiety levels.   Therefore, in conclusion state anxiety seems to increase in 
simple, novel situations in left-handers but this does not necessarily affect their 
performance and in many cases perhaps increases adrenalin and therefore there 
might be a fight or flight reaction which improves performance.  These concepts are 
currently being investigated in more detail. 
 
 
7.14. Overall conclusion 
 
During the course of this thesis different explanations have been investigated as to 
why left- and right-handers have different response styles when approaching (novel) 
tasks.  Planning and emotional processing explanations have been investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and this current chapter aimed to investigate the concepts of 
anxiety, novelty and task complexity.  It was proposed that left-handers might have 
higher anxiety levels than right-handers and thus this might have affected how they 
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approached each task.    Anxiety was examined over two different experiments in this 
chapter using the self-report STAI (Speilberger, 1983) where state anxiety and trait 
anxiety questionnaires were administered.  Also, as part experiment 8 the BIS/BAS 
questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994) was administered to examine behavioural 
inhibition and behavioural activation levels in participants in conjunction with the 
issues of anxiety as the inhibitory system is said to be triggered off by an anxiety 
response often in concurrence with novelty.  It was reported that there was no 
difference in trait anxiety levels between left- and right-handers.  However, it was 
reported in both anxiety experiments that left-handers reported themselves to feel 
significantly more anxious on the state questionnaire (and therefore right at that 
moment in time) than right-handers when faced with a novel task.  Also, although 
there was no difference on any of the behavioural activation scales between left- and 
right-handers, left-handers had significantly higher behavioural inhibition scores than 
right-handers.  This finding can be related to high anxiety levels and could help 
explain why there is a delay in responding, on average, by left-handers.  Thus, from 
the studies carried out in this thesis these findings suggest that an anxiety or 
inhibitory behaviour explanation cannot be ruled out when trying to explain why there 
is a response style difference between left- and right-handers. 
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Chapter 8: General discussion and conclusions 
 
 
8.0 Aims of the thesis 
 
One key concept central to my thesis was the reported differences in response styles 
between left- and right-handed monkeys and apes (e.g. Cameron & Rogers, 1999; 
Hopkins & Bennett, 1994).  These findings suggested that fundamental differences 
exist in the way(s) that these primates interact with the world which are related to 
handedness.  It was noted that very few human studies have reported differences 
between left- and right-handers’ behaviour and their interaction with the world and 
therefore the main aim of my thesis was to investigate the response styles of human 
left- and right-handers towards a variety of different novel tasks.  The investigation of 
these potential response style differences were carried out over a series of 
experiments, which were designed according to the findings of each preceding 
experiment in order to investigate the potential response style differences in humans.  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to outline the main findings of each 
experimental study carried out as part of my thesis and highlight any questions or 
points for discussion that may result from these.  The main implications of my 
findings will be discussed alongside limitations of the studies. Finally, current pilot 
work will be briefly discussed and future studies will be outlined.  More specifically I 
will discuss the findings of the studies examining left- and right-handers response 
styles to novel tasks and will consider the possible reasons for occurring differences 
through a number of follow up studies.   
 
 
8.1 Main findings within each chapter 
 
The experiments carried out in my thesis reveal several important points and these 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.1.1 Response Styles 
 
The first experimental chapter (Chapter 4) examined response style differences 
between left- and right-handers using a novel problem-solving task (the 3-disk Tower 
of Hanoi).  As previous comparative studies suggested that there was a time delay 
demonstrated by left-handers to respond to novel problem-solving tasks and novel 
objects then it was thought that right-handers might be more impulsive than left-
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handers. Thus, in order to investigate this idea in human participants two impulsivity 
measures were developed alongside the novel task (the 3-disk ToH).  The first 
measurement was a self-report impulsivity questionnaire (the Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale (BIS), Barratt & Patton 1983) and the second was a computerised matching 
task where participants were given a series of shape matching trials to complete.  It 
was found that there was no difference in self-report impulsivity scores between left- 
and right-handers (although left-hander’s scores were slightly higher).  However, it 
was found that left-handers took significantly longer to respond to the figure matching 
task suggesting that right-handers might be more impulsive than left-handers in their 
responses.  These findings indicate that although left-handers might consider 
themselves to be as equally impulsive as right-handers on a self-report scale that 
their behavioural responses are slower or perhaps more inhibited than right-handers 
suggesting that right-handers may be more impulsive than them.  However, there 
was no difference in the number of errors made on the matching task between left- 
and right-handers and this therefore suggests that the performance of the right-
handed participants was not impaired by their quicker responses nor was the 
performance of the left-handers enhanced by their slower responses.    
 
On the novel problem-solving task a significant difference in the response styles of 
left- and right-handers towards the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi was shown. It was found 
that left-handers took significantly longer to move the first disk than right-handers on 
the task.  This finding was similar to the findings of Cameron and Rogers (1999) and 
Hopkins and Bennett (1994) in that there was a delayed response by the left-handed 
primates in their studies or perhaps a more impulsive response by the right-handed 
primates.  It was also found in the Tower of Hanoi study that left-handers took 
significantly fewer moves to solve the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (and males took 
significantly fewer moves than females).  The interaction between sex and 
handedness was almost significant and when this was analysed further it was found 
that there was no difference in the number of moves taken to solve the Tower of 
Hanoi between left-handed males and right-handed males.  However, left-handed 
females solved the Tower of Hanoi in significantly fewer moves than right-handed 
females.  When completion time was compared it was found that there was no 
difference in the time taken to complete the Tower of Hanoi (when initiation or 
‘planning’ time was also included) between left- and right-handers.  However, it was 
found that males completed the Tower of Hanoi significantly faster than females.  
When the completion time was analysed minus the initiation or ‘planning’ time 
however it was found that the difference between left- and right-handers was almost 
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significant (p=0.057) with left-handers solving the task faster than right-handers.  
Also, males still completed the task significantly faster than females.   
 
A number of explanations were proposed for why these differences occurred.  
Rogers (1999) suggested that differences between left- and right-handers in terms of 
response style behaviour could be attributed to differences in hemispheric 
specialisation for processing novel stimuli and controlling emotional responses.   She 
adds that the right hemisphere is considered to be specialised for inhibitory or 
avoidance behaviour and the left hemisphere is specialised for approach or 
exploratory behaviour (see Davidson, e.g. 1992 for a detailed explanation of this).  
Therefore as left-handers are right hemisphere dominant then this inhibitory or 
avoidance behaviour would aid in the explanation of their delayed response time in 
moving the first disk of the Tower of Hanoi.  This explanation could also be applied to 
right-handers.  As right-handers are left hemisphere dominant then the idea of 
approach or exploratory behaviour would help explain why they approached the 
Tower of Hanoi and moved the first disk faster than left-handers.  It could be inferred 
from this explanation that left-handers possess a more cautious cognitive style and 
are more likely to think about their actions before executing them. Thus potential 
differences in approach strategies towards this novel task were outlined and 
discussed (see Chapter 4 for details of these).  Superficially, it appeared that left-
handers were studying the problem for longer and that this possibly caused the 
difference in approach towards the Tower of Hanoi between left- and right-handers.  
However, a number of additional (and testable) explanations were proposed and 
these are outlined below. 
 
One reason for the reported response time difference between left- and right-
handers, which has already been partly discussed, is a difference in hemispheric 
specialisation and more specifically emotional processing.   The right hemisphere is 
often cited as being the ‘emotional’ hemisphere of the brain as many researchers 
report that it processes both positive and negative emotions (e.g. Christman & 
Hackworth, 1993).  However, the valence specific hypothesis states that negative 
emotions are processed in the right hemisphere and positive emotions are processed 
in the left hemisphere (e.g. Jansari et al, 2000).  Therefore it is possible that the 
response style behaviour of right-handers may be related to positive emotions 
relating to the left hemisphere dominance of their brains.  This would suggest that 
this dominant positive emotional processing would be related to the bold and more 
impulsive behaviour associated with the left hemisphere and therefore the response 
style behaviour displayed by right-handers would be a more positive and forthright 
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exploratory approach.  In accordance with this the response style behaviour exhibited 
by left-handers may be related to the dominance of negative emotions relating to the 
right hemisphere of their brains.  If the valence specific hypothesis is supported then 
it is possible that dominant negative emotional processing would be related to 
inhibitory and avoidance behaviour and therefore the response style behaviour 
displayed by left-handers would be more reserved and inhibited.  This idea was 
examined in Chapter 5 where potential emotional processing differences between 
left- and right-handers were investigated.   
 
Another potential explanation of why a difference in response behaviour was found 
between left- and right-handers was that the left-handed participants might have 
been planning a solution to the problem before making their first move and thus 
response time would be longer.  Many researchers have indicated that one of the 
main functions of the Tower of Hanoi is to investigate planning (e.g. Shallice, 1982).  
Goel et al. (2001) suggested that in order to effectively solve the Tower of Hanoi that 
participants have to plan ahead before making any moves.  In my Tower of Hanoi 
study (Chapter 4) it was found that left-handers solved the task in significantly fewer 
moves than right-handers and this therefore this supported Goel et al.’s argument 
that planning a solution is more effective.  The finding that left-handers took 
significantly fewer moves to solve the task and significantly longer to move the first 
disk suggests that left-handers were planning a solution to the task during this time.  
If this were the case then it would also be expected that they would solve the task 
quicker than right-handers with their more effective solution.  When ‘planning’ or 
‘thinking’ time was included in completion time there was no difference between the 
performances of left- and right-handers.  However, when the initial ‘planning’ or 
initiation time was not included in the total completion time of the Tower of Hanoi, 
left-handers did solve the task faster than right-handers (this finding almost reached 
significance, p=0.057).  Again this superior performance on the time taken to solve 
the task suggests that the left-handers were planning a solution in the time before 
they made their first response.  However, Phillips et al. (2001) reported that there 
was little relationship between planning and performance on the Tower of Hanoi and 
that planning is not necessarily essential for superior performance.  Also, the 
handedness literature does not report any evidence that left-handers plan more than 
right-handers do and this issue would have to be researched further in order to make 
such a claim.   
 
Not only were handedness differences reported on the Tower of Hanoi task but sex 
differences were also found.  Males solved the task in significantly fewer moves than 
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females and also completed the task in less time than females (regardless of the 
inclusion or exclusion of ‘planning/initiation’ time).  However, there was no sex 
difference in the time taken to move the first disk of the Tower of Hanoi.  These 
findings suggest that although males’ performances were superior, on average, to 
females’ on the Tower of Hanoi that the planning explanation could not be used to 
support these findings as there was no difference in the time taken to move the first 
disk and it is during this time that it was proposed that the planning was occurring.  
Also, the fact that both males and females took less than 1.5 seconds to make their 
first move, on average, suggests that they could not have made an effective plan in 
this time.  An alternative reason why the performance of males was superior to 
females was that the Tower of Hanoi is a visuo-spatial task and males are 
consistently reported to excel on this type of task (e.g. Siegel-Hinson & McKeever, 
2002).  This explanation can also be used to explain the superior performance of left-
handers as literature suggests that they also excel on visuo-spatial tasks compared 
to right-handers.  Therefore it is possible that the nature of the task may have caused 
both the sex and handedness differences reported for the Tower of Hanoi but this 
does not fully explain the difference in response times and styles between left- and 
right-handers.  Further experiments examining the nature of the task were also 
carried out (for example the sorting task in Chapter 6) and this issue will be 
discussed again in section 8.1.3. 
 
A final possible explanation of why there was a difference in response styles to a 
novel task was that left-handers might be more inhibited in their responses due to 
increased stress or anxiety.  Hopkins and Bennett (1994) suggested that left-handers 
took longer to make a motor response in a novel situation due to increased 
behavioural inhibition.  In relation to this a number of studies have reported that left-
handers are, on average, more anxious than right-handers and that they tend to 
worry more about their performances than right-handers (e.g. Orme, 1970; Dillon, 
1989).  Behavioural inhibition is, according to Gray (1982) a main feature of 
increased anxiety and thus it is possible that elevated anxiety levels in left-handers 
caused them to pause before making their first move on the Tower of Hanoi.  Thus, 
left-handers might have worried more about their performance on the Tower of Hanoi 
and have thought about it more before making their first move.  Additionally, it is 
possible that the novelty of the task might have added to increased anxiety levels 
and therefore could have affected overall performance.   
 
Thus, three possible reasons were outlined for why there was a difference in 
response behaviour between left- and right-handers towards a novel task.  Firstly, a 
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difference in emotional processing between left- and right-handers might have 
affected how they approached the Tower of Hanoi.  Secondly, a difference in 
planning strategies might have affected the approach that left- and right-handers took 
to solve the Tower of Hanoi.  Thirdly, a difference in anxiety or stress levels might 
have affected how left- and right-handers responded to the Tower of Hanoi.  In 
addition the issue of the novelty of the task had to be investigated as this might also 
have affected the performances of left- and right-handers.  Each of these 
explanations was investigated through a series of experimental studies and the 
findings are discussed below.   
 
8.1.2. Emotional processing 
 
Chapter 5 examined the lateralisation of emotional processing in left- and right-
handers.  Previous studies that examined emotional processing tended to only use 
right-handed participants (e.g. Jansari et al, 2000) and therefore there was little 
available literature concerning information on emotional processing similarities or 
differences between left- and right-handers.  As previously stated in section 8.1.1 
above, it was proposed that a difference in approach strategies towards a novel task 
might have been caused by differences in hemispheric specialisation in left- and 
right-handers.  More specifically, the dominant right hemisphere of left-handers and 
the associated inhibitory behaviour and the dominant left hemisphere of right-
handers and the associated exploratory and approach behaviour.  In accordance with 
this the valence hypothesis of emotional processing proposes that the left 
hemisphere is specialised for positive emotions and the right hemisphere is 
specialised for negative emotions.  Therefore if the valence hypothesis is supported 
then it would be expected that left-handers would display a more negative and 
inhibitory behavioural style and right-handers would display a more positive and 
impulsive behavioural style caused by their right hemisphere and left hemisphere 
dominance respectively.   Results of the experiment in Chapter 5 found that both left- 
and right-handed participants were more accurate at discriminating positive emotions 
than negative emotions.  All participants also identified positive emotions significantly 
faster than negative emotions.  Therefore it was found that handedness did not 
influence the lateralised processing of emotion on a series of morphed faces and 
therefore the valence specific hypothesis was not supported with respect to 
handedness.  This finding suggests that the difference in the time taken to move the 
first disk on the Tower of Hanoi by left- and right-handers was not influenced by a 
difference in emotional processing (although it could be argued that the location of 
emotions on the right side would differentially affect left handers and this will be 
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further discussed in section 8.3.2).  In order for this idea to be supported it would 
have been expected that left-handers were more accurate and also faster at 
identifying negative emotional faces and right-handers would have been faster and 
more accurate at identifying positive emotional faces.  Presumably this would have 
resulted in a delay in the time taken to move the first disk by left-handers caused by 
the dominance of the right hemisphere and thus a direct link to avoidance behaviour.  
Similarly, the quicker response time to move the first disk by the right-handers would 
have been caused by the dominance of the left hemisphere and thus a direct link to 
approach and impulsive behaviour.  Therefore it was concluded that the delay taken 
by left-handers to move the first disk of the Tower of Hanoi was probably not caused 
by differences in emotional processing (and linked approach/avoidance behaviour 
related to the valence hypothesis) between left- and right-handers.  However, one 
additional important point to note is that these conclusions are based on left- and 
right-handers abilities to correctly identify positive emotions and as there was no 
difference found between them then it shows a lack of support for the valence 
hypothesis of emotional processing with respect to handedness.  However, this 
finding does not rule out the possibility that the left hemisphere of the brain is 
specialised for approach behaviour and the right hemisphere is specialised for 
avoidance or inhibitory information.  This concept is discussed further in the anxiety 
section of this chapter (and also see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion).  As 
the idea of emotional processing differences between left- and right-handers did not 
seem to support the findings, the next possible explanation for the difference 
between left- and right-handers on the time taken to move the first disk of the Tower 




Chapter 6 examined the possibility that there was a difference in planning behaviour 
between left- and right-handers on a series of tasks.  These were a manual sorting 
task, a computerised ‘intelligence’ test and a computerised sequencing task which 
was based around the ‘Fastest Finger First’ game on the television show ‘Who wants 
to be a millionaire’.  
 
The manual sorting task (outlined in Chapter 6) was devised as a follow up study to 
the Tower of Hanoi task outlined in Chapter 4.  This task was designed firstly to see if 
there was a difference between left- and right-handers on the time taken to move the 
first card (and therefore replicating the initiation time finding of the Tower of Hanoi 
task), secondly to see if removing the high visuo-spatial element of the task would 
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affect performance of both left-handers and males since they are reported to be 
superior at these tasks and thirdly, to examine whether there was any evidence of 
planning occurring if the first move response was replicated.  Similarly to the first 
Tower of Hanoi study an indication that planning had occurred was based on a 
longer initiation time and a faster completion time indicating that a plan was being 
formulated during the initiation time and therefore completion was faster due to the 
execution of the plan.   
 
It was found that left-handers took significantly longer to move the first card of the 
sorting task than right-handers, however, there was no difference in the time taken to 
solve the task between left- and right-handers.  This finding suggested that the delay 
taken by left-handers before moving the first card of the task was not obviously used 
for planning.  If left-handers were carrying out planning during this delay then it would 
have been expected to reduce the completion time of the whole task (if it was 
assumed that the planning improved performance).  It was also found that right-
handed males took significantly less time to solve the sorting task than left-handed 
males.  This difference again suggests that left-handed males were not planning in 
the time it took before they moved the first card as right-handed males, on average, 
took longer to move the first card but solved the task quicker.    However, although it 
appeared unlikely that planning was being carried out in this time the task consisted 
of 20 cards and therefore a full and effective plan would have been impossible to 
create and execute during the initiation time.  An alternative explanation might have 
been that any planning that was carried out might been in the form of on-line 
planning where individuals plan their first few moves and then plan as they go 
through the task.  One way to examine an on-line planning strategy would be to look 
at how long a participant took to move each disk or card (to calculate the time taken 
per move) or examine how long participants took in between moves (thus calculating 
possible breaks to plan the new few moves to a solution). However, as this task did 
not require actual moves but merely categorising cards then the idea of on-line 
planning could not be effectively examined.  However, future work will examine this 
type of task further by using video footage and carrying out Observer analyses on 
behaviours displayed.  This issue was further examined on the ‘Fastest Finger First’ 
task that is outlined later on in this section.   
 
Additional studies were carried out to examine the responses of left- and right-
handers to two novel computerised tasks.  The first task involved four different type 
of question: visuo-spatial (mental rotation); language; number and Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (see Chapter 6, section 6.10.).  Participants were asked to 
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solve these tasks as accurately as possibly but no time constraints were given.  It 
was found that overall left-handers took significantly more time to respond to the 
questions but there was no difference between left- and right-handers on accuracy 
scores.  This finding suggested that although left-handers took longer to respond to 
the questions that once again they were not planning in the fact that they were not 
solving the questions more effectively than right-handers.  When each type of 
question was analysed it was found that the only handedness difference found was 
that left-handers were more accurate at solving the mental rotation questions than 
right-handers.  This suggests again that left-handers have superior visuo-spatial skills 
than right-handers and once again the findings on the Tower of Hanoi task may have 
been influenced by the visuo-spatial nature of the task.  There were no differences 
between left- and right-handers in the time taken to respond to each individual type of 
question.  Once again this suggested that one handedness group did not plan their 
responses to the questions any more than the other.   
 
The final ‘planning’ task that was carried out was the ‘Fastest Finger First’ task.  This 
task not only investigated planning but also examined task complexity (questions 
either had 3 or 6 responses to be sorted into according to the question).  The time 
taken to look at the question was also recorded in order to see if one handedness 
group studied the question longer than the other.  It was hypothesised that left-
handers would look at the question on its own for longer than right-handers.  This 
was hypothesised for two different reasons; firstly, it was thought that if participants 
were planning a solution then they might study the question for longer in order to 
make sure that they fully understood the question and perhaps anticipate potential 
answers that might be given.  Secondly, as it is also proposed that high levels of 
anxiety might be responsible for the delay in response in left-handers (see the next 
section on anxiety for further discussion of this) then it was proposed that left-
handers might study the question for longer in order to make sure that they fully knew 
what the question was asking in order to reduce anxiety levels once the answers 
were actually shown.  Thus, they would not have to worry about sorting the 
responses in order and making sure that they knew what the question was asking 
and feeling comfortable with what the question was asking at the same time.   
 
However, it was found that there was no difference between left- and right-handers in 
the time taken to look at the question.  With respect to the time taken to make the 
first response to the questions (overall) it was found that there was no difference in 
the time taken to make the first response between left and right-handers.  When the 
3 responses questions and the 6 responses questions were analysed individually it 
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was found that participants took longer to make the first response to the 6 responses 
than the 3 responses.  However, this difference was not affected by sex or 
handedness.  This finding suggested that more planning or perhaps at least cognitive 
activity was happening when participants had to sort the 6 responses in order and 
therefore the complexity of the task affected the response time, however, this finding 
was not affected by the handedness of the participant.  Thus, this suggests that one 
handedness group was perhaps not planning any more than the other.  The 
response times overall and individually to the 3 and 6 response questions were not 
affected by handedness or sex either and therefore it can be concluded that there 
were no clear planning differences between left- and right-handers on these tasks. 
One possible reason why there were no response style differences shown by this 
task could be due to the lack of novelty of the task.  Studies in the animal literature 
and the findings of a significant delay in response style behaviour by left-handed 
humans have all been reported to be towards a novel task or object.  However, it 
could be argued that this task is not novel to all of the participants as it is similar to 
the ‘Fastest Finger First’ game on ‘Who wants to be a millionaire’ and thus many 
participants will be familiar with the format of this.  If this was the case then this might 
have affected the responses of the participants towards the task.   However, actually 
taking part in this task may have been novel to the participants and this would have 
to be investigated in order to be able to attribute novelty or lack of novelty as a factor 
that could have had an effect on the results. 
 
It has to be noted that two out of the three planning tasks were computerised and this 
may have affected the results of the studies.  Many people would have been aware 
that they were being timed on the computerised planning tasks and possibly felt more 
pressurised to respond quickly rather than accurately.  However, this would have 
been the same for both left- and right-handers and therefore would not have 
influenced the results greatly.  An additional point to note is that the original planning 
task (the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi) and the sorting task were both manual and this 
therefore may have allowed a more ‘natural’ response from participants in that they 
may not have felt as pressurised as they did when participating in the computerised 
tasks (even though the manual tasks were measured by stopwatches). In addition, it 
is possible that these tasks involve a greater level of motor planning (i.e. to execute 
the moves) as well as planning for the sequencing of events.  Therefore, it is a 
possibility that planning is not causing or influencing the original response style 
differences.   
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Another reason why it appeared that there were no planning differences between left- 
and right-handers might have been caused by the type of task they were being asked 
to do.  Because each task involved a short problem solving task then it might not be 
as important to the participant to make a plan to solve the task as it would be if there 
was some importance emphasised on the solution of the task or if it involved some 
kind of real life situation.  If a real life scenario was given to participants then there 
might have been a difference in the way that the two handedness groups approached 
this and there may therefore have been a more valid reason to make a plan before 
tackling the task.  This idea is considered further in the future research section of this 
chapter (section 8.3.2).   The third potential factor proposed to explain the differences 
in response styles to novel tasks between left- and right-handers is anxiety.  The 




As mentioned above, the third explanation proposed in order to explain the reported 
response style differences between left- and right-handers is different levels of stress 
and/or anxiety.  More specifically, left-handers are hypothesised to have higher 
anxiety levels than right-handers and therefore this was proposed to possibly affect 
their responses to tasks and in particular novel tasks.  In order to examine anxiety 
differences between left- and right-handers the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI – 
Speilberger, 1983) was carried out in two different studies.  One important distinction 
that had to be made was that there were two different types of anxiety being 
measured and this could therefore affect the interpretation of results.  Most studies 
only measure generalised anxiety which examines how participants feel in general.  
However, in order to establish how participants felt before taking part in the novel 
problem solving tasks a different measure of anxiety had to be used in order to 
collect this information.  The trait measure allowed the factor of general differences in 
anxiety to be discounted as causes for the differences in responses. The state 
anxiety questionnaire asked participants a series of questions about how they felt 
right at that moment in time rather than in general.  The state anxiety measurements 
in my two studies were considered to be more important than the trait anxiety 
measurements as these measurements allowed me to measure the participant’s 
levels of anxiety towards the novel tasks.   
 
The first study in which the state questionnaire was administered was before 
participants completed the IQ computerised task (see Chapter 6 for details and 
section 8.1.3. for further details of this task).  In this study half of the participants 
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were given the state questionnaire without being told what the actual task entailed 
and the other half of the sample were given the instructions for the task and then 
once they understood what they were they were being asked to do they were given 
the state questionnaire.  The reason for this was to investigate whether state anxiety 
levels would increase if participants were informed of the task that they were 
expected to complete.  It was expected that state anxiety scores would be lower in 
those who did not know what they were going to be asked to do compared with those 
who had a specific task to focus their present feelings on.   
 
It was reported that overall (irrespective of whether participants were given the state 
anxiety questionnaire before they were shown the task instructions or not) that left-
hander’s state anxiety scores were significantly higher than right-hander’s state 
anxiety scores.  The state anxiety scores of the two groups were analysed 
individually and it was found that there was no difference between left- and right-
hander’s state scores when they had not been shown the task instructions 
previously.  However, in the group who had been shown the task instructions before 
they had been given the state anxiety questionnaire to complete there was a 
significant effect of handedness with left-handers reporting themselves to be 
significantly more anxious than right-handers at that moment in time.  There were no 
differences between the trait anxiety scores of left- and right-handers.  These findings 
indicated that left- and right-handers did not differ in their general anxiety scores but 
they did differ in their anxiety scores relating to how they felt at that particular 
moment in time.  More specifically, this difference was most apparent when 
participants had been informed of the task they were expected to complete. 
 
In addition to state and trait anxiety scores participants were also given the BIS/BAS 
questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994) to complete (in conjunction with the ‘Fastest 
Finger First’ study outlined in Chapter 6).  It was found that there were no differences 
between left- and right-hander’s behavioural activation scores.  However, there was a 
significant difference (one-tailed) between behavioural inhibition scores with left-
handers reporting themselves to have higher scores than right-handers.  Again this 
finding can be related to increased anxiety or inhibitory behaviour in left-handers and 
may explain why there was a delay in responding to a novel task.  It has been argued 
that the inhibitory system is related to the right hemisphere and this would aid in the 
explanation of why left-handers have higher BIS scores than right-handers.  This 
finding coupled with the original state anxiety difference lead to the development of 
the second state/trait anxiety investigation.   
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The second study where the state and trait anxiety questionnaires were carried out 
was during the Tower of Hanoi experiment outlined in Chapter 7 (see Chapter 7 for a 
fully comprehensive report and discussion of the Tower of Hanoi findings).  In this 
study state anxiety scores were examined with respect to the issues of task novelty 
and task complexity.  In this study all participants solved two Tower of Hanoi tasks 
(see Chapter 7 for full details of this).  The first Tower of Hanoi task was novel to all 
participants (one group did the 3-disk Tower and the other did the 4-disk Tower) and 
each participant was given the state questionnaire to complete after they read and 
understood the instructions for the Tower of Hanoi that they were going to attempt.  
Once participants had completed the first Tower of Hanoi they were given an 
additional Tower of Hanoi to solve.  This time the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi was given 
and thus this task examined the issue of novelty in one group (the group who had 
already completed the 4-disk ToH) and the issue of complexity in the other group (the 
group who did the 3-disk ToH and then the 4-disk ToH).  Again state anxiety levels 
were recorded before participants completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (and after 
they had read and understood the instructions for the 4-disk ToH).  It was proposed 
that the novelty of the task would affect state anxiety levels and more specifically 
reduce state anxiety levels in left-handers when the task was no longer novel.  No 
specific hypothesis was made about state levels of anxiety and task complexity with 
respect to handedness, however, it was proposed that the novelty of the task would 
stress left-handers more than the complexity of the task would particularly when the 
more complex task was not entirely novel (although see pilot study 2 in section 8.3.1 
for details of task complexity and novelty with respect to whether the task can be 
defined as novel if the number of disks change).   
 
In the condition where participants did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first followed by the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi it was found that left-handers reported themselves to be 
significantly more anxious than right-handers before completing the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi.  However, there was no significant difference between the state anxiety levels 
of left- and right-handers on the second Tower of Hanoi in that condition (the 4-disk 
ToH).  When the state anxiety scores were compared between the first trial and the 
second trial of this condition it was found that state scores were significantly higher 
on the first trial than the second trial – irrespective of sex and handedness.  Overall, 
left-handers reported themselves to be more anxious than right-handers irrespective 
of conditions (however, this was mainly caused by the high state scores of left-
handers before completing the first ToH).  When state scores were examined in the 
4-disk-4-disk Tower of Hanoi condition different results were found.  There was no 
difference in state anxiety scores between left and right-handers before completing 
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the first 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  When participants completed the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the second time it was predicted that there would be no difference between 
left- and right-handers state scores, as the task was no longer novel.  This finding 
was supported. Therefore a difference in state anxiety scores would have been 
expected on the novel trial of the task but not the non-novel trial of the task but no 
differences were found for either trial. When these state anxiety scores were 
compared across trials it was found that there was no effect of sex or handedness.  
However, there was a difference between the state scores overall on the first and 
second trials with the state scores being higher before participants completed the first 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi compared with the state scores given before participants 
competed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time (this approached 
significance p=0.057).  Trait anxiety scores revealed that there were no sex or 
handedness differences within the sample.   
 
State anxiety scores were also compared across conditions to examine whether 
these scores differed with respect to the complexity of the first, novel condition (either 
the 3-disk or 4-disk ToH depending on condition).  It was reported that there was no 
sex or handedness differences on these state anxiety scores but there was an effect 
of condition where state scores were, on average, significantly higher before 
participants did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi than the group who did the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi first.  It was also reported that there was no difference between the state 
scores of right-handers between the two Tower of Hanoi conditions, however, there 
was a significant difference between the state scores of left-handers with respect to 
condition.  It was reported that state scores were significantly higher for left-handers 
who did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first than the state anxiety scores of the left-
handers who did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first.  The comparison of the second state 
anxiety scores across conditions revealed that there were no sex or handedness 
differences.  However, state scores were significantly higher in the group who did the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time (but as their second ToH trial) than in the 
group who did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time (as an identical second 
trial to their first trial).   
 
Therefore, it appears that anxiety possibly does influence response style differences 
between left- and right-handers.  However, although a number of studies reveal that 
anxiety differences exist between left- and right-handers (e.g. Hicks, Pellegrini & 
Evans, 1978), the type of anxiety being measured has to be considered rather than 
citing overall anxiety differences that are not related to the current experimental task.  
Recent studies that have examined state anxiety with respect to handedness (e.g. 
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French & Richards, 1990) found that there was no relationship between handedness 
and anxiety.  However, this is an exception and there are very few studies that 
examine state anxiety with respect to handedness and thus most reported laterality 
and anxiety differences are concerned with trait anxiety data or a similar general 
measurement.   
 
8.1.5 Conclusion of experimental findings 
 
Previous comparative research reported that there was a difference in response style 
behaviour towards a novel task or object between left- and right-handed primates 
where left-handed primates were reported to take significantly longer to respond than 
right-handers.  This finding was examined in this thesis with respect to humans using 
the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi task and a manual sorting task. It was found that the 
comparative findings were replicated and left-handed humans took significantly 
longer to respond to these novel tasks than right-handed humans.  Following this, a 
number of potential explanations of why there was a delay in responding by left-
handers or possibly a more impulsive approach by right-handers were proposed.  
The first potential explanation was that there was a difference in emotional 
processing between left- and right-handers but a study designed to examine this 
found that this was not the case (see Chapter 5 for details).  The next proposed 
difference was that there was a difference in the planning behaviour of left and right-
handers and that left-handers took longer to respond because they were formulating 
an effective plan in this time.  However, a number of experiments were carried out to 
investigate planning and it was reported that there was no clear evidence of planning 
occurring during the delay in responding as the tasks were not completed any more 
effectively (both in terms of time and accuracy) by left-handers than by right-handers.  
If there was evidence of planning then it would have been expected that participants 
who took longer to start a task would complete it both faster and more accurately 
than someone who did not plan.  However, this pattern was not evident from the 
results of the experimental studies.  Finally, it was proposed that left-handers might 
have higher anxiety levels than right-handers and thus this might have affected how 
they approached each task.  Anxiety was examined over two different experiments 
using the self-report STAI (Speilberger, 1983) where a state anxiety and a trait 
anxiety questionnaire were administered.  Also, as part of a different study the 
BIS/BAS questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994) was administered to examine 
behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation levels in participants.  It was 
reported that there was no difference in general anxiety levels between left- and 
right-handers.  However, it was reported in two different experiments that left-
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handers reported themselves to feel significantly more anxious than right-handers 
when faced with a novel task.  Also, although there was no difference on any of the 
behavioural activation scales between left- and right-handers, left-handers had 
significantly higher behavioural inhibition scores than right-handers.  This finding can 
be related to high anxiety levels and could help explain why there is a delay in 
responding, on average, by left-handers.  Thus, from the studies carried out in this 
thesis it appears that evidence suggests that the delay in responding to novel tasks is 
caused by the inhibitory behaviour and increased state anxiety levels of the left-
handed participants.   
 
However, it would be presumptuous to suggest that this is the only reason that such 
a delay is occurring and much more work needs to be done to investigate many of 
these proposed reasons further.  For example, the idea of task novelty was only 
briefly investigated in the final experiment of this thesis and further work would need 
to be carried out on both task novelty and task familiarity to see if any differences 
occurred between left- and right-handers.  Also, anxiety levels would have to be 
investigated in additional ways along with further tests of planning.  These ideas will 
be discussed in the future studies section of this chapter.  However, before ongoing 
pilot studies and proposed future studies are discussed the next section will consider 
the main limitations of the thesis. 
 
 
8.2. Limitations of the thesis 
 
The main limitation throughout each experiment was the difficulty in recruiting 
sufficient numbers of left-handed participants in order to carry out my experiments.  
There were several reasons why this caused difficulties.   
 
Firstly, the number of available left-handers was limited as the studies were carried 
out predominantly with staff and students of the University of Abertay (which is a 
small university) therefore I was not able to recruit as many left-handers for my 
studies as I would have liked.  As a compromise I aimed for 40 left-handers (20 
males and 20 females) for each experiment with the exception of the experiment 
outlined in Chapter 7.   
 
The lack of available left-handers also affected the issue of statistical power in my 
studies.  In order to be able to report large effect sizes then I would have had to 
increase my sample sizes, however, by increasing the number of right-handers in the 
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studies but not being able to increase the number of left-handers in the time frame 
available this may have altered the sample size but would have distorted the 
handedness findings if there were many more right-handers than left-handers in the 
sample.   The experiment in Chapter 7 involved a between subjects design and 
therefore a bigger sample size had to be recruited.  However, only 100 participants 
were recruited and once again this caused issues concerning statistical power.   
 
Another problem with the study described in Chapter 7 was that more participants 
were recruited in to the 4-4-disk condition than in the 3-4-disk condition.  For 
example, there were 28 left-handed participants in the 4-4-disk ToH condition and 
only 24 left-handed participants in the 3-4-disk condition.  Although this is not a huge 
difference in numbers this could still have affected the findings, particularly the time 
taken to make the first move which was a sensitive finding in terms of subtle 
differences being found.  This was also the case for right-handers; there were more 
right-handed participants in the 4-4-disk ToH condition (26 participants) than in the 3-
4-disk ToH condition (22 participants).  The reason for this was that more left-handed 
participants had offered to participate in this particular study and therefore the 
original number (around 60 left-handed participants) was randomly assigned to either 
condition (3-4-disk ToH or 4-4-disk ToH).  However, at the end of the study when a 
number of left-handed participants did not show up to take part in the study a high 
proportion of these participants has been assigned to the 3-4-disk ToH condition and 
therefore a higher number of left-handers had already been tested in the 4-4-disk 
ToH condition which caused there to be more left-handers in one condition than the 
other.  One reason why I was able to recruit more left-handed participants in this 
study than the previous studies was that participants were paid for their participation 
in this study and therefore this created a greater amount of interest from potential 
participants.   
 
Additionally, a high percentage of participants failed to turn up to take part in the 
experiments and therefore the number of potentially recruited participants was at 
least 20% higher than the number who actually took part in the experiments.  
Although there was a considerably high drop out or no-show rate of left-handers it 
was much easier to recruit additional right-handers to take part in the experiments 
when this occurred.  However, there was no ‘reserve list’ of available left-handed 
participants who could replace participants who did not show up, as every left-hander 
who stated that they would like to participate in the experiment was included.  
Although a target number of left-handed participants was set at the beginning of the 
study it was not always possible to achieve this number (due to the reasons outlined 
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above) and therefore in order to keep the proportion of left- and right-handers about 
the same the number of available and willing to participate left-handers dictated how 
many right-handers were needed in each experiment.   
 
Difficulties with left-handed participants not only occurred with the recruitment of 
them but also in classifying them into handedness groups.  As stated in Chapter 3 
there are a number of ways in which handedness can be classified or categorised.  
This ranges from categorising handedness based on levels of hand skill (i.e. if the left 
hand is more skilled than the right and vice versa), quantifying handedness through 
one of a number of handedness questionnaires or inventories or simply classifying 
handedness through the hand that is used to write with.  There are a number of 
advantages and disadvantages for using each method of classification and these 
were discussed in Chapter 3.  However, in the current studies handedness was 
classified using a handedness inventory (and adapted version of Peters (1998) 
questionnaire that also covered Annett’s (1970) handedness questionnaire and the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).  The problem with using the 
handedness inventory was that participants who agreed to participate in the 
experiments and gave their hand preference as left-handed were not always true left-
handers.  In a number of cases these ‘left-handed’ participants wrote with their left 
hands but predominantly did most other actions with their right hands (reasons for 
this are discussed again in Chapter 3) and therefore their data could not be analysed 
due to the inconsistency of their hand preferences.  This was also a contributing 
factor in the reduced number of potentially available left-handed participants.  The 
opposite pattern where someone wrote with the right hand but were classified as left-
handed on the handedness questionnaire only occurred once over 5 separate 
studies and similarly to the cases of the left-handers, their data could not be 
analysed.   
 
In order to take these participants in to consideration a third handedness category 
would have to be created which would include mixed-handers.  Mixed-handers would 
include those who had been forced to change their hand preferences at a younger 
age (and therefore probably still did a number of actions with what used to be their 
dominant hand) and also those who scored a left-handed or right-handed score on 
the questionnaire when they claimed to prefer the opposite hand.  However, in order 
to carry this out a much larger sample size would have to be used.  If there was the 
time to collect such a large sample and the availability of potential participants to 
create this sample then the left-handed and right-handed groups used in my studies 
could be further divided in to a group of strong or consistent left- and right-handers 
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(who use their left or right hands to do everything) and a group of moderate left- and 
right-handers (similar to those in Annett’s (1998) example).  A group of left mixed-
handers and right mixed-handers would also be recruited where left-mixed-handers 
would consist of those who wrote with their left hands but did most other things with 
their right hands and right-mixed-handers would be the opposite (write with their right 
hands but do most other things with their left hands).  Additionally left-mixed –
handers could also be those who were forced to change their handedness from left-
handedness to right-handedness (as they would still perform a number of actions 
with their left hands and only the actions on which they received pressure to change 
would have switched – such as writing).  Porac, Coren and Searleman (1986) stated 
that “even with direct intervention and harsh social pressure, only a small percentage 
of individuals successfully switch handedness.  Those who do, often remain left-
handed except for that small subset of activities that received direct pressure to 
change” (p. 255).  It is unlikely that any participants would be mixed-right-handers if 
this classification system were adopted (i.e. being forced to change from the right 
hand to use the left hand).  Once again as stated above it would be difficult and 
extremely time consuming to be able to recruit participants who were well 
represented in each of the 6 categories outlined above.  For example it would be very 
difficult to recruit a sufficient number of participants who had been forced to change 
their hand preference – particularly among the available group of University staff and 
students.  Previous unpublished work (honours project) found that out of a sample of 
253 participants that only 13 people had been forced to change their hand preference 
and therefore it would be difficult to find around 40 or 50 people who had been forced 
to change.  In order to be able to recruit such a sample, a database of potential 
participants would have to be created over a period of time and also external to the 
university in order to amass adequate numbers in each category to be able to 
examine differences between strong, moderate and mixed left- and right-handers. 
 
 
8.3. Current pilot studies and future research 
 
8.3.1. Current pilot research 
 
The final study examined (ToH study in Chapter 7) issues of anxiety along with task 
complexity and novelty.  It appeared that task complexity did not significantly effect 
state anxiety levels in that the group who did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first did not 
have higher state anxiety levels on average than the group who did the 3-disk Tower 
of Hanoi first.  Task complexity was also examined in one of the conditions of this 
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study (the 3-disk followed by the 4-disk condition) and it was found that state anxiety 
levels were higher, on average, both overall and with respect to sex and handedness 
groups before participants completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (the first and novel 
task) than they were before completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (which was the 
second and therefore not a novel task).  The other condition (the 4-disk ToH followed 
by the same task as a second trial) examined task novelty with respect to state 
anxiety levels. It was found that there was no clear effect of task novelty on state 
anxiety scores.  However, when all conditions were examined it was found that task 
complexity appeared to have an inverse effect on state scores of left-handers in that 
left-handers reported themselves to be more anxious when presented with an easier 
task than a more complex task.  This finding needs to be investigated further and 
pilot studies are currently being carried out using the Tower of Hanoi and the Tower 
of London (Shallice, 1982) in order to compare firstly, responses to a novel task and 
secondly whether task complexity affects state anxiety scores (again with respect to 
the novelty of the task). These tasks and their preliminary findings are outlined in 
sections 2 and 3 below. 
 
1. Handedness, novel problem solving and stress. 
This task was designed in order to examine problem-solving and response behaviour 
towards a novel task.  State anxiety scores were recorded before participants 
undertook the task in order to examine any potential handedness differences and 
also to examine whether state scores correlated with the time taken to make the first 
response.  This idea combined many of the findings outlined in the section above and 
the main emphasis was put on the time taken to move the first piece of the puzzle 
and its relationship to the state anxiety scores.  Participants were asked to fill in the 
state anxiety questionnaire before they under-took the task but had read the 
instructions for the task before completing this questionnaire.   Additional details of 
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Figure 8.2: Picture of the completed task (goal state) 
 
This study examines handedness and anxiety levels in response to a novel task. 30 
left-handed and 30 right-handed participants completed the state anxiety 
questionnaire (Speilberger, 1983) before solving a novel problem (a shape sorting 
problem in which 14 red and yellow pieces could be arranged and fitted together to 
form the shape of a Chihuahua as seen in figures 8.1 and 8.2 above). The time taken 
to move the first piece of the puzzle was recorded and a maximum of 10 minutes was 
given to each participant in which to solve the puzzle before a time out rule was 
used. Therefore, although completion times were recorded for those who 
successfully solved the puzzle these were not analysed due to the incomplete set of 
data for those who ‘timed-out’.   
 
Alongside the time taken to move the first piece of the puzzle the state anxiety score 
of each participant was recorded using the Speilberger state anxiety questionnaire 
(Speilberger, 1983).  A note of the order in which the participant moved each piece of 
the puzzle (as seen in figure 8.1 above) in order to examine whether there was a side 
bias pattern emerging when participants solved the puzzle was also recorded. 
Participants finally completed the trait questionnaire of the State Trait Anxiety 
Questionnaire (Speilberger, 1983). It was hypothesised that state anxiety levels 
would be significantly higher in left-handers than in right-handers when performing a 
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novel task and that left-handers would take longer to move the first piece of the 
puzzle than right-handers.   
 
The main components that were analysed were the time taken to move the first piece 
of the puzzle and the order that they pieces were chosen in.  All of the pieces of the 
puzzle were laid out in the same order for each participant and the side favoured by 
the participant was recorded.  Each piece was numbered on the board so that the 
experimenter could keep track of the order that the pieces were moved in.  A bias of 
left or right was noted (as determined by the choice of the first piece) in order to see 
if there was any pattern of side bias by left- and right-handers. 
 
Preliminary analyses has shown that there was a significant effect of hand 
preference on the time taken to move the first piece of the puzzle where left-handers 
took significantly longer to respond than right-handers.  However, there was no 
evidence of side bias in the preliminary analysis except for left-handed males who 
had a bias for choosing the first piece from the left side.  Additionally, there were no 
reported differences between left- and right-handers’ state anxiety scores when the 
preliminary analysis was carried out.   
 
Tower of Hanoi, novelty and complexity 
 
The main aim of this study is to further investigate self-reported anxiety in left- and 
right-handers when faced with a novel problem, and more specifically when faced 
with varying levels of complexity of a novel problem (do the anxiety levels increase 
as the task complexity increases?).  The second aim of this study is to examine the 
time taken to respond to the novel problem.  It is thought that if planning is a factor in 
the potential delay before responding to a novel problem then by increasing the 
complexity of the problem the initial delay should be longer to allow participants to 
come up with an effective solution. 
 
The novel problem in this research is the Tower of Hanoi.  Participants are presented 
over three experimental sessions with the 3-, 4- or 5-disk version (the order of this is 
counterbalanced) and are given a set of instructions explaining what they have to do 
and outlining the rules of the Tower of Hanoi.  Before solving the Tower of Hanoi 
participants are asked to complete the state questionnaire of the STAI (Spielberger, 
1983) to report how they are feeling (the level of anxiety) at that moment before they 
solve the Tower of Hanoi (in each of the three experimental sessions).  Timing starts 
from the moment the Tower of Hanoi is revealed and the time taken to move/touch 
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the first disk is recorded along with the number of moves taken to solve the Tower 
and the total time taken to solve it.  Each experimental session is video recorded in 
order to check the reliability of the timings and the number of moves made.   
 
It is predicted that if it is stress/anxiety that is playing a part in the delay of the initial 
response then the task complexity will also affect this (the more complex the task 
then the more stressed/anxious the participant will be).  Alternatively, if it is planning 
that is happening during the initial response time then the time before initial response 
should be longer as the problem is more complex (to allow the problem to be 
effectively solved).  Some may argue that the Tower of Hanoi will not be a novel 
problem after the first experimental trial.  However, as the three trials consist of a 
different number of disks on each trial and for each number of disks there are a set 
number of optimal moves and a specific starting peg to achieve this then each 
problem should be treated as a novel one.  In fact, not treating the problem as novel 
will cause the participant to solve it in a less effective manner if they try to learn from 
a prior trial of the Tower of Hanoi.   
 
 Preliminary analysis has shown that there is no effect of handedness or task 
complexity on state anxiety scores. This suggests that the complexity of the task 
does not affect anxiety levels.  However, preliminary mean scores show that left-
handers report a higher mean state score on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi but not on 
the 4- or 5-disk Tower of Hanoi.  Again, although the study is ongoing the pattern 
tends to suggest an interaction between task complexity (and more specifically 
simplicity) and handedness. 
 
With respect to initiation time preliminary analysis shows that there is no effect of 
handedness or task complexity.   
 
Tower of London and task complexity  
 
The novel task used is the Tower of London.  Behavioural style shown towards the 
Tower of London will be examined in left- and right-handers.  The time taken by 
participants to begin, the number of moves taken to solve and complete the task, in 
relation to sex, hand preference and task complexity will be measured.  An additional 
factor that will be examined is task complexity and thus each participant is presented 
with two different ToL problems (one difficult and one easy – see figures 8.4. and 8.5. 
below for examples).  Based on previous findings it is hypothesised that greater 
avoidance or inhibitory behaviour will be observed in left-handed participants, which 
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will increase with task complexity, demonstrated by an increased time taken to begin 
the task.  Any evidence of pre-planning will be examined and future work related to 
this study will video the participants in order to analyse their performances and study 
their behaviour in more detail.  In addition a reflective questionnaire is given to 
participants in order to gain an insight in to their feelings and approaches towards the 
Tower of London.   
 
A preliminary 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA (sex; handedness and complexity level) 
showed that there was no significant effect of task complexity on the time taken to 
move the first ball.  There was no significant effect of handedness on the time taken 
to move the first ball of the task and no main effect of sex on the time taken to move 
the first ball.  These findings were analysed further by examining each complexity 
group individually.  There was no significant effect of handedness on the time taken 
to move the first ball of the Tower of London when the first trial was the easy version 
and there was no significant main effect of handedness when the first trial was the 
difficult version.  However, left-handers took longer to start the both the easy trial and 
the difficult trial than right-handers (9.5 vs. 6 seconds respectively for the easy trial 
and 8.1 vs. 6.1 seconds respectively for the difficult trial).  Preliminary analysis also 
revealed that there were no other significant effects of handedness (for example on 
the time taken to solve the tasks).  However, this study is ongoing and therefore 
results may change. 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Starting position of the TOL 
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Figure 8.4: Easy TOL problem (goal state) 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Difficult TOL problem (goal state) 
 
 
2. Follow up manual sorting task  
 
This experiment replicates the previous manual sorting task procedure outlined in 
Chapter 6 but uses a different set of sorting cards (see Figure 8.6 below).  The basic 
procedure requires participants to move 20 labelled cards containing different sports 
into 4 different categories each with 5 cards in it.  Each of the groups had to have a 
separate rule decided by the participant that describes the category (for example it 
might be that all the sports in one category are played with a ball). The time taken by 
participants to respond (or move the first card) is recorded, as well as the time taken 
to complete the entire task. It is hypothesised in line with the previous manual sorting 
task that left-handers will take longer to begin the task than right-handers, but there 
will be no difference in the time taken to complete the task overall between left- and 
right-handers. In addition to the manual sorting task and as an extension of the 
original manual-sorting task the experiment also measures the state anxiety levels of 
participants before solving the sorting task (using the STAI, Speilberger, 1983) and 
trait anxiety levels at the end of the experiment. It is predicted that there will be a 
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difference in state anxiety scores between left-handers and right-handers (with 
increased scores being shown by left-handers) but no difference in trait anxiety 
scores between the two groups.   
 
Preliminary analysis showed that there was a significant main effect of handedness 
on the time taken to move the first card (p=0.028 1-tailed) with left-handers taking 
significantly longer than right-handers (with a mean initiation time of 12.6 seconds vs. 
7 seconds respectively).  There was a significant main effect of handedness on state 
anxiety scores (before completing the task) (p=0.034).  However, this finding was in 
the opposite direction than what was expected with right-handers reporting 
themselves to be significantly more anxious than left-handers (mean state anxiety 
scores of 42.5 vs. 38.1 respectively).  There were no other significant main effects of 
handedness on this task, however, right-handers reported themselves to be more 
anxious than left-handers after the task (35.1 vs. 39.5); left-handers solved the task 
faster than right-handers overall (including the time taken to start) (mean time of 
107.1 seconds vs. 126.9 seconds) and left-handers took less time to solve the task 
when the start time was not included than right-handers (mean time of 94.5 seconds 
vs. 108.91 seconds).  There were no significant main effects of sex and there were 
no significant interactions on any of the dependent variables measured.  Thus, it 
appears that the delay taken by left-handers to start the task is supported here as 
was reported on the sorting task in Chapter 6.  However, the explanation that it may 
be caused by an increased anxiety levels in left-handers is not supported.  However, 
data for this study is still being collected and thus these results may change. 







Figure 8.6: Two examples of the 20 sports cards used in the manual-sorting task 
 
 
8.3.2. Future studies 
 
In order to follow up, investigate further and extend many of the findings that have 
been reported during the course of this thesis a number of future studies are 
proposed here. 
 
Firstly, the current studies in this thesis have predominantly been carried out with 
students (and a few staff members) from UAD.  However, future studies will examine 
potential response style differences firstly between left- and right-handed older adults 
(possibly using the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi again) to see if the same delay is repeated 
in this age group.  One important point that has to be taken in to consideration, 
however, is the limited numbers of left-handed older adult participants.  Many older 
adults in our society were still subjected to pressures to switch their hand 
preferences and thus it is difficult to ascertain the number of available left-handed 
participants among this age group.  Additionally, future studies will also examine 
potential differences in response styles between left- and right-handed children.  
Possible tasks that will be used to investigate this will be the Tower of London.  It is 
proposed to use the Tower of London rather than the Tower of Hanoi as a simpler 
task can be presented to a child using the Tower of London (for example, a task that 
requires only 4 moves).  However, only children of around 6 years and over will be 
permitted to participate in this study in order for a reliable measurement of 
handedness to be recorded.  Children under the age of 6 years may still swap their 
hand preferences and therefore will not be included in this study.  Mataix-Cols and 
Bart́ès-Faz (2002) stated that 10-year-old children were able to perform the 3-disk 
Tower of Hanoi easily and thus a potential future study using children to solve the 
Tower of Hanoi would be carried out with children of this age or above.  An additional 
task that might also be used in order to investigate response style differences in 
children is a variant of the manual sorting task where fewer cards would be used but 
the same rules would still apply.  Thus, these studies would allow us to investigate 
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potential response style differences between left- and right-handers across the 
lifespan. 
 
Other future studies that are planned include further investigations of the reasons 
proposed during the course of the thesis for why the delay in initial response towards 
a novel task by left-handers is occurring.  These studies include potential brain 
scanning work which would involve presenting participants with problem solving 
tasks and scanning their brains while they solved the task. This would allow us to 
investigate the regions that are activated particularly during the time before they 
make their first responses to the tasks.  This would allow us to gain more of an 
insight into which regions of the brain of participants are activated and whether these 
differ across handedness groups. More specifically, this would also allow us to 
investigate potential planning explanations that were inconclusive from the studies 
carried out during the course of this thesis.   In conjunction with this a series of 
planning studies are also intended where participants will be instructed to plan before 
they solve the task in order to see if this alters the performances between left- and 
right-handers.  These findings will be contrasted with the performances and response 
behaviours of participants who will be allowed to approach the task in any way they 
choose.  Participants who will be instructed to plan will be asked to verbalise their 
plans in order to examine any potential differences either in the actual planning or in 
the time taken to plan. 
 
An additional planning study will involve a problem-solving task such as the one used 
in section 8.3.1, number 1.  In this study participants will be instructed to solve the 
problem but will not be given specific instructions about the approach that they 
should take (and therefore will not be specifically instructed to plan).  Once 
participants begin to solve the puzzle a stopwatch will be started and when 
participants make their first move on the apparatus they will be asked to stop and the 
stopwatch will be stopped.  If a delay is observed between the starting time and the 
first move time, participants will be asked to describe what they were doing or 
thinking during that time.  However, if no delay is observed then participants will still 
be stopped upon their first move and asked about their strategy (if they had one).   
 
Another variation of the sorting task will also be carried out but instead of participants 
being faced with all of the cards set out in front of them (but concealed) participants 
will be given the cards in a pile and face down in order to see how they sort out the 
cards.  The reason for this is to see if there appears to be a different approach 
between left- and right-handers.  Although this variation would not give us an as 
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obvious clear first move time it would allow us to see exactly how the participants 
would organise themselves to solve the task.  However, a first move time could still 
be recorded as a board would be given to place the cards in the categories on and 
thus the first move would be counted as the first card to be placed on the board.  It 
would be expected that if there is any evidence of more planning or anxiety in left-
handers then they would go through all of the cards before placing their first card on 
the board.  Conversely, if there were a lack of planning or lower levels of anxiety in 
right-handers then it would be expected that they would place their first card on the 
board quicker and would not necessarily go through the whole pack of cards before 
making their first response.   
 
As well as further investigations of planning, further investigations of anxiety in 
response to novel problem solving tasks will be carried out.  So far only self-report 
measurements of anxiety have been reported, however, in order to examine this 
explanation further physiological measurements will be assessed.  Blood pressure 
measurements and pulse rate data were taken as part of the Tower of Hanoi, novelty 
and complexity study (see section on pilot studies (2) above) however; results are not 
available at this time.  Further physiological measurements will be investigated such 
as galvanic skin response in order to investigate stress levels before undertaking a 
problem-solving task.  Levels of the stress hormone cortisol may also be investigated 
in future work as Westergaard, Chavanne, Lussier, Houser, Cleveland, Suomi and 
Higley (2003) have reported that there is a significant positive correlation between 
levels of cortisol and left-handedness.    However, this process will be both difficult 
and costly to set up and therefore it might not be carried out in the near future.   
 
Leading on from these studies the issue of task novelty will be investigated further.   
Task novelty was examined in Chapter 7 but only with respect to the Tower of Hanoi 
in order to investigate whether doing a task for the second time would affect anxiety 
levels and the way in which participants responded to it. Cameron and Rogers (1999) 
and Hopkins and Bennett (1994) stated that the novelty of the task was an important 
factor in influencing the response styles in the left- and right-handed primates.  
However, one important factor in Cameron and Roger’s findings was that the task 
involved the participants being rewarded for successfully solving the problem. In 
order to investigate task novelty further it may be beneficial to impose some form of 
reward in to the problem and thus successful solution of the task would result in 
participants being rewarded.  Therefore this might result in a different or more 
thoughtful approach to the task by the participants or alternatively if anxiety is 
influencing the response behaviour of the left-handed participants then this might 
Chapter 8: General discussion and conclusions  
 357 
increase their anxiety levels further due to the added pressure of successfully solving 
the task and thus obtaining the reward.  In order to examine this further more ‘real 
life’ scenarios would perhaps have to be introduced in order to see a more ‘natural’ 
response from participants.   
 
Differences in approaches to studying between left- and right-handers will also be 
investigated. If increased levels of anxiety are prevalent in left-handers then it is 
possible that left-handers might be disadvantaged in stressful situations such as 
exams.  Therefore a study will be designed in order to investigate whether higher 
anxiety levels in left-handers is a disadvantage in exams compared to right-handers. 
Alternative methods of assessment will be investigated with respect to performance 
and also anxiety levels between left- and right-handers.  These alternative methods 
will include poster presentations, oral presentations and coursework based 
assessments in order to see if left-handers are detrimentally affected by this kind of 
assessment or if there is no real difference between the performance and anxiety 
levels of left- and right-handers on such tasks.  Additionally, different anxiety 
questionnaires will also be used in order to see if different questionnaires result in 
different or consistent findings. 
 
Although task novelty has been, and will be, investigated fairly extensively an 
additional factor that also needs to be investigated is not task complexity but task 
simplicity.  It has been found both in the Tower of Hanoi study in Chapter 7 and in the 
Tower of London pilot study that it seems to be the simpler of the two tasks that 
induced higher levels of state anxiety among left-handers (in the ToH study) and 
significantly longer initiation times in left-handers than in right-handers (in the ToL 
study).  Therefore it appears that the simplicity of the task is perhaps having an effect 
on the response styles of the left- and right-handers.  More specifically, it appears 
that the simplicity of the task is affecting the anxiety levels of the left-handers 
because they possibly feel pressured, as they should be able to easily solve these 
tasks and are therefore afraid of the failure.  Therefore, when task simplicity is 
investigated in future studies a questionnaire will be devised (similar to the 
questionnaire completed after the ToL) in order to collect the feelings and attitudes of 
the participants after completing a relatively simple task.  Additionally, further tasks of 
the Tower of Hanoi can be carried out to investigate this.  For example, the task in 
Chapter 7 looks at the 3-disk task and then the 4-disk or the 4-disk task followed by 
the same 4-disk task.  If task simplicity was being investigated then useful data would 
be collected from carrying out the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi twice in order to see how 
participants approach the relatively simple task for a second time (thus we would see 
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if doing an easy task for a second time decreased anxiety levels among left-handed 
participants).  In the same vain a complete set of data could be collected by carrying 
out the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi followed by the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi as the 
secondary task.  Thus, if task novelty increased state anxiety levels then it would be 
expected that state anxiety scores would be similar in the first Tower of Hanoi trial 
regardless of the complexity of the task.  However, if task complexity was more 
important in affecting state anxiety levels then it would be expected that the 4-disk 
condition would result in higher state scores and this was not the case and therefore 
issues of task simplicity need to be investigated.   
 
One thing to add was that the manual tasks used during this thesis all had a spatial 
component to them.  This might have had an effect on the overall completion or the 
solving of the task as left-handers and males are said to have a superior spatial 
ability.  However, this type of task would not effect the response style behaviour in 
that being a spatial task would not have an effect on how long it took a participant to 
make their first move or response.  A series of computerised tasks were designed in 
addition to the manual tasks in order to remove some of the possible spatial biases, 
however, it was found that there was very little difference in the response behaviour 
of left- and right-handers on computerised tasks and this was explained due to the 
fact that most computerised tasks are collecting reaction time data and therefore this 
might have biased the responding towards reacting as quickly as they could.   
One future task that will be carried out in order to address the problems with the 
spatial elements of the tasks and also the possible biases in responding on a 
computerised task is a variant of the manual sorting task.  Instead of having a series 
of cards with pictures and words on them the cards would just contain words and 
instead of manually moving the cards around in to potential categories, participants 
would be asked to verbalise their solution in order to remove the spatial part.  The 
reason that only words would be used rather than pictures is to remove the visual 
aspect of the task. 
 
Finally, as previously outlined during the limitations section of this chapter the 
analysis of the hand preferences of participants throughout this thesis was limited 
purely to left-hand preference and right-hand preference.  This was due to the lack of 
left-handers willing to take part in the experiments in the time available.  However, 
future studies will examine a group of participants who are often neglected in the 
handedness literature – mixed-handers. Data from mixed-handers are most often 
cited in research that looks at schizophrenia or language impairments (See chapter 2 
for a discussion).  Therefore it would be important to collect a large enough sample to 
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at least include a third handedness group and therefore have a group of strong left-
handers, a group of strong right-handers and a group of mixed-handers.  Therefore 
this sample would allow us to gain an insight in to the response style behaviours of 
mixed-handers to see if there are any similarities or differences in both behaviour and 
temperament of this group compared with left- and right-handers. 
 
 
8.4. Summary of major findings 
 
This thesis explored differences in response styles between left- and right-handed 
individuals.  This was based upon the evidence from comparative studies that found 
that left-handed primates took longer to approach novel objects than right-handed 
primates.  Therefore a series of experiments were conducted to investigate these 
potential response style differences in humans.  The first experiment (reported in 
Chapter 4) investigated the approach behaviour of left- and right-handers towards a 
novel problem-solving task (the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi) and it was found that left-
handers took significantly longer to start the task than right-handers, it was also 
found that left-handers solved the task in significantly fewer moves than right-
handers and that in general left-handers solved the task faster than right-handers 
(although this difference only approached significance).  Therefore as there was 
evidence of a response style difference in humans, potential explanations were given 
for why this might be occurring.  Comparative research had reported that there might 
be a difference in the emotional processing of left- and right-handed primates linked 
to the dominant hemispheres and therefore influencing the approach and avoidance 
behaviour of these animals.  Also, the comparative literature reported that there 
might be a difference in the stress or anxiety levels of left- and right-handed primates 
which could influence how they approach or react to a novel object or task.  In 
addition to this because the results of experiment 1 in this thesis suggested that left-
handers were performing better on the task than right-handers (in that they 
completed it faster and in fewer moves) then a final potential explanation that left-
handers might be planning out their solution to the task before starting it was 
proposed.  These 3 possible explanations were explored through a series of 
experimental studies in this thesis.   
 
In order to investigate further response styles towards a novel task a manual sorting 
task was carried out (experiment 4 – see Chapter 6, section 6.3.).  It was found that 
left-handers took significantly longer to start the task than right-handers but they did 
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not complete the task any faster than right-handers which did not support the idea 
that participants were perhaps planning a solution before they moved the first card.  
In order to investigate emotional processing in left- and right-handers an emotion 
discrimination task was carried out (see experiment 3, Chapter 5, section 5.4.) but no 
clear effects were found and results suggested that participants were able to 
distinguish positive emotions more accurately than negative emotions.  Additionally, 
females showed evidence of the valence specific effect but males did not.  These 
findings suggest that there is no clear difference in discriminating emotions with 
respect to the valence and the side presented between left- and right-handers.  
However, perhaps this task did not effectively investigate emotional processing with 
respect to hemispheric dominance and approach and avoidance behaviour and 
therefore this would need to be investigated further.   
 
Tasks that were designed to investigate the planning explanation showed very little 
evidence that this was occurring.  For example, the Fastest Finger First task 
(experiment 5, see Chapter 6, section 6.7.) did not reveal either a difference in the 
time taken to respond to the questions or a more effective solution.   
 
Finally, a number of tasks were carried out to investigate the possibility that there 
might be a difference between the anxiety levels of left- and right-handers.  When the 
state and trait questionnaires of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger, 1983) 
were given results revealed that left-handers reported themselves to feel significantly 
more anxious than right-handers at that specific moment in time (after completing the 
state questionnaire) but completion of the trait questionnaire (asking how the 
participant felt in general) revealed that there was no difference in anxiety scores 
between left- and right-handers (see experiment 7, Chapter 7, section 7.4).  The idea 
of anxiety and inhibitory behaviour was investigated further (see experiment 8, 
Chapter 7, section 7.6.) using the BIS BAS Scale (Carver & White, 1994) and results 
revealed that there was no difference between left- and right-handers on their 
behavioural activation scores, however, left-handers reported themselves to be 
significantly more inhibited (on the BIS scale) than right-handers.  Finally, all of the 
previously investigated ideas were combined to investigate the issues of anxiety, 
novelty and task complexity using the Tower of Hanoi task (both the 3-disk version 
and the 4-disk version).  See experiment 9, Chapter 7, section 7.10. for details of 
this.  Results showed that there was no difference between left- and right-handers on 
the time taken to make the first move on the 3-disk or 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  This 
Chapter 8: General discussion and conclusions  
 361 
was also found for the number of moves taken to complete the task and the time 
taken to complete it.  However, left-handers reported themselves to be significantly 
more anxious than right-handers before completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi but 
there was no difference between left- and right-handers’ state anxiety scores before 
completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (when both tasks were novel).  These findings 
suggest that task novelty and task complexity might contribute towards the anxiety 
levels of left- and right-handers but these issues would need to be investigated in 




8.5. Overall conclusion 
 
Therefore, response style differences have been reported in non-human primates 
and human parallels carried out during the course of this thesis have revealed that 
these differences were also found.  However, although the differences in response 
styles between left- and right-handed non-human primates have been explained 
through differences in hemispheric dominance related to approach and avoidance 
behaviour and/or increased anxiety in left-handers the explanation for these 
differences in humans is not so straightforward.  The results of the experiments 
carried out in this thesis suggest that increased state anxiety levels or more inhibited 
responses by left-handers perhaps influence differences in response styles.  
However, this explanation alone does not clearly explain the results found during the 
thesis and important factors such as task novelty and task complexity also had to be 
considered.  It was found that novel tasks tended to increase the state anxiety levels 
of left-handers significantly more than right-handers and therefore the novelty of the 
task may affect the individual’s response style.  Additionally, a complex (and novel) 
task tended to affect left- and right-handers similarly, however, a more simplistic (and 
also novel) task tended to make left-handers more anxious than right-handers and 
therefore more research needs to be done to investigate task simplicity and anxiety.  
When these complex tasks were not novel there was no difference between the state 
anxiety scores of left- and right-handers.  Thus, although a number of factors appear 
to be contributing towards the response style differences between left- and right-
handers the clearest explanation that can be given at this point of this research 
program is that the response of left-handers is influenced by high levels of state 
anxiety which themselves are influenced by the novelty, and perhaps the simplicity, 
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2) Throw a ball 
3) Hold a racket 
4) Hold a match while striking it 
5) Cut with scissors 
6) Guide thread through the eye of a needle 
7) Which hand is at the top of a broom while sweeping 
8) Which hand is at the top of a shovel while moving sand 
9) To deal cards 
10) To hammer a nail 
11) Hold a toothbrush 









6) Knife (without fork) 
7) Spoon 
8) Broom (upper hand) 
9) Striking match (match) 















Adapted version of Peter’s (1998) Handedness Questionnaire 
 
Student Matriculation Number: _______________________________ 
Course: _________________________________________________ 
Sex:   Male      Female    (please circle) 
Were you born in the:  1940’s (  )   1950’s (  )   1960’s (  )   1970’s (  )   
1980’s (  ) 
 
Assuming that your hands are empty (except as indicated), please state 
which hand you would normally use for the following activities by circling 
Ra (for right hand always), Rm (for right hand most of the time), E (for 
either hand), Lm (for left hand most of the time) and La (for left hand 
always). 
 
Draw Ra Rm E Lm La 
Knife Ra Rm E Lm La 
Comb Hair Ra Rm E Lm La 
Pick up a very small object Ra Rm E Lm La 
Pick up book Ra Rm E Lm La 
Screw in light bulb Ra Rm E Lm La 
Dial pushbutton phone Ra Rm E Lm La 
Wave goodbye  Ra Rm E Lm La 
Pet dog or cat Ra Rm E Lm La 
Which hand washes face with cloth Ra Rm E Lm La 
Pick up heavy object Ra Rm E Lm La 






Appendix 2 continued 
 
Bat baseball Ra Rm E Lm La 
Write  Ra Rm E Lm La 
Brush teeth Ra Rm E Lm La 
Throw ball Ra Rm E Lm La 
Hold tennis racket Ra Rm E Lm La 
Hammer in a nail Ra Rm E Lm La 
Use Scissors Ra Rm E Lm La 
Eats with spoon Ra Rm E Lm La 
Strike match Ra Rm E Lm La 
Thread needle (hand that moves) Ra Rm E Lm La 
Sweep with broom (lower hand) * Ra Rm E Lm La 
Shovel with large shovel (lower hand) * Ra Rm E Lm La 
Which hand deals cards Ra Rm E Lm La 
Opens the lid of a box Ra Rm E Lm La 
Which hand unscrews jar lid Ra Rm E Lm La 
 
 
Note that all of Annett’s (1970) questionnaire items are included within the 
questionnaire and the two highlighted questions above indicate the two Edinburgh 
handedness inventory items (Oldfield, 1971) that are not included in the 
questionnaire.  These items were added in order to analyse data with respect to 
different handedness inventories.  
 
The two asterisked questions (sweep with a brush and use a shovel) indicate that 














Cooper and Podgorny’s (1976) alternative form shapes used as stimuli 









Matching Figures Task 
 
 
The aim of this task is to compare two figures and decide whether they are the same 
or whether they are different.  The task will begin when any key is pressed, you will 
then see a small *  in the centre of the screen to indicate that a stimulus is about to 
appear.  The stimulus (similar to the shape shown below) will then briefly flash on the 
screen and will be followed by a black square which will also flash briefly.  After the 
black square disappears the second shape will appear (the one which you have to 
compare to the first shape).  When this second shape appears a decision has to be 
made on whether it was the same as the stimulus shape or different.  If it is the 
same press N, if it is different press B.  The shape will not disappear until you 
have made a decision.  Once the decision has been made the whole process begins 
again with another stimulus and shape pairing.  This task should be done as quickly 
and as accurately as possible. 
 
 
E.g.   Press a key to begin 
 
 




















Barratt Impulsivity Scale (version 11) 
 
1.    I  “squirm” at plays or lectures.  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
2.    I am restless at the theatre or lectures. rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
3.    I don’t “pay attention”.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
4.    I concentrate easily.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
5.    I am a steady thinker.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
6.    I act “on impulse”.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
7.    I act on the spur of the moment.  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
8.    I buy things on impulse.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
9.    I make up my mind quickly.  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
10.  I do things without thinking.  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
11.  I spend or charge more than I earn. rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
12.  I am happy-go-lucky.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
13.  I am a careful thinker.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
14.  I plan tasks carefully.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
15.  I am self-controlled.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
16.  I plan trips well ahead of time.*  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
17.  I plan for job security.*   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
18.  I say things without thinking.  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
19. I like to think about complex  rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
       problems.*  
20.  I like puzzles.*    rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
21.  I save regularly.*    rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
22.  I am more interested in the present than rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 




Appendix 5 continued 
23.  I get easily bored when solving thought rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
      problems. 
24.  I change residences.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
25.  I change jobs.    rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
26.  I am future oriented.*4   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
27.  I can only think about one problem at rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
       a time. 
28.  I often have extraneous thoughts when rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 
       thinking. 
29.  I have “racing” thoughts.   rarely/never    occasionally    often    almost always/always 














                                                 






Instruction sheet for the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (right side start) 
 
You are going to be presented with the “Tower of Hanoi” problem.  This will 
consist of three vertical pegs in a row, the first of which will have three disks 
piled on it in order of size (the largest disk on the bottom and the smallest disk 
on the top).  The aim is to have all the disks piled in the same order but on the 
last peg (moving from right to left).  BUT, disks can only be moved in certain 
ways.  Only one disk can be moved at a time and a larger disk can never be 




















Instruction sheet for the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (left side start) 
 
You are going to be presented with the “Tower of Hanoi” problem.  This will 
consist of three vertical pegs in a row, the first of which will have three disks 
piled on it in order of size (the largest disk on the bottom and the smallest disk 
on the top).  The aim is to have all the disks piled in the same order but on the 
last peg (moving from right to left).  BUT, disks can only be moved in certain 
ways.  Only one disk can be moved at a time and a larger disk can never be 


















Tower of Hanoi Task – Scoring Sheet 
 
 
Matriculation Number:  ___________________________________________ 
Course (and year):  ______________________________________________ 
Are you:       Male                    Female         (please circle) 
Were you born in the:  1940’s     1950’s     1960’s     1970’s     1980’s     
Do you consider yourself to be left- or right-handed: ____________________ 
Which hand do you use to write with:  _______________________________ 






Time taken before moving first disk  
 
Time taken to complete the task  
 




Number of errors made  
 












‘Fastest Finger First’ Instruction sheet 
 
 
You are going to be shown a series of questions that ask you to order the answers in 
some way.  Half of the questions will have three answers and the other half will have 
five answers that you need to order (these will be presented randomly).  Firstly, you 
will be shown the question and when you understand what it is asking for press a 
key to be shown the answers.  For the questions that have three answers respond 
using keys 1, 2 and 3 (each answer is numbered).  For the questions that have five 
answers respond using keys 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.  An example of a three-answer question 





Example of a three-answer question: 
 
 
Put the following words in alphabetical order 
 









Example of a five-answer question: 
 
Starting with the lowest put these numbers in order 
 
1.  56    2.  42 
 
3.  17    4.  73 
 
                                    5.  32       6. 9 
 





Fastest Finger First Experimental stimuli 
Three-response questions and answers: 
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Fastest Finger First Experimental stimuli 
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Fastest Finger First Experimental stimuli 
Questions with 6 responses: 
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Fastest Finger First Experimental stimuli 
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Chapter 6 – additional results. 
A6.0. ‘FASTEST FINGER FIRST’ (Study 1) 
Table A6.1: Average time (in milliseconds) spent looking at the question by left- and 
right-handers (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
Hand Preference Chapter 3 Mean time 
Left 4113.76 (1160.8) 
Right 4665.8 (1478.27) 
Total 4378.43 (1342.2) 
The above table shows that, on average, the time spent looking at the question by 
left and right-handers was similar with right-handers spending around 500ms longer. 
To see if there was a significant difference between left and right-handers on the time 
spent looking at the question a Oneway ANOVA was carried out F(1, 72) = 3.175, 
p=0.079 and it was found that there was no significant difference.  (However, this 
approached significance). 
Table A6.2: Average time (in milliseconds) spent looking at the question by males 
and females (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
Sex Chapter 4 Mean time 
Male 4491.04 (951.29) 
Female 4292.38 (1205.9) 
Total 4391.71 (1078.6) 
The above table shows that, on average, the time spent looking at the question by 
males and females was very similar with males spending slightly more time.  To see 
if there was a significant difference between males and females on the time spent 
looking at the question a Oneway ANOVA was carried out F(1, 72) = 0.355, p>0.05 
and it was found that there was no significant difference. 
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A6.1.  First response – Correct responses only  
Table A6.3: Mean time taken (in milliseconds) for male and female left and right –
handers to make the first response to questions with 3 options (with standard 
deviations in parentheses).   
Left Right Total 
Chapter 5 Male 6179.00 (3891.25) 5435.15 (1960.41) 5807.08 (2925.83) 
Female 6282.97 (3430.48) 5884.07 (1999.96) 6083.52 (2715.22 
Total 6230.99 (3660.87 5659.61 (1980.19) 
The above table shows that for questions that contained three options to be ordered, 
left-handed females, on average, took the longest to make their first response to the 
question followed by left-handed males and then right-handed females.  Right-
handed males responded the quickest.  Left-handers overall took longer to make 
their first response than right-handers and females took longer than males to make 
their first response.   
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.156, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.668, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.061, 
p>0.05.
Table A6.4 : Mean time taken (in milliseconds) for male and female left and right-
handers to make the first response to questions with 6 options (with standard 
deviations in parentheses).  
Left Right Total 
Chapter 6 Male 6533.06 (4357.56) 6308.63 (3140.89) 6420.85 (3749.23) 
Female 7194.03 (3755.19) 7314.68 (2970.23) 7254.36 (3362.71) 
Total 6863.55 (4056.38) 6811.66 (3055.56) 
The above table shows that for questions that contained five options to be ordered as 
answers, right-handed females, on average, took the longest to make their first  
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response to the question followed by left-handed females and then left-handed 
males.  Right-handed males responded the quickest.  There was very little difference 
between the first response times of left-handers and right-handers and females took 
longer than males to make their first response.  To see if any of these differences 
were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) ANOVA was carried out.  There was no 
main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.966, p>0.05. There was no main effect of handedness 
F(1, 72) = 0.004, p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed 
to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.041, p>0.05. 
 
Table A6.5: Mean first response times (in milliseconds) for each sex and 
handedness group for 3 and 6 options averaged (with standard deviations in 
parentheses).   
 
 Left Right Total 
Chapter 7 Male 9739.10 (5578.96) 9826.75 (6306.30) 9782.93 (5942.63) 
Female 9883.41 (2780.69) 8059.37 (2460.26) 8971.39 (2620.48) 
Total 9811.26 (4179.83) 8943.06 (4383.28)  
 
The above table shows that when the first response times are averaged across three 
and five options left-handed females, on average, take the longest to respond 
(9883.41 ms) closely followed by right-handed males (9826.75 ms on average) and 
left-handed males (9739.10 ms on average).  Right-handed females, on average 
over three and five options, responded the quickest (8059.37 ms).  Males, on 
average, took longer to respond than females (9782.93 ms Vs. 8971.39 ms) and left-
handers took longer to respond than right-handers (9811.26 ms Vs. 8943.06 ms).  
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.575, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.658, p>0.05 and the interaction 
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Table A6.6: Comparison of mean correct first response times between three options 
and six options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
Left Male Right Male Left Female Right 
Female 
Total 




















The above table shows that for each group the mean correct first response times for 
the questions with 6 options were longer than the first response times for the 
questions with 3 options. The total times showed that overall the correct first 
response times for 6 options were, on average, longer than the first responses to the 
questions with 3 options. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the within 
subjects factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
subjects factors.  A significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 14.975, 
p=0.000 where correct first response times to the 6 option questions were 
significantly longer than first response times to the 3 option questions (6837.61 ms 
vs. 5945.30 ms respectively).  However, the main effect of sex failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 0.559, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  handedness F(1, 69) 
= 0.176, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 69) = 0.054, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options to the 
questions had an effect on first response time but sex or handedness played no part 
in this effect – it appeared to be the complexity rather than sex or handedness. 
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A6.2.  Total time taken (correct responses only) 
Table A6.7:  Mean total time taken (in seconds) for male and female, left and right-
handers to answer questions with three options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses).  
Left Right Total 
Chapter 8 Male 7967.34 (5128.83) 8394.01 (2497.94) 8180.68 (3813.39) 
Female 7695.16 (2303.91) 6650.98 (1922.37) 7173.07 (2113.14) 
Total 7831.25 (3716.37) 7522.50 (2210.16) 
The above table shows that right-handed males, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question with three options (8394.01 ms).  Left-handed males took the 
next longest (7967.34 ms on average) followed by left-handed females (7695.16 ms 
on average) and right-handed females took the shortest time (6650.98 ms on 
average).  Males took longer than females, on average, to solve the three option 
questions (all correct) (8180.68 ms Vs. 7173.07 ms) and left-handers took longer to 
solve the questions than right-handers (7831.25 ms Vs. 7522.50 ms). 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 1.490, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.140, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.794, 
p>0.05.
Table A6.8:  Mean total time taken (in seconds) for male and female, left and right-
handers to answer questions with six options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses).   
Left Right Total 
















Appendix 15 continued 
The above table shows that right-handed males, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question with five options (15279.36 ms).  Left-handed males and left-
handed females took similar times, on average, to solve the five option questions 
(13846.04 ms and 13862.21 ms respectively).  Right-handed females solved the five 
option questions the fastest (12352.10 ms on average).  Males took longer than 
females, on average, to solve the six option questions (14562.7 ms Vs. 13107.16 ms) 
and left-handers took slightly longer to solve the questions than right-handers but 
only a difference of 38.4 ms on average (13854.13 ms Vs. 13815.73 ms). 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.223, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.974, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.218, 
p>0.05.
Table A6.9:  Mean total time taken (in seconds) for male and female, left and right-
handers to answer questions overall (with standard deviations in parentheses).   
Left Right Total 















The above table shows that right-handed males, on average, took the longest to 
answer each question over three and six options (15265.88 ms).  Left-handed males 
and left-handed females took similar times, on average, to solve the three and five 
option questions (combined) (14038.18 ms & 14373.49 ms respectively).  Right-
handed females took the shortest time, on average, to solve the three and five 
options combined (12887.71 ms).  Males took longer than females, on average, to 
solve the three and six option questions (combined) (14652.03 ms Vs. 13630.6 ms) 
and left-handers took slightly longer to solve the questions than right-handers  
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(14205.84 ms Vs. 14076.80 ms).To see if any of these differences were significant, a 
2 x 2 (sex v handedness) ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex 
F(1, 72) = 1.199, p>0.05. There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.019, 
p>0.05 and the interaction between sex and handedness also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 72) = 2.115, p>0.05. 
 
Table A6.10: Comparison of mean total time taken to answer the questions (correct 
answers only) between three options and six options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Male Right Male Left Female Right 
Female 
Total 





















The above table shows that for each group the mean total time for the questions with 
6 options were longer than the mean total time for the questions with 3 options.  The 
total times showed that overall the mean total time (correct responses only) for 5 
options was, on average, longer than the mean total time for the questions with 3 
options.A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the 
within subjects factor (3 options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between 
subjects factors.  A significant main effect of question was found F(1, 69) = 281.450, 
p=0.000 where mean total time taken to answer the 6 option questions was 
significantly longer the mean total time taken to answer the 3 option questions 
(13834.93 ms vs. 7676.87 ms respectively).  However, the main effect of sex failed to 
reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.110, p>0.05 as did the main effect of  handedness 
F(1, 69) = 0.039, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and handedness also failed to 
reach significance F(1, 69) = 0.012, p>0.05  Therefore, the number of options to the 
questions had an effect on total completion time although this is a straightforward 





Appendix 15 continued 
 
A6.3. Time per move (correct responses only) 
 
Table A6.11:  Mean time per response for male and female, left and right-handers 
(correct only) for questions with three options (with standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 Left Right Total 
Chapter 11 Male 2543.51 (1646.55) 2611.77 (842.12) 2577.64 (1244.34) 
Female 2532.03 (733.36) 2216.99 (640.79) 2374.51 (687.08) 
Total 2537.77 (1189.96) 2414.38 (741.46)  
 
The above table shows that each of the four groups took a similar time, on average, 
to make each individual response to the question for three options.  Right-handed 
females were slightly faster (2216.99 ms on average) but left-handed males, right-
handed males and left-handed females took similar times, on average, per response 
(2543.51 ms; 2611.77 ms & 2532.03 ms).  Males and females also took similar times 
per response, on average.  Males took slightly longer per response than females 
(2577.64 ms Vs. 2374.51 ms).  Left-handers took slightly longer per response than 
right-handers (2537.77 ms Vs. 2414.38 ms).    
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.675, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.249, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 0.601, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table A6.12:  Mean time per response (correct only) for male and female, left and 
right-handers for questions with six options (with standard deviations in parentheses).   
 
 Left Right Total 
Chapter 12 Male 2563.06 (684.89) 2972.23 (1440.89) 2767.65 
(1062.89) 
Female 2710.97 (666.39) 2494.69 (587.50) 2602.83 (626.95) 
Total 2637.02 (675.64) 2733.46 1014.20)  
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The above table shows that each of the four groups took a similar time, on average, 
to make each individual response to the question for six options.  Right-handed 
males took the longest per response (2972.23 ms on average) followed by left-
handed females (2710.97 ms on average), left-handed males (2563.06 ms on 
average) and right-handed females took the least time per response (2494.69.  
Males and females also took similar times per response, on average.  Males took 
slightly longer per response than females (2767.65 ms Vs. 2602.83 ms).  Right-
handers took slightly longer per response than left-handers on average (2733.46 ms 
Vs. 2637.02 ms).   
 
To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 0.436, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.211, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 2.213, 
p>0.05. 
 
Table A6.13:  Mean time per correct response for male and female, left and right-
handers for questions overall (with standard deviations in parentheses).    
 
 Left Right Total 
Chapter 13 Male 2553.29 (920.48) 2792.00 (830.72) 2672.65 (875.6) 
Female 2621.50 (458.15) 2355.84 (435.30) 2488.67 (446.73) 
Total 2587.40 (689.32) 2573.92 (633.01)  
 
The above table shows that when averaging the time per response (for correct 
responses only) for three and six options right-handed males took the longest time 
per response (2792.00 ms on average), they were closely followed by left-handed 
females who took, on average, 2621.50 ms per response.  Male left-handers took 
2553.29 ms on average and right-handed females took the shortest time per move 
on average (2355.85 ms).  Males took slightly longer, on average, per response than 
females (2672.65 ms Vs. 2488.67 ms) and left- and right-handers took almost the 
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To see if any of these differences were significant, a 2 x 2 (sex v handedness) 
ANOVA was carried out.  There was no main effect of sex F(1, 72) = 1.128, p>0.05. 
There was no main effect of handedness F(1, 72) = 0.007, p>0.05 and the interaction 
between sex and handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 72) = 2.228, 
p>0.05.
Table A6.14: Comparison of mean time per response (correct answers only) 
between three options and six options (with standard deviations in parentheses). 
The above table shows that for each group the mean correct time per response for 
the questions with 6 options were longer than the first response times for the 
questions with 3 options but the scores were very similar.    The total time per 
response showed that overall time per response for 6 options was, on average, 
longer than time per response to the questions with 3 options. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
model ANOVA was carried out with type of question as the within subjects factor (3 
options or 6 options) and sex and handedness the between subjects factors.  There 
was no significant main effect of question F(1, 69) = 1.760, p>0.05).  The main effect 
of sex also failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 1.128, p>0.05 as did the main effect 
of  handedness F(1, 69) = 0.007, p>0.05.  The interaction between sex and 
handedness also failed to reach significance F(1, 69) = 2.288, p>0.05.  
Left Male Right Male Left Female Right 
Female 
Total 






















Sorting task stimuli 
  3   Cow 
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Sorting task stimuli 
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Sorting task stimuli 
  12   Chimpanzee 
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Sorting task stimuli 
 15  Rat 
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Sorting task stimuli 
 18  Penguin 
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Sorting task stimuli 
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Sorting Task Instructions 
You are going to be presented with a set of 20 cards. 
Your task is to sort them into different categories. 
You should make 4 categories, each with 5 items in them.  You should move 
them the cards in to a space on the board provided. 
Each category that you make should follow a rule decided by you – but all 
groups don’t have to follow the same rule. 
When you have finished making the categories you will be 




Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
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Are you: Male Female 
With which hand do you write?     Left          Right          Either 
Which do you consider to be your dominant hand?   Left Right  Either 
Time taken to move first picture 
Total time taken to make all 
categories 
Category 1 Rule 
_______________________________________________________ 
Category 2 Rule 
_______________________________________________________ 
Category 3 Rule 
_______________________________________________________ 
Category 4 Rule 
_______________________________________________________ 
Pictures in each category (by number): 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
Appendices 20-24 (pp. 449-472) have been removed  from this e-thesis due to copyright restrictions
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   BIS/BAS Questionnaire 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or 
disagree with.  For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the 
item says.  Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one 
response to each statement.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond 
to each item as if it were the only item.  That is, don't worry about being "consistent" 
in your responses.  Choose from the following four response options:  
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me    3 = somewhat false for me    4 = very false 
for me 
(THE BIS QUESTIONS ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BLUE) 
1. A person's family is the most important thing in life.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
2. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or
nervousness.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
3. I go out of my way to get things I want.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
4. When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
5. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
6. How I dress is important to me.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
7. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
8. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
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BIS/BAS Questionnaire continued 
9. When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
10. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
11. It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
12. If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
13. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at
me.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
14. When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
15. I often act on the spur of the moment.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
16. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty
"worked up."
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
17. I often wonder why people act the way they do.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
18. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
19. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
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BIS/BAS Questionnaire continued 
20. I crave excitement and new sensations.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
21. When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
22. I have very few fears compared to my friends.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
23. It would excite me to win a contest.
1 = very true for me 2 = somewhat true for me 3 = somewhat false for me 4 = very false for me 
24. I worry about making mistakes.




4-disk Tower of Hanoi Instructions
You are going to be presented with the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  The aim is to 
move all 4 disks to the opposite peg so that they are sitting in the same order.  
There are 3 rules– firstly, you can only move one disk at a time (you cannot 
hold another disk in your hand while moving a disk), you can never place a 
bigger disk on top of a smaller disk and you can only use one hand to move 
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You are going to be presented with the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi.  The aim is to 
move all 4 disks to the opposite peg so that they are sitting in the same order.  
There are 3 rules – firstly, you can only move one disk at a time (you cannot 
hold another disk in your hand while moving a disk), you can never place a 
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Tower of Hanoi Scoring Sheet (novelty and complexity) 
Participant # ________ 
1st trial 3-disk 4-disk
Time taken before moving first disk 
Time taken to complete the task 
Number of moves taken to complete 
task 
2nd trial 4-disk (1st time) 4-disk (2nd time)
Time taken before moving first disk 
Time taken to complete the task 




A7.0. Chapter 7:  Additional analyses 
These results (both state and trait anxiety measurements) were reanalysed using 
different handedness classification systems (these different handedness 
measurements are ones that are used most often in the handedness literature).    A 
summary of these findings can be found in the table below. 
A7.1. Before state overall 
Table A7.1: Summary of state/trait findings (overall) using different 
handedness classification systems. 
Classification System State Analysis Trait Analysis 
Own overall Significant (left) Not Significant 
Peters Consistent Significant (left) Not Significant 
Own Strong Not Significant Not Significant 
Own Mixed Not Significant Not Significant 
EHI Strong Significant (left) Not Significant 
EHI Mixed Not Significant Not Significant 
Waterloo Strong Significant (left) Not Significant 
Waterloo Mixed Not Significant Not Significant 
Bishop Weak Not Significant Not Significant 
Bishop Predominant Not Significant Not Significant 
Annett Consistent Significant (left) Not Significant 
Annett Mixed Not Significant Not Significant 
The significant differences between left and right-handers’ responses to the state 
questionnaire are consistent using Peter’s consistent classification system, the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory strong classification system, the Waterloo 
handedness inventory strong classification system and Annett’s consistent left- or 
right-hander classification system (as well as the initial classification system (Peters 
1998 adapted questionnaire)).  All of the classification systems that show significant 
differences between left- and right-handers are ones that identify strong right- and 
left-handers rather than ones that identify some degree of weak left- and right-hander 
or mixed-hander. 
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A7.2. State/trait: Before 
Table A7.2: Summary of state/trait findings (before instructions were shown to the 
participant) using different handedness classification systems. 
Classification System State Analysis Trait Analysis 
Own overall 
Not Significant Not Significant 
Peters Consistent Not Significant Not Significant 
Own Strong Not Significant Not Significant 
Own Mixed Not Significant Significant (left) 
EHI Strong Significant (left) Not Significant 
EHI Mixed Significant (interaction) Not Significant 
Waterloo Strong Significant (left) Not Significant 
Bishop Weak Not Significant Not Significant 
Bishop Predominant Not Significant Not Significant 
Annett Consistent Not Significant Approaching (left) 
Annett Mixed Not Significant Significant (female) 
The lack of significant differences between left and right-handers’ responses to the 
state questionnaire are consistent using all classification systems except for both 
Edinburgh handedness inventory classifications and the strong classification of the 
Waterloo handedness inventory.  There are significant differences between the 
mixed classification of the original questionnaire used (Peters 1998 adapted 
questionnaire) and of Annett’s mixed classification group on the trait questionnaire. 
This is inconsistent with the original overall findings. 
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A7.3. State/trait: After 
Table A7.3: Summary of state/trait findings (after instructions were shown to the 
participant) using different handedness classification systems. 
Classification System State Analysis Trait Analysis 
Own overall Significant (left) Not Significant 
Peters Consistent Significant (left) Not Significant 
Own Strong Not Significant Not Significant 
Own Mixed Significant (left + Interact) Significant (left) 
EHI Mixed Not Significant Significant (left) 
Waterloo Strong Not Significant Not Significant 
Bishop Predominant Not Significant Not Significant 
Annett Mixed Not Significant Significant (left) 
The above table shows that among those that were shown the instructions before 
completing the state anxiety questionnaire using the current questionnaire (adapted 
version of Peters 1998) left-handers had a significantly higher state anxiety score 
than right-handers.  When the data was reanalysed using a variety of other popular 
handedness inventories Peter’s consistent classification also revealed significant 
differences between the groups but no other handedness inventories did.  With 
respect to the trait anxiety questionnaire three mixed classifications all revealed 
significant differences between weak left- and right-handers with the left-handers in 
the current mixed category, the Edinburgh handedness Inventory mixed classification 
and Annett’s mixed classification all scoring significantly higher on the trait anxiety 
questionnaire than right-handers. 
A7.4. Tower of Hanoi – Study 3. 
Table A7.4: Participant’s mean handedness scores with standard deviations in 
parentheses 
Left Right 
Male -19.3 (14.5) 32.2 (9.1) 
Female 26.6 (13.2) 33 (8.4) 
Total -23.5 (13.9) 32.6 (8.5) 
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Table A7.4 shows that on average right-handed males and females scored similar 
scores on the handedness questionnaire with right-handed males scoring slightly 
lower and having more variability in their scores.  Left-handed females had on 
average stronger left-hand preferences than left-handed males (-26.6 v –19.3 
respectively).   
 
* This supports Annett’s work that states that females have a stronger shift to the 
right and thus who do not shift must have a stronger left-hand preference. 
 
A7.5. Condition 2 – 4-4-disk 
Table A7.5: Participant’s mean handedness scores with standard deviations in 
parentheses 
 Left Right 
Male -23.6 (14.4) 32.8 (8.7) 
Female -30.3 (12.5) 40.6 (7.3) 
Total -27.2 (13.6) 36.7 (8.8) 
 
Table A7.5 shows that on average right-handed males scored lower on the 
handedness questionnaire than right-handed females indicating a weaker right-hand 
preference among right-handed males than females.  Left-handed females had on 
average stronger left-hand preferences than left-handed males (-30.3 v –23.6 
respectively).   
 
 Again this supports Annett’s work that states that females have a stronger 
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A7.6. Two-way interaction on time taken to move the first disk on 4-4 
condition – condition X handedness 












































 Figure: A7.1: Two-way interaction of trial and sex on the 4-4-disk condition of the     
Tower of Hanoi on the time taken to move the first disk of the task. 
 
The graph shows that on the first trial of the 4-disk ToH that females took longer to 
start, on average than males (3.4 seconds vs. 6.2 seconds respectively).  However, 
on the second trial males and females took a similar amount of time to move the first 
disk on the 4-disk ToH (2.1 seconds for both groups on average). 
 
This significant two-way interaction was examined further by conducting two one-
way between subjects ANOVAS – the first examined sex differences on the time 
taken to move the first disk on the first 4-disk trial and it was found that the difference 
approached significance F(1, 52) = 3.588, p=0.064  The second one-way between 
subjects ANOVA examined sex differences on the time taken to move the first disk 
on the second 4-disk trial and it was found that there was no significant difference 
between the groups F(1, 52) = 0.001, p>0.05.  This was caused by males and females 
having identical average initiation times to move the first disk on the second trial. It 
therefore looks possible that the significant interaction between trial and handedness 
was caused by the slow initiation time of the females on the first task.   
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Sex X handedness interaction of number of moves taken to solve the Toh on 
first trial
Figure A7.2: Two-way sex X handedness interaction of the number if moves taken to 
solve the 4-disk ToH on the first trial. 
The above graph shows that when solving the 4-disk ToH for the first time that left-
handed males solved it in fewer moves (22.4), on average, than right-handed males 
(30.5) and in fewer moves than left-handed females (29.4) but took around the same 
number of moves to solve it as right-handed females (23.2).   
This significant interaction was examined further by conducting a series of one-way 
ANOVAs. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the number of moves taken to 
complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial) by right-handed males and left-handed 
males F(1, 24) = 4.268, p=0.05.  This suggests that right-handed males took 
significantly more moves to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi than left-handed 
males. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the number of moves taken to 
complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial) by right-handed females and left-
handed females.  This was not significant F(1, 26) = 2.815, p>0.05.   
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Therefore, the significant interaction seems to have been influenced by the 
performance of left-handed males and right-handed females who took the fewest 
moves, on average, to solve the 4-diskTower of Hanoi first time.  Also, left-handed 
females and right-handed males took the most moves to solve the Tower of Hanoi 
and this also contributed to the significant interaction. 
A7.7. Comparisons were carried out between the number of moves taken to 
complete the first trial and the number of moves taken to complete the second 
trial of the 4-4-disk condition of the ToH.  : 
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted to examine any differences 
between trials on the number of moves taken to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi. 
This revealed that there was no significant effect of the Trial (whether it was trial 1 or 
trial 2) on the number of moves taken to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi F(1, 50) 
= 0.057, p>0.05.  There was no significant main effect of sex F(1, 50), 0.808, p>0.05 
or handedness F(1, 50) = 0.127, p>0.05.  There were no significant two-way 
interactions (trial X sex; trial X handedness & sex X handedness all p>0.05). 
However, there was a significant 3-way interaction between trial, sex and 
handedness F(1, 50) = 7.152, p=0.01. 
The 3-way interaction is further examined below and is split according to hand 
preference: 
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4-disk ToH 1st time
4-disk ToH 2nd time
Left-handers' sex X trial interaction plot
Figure A7.3: Left-handed participant’s two-way interaction of sex and trial for the 
number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk ToH. 
The above figure shows that left-handed males took fewer moves to solve the 4-disk 
ToH on the first trial (22.3 moves) than the second trial (25.2 moves).  However, 
females took fewer moves to solve the second trial (26 moves) than the first trial 
(29.4 moves). Females took more moves than males on the first trial but around the 
same number of moves on the second trial.. 
In order to examine these effects further two one-way between subjects ANOVA’s 
were carried out.  The first was carried out on the first 4-disk ToH trial and examined 
the effect of sex on the number of moves taken to solve the first trial in left-handers 
F(1, 26) = 3.884, p=0.059.  It was found that the difference between male and female 
left-handers on the number of moves taken to solve the first 4-disk trial of the ToH 
approached significance with males taking fewer moves to solve it than females.  The 
second ANOVA examined the effect of sex on the number of moves taken to solve 
the 4-disk ToH second trial in left-handers F(1, 26) = 0.028, p>0.05.  It was found that 
there was no significant difference in the number of moves taken between left-
handed males and left-handed females to solve the 4-disk ToH on the second trial. 
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4-disk ToH 1st time
4-disk ToH 2nd time
Right-handers' Sex X Trial interaction plot
 
Figure A7.4: Right-handed participant’s two-way interaction of sex and trial for the 
number of moves taken to solve the 4-disk ToH. 
The above figure shows that right-handed males took fewer moves to solve the 4-
disk ToH on the second trial (22.6 moves) than the first trial (30.5 moves).  However, 
females took fewer moves to solve the first trial (23.2 moves) than the second trial 
(29.8 moves). Males took more moves than females on the first trial but took less 
moves than females on the second trial. 
In order to examine these effects further two one-way between subjects ANOVA’s 
were carried out.  The first was carried out on the first 4-disk ToH trial and examined 
the effect of sex on the number of moves taken to solve the first trial in right-handers 
F(1, 24) = 3.214, p=0.086.  It was found that the difference between male and female 
right-handers on the number of moves taken to solve the first 4-disk trial of the ToH 
approached significance with females taking fewer moves to solve it than males.  The 
second ANOVA examined the effect of sex on the number of moves taken to solve 
the 4-disk ToH second trial in right-handers F(1, 24) = 02.984, p=0.097.  It was found 
that there was no significant difference in the number of moves taken between right-
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Therefore on average the number of moves taken by each group to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi on trial 1 and trial 2 revealed that their performance when doing the 
trial for a second time did not result in a significantly different number of moves (in 
either direction). 
 
A7.8. First move 
 
Comparison of condition 1 (3-4-disk) v condition 2 (4-4-disk) 
 
Table A7.6: Mean time taken (in seconds) by males and females to move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi across conditions (first trial)  
 
 Condition 1   3-disk Condition 2   4-disk 
Male 2.85 (2.37) 3.38 (2.75) 
Female 5.34 (4.34) 6.26 (7.28) 
 
The above table shows that on average male participants moved the first disk on the 
3-disk Tower of Hanoi quicker than females did (average of 2.85 seconds v 5.34 
seconds).  Males also moved the first disk on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi quicker than 
females did (3.38 seconds v 6.26 seconds).  Comparing the groups across conditions 
males moved the first disk quicker on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi than the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi (2.85 v 3.38 seconds) and females moved the first disk of the 3-disk 
Tower of Hanoi quicker than they moved the first disk of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
(5.34 v 6.26 seconds). 
 
Table A7.7: Mean time taken (in seconds) by males and females to move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial) 
 Condition 1           
4-disk 1st time 
Condition 2       4-
disk 2nd time 
Male 2.25 (2.1) 2.09 (1.3) 
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The above table shows that on average on the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi 
male participants moved the first disk on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first time) quicker 
than females did (average of 2.25 seconds v 3.0 seconds).  Males and females 
moved the first disk on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (when they completed it for a 
second time) in the same time (2.09 seconds v 2.1 seconds).  Comparing the groups 
across conditions males moved the first disk quicker in the condition where they were 
completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time than the males that were 
completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time (2.09 v 2.25 seconds) and 
females also took longer to move the first disk of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi when 
they did it for the first time than when the other group did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
for the second time (3.0 v 2.1 seconds). 
 
Table A7.8: Mean time taken (in seconds) by left- and right-handers to move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi across conditions (first trial)  
 
 Condition 1           
3-disk 
Condition 2       4-
disk 
Left 4.72 (3.85) 3.8 (2.7) 
Right 3.75 (3.76) 6.0 (7.67) 
 
The above table shows that on average right-handed participants moved the first disk 
on the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi quicker than left-handers did (average of 3.75 seconds 
v 4.72 seconds).  However, left-handers moved the first disk on the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi quicker than right-handers did (3.8 seconds v 6.0 seconds).  Comparing the 
groups across conditions left-handers moved the first disk quicker on the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi than the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi (3.8 v 4.72 seconds) and right-
handers moved the first disk of the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi quicker than they moved 
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Table A7.9: Mean time taken (in seconds) by left- and right-handers to move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial)  
 
 Condition 1           
4-disk 1st time 
Condition 2       4-
disk 2nd time 
Left 3.16 (3.13) 2.2 (1.36) 
Right 2.11 (1.67) 2.0 (1.04) 
 
Participants were then asked to complete the Tower of Hanoi again.  This time the 
group that completed the 3-disk version in the first trial was asked to complete the 4-
disk version.  The group that completed the 4-disk version in the first trial was asked 
to complete this version again. 
 
The above table shows that on average right-handed participants moved the first disk 
on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (when they did it for the first time) quicker than left-
handers did (average of 2.11 seconds v 3.16 seconds).  Right-handers moved the 
first disk on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (when they did it for a second time) quicker 
than left-handers did (2.0 seconds v 2.2 seconds).  Comparing the groups across 
conditions left-handers moved the first disk quicker on the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
(second time) than the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first time) (2.2 v 3.16 seconds) and 
right-handers moved the first disk of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (second time) quicker 
than they moved the first disk of the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first time) (2.0 v 2.11 
seconds). 
 
Table A7.10: Mean time taken (in seconds) overall by participants to move the first 
disk on the Tower of Hanoi across conditions (trials 1 and 2). 
 First trial  Second trial        
Condition1 4.25 (3.8) (3-d) 2.67 (2.6) (4-d) 
Condition 2 4.88 (5.7) (4-d)  2.1(1.2) (4-d) 
 
The above table shows that overall the group that completed the 3-disk Tower of 
Hanoi first took less time to make the first move on average than the group that 
completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first (4.25 v 4.88 seconds).  When the groups 
were asked to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi in trial 2 (for one group this was  
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the second time and for the other it was the first time) the group that was completing 
it for the first time took longer to make the first move than the group that was 
completing it for the second time (2.67 v 2.1 seconds on average).  The group that 
did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first took more time on average to move the first disk 
on the 3-disk than when they did the 4-disk version afterwards (4.25 v 2.67 seconds).  
The group that did the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first took longer to move the first disk on 
the first 4-disk trial than the second 4-disk trial (4.88 v 2.1 seconds).   
 
In order to examine these differences a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x 
handedness x condition) was carried out on the time taken to move the first disk on 
the Tower of Hanoi (trial 1 3-disk v 4-disk).  The main effect of sex was significant 
F(1, 92) = 8.005, p<0.01 with females taking significantly longer to move the first disk 
than males.  The main effect of handedness was not significant F(1, 92) = 0.689, 
p>0.05  nor was the main effect of condition F(1, 92) = 0.756, p>0.05. The two way 
interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 
0.001, p>0.05 as did the two way interactions between sex and condition F(1, 92) = 
0.097, p>0.05 and hand preference and condition F(1, 92) = 2.431, p>0.05.  The 
three-way interaction between sex, handedness and condition also failed to reach 
significance F(1, 92) = 1.982, p>0.05. 
 
An additional 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x handedness x condition) was 
carried out on the time taken to move the first disk on the second trials of the Tower 
of Hanoi (trial 2 4-disk first time v 4-disk second time).  The main effect of sex was 
not significant F(1, 92) = 0.712, p>0.05.  The main effect of handedness was not 
significant F(1, 92) = 2.365, p>0.05 nor was the main effect of condition F(1, 92) = 
1.663, p>0.05. The two way interaction between sex and handedness failed to reach 
significance F(1, 92) = 0.622, p>0.05 as did the two way interactions between sex 
and condition F(1, 92) = 0.770, p>0.05 and  hand preference and condition F(1, 92) = 
1.025, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction between sex, handedness and condition 
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A7.9. Number of moves (2nd trial comparisons only 4-disk condition 1 vs. 4-disk 
condition 2). 
 
Table A7.11: Mean number of moves taken by males and females to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial)  
 Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(1st time trial 2) 
Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(2nd time trial 2) 
Male 29.38 (14.1) 23.9 (10.6) 
Female 30.3 (14.1) 27.8 (11.7) 
 
The above table shows that on average the males and females completing the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi for the first time took more moves on average to solve it than the 
males and females who had completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi once before.  
Males took on average 6 more moves to solve the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi the first 
time than the males who solved it for the second time (29.4 v 23.9 moves) and 
females who solved it for the first time only took, on average, 3 more moves to solve 
the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi than the females who were solving it for the second time 
(this relates to Mataix-Cols & Bartés-Faz (2002) who stated that there was no effect 
of learning and that this would have to be solved around 5 times before a noticeable 
improvement in solving it occurred).  In the group that solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the first time males and females solved it in a similar mean number of 
moves (29.4 v 30.3 moves respectively) and in the group that solved the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi for the second time males solved it on average in less moves than 
females (23.9 v 27.8 moves respectively). 
 
*Note that the group completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time had 
already completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi and were therefore familiar with the 
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Table A7.12: Mean number of moves taken by left- and right-handers to solve the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial)  
 
 Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(first time trial 2) 
Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(2nd time trial 2) 
Left-handers 27.25 (11.7) 25.6 (11.6) 
Right-handers 32.8 (15.8) 26.2 (11.0) 
 
The above table shows that on average left-handers solved the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi in fewer moves than right-handers when the completed it for the first time 
(after previously completing the 3-disk TOH) (27.3 v 32.8 moves).  The left-handers 
that solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time (after previously 
completing the same 4-disk problem earlier) completed this in fewer moves than the 
right-handers in this group (25.6 v 26.2 moves on average).  Looking across 
conditions the left-handers who solved the 4-disk task for the second time solved this 
in fewer moves than the left-handers that solved this for the first time; however, this 
difference was only an average of 2 moves.  The right-handers that solved the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi for the second time solved this in fewer moves, on average, than the 
right-handers that solved this for the first time (26.2 v 32.8 moves).   
 
Table A7.13: Mean number of moves taken overall by condition to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial)  
 
 Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(first time trial 2) 
Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk ToH 
(2nd time trial 2) 
Overall 29.9 (14.0) 25.9 (11.2) 
 
Overall, the group that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time took 
fewer moves, on average, to solve it than the group that completed it for the first time 
(after completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi).  However, this difference was only an 
average of 4 moves and thus does not necessarily indicate a great deal of learning 
has gone on from the first to the second trial.  
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In order to examine these differences a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x 
handedness x condition) was carried out on the number of moves taken to solve the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi (trial 2 4-disk for the first time v trial 2 4-disk for the second
time).  The main effect of sex was not significant F(1, 92) = 1.046, p>0.05.  The main 
effect of handedness was not significant F(1, 92) = 1.287, p>0.05  nor was the main 
effect of condition F(1, 92) = 2.589, p>0.05. The two way interaction between sex 
and handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 1.507, p>0.05 as did the two 
way interactions between sex and condition F(1, 92) = 0.283, p>0.05 and hand 
preference and condition F(1, 92) = 0.828, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction 
between sex, handedness and condition also failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 
0.001, p>0.05. 
A7.10. Completion time – 4-disk condition 1 (first time) vs. 4-disk condition 2 
(second time) 
Mean time taken to solve the 4-disk ToH (second trial) across conditions 
Table A7.14: Mean time (in seconds) taken by males and females to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi across conditions (second trial)  
Mean time to solve 
4-disk TOH (first
time trial 2)
Mean time to solve 
4-disk TOH ( 2nd
time trial 2)
Male 116.5 (127.5) 53.1 (38.7) 
Female 107.0 (70.8) 74.7 (46.3) 
The above table shows that males, on average took longer than females to solve the 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi in the group that did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi previously and
then did the 4-disk version for the first time.  In the group that did the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the second time males solved it on average 21 seconds quicker than 
females (53.1 v 74.7 seconds).  Examining the performance across the conditions, 
the males that solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time took on average 
more than twice the time taken by the males that solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi 
for the second time (116.5 v 53.1 seconds).  The females that completed the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi for the first time also took longer than the group of females that 
completed it for a second time (107 v 74.7 seconds). 
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Table A7.15: Mean time (in seconds) taken by left- and right-handers to solve the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi (second trial)  
 Mean time to solve 
4-disk ToH (1st time 
trial 2) 
Mean time to solve 
4-disk TOH (2nd 
time trial 2) 
Left-handers 98.9 (85.9) 62.0 (45.3) 
Right-handers 124.6 (110.8) 66.8 (42.8) 
 
The above table shows that on average left-handers took longer to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi in the group that did it for the first time (after completing the 3-disk 
version previously) compared to the left-handers that solved it for a second time with 
an average difference of around 36 seconds (98.9 v 62 seconds).  Right-handers 
who completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time took almost twice as long 
to do this than the right-handed group that solved the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the 
second time (124.6 v 66.8 seconds).   
 
Table A7.16: Mean time (in seconds) taken overall by condition to solve the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi (second trial)  
 Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk 
TOH (first time trial 
2) 
Mean No of moves 
to solve 4-disk 
TOH (second time 
trial 2) 
Overall 111.17 (98.3) 64.3 (43.8) 
 
The above table shows that overall the group that completed the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi for the second time solved the task much quicker than the group who solved 
the 4-disk task for the first time, even though they had previously solved the 3-disk 
version.   
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x handedness x condition) was carried out 
to examine any differences between conditions on the time taken to complete the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi (in seconds) (trial 2 4-disk first time v 4-disk second time).  The 
main effect of sex was not significant F(1, 92) = 0.200, p>0.05.  The main effect of  
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handedness was not significant F(1, 92) = 1.076, p>0.05.  However, the main effect 
of condition was significant F(1, 92) = 9.980, p<0.01 with those solving the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi for the second time solving it significantly faster than those solving it 
for the first time. The two-way interaction between sex and handedness failed to 
reach significance F(1, 92) = 0.041, p>0.05 as did the two way interactions between 
sex and condition F(1, 92) = 1.051, p>0.05 and  hand preference and condition F(1, 
92) = 0.490, p>0.05.  The three-way interaction between sex, handedness and 
condition also failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 0.513, p>0.05. 
 
7.11. Comparison of state scores trial 1 
 
Table A7.17: Overall mean first state scores before completing the 3-disk or 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi (first trial) 
 3-disk 4-disk 
Mean state score 36.7 (7.5) 31.7 (8.9) 
The above table shows that before completing the first Tower of Hanoi puzzle in the 
study the group that was given the instructions to and asked to complete the 3-disk 
Tower of Hanoi had higher state anxiety scores, on average, than the group that 
were asked to complete the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first.   
 
Table A7.18: Overall mean second state scores before completing the 4-disk (first 
time) or 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (second time) (second trial). 
 
 4-disk (1st time) 4-disk (2nd time) 
Mean state score 34.8 (8.2) 30.5 (8.6) 
The above table shows that before completing the second Tower of Hanoi trial when 
both groups were asked to solve the 4-disk version the group that had previously 
solved the 3-disk version and was completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first 
time had a higher mean trait score than the group that was completing the 4-disk 
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Table A7.19: Male and female’s mean state scores before completing the 3-disk or 
4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial). 
 
 3-disk 4-disk Total 
Male 37.2 (6.6) 30.2 (8.8) 33.7 (7.3) 
Female 36.3 (8.3) 33.1 (8.9) 34.7 (8.6) 
Total 36.7 (7.5) 31.7 (8.9)  
The above table shows that before completing the first trial on the Tower of Hanoi, 
males who completed the 3-disk version first had higher mean state scores than 
males who completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first (37.2 v 30.2).  This pattern was 
repeated for females as they also had higher mean state scores before completing 
the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi than before completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (36.7 v 
31.7).  Overall, state scores were on average higher for those who completed the 3-
disk Tower of Hanoi than for those who completed the 4-disk version of the Tower of 
Hanoi.  Overall, females scored slightly higher on state scores irrespective of 
condition than males but the difference was small (34.7 v 33.7). 
Table A7.20: Left- and right-hander’s mean state scores before completing the 3-
disk or 4-disk Tower of Hanoi (first trial). 
 
 3-disk 4-disk Total 
Left-handers 39.4 (5.4) 30.7 (7.8) 35.1 (6.6) 
Right-handers 33.7 (8.5) 32.9 (10.0) 32.7 (9.3) 
Total 36.7 (7.5) 31.7 (8.9)  
 
The above table shows that left-handers scored higher overall than right-handers on 
the state scores before completing the first trial of the Tower of Hanoi.  When this 
was divided into handedness categories left-handers scored higher than right-
handers on average before completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi but right-handers 
scored higher than left-handers before completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the 
first time.  The group of left-handers completing the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first 
scored higher on the state questionnaire than the group of left-handers completing 
the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first (39.4 v 30.7).  This was also the case for the right- 
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handers but the difference in state scores between the two right-handed groups was 
minimal (33.7 v 32.9).  Overall across conditions those in the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi 
condition had higher state scores than those in the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi condition 
irrespective of hand preference.   
Table A7.21: Male and female’s mean state scores before completing the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi – second condition. 
 
 4-disk (1st time) 4-disk (2nd time) Total 
Male 35.4 (7.5) 28.7 (7.7) 32.1 (7.6) 
Female 34.5 (8.9) 32.2 (9.1) 33.4 (9.0) 
Total 34.8 (8.2) 30.5 (8.6)  
The above table shows that females scored slightly higher on the state questionnaire 
than males overall prior to completing the second trial of the Tower of Hanoi (when 
one group completed the 4-disk version for the first time and the other group 
completed the 4-disk version for the second time).  Overall, those completing the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time scored higher on the state questionnaire than 
the group completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time.  Within the 
group that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time males scored 
slightly higher on average on the state questionnaire than females (35.4 v 34.5).  
Within the group that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the second time males 
scored lower on average than females (28.7 v 32.2).  Both males and females scored 
higher in the group that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time than 
the males and females in the group that completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the 
second time (35.4 v 28.7 for males) and (34.5 v 32.2 for females). 
Table A7.22: Left- and right-hander’s mean state scores before completing the 4-
disk Tower of Hanoi – second condition. 
 
 4-disk (1st trial) 4-disk (2nd trial) Total 
Left-handers 36.2 (5.7) 29.7 (7.9) 33.0 (6.8) 
Right-handers 33.3 (10.2) 31.3 (9.3) 32.3 (9.8) 
Total 34.8 (8.2) 30.5 (8.6)  
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The above table shows the state scores of left-handers and right-handers who were 
assigned to the condition where the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi was completed twice.  
Before completing the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi for the first time left-handers had higher 
state scores than right-handers (36.2 v 33.3) but before completing the 4-disk Tower 
of Hanoi for the second time right-handers had higher state scores than left-handers 
(suggesting some effect of novelty for left-handers?).  Overall in this condition left-
handers scored marginally higher on state scores than right-handers (33.0 v 32.3) 
and state scores were higher overall before participants completed the first 4-disk 
trial than before they completed the second 4-disk trial on the Tower of Hanoi (34.8 v 
30.5).   
 
A7.12. First state scores (state 1) 
In order to examine these differences a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA (sex x 
handedness x condition (3-disk ToH first or 4-disk ToH first) was carried out on the 
self-reported first state scores.  The main effect of sex was not significant F(1, 92) =, 
0.280, p>0.05.  The main effect of handedness was not significant F(1, 92) = 0.874, 
p>0.05. However, the main effect of condition was significant F(1, 92) = 8.929, 
p<0.01 with state scores being significantly higher before competing the 3-disk ToH 
than before completing the 4-disk ToH . The two way interaction between sex and 
handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 2.187, p>0.05 as did the two way 
interaction between sex and condition F(1, 92) = 1.557, p>0.05.  However, the two-
way interaction between hand preference and condition was significant F(1, 92) = 
5.795, p<0.05.  The three-way interaction between sex, handedness and condition 
failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 0.025, p>0.05. 
 
The significant interaction between condition and handedness for the first state 
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Figure A7.5: Interaction plot between condition (3-disk ToH first or 4-disk ToH first) 
and handedness for the initial state anxiety scores. 
The above plot shows that the state anxiety scores of right-handers did not vastly 
differ between the two conditions (whether they completed the 3-disk or the 4-disk 
Tower of Hanoi first).  However, the condition did appear to affect the state scores of 
left-handers.  Left-handers who completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi first had much 
lower scores than the left-handers who completed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first. 
When comparing the state scores of left- and right-handers it can be seen that before 
left-handers completed the 4-disk Tower of Hanoi their mean state score was lower 
than that of the right-handers, however, left-hander’s mean state scores were much 
higher than right-handers mean state scores before they completed the 3-disk Tower 
of Hanoi.  (Left-hander’s high state score contributed to the interaction as the right-
handers’ scores were flat and the effect of condition was already a significant main 
effect).   
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was carried out on left-handed participants in 
order to examine the difference between the mean state scores in the 3-disk ToH 
condition and the 4-disk ToH condition F(1, 50) = 21.194, p<0.01.  It was found that 
left-handers in the 3-disk ToH reported themselves to be significantly more anxious 




Appendix 28 continued 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was carried out on right-handed participants to 
examine the difference between the mean state scores in the 3-disk ToH condition 
and the 4-disk ToH condition F(1, 46) = 0.087, p>0.05.  It was found that there was 
no significant difference between right-handers’ state scores regardless of the 
condition that they were in (before they completed the 3-disk ToH or the 4-disk ToH).   
Thus it seems that the high state score of the left-handed participants before they 




A.7.13. Comparison of trait scores across the two conditions 
 
Table A7.23: Mean overall trait scores for each condition (3-disk TOH first and 4-disk 
TOH first) 
 
 3-disk first 4-disk first 
Mean trait score 40.3 (8.9) 38.6 (9.3) 
The above table shows that overall trait scores on average are higher for the group 
that did the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi first than the group that did the 4-disk Tower of 
Hanoi first (40.3 v 38.6).  
Table A7.24: Mean trait anxiety scores of males and female’s in each condition (3-
disk TOH and 4-disk TOH) 
 3-disk condition 4-disk condition Total 
Male 40.0 (8.8) 37.2 (9.2) 38.6 (9.0) 
Female 40.6 (9.3) 40.0 (9.3) 40.3 (9.3) 
Total 40.3 (8.9) 38.6 (9.3)  
The above table shows that males and females had similar mean trait scores overall 
and regardless of the condition that they were in with a range of 37.2 to 40.6.  
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Table A7.25: Mean trait scores of left- and right-handers in each condition (3-disk 
TOH and 4-disk TOH) 
3-disk condition 4-disk condition Total 
Left-handers 42.3 (8.3) 37.6 (8.2) 40.0 (8.3) 
Right-handers 38.2 (9.3) 39.6 (10.4) 38.9 (9.9) 
Total 40.3 (8.9) 38.6 (9.3) 
The above table shows that the group with the highest mean trait anxiety scores was 
the left-handers in the 3-disk condition.  Their trait anxiety scores were higher than 
the left-handers’ trait anxiety scores in the 4-disk condition as well as the two right-
handed groups.  The right-handed group in the 4-disk condition had higher trait 
anxiety scores than the left-handers in this condition (39.6 v 37.6).  Overall, left-
handers had higher mean trait anxiety scores than right-handers and the group in the 
3-disk condition had higher trait anxiety scores than the group in the 4-disk condition.
A 2 x 2 x 2 (sex x handedness x condition) between subjects ANOVA was carried out 
on the trait scores of participants in both conditions.  There were no significant main 
effects of sex F(1, 92) = 0.718, p>0.05 or handedness F(1, 92) = 0.259, p>0.05 or 
condition F(1, 92) = 0.835, p>0.05. The two-way interaction between sex and 
handedness failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 1.069, p>0.05 as did the two way 
interactions between sex and condition F(1, 92) = 0.345, p>0.05 and hand 
preference and condition F(1, 99) = 2.929, p<0.05 (although this approached 
significance p=0.09).  The three-way interaction between sex, handedness and 
condition also failed to reach significance F(1, 92) = 1.333, p>0.05.  
When the overall state anxiety scores were examined using a number of different 
handedness classifications to measure handedness it was found that the strong 
handedness classifications all supported the initial result that there was a difference 
between state anxiety scores of left- and right-handers (with left-handers having 
higher anxiety scores).  Again as very few studies have focussed on state anxiety 
and handedness then it is difficult to back these results up with previous experimental 
evidence.  However, Wienrich et al’s. study found that there was a difference in trait 
anxiety scores between left- and right-handers with strong hand preferences 
compared to those with weak hand preferences.  However, they did not distribute the  
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state anxiety questionnaire in relation to strength of hand preference and so no 
comparisons can be made with the current study (but this might have made a 
difference).   
